Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

An estate dispute arose following the death of Marvin C. Lepp, whose heirs included seven children and four grandchildren. Initially, Murray Lepp and Michael Lepp were appointed co-personal representatives of the estate. Over time, disputes developed between the heirs regarding the management of the estate, including the removal of personal representatives, appointment of a successor, and the handling of a contract for deed concerning estate property. After both co-personal representatives were removed, the district court appointed Dacotah Bank as successor personal representative. Additional litigation involved the cancellation of Murray Lepp’s contract for deed, disputes over rent payments related to estate property, and requests for attorney’s fees.The District Court of McIntosh County, Southeast Judicial District, considered and issued various orders: it removed the co-personal representatives, appointed Dacotah Bank, cancelled Murray Lepp’s contract for deed following summary judgment, denied Murray Lepp’s motions to dismiss and reconsider, resolved some rent disputes, and awarded attorney’s fees to Maureen Lepp. Murray Lepp filed notices of appeal from these orders.The Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota reviewed the appeal. It determined that the appeal from the order appointing Dacotah Bank was untimely under the procedural rules. The court further found that, because the estate’s administration was unsupervised and several claims and petitions remained unresolved in the district court, including issues of partial distribution and final accounting, the orders appealed from were not final and appealable absent certification under Rule 54(b) of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure. Since no such certification was sought or granted, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. View "Estate of Lepp" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with simple assault following an incident in April 2022. Throughout the proceedings, he was represented by a series of court-appointed attorneys. The first attorney was replaced due to a change in employment. The next two attorneys withdrew, one citing a breakdown in the attorney-client relationship and the other a conflict of interest. Each time, a new attorney was appointed. Upon the withdrawal of the fourth appointed attorney, due to a deteriorated attorney-client relationship and the defendant’s insistence on pursuing an unethical defense, the defendant was informed by court order that no further counsel would be provided at public expense. He was served with the withdrawal orders but was not present at every hearing. At a pretrial hearing the day before trial, the defendant again requested appointed counsel, but the court required him to proceed pro se if he had not retained a lawyer by the next day. The defendant represented himself at trial and was convicted.The District Court of Burleigh County, South Central Judicial District, presided over the pretrial proceedings, withdrawals, and trial. The court concluded that, given the repeated breakdowns with counsel and explicit orders, the defendant’s conduct constituted the functional equivalent of a voluntary waiver of his right to counsel, and therefore required him to proceed without appointed counsel.Upon review, the Supreme Court of North Dakota found that, although the defendant’s actions amounted to a functional waiver of his right to counsel, the record did not establish that such waiver was made knowingly and intelligently. Specifically, the court noted the absence of a warning or explanation to the defendant regarding the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation prior to his final attorney’s withdrawal. The Supreme Court of North Dakota reversed the conviction and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that the defendant’s waiver of counsel was not knowing and intelligent as required by law. View "State v. Hoff" on Justia Law

A driver was involved in a traffic collision in Grand Forks County, North Dakota, which resulted in injuries to two people in another vehicle, including a minor who later died. Law enforcement, led by the North Dakota Highway Patrol, responded to the scene and investigated the driver for driving under the influence. During the investigation, a chemical breath test was administered to the driver to determine his blood alcohol content. The State later charged the driver with criminal vehicular injury and criminal vehicular homicide, both alleging he was driving under the influence.The District Court of Grand Forks County, Northeast Central Judicial District, held an evidentiary hearing on the driver's motion to suppress the results of the chemical breath test. The driver argued that his consent to the test was not voluntary and that the evidence was obtained in violation of statute and his due process rights. The court granted the motion, suppressing the breath test evidence, finding that the State failed to show that the driver voluntarily consented to the chemical test after being read the implied consent advisory.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the District Court’s decision and applied a de novo standard to questions of law, while deferring to the lower court’s factual findings unless they were contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. The Supreme Court held that the District Court misapplied the law by treating the relevant statutes—N.D.C.C. §§ 39-20-01 and 39-20-01.1—as separate and distinct rather than as statutes that operate in conjunction. The Supreme Court clarified that both statutes may apply simultaneously and that providing an accurate implied consent advisory does not constitute per se coercion. The Court reversed the suppression order and remanded the case for further findings on whether the driver’s consent was voluntary, using the correct legal standards. View "State v. Bell" on Justia Law

Lawrence Harris sought postconviction relief following his criminal conviction, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective and that the State violated its obligations under Brady v. Maryland by failing to disclose favorable evidence—specifically, the probation conditions of a witness. Harris claimed that these alleged deficiencies undermined the fairness of his trial and warranted relief from his conviction.The District Court of Burleigh County, South Central Judicial District, reviewed Harris’s claims. Applying the standard from Strickland v. Washington, the district court found that Harris failed to demonstrate that any alleged errors by his trial counsel prejudiced the outcome of his case; in other words, he did not show a reasonable probability of a different result but for counsel’s unprofessional errors. Regarding the Brady claim, the court determined that Harris did not provide evidence that the State suppressed the witness’s probation conditions, and thus denied relief on that basis as well.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota considered Harris’s arguments. The Court affirmed the district court’s denial of postconviction relief. It held that the lower court’s findings regarding ineffective assistance of counsel were not clearly erroneous and were supported by evidence. Regarding the Brady claim, the Supreme Court concluded that Harris waived the issue by failing to meet the minimum briefing requirements under the North Dakota Rules of Appellate Procedure, as his appellate brief did not adequately articulate or support the claim. As a result, the Supreme Court declined to address the Brady claim on its merits and affirmed the district court’s order denying Harris’s application for postconviction relief. View "Harris v. State" on Justia Law

James and Tahnee Young executed a promissory note and mortgage on property in Fargo, North Dakota, in 2016, originally with The Mortgage Company, Inc., and naming Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. as nominee. In July 2022, MidFirst Bank became the holder of the note. After the Youngs stopped making payments, with the last payment in February 2023, MidFirst initiated foreclosure proceedings. In response, the Youngs filed counterclaims alleging fraudulent misrepresentation (based on alleged “robo-signing” or forgery in the assignment of the mortgage), various federal statutory violations, unjust enrichment, coercive collection practices, and constructive fraud.The District Court of Cass County, East Central Judicial District, granted summary judgment in favor of MidFirst Bank and denied the Youngs’ motion for summary judgment. The court found that the Youngs lacked standing to challenge the mortgage assignment because they were not parties to the assignment contract and, therefore, could not claim injury from any alleged fraud in the assignment. The district court also ruled against the Youngs on their federal law claims, finding some barred by res judicata and others lacking proof of damages. Additionally, the court denied their request for audio recordings of hearings, stating the transcript was the official record.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo. The court agreed that the Youngs lacked standing to challenge the assignment of the mortgage and that MidFirst Bank, as holder of the note, was entitled to foreclose as a matter of law. The court found no evidence of judicial bias or error in the denial of audio recordings that would have affected the outcome. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that any error in denying access to audio recordings was harmless and that summary judgment for MidFirst was proper. View "MidFirst Bank v. Young" on Justia Law

Joshua Martinez was charged in two separate cases with serious offenses, including attempted murder, reckless endangerment, terrorizing, fleeing from law enforcement, violation of a domestic violence protection order, unlawful firearm possession, and other related crimes. The cases were consolidated and proceeded to a seven-day jury trial, where twelve jurors and two alternates were sworn in. After the first day of trial, Juror 9 was observed interacting with Jacob Martinez, a relative of the defendant. Upon questioning, Juror 9 disclosed he only learned of the familial relationship after speaking with Jacob Martinez. Despite Juror 9’s assurance of impartiality, the district court dismissed him, citing concerns about the interaction, and replaced him with an alternate juror.The District Court of Williams County, Northwest Judicial District, presided over the consolidated trial. Following the jury’s verdict, Martinez was convicted on all counts except one of reckless endangerment. Martinez objected to the removal of Juror 9, arguing that the substitution violated his constitutional rights and exceeded the court’s authority under North Dakota Rule of Criminal Procedure 24(c)(1).On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed whether the district court’s decision to replace Juror 9 constituted an abuse of discretion or violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Supreme Court held that substituting a properly qualified alternate juror did not implicate double jeopardy, as it did not terminate the original jeopardy. The court further held that the district court’s expressed concerns regarding Juror 9’s impartiality constituted a sufficient basis for dismissal, and that the court did not abuse its discretion in replacing Juror 9 with an alternate. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the criminal judgments against Martinez. View "State v. Martinez" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with preventing arrest and domestic violence following an incident at his mother’s residence in Minot, North Dakota. The alleged facts included a confrontation between the defendant and his sister, during which she claimed the defendant pushed her, causing her to fall and sustain injuries. Police responded to the scene, and when attempting to arrest the defendant, he physically resisted, repeatedly stating he was “not going to jail.” Officers used force to restrain and handcuff him, and body camera footage was entered into evidence.The case was heard in the District Court of Ward County, North Central Judicial District. At trial, testimony was provided by the victim, two police officers, and the defendant. The court also reviewed photographic and video evidence. The defendant made motions for acquittal at the close of the State’s case and at the end of all evidence, both of which were denied. The District Court found the defendant guilty of both charges, sentencing him to 360 days’ imprisonment with most suspended for supervised probation on the preventing arrest conviction, and a concurrent 30-day sentence on the domestic violence conviction.On appeal to the Supreme Court of North Dakota, the defendant argued that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, claiming he was not informed of his arrest before being restrained and that he acted in self-defense with no intent to cause injury. The Supreme Court held that sufficient evidence supported both convictions. The Court found that the officers were justified in not informing the defendant of his arrest prior to his resistance, and that the defendant’s actions toward his sister constituted willful, or at least reckless, conduct resulting in bodily injury. The criminal judgment was affirmed. View "State v. Gores" on Justia Law

The case involves two parents, Staiger and Johnson, who were never married but share one minor child. The original judgment awarded primary residential responsibility to Johnson, with Staiger receiving scheduled parenting time. Following Johnson’s DUI arrest—during which the child was present—Staiger sought to obtain primary residential responsibility, or alternatively, equal parenting time and joint decision-making. Staiger also requested modifications to safety measures in the parenting plan and the removal of certain alcohol testing requirements for himself. Johnson, as a result of her DUI, was required to participate in a sobriety program and begin mental health services.Previously, the District Court of Morton County, South Central Judicial District, modified the parenting plan to include a graduated visitation schedule for Staiger, alcohol testing requirements, and behavioral conditions. Upon Johnson’s DUI conviction, Staiger moved for further modification. The district court found that Johnson’s DUI incident did not constitute a material change in circumstances warranting a change in primary residential responsibility, noting there was no evidence the child was harmed or suffered a decline in welfare. The court did, however, modify the parenting plan to add alcohol and mental health restrictions for Johnson and removed one of Staiger’s alcohol testing requirements. Staiger’s subsequent motions for reconsideration and clarification were denied.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the district court’s findings under the clearly erroneous standard. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s determination that Johnson’s DUI did not rise to the level of a material change in circumstances affecting the child’s welfare, and that the modifications to the parenting plan were supported by the record. The Supreme Court also upheld the denial of Staiger’s motions for reconsideration and clarification, finding no abuse of discretion. Johnson’s request for attorney’s fees was denied. The district court’s second amended judgment and related orders were affirmed. View "Johnson v. Staiger" on Justia Law

After the divorce of a couple who had three children—two minors and one adult—a parenting plan was established. Several years later, the father moved for contempt, alleging that the mother prevented his relationship and communication with the children, in violation of the parenting plan. The mother responded by seeking a modification of parenting time and requested a mental examination of the father, citing concerns about his behavior toward the children. She submitted affidavits from herself and their children, which described the father's angry outbursts and alleged emotional mistreatment.The District Court of Cass County, East Central Judicial District, denied the father’s motion for contempt, reduced his parenting time, and ordered a mental examination under N.D.R.Civ.P. 35, with the father responsible for the costs of both the examination and supervised parenting sessions. The court also admitted the children’s affidavits into evidence over the father's hearsay objection. The court’s order delegated authority to a therapist to determine the progression of the father’s “stepped” parenting plan, allowing the therapist to control when and how parenting time would increase.On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court found that while the admission of the children’s affidavits was an abuse of discretion, it was harmless error because their live testimony provided similar evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed the findings that a material change of circumstances justified modifying parenting time, upheld the requirement for a mental examination at the father's expense, and found no abuse of discretion in denying contempt against the mother. However, it reversed the delegation of decision-making authority to the therapist regarding progression in the parenting plan, holding that such delegation was improper, and remanded for a court-supervised plan. The court also partially granted the mother’s motion to strike portions of the father’s appellate brief and imposed double costs against him. View "Boyda v. Boyda" on Justia Law

The parties, who share two children, divorced in 2022 and initially agreed to share residential responsibility on a week-on, week-off basis. After their divorce, Ashlyn Clemenson moved to Bottineau and began living with her boyfriend and the children’s half-sibling. The parties later stipulated to an amended judgment to reflect changes in income and child support, maintaining equal residential responsibility. In July 2024, Cole Clemenson moved to modify residential responsibility, seeking primary custody of the children, while Ashlyn Clemenson filed a cross-motion for primary residential responsibility. Both parties agreed that Ashlyn’s relocation constituted a material change in circumstances, and a two-day trial was held in January 2025.The District Court of McHenry County, Northeast Judicial District, found that Cole Clemenson had a history of domestic violence, including incidents in 2013 and 2021, and concluded that the presumption against awarding residential responsibility to a parent who has perpetrated domestic violence under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1)(j) applied. The district court designated Ashlyn Clemenson as the primary residential parent, granting Cole Clemenson parenting time on alternating weekends and weekly during the summer. Cole Clemenson appealed, challenging the application of the domestic violence presumption, the findings regarding serious bodily injury, the court’s weighing of best interest factors, and the sufficiency of the district court’s findings.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the district court’s findings for clear error. It held that the domestic violence presumption in N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1)(j) applies even when the parent previously shared equal residential responsibility and does not require serious bodily injury to be proximate to the proceeding. The Supreme Court determined that the district court did not clearly err in its findings or in weighing the best interest factors, and affirmed the amended judgment designating Ashlyn Clemenson as the primary residential parent. The request for attorney’s fees was denied. View "Clemenson v. Clemenson" on Justia Law