Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In a legal malpractice case in North Dakota, a couple, Kenneth and Carol Pinks, sued attorney Alexander Kelsch and his professional corporation, along with associated partners, alleging negligence in representing them in a quiet title action against the State of North Dakota. The District Court, South Central Judicial District, bifurcated the malpractice action to first determine the element of causation, specifically whether the Pinks would have achieved a more favorable outcome in the quiet title action but for the alleged negligence of the defendants. The court denied cross-motions for summary judgment, finding there were genuine issues of material fact.Following a bench trial on the causation element, the district court concluded that had the evidence of the Pinks’ ownership of the disputed land been presented in the quiet title action, they would have established their ownership claim was prior and superior to the State’s claim of title. The court concluded the Pinks proved the element of causation and ordered a jury trial be set on the remaining issues of the legal malpractice claim. The defendants appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of North Dakota, however, dismissed the appeal, ruling that the defendants were attempting to appeal from an interlocutory order, and the defendants did not seek certification under Rule 54(b) of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule requires that, in cases with more than one claim or multiple parties, a final judgment on one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties can only be directed if the court expressly determines there is no just reason for delay. The court found that the district court only ruled on the causation element of the legal malpractice claim, and other elements, such as the existence of an attorney-client relationship, a duty by the attorney to the client, a breach of that duty by the attorney, and damages were still left to be adjudicated. The defendants' failure to comply with Rule 54(b) led to the dismissal of the appeal. The court also denied the Pinks' request for costs and attorney’s fees, determining that the defendants' appeal was not frivolously made. View "Pinks v. Kelsch" on Justia Law

In North Dakota, Friends of the Rail Bridge (FORB), Downtown Business Association of Bismarck (DBAB), and CD Holdings, LLC appealed from a judgment dismissing their administrative appeal due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The case arose when BNSF Railway Company applied for permits to construct a new rail bridge and remove the existing rail bridge across the Missouri River. FORB and DBAB requested the Department of Water Resources (DWR) to conduct a public hearing or meeting regarding the permits. After the permits were issued, FORB, DBAB, and CD Holdings appealed to the district court. The court dismissed the appeal, concluding they did not request a hearing under N.D.C.C. § 61-03-22, therefore it lacked subject matter jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of North Dakota, in an opinion written by Justice McEvers, affirmed the lower court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the appellants failed to perfect their appeal and the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal because the appellants did not request a hearing within 30 days after DWR’s issuance of the permits. Therefore, no hearing was held, nor was a hearing request denied by DWR. The court further clarified that the public meetings held were not hearings under N.D.C.C. § 61-03-22 and should not be confused with adjudicative proceedings. View "Friends of the Rail Bridge v. Dep't of Water Resources" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of North Dakota considered an appeal and cross-appeal related to a dispute over three contracts for deed between LAWC Holdings, LLC, and Vincent Watford, L.L.C. The court affirmed the lower court's findings that Vincent had breached the contract for deed on one of the parcels of land, and that specific performance was an appropriate remedy. The court also affirmed the lower court's decision that LAWC was the prevailing party and was thus entitled to attorney’s fees. However, the court denied LAWC's claim for damages as LAWC was not entitled to both performance of the contract through specific performance and damages for Vincent's breach of contract. The court also concluded that LAWC was entitled to an award of attorney’s fees on appeal. The case was remanded to the lower court to determine a reasonable amount of attorney’s fees on appeal. The court did not address LAWC's cross-appeal regarding title to the other two parcels as it was determined that LAWC had waived this cross-appeal. View "LAWC Holdings, LLC v. Vincent Watford, L.L.C." on Justia Law

The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed a lower court decision finding Erica Good Bear guilty of terrorizing, a class C felony. Good Bear appealed the judgment, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to warrant a conviction, improper admission of hearsay evidence, and denial of her right to confront a witness. The alleged hearsay evidence was two statements made by the victim's four-year-old child, both of which were recounted by other witnesses. The first statement was recounted by the victim, and the second was recounted by the responding police officer. The court concluded that both statements fell under the "excited utterance" exception to the hearsay rule, making them admissible. The court also found that the second statement did not violate Good Bear's right to confront her accuser, as it was not considered "testimonial" under the Sixth Amendment. The court determined that sufficient evidence supported the jury's verdict of guilty on the terrorizing charge. View "State v. Good Bear" on Justia Law

In this divorce case between Stacey Jean Dimmler and Dustin Scott Dimmler, the Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed several issues. The couple had two children and disputed matters of property division, child support, and primary residential responsibility. Both parties appealed the decision of the District Court. Dustin argued that the court erred in valuing and distributing the marital estate, in determining primary residential responsibility, in calculating child support, and by refusing to remove a parenting investigator. Stacey cross-appealed, arguing that the court erred by not making child support retroactive to the date of the interim order, not awarding her attorney’s fees, and not ordering Dustin to repay her the cost of her parental capacity evaluation.The supreme court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. It affirmed the district court's valuation of the Florida property and the parties’ personal property, its decision on primary residential responsibility, its calculation of Dustin's child support payments, its refusal to retroactively award child support to Stacey, and its denial of attorney’s fees or reimbursement of Stacey's fees for a parental capacity evaluation. However, the court found error in the district court's calculation of the farmland's value. The supreme court held that the district court should have included the debt from the life estate in calculating the value of Dustin's remainder interest in the farmland. It remanded the case for further proceedings to properly evaluate the farmland’s value and to equitably divide the marital estate. View "Dimmler v. Dimmler" on Justia Law

In this case, George Lyons appealed from a district court order dismissing his application for postconviction relief. Lyons had been convicted of gross sexual imposition in 2017, a conviction that was upheld on appeal. He filed an application for postconviction relief more than two years after his conviction became final, claiming newly discovered evidence and arguing that his conviction was barred by a statute of limitations for gross sexual imposition. The district court dismissed his application as untimely under N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-01, which requires such applications to be filed within two years of the conviction becoming final.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the dismissal. The court first noted that while postconviction relief is available for convictions obtained without jurisdiction, such claims must be brought within the two-year deadline, and no exception exists for claims challenging the district court's jurisdiction. Therefore, Lyons' claim concerning the statute of limitations for gross sexual imposition was untimely.Second, the court rejected Lyons' argument that the newly discovered evidence exception to the two-year deadline applied. The court found that Lyons had failed to provide competent admissible evidence to support his claim that the new evidence was discovered after trial. As such, the court held that Lyons had failed to meet his burden to obtain an evidentiary hearing in the district court.Lastly, the court declined to address Lyons' ineffective assistance of counsel claim because he did not provide any argument or explanation concerning this claim in his brief. View "Lyons v. State" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of North Dakota reversed and remanded a juvenile court order that terminated the parental rights of T.W. to her children, J.C. and M.W. The children had been placed in foster care by the Ward County Human Services Zone due to child abuse by T.W. and A.W., and T.W. was sentenced to four years in custody after pleading guilty to three counts of child abuse. The State later filed a petition for termination of T.W.'s parental rights.The Supreme Court found that the juvenile court had abused its discretion when it took judicial notice of and considered evidence beyond the evidentiary record. The court also found that the juvenile court had made clearly erroneous findings, including incorrectly stating that the children had been in foster care for 1123 nights when they had actually been there for 877 nights. Although there was sufficient evidence to support the termination of T.W.'s parental rights, the court was unable to discern whether the juvenile court had relied on inadmissible evidence in its decision.As a result, the Supreme Court remanded the case with instructions for the juvenile court to issue an order based only on the evidence received at trial. The Supreme Court retained jurisdiction and requested that the juvenile court issue its new order within 20 days. View "Interest of J.C." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of North Dakota reversed a district court decision denying Chad Hanson's petition to be recognized as the heir of the late Arlen Lindberg. Lindberg died intestate, and Hanson filed a petition alleging that he was Lindberg's biological son, substantiating his claim with an affidavit from his mother and DNA testing results showing a 99.7% chance of relation to Lindberg's biological brother. The Lindberg family opposed the petition, arguing that Lindberg's parental rights were terminated when Hanson was adopted by his stepfather. The district court ruled in favor of the Lindberg family, interpreting North Dakota's Uniform Probate Code and Uniform Parentage Act to require that a paternity action commence within two years of birth, which was not the case for Hanson. However, the Supreme Court of North Dakota disagreed with this interpretation, stating that the district court had applied the law incorrectly. The Supreme Court ruled that the Uniform Probate Code allows for establishing a "genetic father" through genetic testing or the Uniform Parentage Act, and that the act of adoption does not equate to an adjudication of paternity. The case was remanded back to the district court for further proceedings. View "Estate of Lindberg" on Justia Law

In this case from the Supreme Court of North Dakota, Daynen Hoover contested a district court judgment that affirmed a decision by the North Dakota Department of Transportation (Department) to suspend his driving privileges for 91 days. This penalty was the result of Hoover being arrested for being in control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, with a blood alcohol concentration of .085 percent by weight. The Department conducted an administrative hearing by video conference, during which they introduced eight foundational exhibits from the State Crime Laboratory. Hoover objected to this on the grounds that he and his counsel did not have copies of these exhibits to review and analyze. Despite these objections, the hearing officer admitted the exhibits and the Department subsequently suspended Hoover's driving privileges for 91 days.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota reversed the district court's decision. The court concluded that the procedure used by the Department, which admitted exhibits into evidence without providing Hoover a meaningful opportunity to examine them, deprived him of a fair hearing. The court noted that the Department's notice of information did not offer copies of the exhibits or specifically identify which documents maintained by the Department or available on the attorney general's website would be introduced at the hearing. The court found that this violated the requirement for parties to be afforded an opportunity to examine exhibits before they are admitted into evidence. Therefore, the court ruled that the Department's procedures did not comply with state law and substantially prejudiced Hoover's procedural rights. The court's decision emphasized the importance of a party's ability to examine exhibits introduced against them as a critical procedural protection in adjudicative proceedings. View "Hoover v. NDDOT" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of North Dakota heard an appeal from Robert Williamson, who was sentenced for probation violations related to two counts of gross sexual imposition and one count of luring minors by computer. Williamson had initially served approximately four and a half years of a 10-year sentence, with all but five years suspended, and was then released on probation. He was given "good time" credit by the Department of Corrections, which aids in reducing a sentence. However, after violating his probation conditions, Williamson was re-sentenced to a 10-year term with credit for 4 years and 181 days, without any consideration of his accrued good time.Williamson appealed the decision, arguing that his re-sentencing was illegal because it did not account for his good time credit. The Supreme Court of North Dakota agreed, stating that a court does not have the authority to waive or limit good time awarded by the Department of Corrections, and any credit for sentence reductions must be stated in the criminal judgment. The court held that the lower court had illegally sentenced Williamson by failing to include his accrued good time in the re-sentencing. The case was reversed and remanded for re-sentencing in accordance with the opinion. View "State v. Williamson" on Justia Law