Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Larry Hewitt appealed a district court judgment affirming the North Dakota Department of Transportation’s revocation of his driving privileges. Hewitt claimed the Department’s hearing file was improperly admitted at the administrative hearing. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the hearing file was properly admitted as a self-authenticating copy of an official record. View "Hewitt v. NDDOT" on Justia Law

In December 2018, Officer Nelson of the University of North Dakota Police Department conducted a traffic stop of Stanley Kolstad for suspicion of driving under the influence. Kolstad performed field sobriety tests and a preliminary breath test (PBT). Prior to performing the PBT, Kolstad informed Nelson that he had asthma. Nelson testified he was unable to obtain a PBT result because Kolstad was filling his cheeks with air while performing the test. Kolstad was arrested for DUI and refusing to submit to a chemical test. Kolstad was transported to the UND police station to be given an Intoxilyzer breath test. Prior to the Intoxilyzer test, Nelson read Kolstad the implied consent advisory. But, because Nelson was not a certified operator of the Intoxilyzer machine, Officer Waltz conducted the test. Prior to the test, Kolstad informed Waltz he had asthma. The Intoxilyzer test results were deficient. Waltz testified Kolstad was not providing enough air for the test machine to provide a valid result. Kolstad was charged with driving under the influence and refusing to submit to a chemical test. Kolstad’s counsel made a discovery request to the State seeking copies of any audio or video recordings taken by police officers. Kolstad’s counsel also requested the State inform him whether any sound or video recordings taken of Kolstad were subsequently “altered, edited, destroyed, or discarded.” The State provided Kolstad’s counsel with dash camera footage from Nelson’s police car that had been taken at the scene of the arrest, but the State did not provide any body camera footage from either Nelson or Waltz. Upon learning that Waltz’s body camera footage was successfully uploaded to UND servers, Kolstad’s counsel moved to dismiss the case because the State did not provide any body camera footage in discovery as requested. The district court ultimately dismissed the refusal to submit to a chemical breath test charge as a sanction for failing to provide the body camera footage. The State appealed, arguing the alleged discovery violation did not rise to a constitutional violation of Kolstad’s due process rights, and the district court abused its discretion in dismissing the refusal charge. Kolstad argued the district court’s order dismissing the refusal charge was not appealable, and if it was, the court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the charge. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded there was nothing in the record to indicate the district court adequately considered an alternative or less severe sanction to dismissal, and by not considering a less severe sanction, the trial court erred. The district court’s order dismissing the refusal charge was reversed, and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "North Dakota v. Kolstad" on Justia Law

Gregory Schwindt appealed a district court judgment affirming a Department of Transportation hearing officer’s revocation of his driving privileges for 180 days. Schwindt argued North Dakota’s implied consent and refusal laws were unconstitutional, the hearing officer erred by considering the results of the horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test, and the hearing officer erred in finding he refused to take a chemical test. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the hearing officer’s findings of fact were supported by a preponderance of the evidence, the conclusions of law were sustained by the findings of fact, and the decision to revoke Schwindt’s driving privileges was in accordance with the law. View "Schwindt v. Sorel" on Justia Law

Akeem Foster was convicted by jury of Terrorizing and Carrying a Concealed Weapon. Foster contended on appeal he was denied a fair trial because he was asked during cross-examination if other witnesses were lying and because the prosecutor expressed personal beliefs about the evidence during closing arguments. Foster also argued there was insufficient evidence to convict him of either charge. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed Foster’s conviction for Carrying a Concealed Weapon, but reversed his conviction for Terrorizing. The Court found Foster was improperly asked to provide an opinion on the veracity and credibility of the State’s witnesses. The improper questioning was prejudicial and denied Foster a fair trial on the terrorizing charge. View "North Dakota v. Foster" on Justia Law

The North Dakota Department of Transportation (Department) appealed the district court's reversing a hearing officer’s decision suspending Holden Kastet’s driving privileges for 365 days. The Department argued the hearing officer did not abuse his discretion in admitting the chemical breath test, and State Highway Patrol Trooper King scrupulously complied with the approved method for testing Kastet’s breath on the Intoxilyzer 8000. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court concurred with the Department and reversed the district court judgment. The matter was remanded with instructions to reinstate the hearing officer’s decision. View "Kastet v. NDDOT" on Justia Law

Workforce Safety & Insurance (WSI) appealed a district court judgment affirming the administrative law judge’s (ALJ) order concluding Isai Avila was entitled to both the scheduled permanent partial impairment award for vision loss and whole body permanent partial impairment award for additional injuries to his cervical spine, facial bone, acoustic nerve, and brain. In 2015, Avila fell on ice carrying a railroad tie while employed by SM Fencing & Energy Services, Inc., and sustained injuries. WSI issued an order awarding permanent impairment benefits of $34,000 to Avila. Avila requested a hearing. During a second review Avila underwent a permanent impairment evaluation. The evaluation determined Avila had 29% whole body permanent partial impairment which included 16% whole body impairment for vision loss of Avila’s left eye. WSI concluded under N.D.C.C. 65-05-12.2(11) that Avila was entitled to the greater of either the scheduled impairment award or the whole body impairment award, but not both. WSI issued a notice of decision confirming no additional award of permanent impairment benefits was due. Avila again requested a hearing after reconsideration. The sole issue at the administrative hearing was interpretation of the portion of N.D.C.C. 65-05-12.2(11). and whether the statute applied to the same work-related injury or condition, and not impairments for the same work-related incident. Since Avila’s loss of vision in his left eye was the same work-related injury or condition for which Avila received a 100 permanent impairment multiplier (PIM) scheduled injury award, the “loss of vision in left eye” component of the 29% whole body impairment must be subtracted from the award to determine Avila’s additional permanent impairment benefits. The ALJ concluded the additional injuries were not the same work-related injury or condition as the vision loss, and N.D.C.C. 65-05-12.2(11) was not applicable. Therefore, the ALJ determined Avila was entitled to both the scheduled impairment award for vision loss and the whole body impairment award for his additional injuries. The North Dakota Supreme Court found that because Avila had an injury set out in N.D.C.C. 65-05-12.2(11), he was entitled to the greater of the combined rating for all accepted impairments under the AMA Guides or the injury schedule. Here, N.D.C.C. 65-05-12.2(11) provided the greater PIM. Accordingly, WSI correctly determined Avila’s award. The ALJ judgment was not in accordance with the law. The Supreme Court therefore reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded to the ALJ for further proceedings. View "WSI v. Avila, et al." on Justia Law

The State of North Dakota appealed a district court order denying its motion to resume prosecution against Matthew Dahl and dismissing the case. In December 2014, the State charged Dahl with two counts of theft. Dahl did not appear on the charges until he was arrested on a bench warrant in February 2017. In mid-April 2017, the State mailed Dahl a pretrial diversion agreement. Dahl signed and returned the notarized agreement dated May 3, 2017. On May 9, 2017, the state’s attorney signed and filed the agreement with the district court, and the court approved the agreement the same day. Under the agreement, the State agreed to suspend prosecution for “two years from the date of execution” conditioned on Dahl’s timely payment of restitution. Dahl failed to make minimum monthly restitution payments. On June 6, 2019, the State moved to resume prosecution, alleging Dahl violated the pretrial diversion agreement by his non-payment. The district court held a hearing on the State’s motion in August 2019. The court concluded the pretrial agreement was executed when Dahl signed it on May 3, 2017. The court then denied the State’s motion to resume prosecution as untimely under N.D.R.Crim.P. 32.2(d)(2), and dismissed the complaint against Dahl. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed, concluding the district court erred in determining the State’s motion was untimely, and remanded for further proceedings. View "North Dakota v. Dahl" on Justia Law

Shadow Industries, LLP, appealed a district court judgment dismissing its eviction action and holding the tenants David and Chris Hoffman had timely exercised their option to extend the term of the parties’ lease agreement. Shadow argued the district court erred in finding the parties’ lease agreement to be ambiguous, finding the option to extend the lease expired on February 1, 2019, and finding the Hoffmans timely exercised their option to extend the lease. The North Dakota Supreme Court found the district court’s interpretation of the lease as having ambiguity as to when the lease terminated was premised upon the court’s observation that “[w]hen ‘crop years’ end and begin is undefined.” To this, the Supreme Court disagreed that the lease was ambiguous and failed to define the end of the lease. The Supreme Court found the lease terminated at the end of the 2018 crop year. "While determining when the end of the 2018 crop year occurred may be a question of fact, the term is not ambiguous simply because it requires a future event or contingency." There was testimony that the crop year ended no later than October 2018; following the harvesting of their crops and still in 2018, the Hoffmans deep ripped the land, tilled to create fall bedding, and applied fertilizer to prepare for the 2019 crop year. "On the basis of these facts, and the absence of any contrary facts in the record, we conclude as a matter of law the 2018 crop year ended and the lease terminated in 2018." Because the facts of this case compelled a finding the 2018 crop year ended in 2018 and the lease terminated at the end of the 2018 crop year, the Court found the exercise of the option in January 2019 was not timely and the lease terminated. It therefore reversed judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Shadow Industries, LLP v. Hoffman, et al." on Justia Law

Roger Feltman and TRRP LLC (Feltman) appeal a district court judgment dismissing their malpractice lawsuit against attorney Daniel Gaustad and the Pearson, Christensen & Clapp law firm (Gaustad). The court concluded summary judgment was appropriate because Feltman failed to establish a factual dispute as to the elements of legal malpractice. Finding no reversible error in that decision, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed judgment. View "Feltman, et al. v. Gaustad, et al." on Justia Law

Alton Johnson appealed a judgment denying his variance application. In the 1970s Johnson purchased land in Burlington, ND, and in 1973, opened an auto body shop. The auto body shop was zoned as a C-1 residential sometime after the shop was built. In 1989, a fire damaged the building. After building repairs in 1991, Johnson leased part of the property. Johnson began to use another location for his auto body business. In 2012, Johnson sold his business at the second location. Property owners neighboring the property raised concerns about the use of the property. In May 2013, the city attorney issued an opinion regarding the body shop, stating it “was a non-conforming use when the zoning ordinance was initially passed, so it was essentially ‘grandfathered in’” and when the auto body shop’s use was discontinued, and the current renters went into the building, the auto body shop was no longer “grandfathered in” and would need approval by the planning commission. Johnson operated the auto body shop at the location of the property at issue subsequent to the sale of the second location. In October 2013, Johnson moved for a temporary injunction and ex parte restraining order to allow him to continue to use his auto body shop, which was granted by the district court. In October 2016, Johnson requested a variance from the City. When it was denied, he appealed, arguing the City’s findings were arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, and not supported by substantial evidence. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded after review it was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable for the City to deny Johnson’s variance application and there was substantial evidence to support the City’s decision. Accordingly, the Court affirmed judgment. View "Johnson v. City of Burlington" on Justia Law