Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Christopher Kjelgren appealed a district court judgment entered in favor of Cavare, Inc., and the subsequent order denying his motion for relief from the judgment. In 2017, Cavare, Inc. (also referred to as “Cavare USA”) commenced this action seeking a judgment declaring Cavare USA the rightful owner of a one-third interest in Petroleum Services Drilling Motors, Inc. (“PSDM”), and claiming breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, and unjust enrichment to recover $230,000 in shareholder distributions that PSDM had made to Kjelgren. Following a bench trial, the district court found Cavare USA was the owner of the disputed PSDM shares and $230,000 in shareholder distributions issued to Kjelgren belonged to Cavare USA. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the court’s finding that Cavare, Inc. was the rightful owner of disputed shares corresponding to a one-third interest in Petroleum Services Drilling Motors, Inc. was not clearly erroneous. Furthermore, the Supreme Court concluded the court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion for relief from the judgment under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60. View "Cavare v. Kjelgren" on Justia Law

John Bridges appealed a district court order denying his applications for postconviction relief. In 2012, Bridges pleaded guilty to murder and kidnapping. The district court sentenced him to life in prison without parole. In 2013, Bridges pleaded guilty to attempted murder and possession of contraband by an inmate. The court sentenced him to twenty years’ imprisonment on each count. n January 2019, Bridges filed applications for postconviction relief in both criminal matters. He alleged he suffered from paranoid schizophrenia that prevented him from filing a timely application for relief. He alleged he was diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia and took psychotropic medication before his incarceration and while in custody. He alleged prison officials coerced him “to say things that would ultimately discredit his history of mental illness.” He alleged he was injected with a powerful antipsychotic drug before sentencing. Bridges sought to withdraw his guilty pleas. The district court held a hearing on Bridges’ applications, allowing him to present evidence related to his mental status. The court found Bridges’ mental status was not newly discovered evidence because his competency was fully evaluated at the time of his convictions. The court found Bridges’ applications were untimely and denied him relief. On appeal of the denial of relief to the North Dakota Supreme Court, Bridges claimed his mental illness prevented him from understanding the charges against him or aiding in his defense. He also claimed his mental illness prevented him from filing a timely application for relief. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court. View "Bridges v. North Dakota" on Justia Law

Eugene Taszarek, Marlys Taszarek, Trina Schilling, Steven Taszarek, and Michael Taszarek (“Taszareks”) appealed a judgment finding Lakeview Excavating, Inc., was not the alter ego of Brian Welken. Welken was Lakeview Excavating’s president and sole shareholder. While working on certain county projects, Lakeview Excavating’s employees took fieldstones from a nearby property owned by the Taszareks to use for the roads. The Taszareks sued Lakeview Excavating and Welken for intentional trespass, conversion of property, and unjust enrichment. The claims of trespass and conversion were tried to a jury. The jury returned a verdict in the Taszareks’ favor, finding Lakeview Excavating was the alter ego of Welken and holding both parties liable for damages. The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, concluding the district court inadequately instructed the jury on the alter ego doctrine. After a bench trial, the district court found Lakeview Excavating was the alter ego of Welken and ordered the Taszareks could recover damages from either Welken or Lakeview Excavating. The Supreme Court reversed again, concluding the court’s findings relating to piercing Lakeview Excavating’s corporate veil were inadequate to permit appellate review. On remand, the court held an evidentiary hearing and found Lakeview Excavating was not the alter ego of Welken. The Taszareks argue the district court exceeded the scope of remand by holding an evidentiary hearing instead of specifying findings of fact based on evidence already in the record. Finding no reversible error in last of the district court's alter ego findings, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Taszarek, et al. v. Lakeview Excavating, et al." on Justia Law

Joseph Motisi appealed a district court order and judgment denying his petition for writ of mandamus. Hebron Public School District employed Motisi as a teacher during the 2019-20 and 2020-21 school years. Prior to his employment with the District, Motisi worked as a teacher in another North Dakota school district for four years. On April 23, 2021, the District sent Motisi a Probationary Teacher Notice of Nonrenewal, informing him the District would not be renewing his teaching contract. Motisi sent a letter to the District on April 26, 2021, notifying the District of his acceptance of a continuing contract for the 2021-22 school year. The District then notified Motisi he was unable to accept an offer to renew a contract because his contract was nonrenewed. Motisi applied for a temporary restraining order, a preliminary injunction, and later for a writ of mandamus. The court issued an order denying Motisi’s petition for writ of mandamus, stating the sole issue was “whether Motisi is a probationary employee under N.D.C.C. 15.1-15-02(8)” and that “Motisi concedes that if he was a probationary teacher, the District complied with the law.” The district court rejected Motisi’s argument that because he had four years of experience at another school, he could not be considered a probationary teacher under the statute. The court ultimately found “[t]he District followed the requirements of the statute when it non-renewed Motisi’s contract” and “Motisi has not demonstrated that he has a clear legal right” to the renewed contract. The North Dakota Supreme Court determined the district court did not err in interpreting N.D.C.C. 15.1-15-02(8), and affirmed judgment. View "Motisi v. Hebron Public School District" on Justia Law

Defendants William Grommesh and Jon Pansch appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of American Federal Bank in its action to enforce four guaranties. The defendants argued the district court erred in granting summary judgment because the court misinterpreted the guaranties, and genuine issues of material fact exist regarding the defendants’ defenses. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "American Federal Bank v. Grommesh, et al." on Justia Law

The State appealed a district court order dismissing without prejudice charges of criminal trespass, burglary, and theft of property against Joseph Brown. With the exception of criminal mischief, all charges were class C felonies. At the preliminary hearing, Officer Gannon Miller was the only witness. He was not the investigating officer and had no contact with Brown prior to the preliminary hearing. Officer Miller testified he did not respond to the scene of the possible break-in. The court dismissed the felony charges against Brown, informing the State “unless [the witness] has some actual, hands-on, direct contact with this crime,” the court would not find probable cause. The court determined that “[p]roducing a witness with no point of contact with the case, and whose only role in the hearing would be to read reports and affidavits prepared by others is insufficient to establish probable cause at a preliminary hearing.” On appeal, the State argued the court erred in refusing to admit hearsay testimony offered by the State’s witness. The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed. "While a court is given discretion in admitting hearsay evidence under N.D.R.Crim.P. 5.1(a), the court here permitted only a limited examination of Officer Miller before determining he had no basis to provide any testimony. In light of the burden of proof placed upon the State, and noting the court should draw all inferences in favor of the prosecution, we conclude the court abused its discretion by misapplying the law when it unreasonably prevented the State’s inquiry into matters that were relevant to a determination of probable cause. The court abused its discretion in refusing to allow the State to fully examine Officer Miller and in not considering whether Officer Miller’s testimony was implausible or incredible. We hold a court must allow the State to present its evidence at the preliminary hearing before determining what weight to give that evidence, including otherwise inadmissible hearsay." The matter was remanded for a preliminary hearing. View "North Dakota v. Brown" on Justia Law

Len Vannett appealed an amended criminal judgment entered after his conditional guilty plea for actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. He argued the arresting officer lacked reasonable and articulable suspicion for the stop and the approved methods were not followed in administering the intoxilyzer breath machine. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed Vannett's conviction. View "North Dakota v. Vannett" on Justia Law

Allison Houkom appealed after she was found guilty of giving false information to a law enforcement officer. In 2019, Officer Matt Oldham of the West Fargo Police Department attempted to serve a warrant on a male at a residence in West Fargo. Houkom was in the driveway of the residence smoking a cigarette. Oldham approached Houkom and asked if the male he was looking for was inside the residence. She stated she did not know. Oldham then asked Houkom if she lived at the residence. She responded that she did not. Oldham then proceeded to ask Houkom for her name. She responded with “Kaylinn Marie Schmainda.” When Oldham asked for her date of birth, Houkom responded that he did not need it. Oldham then contacted dispatch to check the name. Approximately a minute later, Houkom informed Oldham that she had given him a false name because she had an outstanding warrant. Houkom then provided her correct name, and Oldham determined the warrant was from Minnesota and was non-extraditable. Houkom was arrested and charged with giving false information. On appeal, Houkom argued: (1) the district court erroneously denied her pre-trial motion to dismiss; (2) the district court misinterpreted N.D.C.C. 12.1-11-03(1); and (3) the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to sustain a guilty verdict because the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she interfered with an investigation or materially misled an officer by giving a false name. The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed, concluding that under a correct application of the statute there was insufficient evidence to sustain a guilty verdict. View "North Dakota v. Houkom" on Justia Law

S.J.H. appealed a district court order granting the State’s motion for sanctions against him for failure to obey a court order for genetic testing and from a default judgment ordering him to pay child support. The North Dakota Child Support Division (“State”) commenced a civil action against S.J.H. to establish paternity for a minor child. S.J.H. retained counsel. In S.J.H.’s answer and counterclaim, he included a request for genetic testing to be conducted. At a hearing nearly four months later, he withdrew his request for testing. The district court then entered an order requiring S.J.H. to submit to genetic testing. After two months went by with no testing having been conducted, the district court requested a status update from the parties. S.J.H.’s counsel responded that S.J.H. had not been tested, and counsel moved to withdraw, stating that his attorney-client relationship with S.J.H. had “deteriorated to a degree that further representation is not possible” after their discussions about the proceedings “resulted in an impasse.” The State subsequently scheduled an appointment for genetic testing for March 25, 2021, in S.J.H.’s state of residence. On March 10, the State sent a letter to S.J.H.’s counsel with the information regarding the upcoming appointment. This letter was sent to counsel only and not directly to S.J.H. On March 31, the court granted S.J.H.’s counsel’s motion to withdraw. On April 30, the district court again asked the State and S.J.H. for a status update. Because S.J.H. failed to attend his March 25 appointment, the State requested sanctions against him, including striking his answer and rendering default judgment against him. S.J.H. stated he was unaware of the March 25 appointment, and learned of such appointment only upon being served the State’s motion for default judgment two months later. Nevertheless, the court granted the State's motion for sanctions. S.J.H. argued on appeal that the district court abused its discretion in granting sanctions against him because his former attorney failed to notify him of the scheduled genetic testing appointment, thus he did not disobey the court order to submit to genetic testing. Finding that the district court did not abuse its discretion, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the sanctions order. View "North Dakota v. S.J.H., et al." on Justia Law

The State of North Dakota appealed an amended judgment entered after the district court modified Bradley Neilan’s sentence under North Dakota Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b). In 2019, Neilan was arrested for possession of marijuana with the intent to deliver. On February 9, 2021, the parties appeared at a change of plea hearing. At the hearing, the State detailed a plea agreement in which it dropped the firearm enhancements from Neilan’s charges, removing the mandatory minimum sentences. The plea agreement provided that Neilan would be incarcerated for four years with all but 18 months suspended. At the hearing, in response to the district court inquiry as to why the State was seeking incarceration rather than probation, the State indicated that if the plea agreement was rejected the State would withdraw the proposed amendments and pursue the mandatory minimum sentencing. Neilan confirmed his preference to accept the plea agreement. The court, noting the State was giving it “zero option,” accepted the agreement and stated it would sentence Neilan to its terms. The day following the district court's accepting the plea agreement, the court signed and entered a judgment consistent with the terms of the plea agreement. Later that day, the court initiated its own N.D.R.Crim.P. 35(b) motion to consider reducing the sentence from incarceration to probation. On appeal to the North Dakota Supreme Court, the State argued the court was precluded from modifying a sentence imposed pursuant to a plea agreement or, in the alternative, the court abused its discretion by modifying the sentence. Neilan challenged the State’s right to appeal. The Supreme Court concluded the court’s reduction of Neilan’s sentence was appealable, the plain language of N.D.R.Crim.P. 35(b) provided the court with the authority to exercise its discretion in reducing a sentence, and, in this case, the court abused its discretion in reducing Neilan’s sentence. However, as mandated by N.D.C.C. 29-28-35, the Supreme Court's opinion was limited to affirming the sentence imposed by the court and pointing out the error in the proceeding. The Court, accordingly, affirmed the amended judgment. View "North Dakota v. Neilan" on Justia Law