Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

L&C Expedition, LLC (“L&C”) appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of International Fidelity Insurance Company (“IFIC”) and denying summary judgment to L&C. L&C contracted with Unlimited Excavating (“Unlimited”) to perform work on a residential development project. Unlimited completed its work in November 2016 and received final payment in July 2017. In 2019, L&C learned of major problems in the construction and notified Unlimited it needed to make repairs. Unlimited did not make the repairs and L&C demanded IFIC arrange for performance of Unlimited’s work per the terms of the performance bond. IFIC refused to arrange for performance. L&C subsequently initiated suit against IFIC in May 2020 arguing L&C is entitled to recover $393,000 under the terms of the performance bond. The performance bond provided the following: “[a]ny suit under this bond must be[] [i]nstituted before the expiration of two years from the date on which final payment under the subcontract falls due.” The parties do not dispute the district court’s finding L&C initiated its action outside the limitation period provided within the terms of the bond. L&C argued the district court erred in finding a contractual limitation on the period to assert a claim was enforceable, erred in failing to apply N.D.C.C. § 9-08-05 to preclude modification of the applicable statute of limitations, and erred in interpreting N.D.C.C. § 22-03-03 as providing an exception to the prohibition against modifying the applicable statute of limitations. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "L&C Expedition, et al. v. Swenson, Hagen and Co., et al." on Justia Law

Paul Reed appealed a district court judgment modifying his child support obligation, arguing the court erred in determining his gross income. Reed had two separate sources of income: a military disability benefit of $2,571.85 monthly and a military pension of $2,491.00 monthly. Reed’s first ex-wife received a monthly payment of $622.75 from his military pension and a monthly payment of $189.72 for a Survivor Benefit Plan (SBP). Reed’s second ex-wife, Ellen Reed, received a monthly payment of $327.00 from his military pension. Reed argued the payments made to his ex-wives should have been deducted from his total gross income when calculating his child support obligation. The district court disagreed, did not deduct the payments made to his ex-wives, and modified Reed’s monthly child support obligation to $1,657.00 per month. Although the North Dakota Supreme Court agreed military disability benefits and military pension payments payable to Reed fell within the definition and examples of income, the Court concluded retirement benefits allocated within the property division in the prior divorce proceedings was not income for child support purposes. The allocation of $622.75 to Reed’s first ex-wife should not have been included in his calculation of income for child support because the funds were the property of his first ex-wife. The payment was specifically included in the property division in Reed and his first ex-wife’s divorce judgment. The monthly payment of $327.00 to Ellen Reed was her property and therefore not income. The monthly SBP payment of $189.72 was correctly included in Paul Reed’s income. The SBP payment is not included within the division of property in the divorce judgment. The support order was reversed and the matter remanded for recalculation of the child support obligation. View "Reed v. Reed, et al." on Justia Law

Heather Kitzan appealed a judgment entered following a bench trial in her divorce action against Justun Kitzan asserting the district court erred in including certain items as marital property, in distributing the marital estate, and in denying her spousal support. After review of the trial court record, the North Dakota Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Kitzan v. Kitzan, et al." on Justia Law

Jesse Keidel appealed a district court judgment affirming an administrative law judge’s (ALJ) decision denying Keidel permanent partial impairment (PPI) benefits. In May 1996, Keidel suffered a work-related injury to the meniscus of his left knee. Keidel had surgery in December 1996. In October 1997, Keidel underwent a second surgery to his left knee, a high tibial osteotomy. The doctor performing an independent medical evaluation in May 1998 opined that Keidel’s left knee condition was a “combination of his significant preexisting left knee degenerative joint disease and the work-related permanent aggravation.” Following a permanent impairment evaluation, WSI denied Keidel a PPI award because Keidel’s 15% whole body impairment was below the statutory 16% threshold for an impairment award. In January 2019, Keidel had left total knee replacement surgery. In June 2020, Keidel underwent a second permanent impairment evaluation. The evaluating doctor, Dr. Redington, determined Keidel had a 24% whole person impairment for the left total knee replacement. "Giving [Keidel] the benefit of the doubt, I will apportion 50% of the impairment rating of the left knee to pre-existing conditions." In November 2020, WSI denied an impairment award for Keidel’s left knee because his overall impairment rating after apportionment after the second evaluation was 12%, which was below the 14% threshold for an impairment award under then current version of N.D.C.C. § 65-05-12.2. At a hearing, Keidel argued the apportionment of his left knee impairment due to preexisting arthritis was litigated and decided in a 2000 hearing. Keidel argued administrative res judicata prohibited WSI from litigating whether his permanent impairment could be apportioned to a preexisting condition. The ALJ and district court concluded administrative res judicata did not apply. Finding no error in that judgment, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "Keidel v. WSI, et al." on Justia Law

Brian and April Szostak appealed a district court’s order granting a second motion for sanctions, and the court’s finding of facts, conclusions of law, and order for judgment and judgment. Panther Pressure Testers Inc., and Kirk Wold sued the Szostaks alleging the Szostaks and Wold formed a company named Szostak Services, LLC. Panther and Wold alleged Wold was a member of Szostak Services and the company breached their contract by failing to recognize him as a member. Panther and Wold claim the Szostaks were unjustly enriched after Panther and Wold erroneoysly deposited funds into a Szostak Services bank account and the Szostaks refused to return the funds. The Szostaks answered and counterclaimed. The Szostaks served discovery responses, but did not provide requested documents. Panther and Wold moved for sanctions due to Szostaks’ non-compliance with the district court’s order compelling discovery. At a deposition, for which a subpoena duces tecum was issued, April Szostak revealed she and her husband had 12 boxes of documents pertaining to Szostak Services, but Szostak Services did not bring any documents to the deposition. Panther and Wold moved again for sanctions, requesting the district court enter a default judgment against the Szostaks and dismiss their counterclaims. The Szostaks argued the court abused its discretion by granting Panther and Wold’s second motion for sanctions and entering default judgment. The Szostaks also argued the court erred in its determination of damages. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the default judgment. View "Panther Pressure Testers, et al. v. Szostak, et al." on Justia Law

Shilo Knutson petitioned for a supervisory writ to overturn the district court’s order denying summary judgment and to direct the court to grant his motion for summary judgment on his post-conviction relief application. Because Knutson’s arguments could be reviewed on appeal from a final judgment disposing of his post-conviction relief application, or could potentially have been reviewed in a direct appeal from the underlying criminal case’s order revoking probation, the North Dakota Supreme Court declined to exercise discretion to grant supervisory relief. The Court therefore denied his petition. View "Knutson v. Foughty, et al." on Justia Law

R.F. appealed a juvenile court order appointing a guardian for R.F.’s and S.V.’s children and restricting contact and visitation between the parents and children. C.B. filed petitions for guardianship of G.V. and S.V., R.F.’s and S.V.’s children. R.F. is the mother, and S.V. is the father. C.B. is the children’s maternal grandmother, and she lives in Fargo. Both parents were living in Florida at the time of the hearing. A judicial referee granted C.B. guardianship for three years and restricted the visitation rights of R.F. and S.V. On de novo review, the juvenile court then adopted the referee’s findings and order. At the time of the hearing, G.V. was eight and S.V. was four. C.B. had been taking care of the children since their births. R.F. would sometimes live with C.B., but she would come and go as she pleased, leaving the children with C.B. for extended periods. S.V. sometimes visited the children with R.F. Both parents wanted their children to reside in Florida, and R.F. wanted the children to live with her since she was not incarcerated. R.F. and S.V. provided the juvenile court a letter predating the guardianship petition stating their preference that in the event that they were unable to take care of the children, they wanted them to reside with their paternal grandmother in Florida. The juvenile court found that neither parent has acted as the primary caregiver or parental figure during the children’s lives. The juvenile court found that in Florida neither parent was the primary caregiver for the children; instead they lived for most of that time with their paternal grandmother. R.F. had warrants out for her arrest at the time of the hearing, she has absconded from probation, and she has not been a consistent presence in the children’s lives because of her criminal activity. S.V. also spent time in jail and has voluntarily left the children with C.B. since their births and has not cared for them as required by law. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the juvenile court did not err in its order appointing a guardian and for restricting contact between the parents and children. View "Interest of G.V." on Justia Law

John and Tammy Sadek appealed orders denying their post-judgment motion and sanctioning their attorney under N.D.R.Civ.P. 11. Jason Weber was a Richland County, North Dakota sheriff’s deputy. Sadek acted as a confidential informant for Weber. Sadek was later found in the Red River with a gunshot wound to his head and a backpack full of rocks tied to his body. Sadek’s parents sued Weber and Richland County alleging Weber deceived Sadek by telling Sadek he faced a lengthy prison sentence. They also alleged Weber negligently caused Sadek’s death by failing to adequately train and protect him. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Weber and Richland County: the misrepresentation underlying the deceit claim was a prediction of a future event and therefore not actionable as deceit as a matter of law; as to the negligence claim, there was no evidence to establish Weber’s conduct was the proximate cause of Sadek’s death. In the first appeal ("Sadek I"), the Sadeks argued a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether Weber’s conduct caused Andrew Sadek’s death. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, holding that "the evidence only presents a timeline of events and a request that a jury be allowed to speculate what happened as a result of that string of events." The Court's mandate affirming the dismissal judgment was issued on October 7, 2020. In 2022, the Sadeks filed a “Motion for Summary Judgment,” citing N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b) but requested relief under N.D.R.Civ.P. 56. The Sadeks argued the district court made a mistake by relying on “bad faith” representations by Weber who “successfully hoodwinked [the district court] and obtained a Judgment of Dismissal.” Yet the Sadeks claimed they were entitled to summary judgment because “no triable issue of fact exists as to whether Defendants owed a duty of care to Andrew under the Statute.” The brief was accompanied by a list of signatures “verifying” they agreed with on Supreme Court Justice's dissent in Sadek I. The district court entered an order denying the Sadeks’ post-judgment motion, characterizing it as "baffling and bizarre." After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s orders and granted the Appellees’ motion for sanctions. View "Sadek, et al. v. Weber, et al." on Justia Law

Mark Rath appealed district court orders granting the State’s request for an extension of time to file pleadings, granting two protective orders to Heather Zins, denying two applications to file motions subject to a then existing but subsequently vacated pre-filing order, and a final judgment denying his motion to amend a child support judgment. Rath also argued the North Dakota Child Support Guidelines were unconstitutional. Rath and Zins shared one minor child, A.J.O., born in 2004. The North Dakota Department of Human Services’ Child Support Enforcement Division (“the State”) commenced support proceedings against Rath in 2005 and a judgment ordering child support payments was entered. The judgment was amended in 2008 to establish a parenting plan for A.J.O. Zins was awarded primary residential responsibility while Rath received scheduled parenting time. The judgment was modified three different times—in 2009, 2013, and 2016—with the last judgment requiring Rath to pay $366.00 per month. The district court issued an order detailing the applicable provisions of the North Dakota Child Support Guidelines, applying them to the evidence presented at the hearing, and addressing Rath’s constitutional claims. The court denied Rath’s motion to modify his child support judgment. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s orders granting the State an extension, protection orders on behalf of Zins, and the final judgment denying Rath’s motion to amend his child support obligation. The Court reversed the district court’s orders denying Rath’s applications to file pleadings pursuant to a vacated pre-filing order and remanded to allow for further proceedings. View "Burleigh Cty. Social Service Bd. v. Rath" on Justia Law

Steven Rademacher appeals from criminal judgments after a jury found him guilty of murder, attempted murder and terrorizing. On July 29, 2019, a vehicle driven by Rademacher struck three people. At trial Rademacher conceded that the incident occurred, and that three individuals were struck by his vehicle. The issue for the jury was whether Rademacher had the requisite intent for the charged crimes. Rademacher claimed the district court violated his right to be present during trial on two occasions—prior to jury deliberations and after the jury started deliberations. He also argued the North Dakota Supreme Court should amend N.D.R.Crim.P. 43 because it was internally contradictory. To the latter, the Court declined, and finding no other reversible error, judgment was affirmed. View "North Dakota v. Rademacher" on Justia Law