Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The case involves the distribution of trust assets following the death of the surviving trustor, G.I.C. The trust agreement initially provided for specific distributions of farmland to the trustors' five children. However, the land was sold to fund the trust before its termination, leading to a dispute over how the remaining liquidated assets should be distributed. Luke, one of the beneficiaries, argued that the assets should be distributed proportionately to the value of the specific land parcels each beneficiary would have received. The trustee, Bremer Trust, and Luke’s siblings contended that the assets should be distributed equally among the beneficiaries.The District Court of Sargent County, Southeast Judicial District, initially ordered an equal distribution of the liquidated assets among the five children. This decision was based on the interpretation that the trust agreement reflected an overall intent to treat the beneficiaries equally, despite the specific land distributions being impossible due to the sale of the land.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the trust agreement's primary intent was to provide for the trustors' care and support during their lifetimes, with a secondary intent to distribute specific parcels of land to the children upon the trust's termination. The court found that the most consistent interpretation with the trustors' intent was to distribute the remaining trust assets proportionately to the value of the specific land distributions each beneficiary would have received. The case was remanded for redistribution of the trust assets in accordance with this interpretation. View "Guardianship and Conservatorship of G.I.C." on Justia Law

Coby Edwards was charged with class AA felony gross sexual imposition for allegedly engaging in a sexual act with a five-year-old child. The State intended to use statements made by the child during a recorded interview and a forensic medical examination, which were admitted under an exception to the hearsay rule. During the trial, various witnesses, including the child, testified. Edwards's counsel mentioned difficulties in communication due to Edwards's pretrial detention and failed to call an expert witness. The jury found Edwards guilty, and the conviction was affirmed on appeal.Edwards then filed for postconviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. He argued that his counsel's references to the child as "the victim," failure to object to hearsay, and failure to call an expert witness constituted ineffective representation. The district court held an evidentiary hearing and denied the application, finding that the counsel's decisions were strategic and that Edwards did not demonstrate how an expert witness would have changed the outcome. The court also found that the references to the child as a victim were deficient but did not prejudice the trial's outcome.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Edwards failed to show a reasonable probability that the trial outcome would have been different without the alleged deficiencies in his counsel's performance. The court noted that the evidence against Edwards, including the child's testimony and statements, was substantial and that the counsel's errors did not undermine confidence in the trial's outcome. View "Edwards v. State" on Justia Law

Jared Peterka, a neighbor and tenant of John and Irene Janda, assumed the lease of their farmland in 2012. The lease was renewed every three years, and in 2019, a right of first refusal for Peterka to purchase the land was added. In October 2018, the Jandas established a living trust and conveyed the property into it, with their daughters as residuary beneficiaries. In June 2021, the Jandas and Peterka executed an option to purchase the property. Shortly after, guardianship proceedings were initiated, and the Jandas were found incapacitated. The guardians rescinded the option to purchase.Peterka filed a complaint for declaratory judgment to validate the option to purchase. The Defendants counterclaimed, arguing the option was the result of undue influence and that the Jandas lacked capacity. After a four-day bench trial, the District Court of Traill County found the option to purchase was facially valid and not a product of undue influence. However, it ruled the option was voidable under N.D.C.C. § 14-01-02 due to the Jandas' lack of capacity and dismissed Peterka’s complaint.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case. Peterka argued the district court erred in its findings on capacity. The Supreme Court clarified that the capacity to enter into a contract and the capacity under N.D.C.C. § 14-01-02 are distinct. The court found the district court did not misstate the law and its findings were supported by evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that the option to purchase was voidable under N.D.C.C. § 14-01-02 due to the Jandas being of unsound mind but not entirely without understanding. View "Peterka v. Janda" on Justia Law

In 2018, Kevin Hoff pled guilty to murder and was sentenced to life without parole. Since his conviction, Hoff has filed three applications for postconviction relief. His first application, filed in May 2020, claimed ineffective assistance of counsel and newly discovered evidence. The amended application, which abandoned the newly discovered evidence claim, was denied, and the denial was affirmed on appeal. Hoff's second application, filed in December 2021, claimed his trial counsel incorrectly advised him about the defense of others. The State moved to dismiss this application as time-barred and for summary disposition based on res judicata and misuse of process. The district court granted the State's motions, and Hoff did not appeal.In his third application, Hoff claimed a mental disease excepted him from the two-year limitation, his trial counsel incorrectly advised him, and newly discovered evidence existed. He also filed a Rule 60(b) motion to vacate the order denying his second application. The district court consolidated the Rule 60(b) motion with the third application and held an evidentiary hearing. The court granted the State's motion to dismiss based on the two-year limitation, granted the State's motion for summary disposition based on res judicata and misuse of process, denied Hoff's application, and dismissed his Rule 60(b) motion.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's judgment. The court held that Hoff's third application was barred by the two-year limitation in N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-01(2) and that Hoff did not demonstrate a physical disability or mental disease that precluded timely assertion of his application. The court also concluded that Hoff waived the issue of the denial of his Rule 60(b) motion by not adequately briefing it on appeal. The court did not address the res judicata and misuse of process arguments, as the application was already precluded by the two-year limitation. View "Hoff v. State" on Justia Law

McKenzie Electric Cooperative, Inc. ("McKenzie Electric") sought a supervisory writ from the North Dakota Supreme Court to direct the district court to vacate its order of recusal, deny the motion for recusal, and reassign the case back to Judge El-Dweek. The case began in November 2019, and in July 2020, Judge El-Dweek disclosed his membership in McKenzie Electric. Discovery continued through 2023, and McKenzie Electric disclosed it was seeking significant damages. In May 2024, the respondents filed a motion for a change of venue due to potential juror bias. Following a hearing, Judge El-Dweek recused himself, citing the appearance of impropriety.The district court's decision to recuse was challenged by McKenzie Electric, which argued that the recusal would cause delays and waste judicial resources. The North Dakota Supreme Court, however, emphasized that the justice system presumes judges impartially apply the law and that having a different judge decide the case does not merit the assertion of supervisory jurisdiction. The court noted that any error in granting or denying recusal could be remedied by appeal.The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that this case did not present extraordinary circumstances warranting the exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction. The court found that the claimed injustice from the delay was largely unavoidable and could not be remedied by granting the writ. Therefore, the petition for a supervisory writ was denied. View "McKenzie Electric Coop., Inc. v. El-Dweek" on Justia Law

The case involves Access Independent Health Services, Inc., doing business as Red River Women’s Clinic, and several physicians who challenged the constitutionality of North Dakota’s abortion regulation statutes, N.D.C.C. ch. 12.1-19.1. The plaintiffs argued that the law was unconstitutionally vague and violated pregnant women’s rights to life and health-preserving care under the North Dakota Constitution.The District Court of Burleigh County granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, declaring the law unconstitutionally vague and recognizing a fundamental right for pregnant women to choose abortion before viability under the North Dakota Constitution. The court found that the law’s language was ambiguous and did not provide clear guidelines for physicians, thus violating due process. The court also held that the law infringed on the fundamental rights of pregnant women.The State of North Dakota appealed to the Supreme Court of North Dakota, seeking a stay of the district court’s judgment pending appeal. The Supreme Court of North Dakota denied the motion for a stay. The court applied a four-factor test to determine whether to grant a stay: likelihood of success on appeal, irreparable injury to the appellant, substantial harm to any party, and harm to the public interest. The court found that the State was unlikely to succeed on the merits of the appeal, as the law was likely unconstitutionally vague and did not meet the strict scrutiny standard required for laws infringing on fundamental rights. The court also determined that the balance of harms and public interest did not favor granting a stay, noting that the law had never been enforced and that the state’s attorneys had agreed not to enforce it pending the outcome of the appeal. View "Access Independent Health Services, Inc. v. Wrigley" on Justia Law

Northstar Center, LLC entered into a real estate contract with Lukenbill Family Partnership, LLLP to purchase a 120-acre parcel of land. The contract was later assigned to Northstar by Templeton Enterprises, LLC. The agreement included an option to purchase an additional 105-acre parcel, which was amended to a commitment to purchase. Northstar provided a promissory note for a tax increase payment due by January 1, 2014, but paid it late. Lukenbill sold the disputed property to Tundra Properties, LLC, leading Northstar to sue for breach of contract and intentional interference with contract.The District Court of Williams County granted summary judgment in favor of Northstar on its breach of contract claim against Lukenbill and its intentional interference with contract claim against Tundra. The court also granted summary judgment in favor of Lukenbill on its indemnification claim against Tundra and dismissed Tundra’s breach of warranty claim against Lukenbill. The court held a bench trial on Northstar’s damages due to Lukenbill’s breach.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for Northstar on its breach of contract and intentional interference claims. The Supreme Court determined that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding whether Northstar breached the contract by failing to make the tax increase payment on time and whether Tundra had knowledge of the contract amendments. The court also found that the district court improperly resolved factual disputes regarding Tundra’s knowledge and intent, and whether Tundra acted without justification.The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Tundra’s breach of warranty claim but reversed the summary judgments on Northstar’s breach of contract and intentional interference claims, as well as Lukenbill’s indemnification claim. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court’s opinion. View "Northstar Center v. Lukenbill Family Partnership" on Justia Law

A.K. appealed a disorderly conduct restraining order issued against her. Jennifer Gooss, on behalf of her minor daughter, filed the petition alleging A.K., also a minor, engaged in disorderly conduct. A temporary restraining order was issued, and a hearing was held. After a 30-minute hearing, the district court issued a disorderly conduct restraining order against A.K.The District Court of Mercer County, South Central Judicial District, conducted the hearing. A.K. argued on appeal that she was denied due process because the court's time limit on the hearing deprived her of a reasonable opportunity to rebut the evidence and testify on her own behalf. She also contended that the district court's findings were not supported by the evidence.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court noted that a district court's decision to grant a restraining order or conduct a hearing is reviewed for abuse of discretion. The court found that A.K. did not object to the 30-minute time limit at the outset of the hearing and did not request additional time. The court determined that the district court did not act arbitrarily or capriciously by setting the time limitations and that A.K. had a reasonable opportunity to cross-examine the petitioner.The Supreme Court also reviewed the district court's findings and concluded that sufficient evidence supported the finding that A.K.'s conduct affected the minor petitioner's safety, security, or privacy. The court held that the district court's findings were not clearly erroneous and that the court did not abuse its discretion in granting the restraining order. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the disorderly conduct restraining order. View "Gooss v. A.K." on Justia Law

Samantha Davis filed a petition for a disorderly conduct restraining order against Richard Romanyshyn in April 2024. The district court granted a temporary restraining order and outlined the hearing procedure, which limited the hearing to 15 minutes unless a full evidentiary hearing was requested. The procedure required the requesting party to file a notice of witnesses and a summary of their anticipated testimony three days before the hearing. If no request was made, evidence had to be presented by affidavit, and affiants had to be available for cross-examination if notified 24 hours before the hearing.Davis did not request a full evidentiary hearing but filed a notice to cross-examine Romanyshyn. Romanyshyn argued he requested a full evidentiary hearing and filed a notice to cross-examine through his answer, but the district court found he did not follow the proper procedure. The hearing was limited to arguments from Davis’s counsel and Romanyshyn, along with Davis’s petition and Romanyshyn’s affidavit. The district court granted Davis a two-year restraining order, later amended to include the parties’ two minor children, conflicting with an existing parental responsibility order.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case and concluded that the district court deprived Romanyshyn of a full evidentiary hearing as required by N.D.C.C. § 12.1–31.2–01(1). The court found that the district court relied solely on inadmissible hearsay in Davis’s petition and Romanyshyn’s affidavit, without allowing cross-examination or presenting admissible evidence. The Supreme Court reversed the restraining order and remanded the case for a full evidentiary hearing. The court also noted that any restraining order issued on remand must not conflict with the existing parental responsibility order. View "Davis v. Romanyshyn" on Justia Law

Christine Berger and Brian Repnow were in a decade-long relationship but never married. During their relationship, they accumulated various properties and businesses. In August 2021, Berger filed a lawsuit seeking partition, conversion, promissory estoppel, and unjust enrichment, requesting an equitable division of their accumulated real and personal property or monetary damages. Repnow claimed sole ownership of the properties and requested denial of Berger's claims.The District Court of Mercer, South Central Judicial District, held a two-day bench trial in October 2023. The court granted Berger's partition claim for the Expansion Drive property, awarding her sole ownership, and determined that the other properties and vehicles were solely owned by Repnow. The court also granted Berger's unjust enrichment claim, awarding her $64,000 for her contributions to Repnow's properties, and denied the claims of conversion and promissory estoppel. The court awarded the Dream Girls Boutique business to Repnow and Powerhouse Nutrition to Berger.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's finding that the parties intended to share ownership of the Expansion Drive property and the award of Powerhouse Nutrition to Berger. However, it reversed the decision to award 100% of the Expansion Drive property to Berger, stating that the district court should have considered the parties' respective ownership interests and made an equitable division. The court also found that the district court failed to complete the unjust enrichment analysis and adequately explain the $64,000 award.The North Dakota Supreme Court remanded the case for the district court to determine the parties' respective ownership interests in the Expansion Drive property and make an award consistent with those interests. The court also instructed the district court to complete the unjust enrichment analysis and provide a clear explanation for the $64,000 award if necessary. View "Berger v. Repnow" on Justia Law