Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Donna Wald appealed an amended divorce judgment valuing and distributing hers and Gerard Wald’s marital property. She also appealed a postjudgment order denying her motion for contempt or redistribution of property. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the district court did not clearly err in valuing and distributing the parties’ marital property. View "Wald v. Wald" on Justia Law

The State of North Dakota appealed dismissal of its criminal complaint against Jerome Greenshields with prejudice. In February 2018, the State charged Greenshields with one count of sexual assault occurring in 1997 and one count of gross sexual imposition occurring in 2001. Greenshields requested a bill of particulars, and the district court ordered the State to file a bill of particulars within ten days. The State failed to produce the bill of particulars. After Greenshields moved for dismissal, the court dismissed the complaint. The order of dismissal did not specify whether the dismissal was with or without prejudice, and the State did not appeal the dismissal. In January 2019, the State filed another criminal complaint against Greenshields, charging him again on counts of sexual assault, one occurring between June 1 to July 31, 1997, and the other occurring in August 1997. The complaint also charged Greenshields with gross sexual imposition occurring in September 2001. Greenshields moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing the charges could not be refiled because the district court dismissed the first case with prejudice. In response, the State argued the earlier dismissal was silent as to whether it was with or without prejudice. After the case was assigned to a new judge, the court dismissed the complaint without a hearing, concluding the first judge intended to sanction the State and dismiss the first case with prejudice. The State appealed; the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed and remanded, concurring with the State there was no evidence of whether the district court dismissed the first complaint with or without prejudice. On remand, Greenshields renewed his motion to dismiss, claiming the district court intended to dismiss the first complaint with prejudice. After a hearing, at which the judge who dismissed the first complaint testified, the court found the judge intended to dismiss the first complaint with prejudice. The court dismissed the complaint in this case with prejudice. After reviewing the record, the Supreme Court found evidence to support the court’s findings, leaving the Court with a "definite and firm conviction" no mistake was made. Because the district court’s findings were not clearly erroneous, the Court concluded the court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the criminal complaint against Greenshields with prejudice. View "North Dakota v. Greenshields" on Justia Law

Hess Bakken Investments II, LLC; Arkoma Drilling II, L.P.; and Comstock Oil & Gas, LP, (together the “Hess Group”) appealed an order and judgment dismissing their claims against AgriBank, FCB; Intervention Energy, LLC; and Riverbend Oil & Gas VI, L.L.C. (together, “Appellees”). At issue was the meaning of the term “actual drilling operations” as used in continuous drilling clauses in two oil and gas leases. The district court interpreted the term as requiring “placing the drill bit in the ground and penetrating the soil.” Each side has advanced competing readings of the term based on understandings of English grammar and industry usage. Although at odds, both interpretations are supported by rational arguments. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the term was ambiguous; "when ambiguity exists, the parties’ intent becomes a question of fact requiring a factual finding based on extrinsic evidence." Given this ambiguity, dismissal as a matter of law was improper. View "Hess Bakken Investments II, et al. v. AgriBank, et al." on Justia Law

Carlin Schultz appealed a criminal judgment entered following his conditional guilty plea to the charge of driving under the influence. Schultz entered a conditional guilty plea preserving his right to challenge the denial of his motion to suppress evidence. Schultz argued he did not receive a reasonable opportunity to consult with counsel before deciding to take a chemical test and the subsequent test results should be excluded from evidence. The North Dakota Supreme Court found Schultz was provided with an opportunity to consult with an attorney before he decided whether to submit to chemical testing. Schultz was not required to be provided with a second chance to consult with an attorney subsequent to making a decision to take the chemical test. The judgment of the district court was therefore affirmed. View "City of Jamestown v. Schultz" on Justia Law

Deborah Holter appealed a district court judgment dismissing her appeal of the Mandan Board of City Commissioners’ decision to specially assess her property for street improvements. In July 2017, the Mandan Special Assessment Commission published a notice of a meeting in August 2017 that contained the items of expense of the improvement, allocation of a portion of the cost to the City, and the net amount to be assessed. The notice provided a list of properties found to be especially benefited by the construction performed in the project and the amounts to be assessed. In August 2017, the Special Assessment Commission approved the proposed assessments against the especially benefited properties and moved the decision to the Board for its consideration. The Board approved the special assessments in October 2017. Holter owned three undeveloped residential lots in the improvement district. Each lot was assessed $15,928.40, for a total of $47,785.20. Holter objected to the assessments against her properties, claiming they exceeded the value of the benefits they received. She also argued the method for determining the assessments was unfair because corner lot owners and non-corner lot owners were not treated equally. When unsuccessful at the district court, Holter raised the same issue to the North Dakota Supreme Court, which found the City did not act arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably in determining the benefits and assessments to Holter’s properties. View "Holter v. City of Mandan" on Justia Law

Terrance Fredericks appealed a district court order dismissing his lawsuit against the Vogel Law Firm and its attorneys Monte Rogneby and Maurice McCormick, McCormick Inc., and Northern Improvement Company. In the earlier (2016) lawsuit Northern Improvement and McCormick, individually and on behalf of Native Energy, sued Fredericks for breaching contractual and fiduciary duties. Fredericks counterclaimed, alleging McCormick breached fiduciary duties. The jury found that McCormick and Northern Improvement did not breach duties owed to Native Energy or Fredericks. Vogel represented McCormick and Northern Improvement in the 2016 lawsuit. Fredericks sought to disqualify Vogel after testimony revealed Vogel may have indirectly provided services to Native Energy in 2010 and 2011 when it reviewed certain agreements that were later executed by Native Energy and third-party oil companies. The district court declared a mistrial and disqualified Vogel from representing McCormick. McCormick moved for reconsideration of the court’s decision to disqualify Vogel. After a hearing, the court did not disqualify Vogel, ruling it had not represented Native Energy by reviewing the agreements. In December 2017, Fredericks moved to add Vogel as a third-party defendant, claiming it committed legal malpractice by breaching fiduciary duties owed to Native Energy and Fredericks. Fredericks’ motion also sought to amend his counterclaims against McCormick and Northern Improvement. In April 2018, the district court allowed Fredericks to amend his claims against McCormick and Northern Improvement, but denied his motion to join Vogel as a third-party defendant. In February 2019, Fredericks, individually and derivatively on behalf of Native Energy Construction, filed the instant lawsuit against Vogel, McCormick, and Northern Improvement. Fredericks’ complaint alleged that Vogel had a conflict of interest because it had provided legal services to Native Energy in 2010 and 2011, and its current representation of McCormick was adverse to Native Energy and Fredericks. Fredericks alleged Vogel committed legal malpractice by disclosing Native Energy’s and Fredericks’ confidential information to McCormick. Fredericks also alleged McCormick and Northern Improvement breached fiduciary duties owed to Native Energy and Fredericks. The district court concluded res judicata barred Fredericks’ claims. Finding no reversible error in that decision, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "Fredericks, et al. v. Vogel Law Firm, et al." on Justia Law

Aimee Norby and Robert Hinesley were the parents of a child born in 2012. In 2014, Norby filed and served a complaint seeking primary residential responsibility over the child. Norby was awarded primary residential responsibility, and Hinesley was awarded parenting time. In March 2019, Norby married Lyle Anderson. Anderson worked as a diesel mechanic in the Williston, North Dakota, area. Anderson grew up in Smithville, Missouri, and owned a home there. Smithville was a town of approximately 10,000 people about twenty minutes north of Kansas City, Missouri. Norby and Anderson resided in Williston with the Norby’s and Hinesley’s child. Hinesley also lived in Williston. Norby filed a motion to relocate to Smithville with the child. Hinesley opposed Norby’s motion and filed a motion to change primary residential responsibility or modify parenting time. The district court denied Norby’s motion to relocate. On appeal, Norby argued the district court erred in denying her motion, that the district court’s findings under the two Stout-Hawkinson factors were clearly erroneous. She argued the evidence demonstrated an out of state move had prospective advantages that would improve her and the child’s quality of life. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded sufficient evidence supported the district court’s finding on factor one. Norby also argued the district court’s findings were clearly erroneous because there was no indication the move was premised upon an effort to limit Hinesley’s parenting time. The Supreme Court concluded sufficient evidence supported the district court’s finding on factor two. The Court thus affirmed denial fo Norby's motion to relocate. View "Norby v. Hinesley, et al." on Justia Law

In 2019, the district court entered a judgment awarding Karen Wieland $850,000 as just compensation for the taking of her property. The following day, the City of Fargo deposited $850,000 with the Cass County Clerk of Court. In March 2019, the district court amended the judgment to include an additional $89,044.32 for attorney fees and costs. That same day, the City deposited an additional $89,044.32 with the Cass County Clerk of Court. Wieland appealed the amended judgment. In her prior appeal, Wieland argued the eminent domain action should have been dismissed because the City failed to pay or deposit post-judgment interest subsequent to the City depositing the full amount of the judgment in court. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded there was no authority that required dismissal of an eminent domain action upon a political subdivision’s failure to pay or deposit post-judgment interest subsequent to the deposit of the full amount of the judgment in court. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s amended judgment awarding Wieland $939,044.32 for just compensation and attorney’s fees in the eminent domain action; the decision was limited to Wieland's request dismiss the proceedings in their entirety. In that prior appeal, the Supreme Court noted a potential issue of whether a landowner who appeals a judgment in eminent domain proceedings, without accepting or withdrawing deposited funds, was entitled to post-judgment interest subsequent to the deposit of the full amount of the judgment in court. Wieland did not raise that issue in her appeal, so the Supreme Court declined to opine on it. Following the issuance of the Supreme Court's mandate, Wieland moved for payment of the original amended judgment that had been deposited by the City in court, plus any accrued post-judgment interest. The district court denied the request for post-judgment interest after determining the accrual of interest was suspended once the City deposited the original amended judgment amount with the court and that it did not have the authority to further amend the judgment after the Supreme Court’s affirmance of the original amended judgment without remand on the prior appeal. Wieland appealed the denial of her request, and raised the issue the Supreme Court left unaddressed in the prior appeal. The Supreme Court determined that absent a absent a statutory provision to the contrary, the accrual of interest was suspended by the City’s deposit of the judgment amount. Therefore, the district court's order denying Wieland's request for post-judgment interest was affirmed. View "City of Fargo v. Wieland" on Justia Law

In early 2019, Devils Lake Police Officer Gilbertson was dispatched on a report of a possibly impaired driver. Gilbertson pulled the vehicle over and as he reached the back of the vehicle, the vehicle fled the scene. Gilbertson pursued; another officer attempted to deploy road spikes. The vehicle avoided the spikes and zig-zagged through a field until it became stuck in the snow. When the occupants did not leave the vehicle, Gilbertson approached the vehicle, reached in, put it in park, smelling a strong odor of marijuana. After removing and arresting the driver, officers removed passenger, K.V. Another responding officer, Officer Engen, Engen did a pat down search of K.V. and found drug paraphernalia, a bong, and a bag of meth in K.V.’s jacket. Engen averred he patted down K.V. to search for weapons as a safety issue and to look for illegal drugs. K.V. was alleged to be a delinquent child, charged with possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. K.V. filed a motion to suppress, contending there was no exception for the warrantless search and the search was prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. The juvenile court denied the motion to suppress on the record, finding: “There was marijuana in the vehicle. You were in the vehicle [K.V.]. Once [the officers] establish that they had the smell of marijuana in the vehicle, they had the right to search you and they found the methamphetamine in the coat pocket that you were wearing.” The court denied K.V.’s renewed motion to suppress at the adjudication hearing. K.V. was adjudicated a delinquent child for possession of methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia. Although the juvenile court court received testimony about the officers’ concern for their safety and the smell of marijuana, the North Dakota Supreme Court found the juvenile court did not make specific findings on the reasonableness of the pat down or subsequent search. "It did not identify which exception to the warrant requirement justified the search in its conclusions of law. We are unable to understand the court’s reasoning for its decision and are left to speculate as to the law and facts the court relied on in denying the motion to suppress." Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for reconsideration of the suppression order. View "Interest of K.V." on Justia Law

North Dakota Workforce Safety and Insurance (WSI) appealed a district court judgment reversing an administrative law judge’s (ALJ) decision terminating Gregory Beam’s benefits. Beam was injured in 2016 while working for his employer, Gagnon, Inc. (Gagnon), installing sheets of metal. At the time Beam applied for workers compensation benefits, Gagnon submitted a job description for machinist as Beam’s position with the company at the time of his injuries. A Functional Capacity Evaluation identified Beam could occasionally climb ladders and kneel, but was unable to crouch or crawl. After completion of the evaluation, WSI identified Beam’s transferable skills and physical capabilities. WSI determined Beam’s pre-injury occupation was that of a sheet metal worker, not a machinist as submitted by Gagnon. WSI forwarded a list of job descriptions to Beam’s treating physician, Dr. Kelly, for approval. The description for the physical requirements of a machinist stated the position required “[o]ccasional stooping, kneeling and crouching;” the description for a sheet metal worker were "“[f]requent stooping, handling and reaching & occasional fingering.” Dr. Kelly did not approve Beam returning to work as a machinist, stating, “I don’t think the knee will tolerate the potential kneeling.” Dr. Kelly did approve Beam returning to work as a sheet metal worker. Based on Dr. Kelly’s approval for Beam to return to work as a sheet metal worker, WSI determined Beam could return to work in the same occupation, any employer, and discontinued Beam’s benefits. The ALJ found the job description of a machinist did not match Beam’s pre-injury profession. The ALJ found the preponderance of the evidence established Beam could return to the occupation of sheet metal worker, but could not return to his pre-injury position with Gagnon. The district court determined the ALJ’s findings of fact were not supported by a preponderance of the evidence and reversed. Applying its deferential standard of review, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded there was evidence in the record from which a reasoning mind could have reasonably concluded WSI’s rehabilitation plan would return Beam to substantial gainful employment. It therefore reversed the district court and reinstated the ALJ's decision. View "Beam v. WSI et. al." on Justia Law