Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A field consultant for a public teachers’ union brought a lawsuit after a school board held a closed executive session during a grievance hearing involving a teacher’s transfer and removal of extracurricular duties. The board’s attorney presented the school district’s legal position and rationale in an open meeting before the board entered executive session to receive additional legal advice. The board later voted in public to deny the grievance, and the plaintiff, who was not the aggrieved teacher, claimed the executive session violated North Dakota’s open meetings laws. She sought disclosure of the executive session recording as a remedy. The District Court of Grand Forks County granted summary judgment to the school district, finding no waiver of the right to enter executive session, that the requirements for the attorney consultation exemption were met, and that the plaintiff’s due process rights were not violated by her lack of access to the executive session transcript. The court declined to review the executive session recording, relying instead on declarations from board representatives and the parties’ stipulation that no material facts were in dispute. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court held that the school board did not waive its right to an executive session by publicly stating its legal position and that the statutory requirements for entering executive session were satisfied. The court also found no due process violation from not providing the plaintiff access to the transcript. However, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court abused its discretion by not conducting an in camera review of the executive session recording before granting summary judgment. The judgment of dismissal and the award of costs to the school district were reversed, and the case was remanded for the district court to review the recording and proceed accordingly. View "Haskell v. Grand Forks Public Schools" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with terrorizing—domestic violence, a class C felony, after an incident involving his ex-wife, who is also the mother of his minor child. The district court imposed a pre-dispositional order prohibiting contact with the victim, initially for thirty days. After the defendant pled guilty, the court sentenced him to two years, including three days to serve (with credit for time served) and two years of supervised probation. As a condition of probation, the court extended the no-contact order for two years, prohibiting all direct or indirect contact with the victim, including communication relevant to their minor child.After sentencing, the defendant requested an exception to allow necessary communications with the victim regarding court-ordered parenting time with their child. The district court declined, stating the defendant was not prohibited from having contact with his child but failed to provide any method for arranging parenting time, given the victim’s residential responsibility and the communication restrictions. The defendant appealed the judgment and the order extending the no-contact provision.The Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota reviewed the case. It held that, although the district court acted within statutory limits and did not rely on any impermissible factor (so the sentence was not illegal), it abused its discretion by failing to provide a means for the defendant to arrange contact with his child or to explain why no such method was allowed. The court determined that, under these circumstances, the blanket prohibition on contact with the victim—including for purposes of exercising parental rights—was arbitrary and not the result of a reasoned decision. The Supreme Court of North Dakota reversed the criminal judgment and the order extending the order prohibiting contact and remanded for resentencing, instructing the district court to consider alternatives that would permit the defendant to exercise his parental rights. View "State v. Maher" on Justia Law

The case concerns divorced parents who share a minor child. After their 2019 divorce, the mother was awarded primary residential responsibility, with the judgment affirmed on appeal. In 2024, the father moved to modify the custody arrangement, citing a material change in circumstances and seeking joint, and later, primary residential responsibility. Following hearings in 2025, the District Court of Burleigh County granted the father primary residential responsibility, established a parenting plan for the mother, and entered a second amended judgment. The mother appealed, arguing that the district court erred by modifying custody without finding a material change in circumstances, violated her due process rights, improperly delegated authority to the child and a counselor regarding parenting time, and suspended child support without adequate findings. She also asserted cumulative errors and alleged parental alienation. The Supreme Court of North Dakota found that the district court’s findings on the material change of circumstances, best interests factors, and award of primary residential responsibility were not clearly erroneous. The court determined that most of the mother’s arguments were inadequately briefed and thus were not considered on appeal, except for her claim regarding the delegation of parenting time authority. The Supreme Court of North Dakota held that the district court improperly delegated its authority over parenting time to both the minor child and her therapist, allowing them to determine the conditions and occurrence of the mother’s contact with the child. The court found that the district court failed to provide sufficient findings or a clear link between the mother’s conduct and potential harm to the child that would justify such a restriction. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment in part, reversed it in part, and remanded for further proceedings limited to parenting time. View "Vetter v. Vetter" on Justia Law

Two children were removed from their parents’ home in June 2020 and subsequently found by the Juvenile Court of Williams County, North Dakota, to be children in need of protection. The children remained in the custody of North Star Human Service Zone. In 2022, the State petitioned to terminate the parental rights of both parents, but those petitions were denied. On April 1, 2025, the State filed new petitions to terminate parental rights. Following a hearing, the juvenile court found that termination was in the children’s best interests and ordered that the parental rights of G.G. (the father) and S.F. (the mother) be terminated. The court issued oral and written findings supporting its decision, but neither addressed whether the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) applied. G.G. appealed the termination of his parental rights, contending that the juvenile court’s findings were inadequate because they failed to determine whether ICWA applied. The State responded that ICWA was not applicable. The Supreme Court of North Dakota noted that in termination proceedings, a juvenile court must make a threshold inquiry and finding as to whether ICWA applies whenever there is reason to know the child may be an Indian child. The Supreme Court further explained that this inquiry is required for each new petition, and the absence of such a finding constitutes clear error. The Supreme Court of North Dakota held that the juvenile court’s failure to make a threshold finding on ICWA applicability was clearly erroneous. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the juvenile court with instructions to make a finding on whether ICWA applies, based on the existing record or with additional evidence if necessary. The Supreme Court retained jurisdiction during the remand. View "Interest of D.G." on Justia Law

David Hughes and Dana Waters were in a relationship beginning in 2016 while living in Washington. During their relationship, Hughes raised Waters’s son, C.H., as his own, and later they had another son, D.H. Following their separation, they shared custody on a rotating basis. Hughes moved to North Dakota in late 2020, and the children visited him there during holidays and summers. In April 2023, Waters moved with the children to California. That summer, Hughes flew the children to North Dakota for vacation and later informed Waters he would not return them, citing concerns for their safety.After Hughes’s decision to keep the children, both parties initiated legal proceedings: Waters filed a complaint in California on August 9, 2023, but did not serve Hughes until October 20, 2023. Hughes began a child custody action in North Dakota by serving Waters on August 30, 2023. The California court issued ex parte orders for the return of the children, first claiming emergency jurisdiction, then issuing a non-temporary order, both before Hughes was served. The North Dakota District Court of McKenzie County held a hearing, invited arguments on jurisdiction, and communicated with the California court. Eventually, California transferred its case to Washington, although there was no evidence of a pending Washington action.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed whether the district court properly exercised jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA). The court held that neither California nor North Dakota was the children’s “home state,” and no other state had a pending child custody action or declined jurisdiction. North Dakota properly assumed jurisdiction under N.D.C.C. § 14-14.1-12(1)(d). The court affirmed the district court’s order granting primary residential responsibility of D.H. and C.H. to Hughes and rejected Waters’s additional challenges. View "Hughes v. Waters" on Justia Law

Andrew Sangster, on behalf of a class of flight instructors, filed suit against the University of North Dakota alleging that instructors were not paid for all hours worked. Sangster claimed the university compensated instructors only for student contact hours and excluded other work-related tasks such as scheduling, pre- and post-flight procedures, recordkeeping, and waiting at the airport. He sought damages for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), North Dakota wage laws, unjust enrichment, and conversion.The District Court for Cass County reviewed the university’s motion to dismiss, which argued the court lacked jurisdiction because Sangster failed to give timely notice to the Office of Management and Budget as required by North Dakota law. Sangster admitted he had not provided this notice but contended his claims were contractual and thus exempt from the notice requirement. The district court denied the motion to dismiss with respect to the FLSA, state wage law, and unjust enrichment claims, finding them contractual in nature. The conversion claim was dismissed because Sangster conceded the notice requirement applied.The Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota subsequently reviewed the district court’s decision upon the University’s petition for a supervisory writ. The Supreme Court exercised its discretionary supervisory jurisdiction, holding that Sangster’s claims for relief under the FLSA, North Dakota wage laws, and unjust enrichment were not contractual in nature and therefore not authorized by N.D.C.C. ch. 32-12. The Supreme Court concluded that because Sangster had not complied with the statutory notice requirements for noncontractual claims, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The court granted the supervisory writ and directed the district court to dismiss Sangster’s case for lack of jurisdiction. View "UND v. Whelan" on Justia Law

A seventeen-year-old defendant was charged with murder after stabbing another individual during an altercation in a Grand Forks, North Dakota apartment parking lot. The victim died from the stab wound. With the assistance of counsel, the defendant entered into a plea agreement, pleading guilty to murder. The agreement stipulated a sixty-year sentence with twenty years suspended, and permitted the defendant to request a downward departure to as low as fifteen years. During the plea hearing, the court confirmed the defendant’s understanding of the plea and its consequences, and accepted the plea as voluntary.The District Court of Grand Forks County, Northeast Central Judicial District, presided over the case. At sentencing, the court reviewed investigative reports, victim impact statements, and arguments from both sides. The court considered the defendant’s age and behavior, including social media posts related to the incident. Ultimately, the court imposed a sixty-year sentence with twenty years suspended, consistent with the plea agreement, without granting a downward departure. The defendant did not object to the adequacy of the plea colloquy or move to withdraw the guilty plea before sentencing.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the appeal. The defendant argued that the plea was not knowing, voluntary, or intelligent due to an insufficient Rule 11 colloquy, and that the forty-year sentence was cruel and unusual punishment. The court applied the obvious error standard, finding that the District Court erred by not adequately establishing a factual basis for the plea, but concluded the error did not affect the defendant’s substantial rights. The court further held that the forty-year sentence was not grossly disproportionate to the offense and did not violate the Eighth Amendment. The Supreme Court affirmed the amended criminal judgment. View "State v. Haskins" on Justia Law

Several trusts owned by the Garaas family hold mineral interests in McKenzie County, North Dakota. Petro-Hunt, L.L.C. operates a well on these lands, which are subject to two distinct spacing units created by orders of the North Dakota Industrial Commission (NDIC): a base unit and an overlapping unit. NDIC issued an order allocating production from the well in the overlapping unit to Section 20, which is part of the base unit but not wholly contained within the overlapping unit. This allocation reduced the Trusts’ royalty interests, prompting them to seek declaratory relief and damages.The Trusts first brought their claims in the District Court of McKenzie County, but the court dismissed the case. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal, holding that the Trusts were required to exhaust administrative remedies before the NDIC. Subsequently, Petro-Hunt applied to NDIC for clarification on production allocation, and NDIC issued Order No. 33453, allocating production from the overlapping unit to the base unit. The Trusts appealed NDIC’s order to the district court, which affirmed NDIC’s order. The Trusts then appealed to the North Dakota Supreme Court.The Supreme Court of North Dakota held that NDIC had legal authority under statute to allocate oil and gas production among spacing units. However, the court concluded that NDIC did not regularly pursue its authority because it failed to follow proper procedures, including providing notice and opportunity to participate to all affected interest owners. As a result, the Supreme Court reversed the district court’s judgment and vacated NDIC Order No. 33453. The request for attorney’s fees by the Trusts was denied, as the record did not show NDIC acted without substantial justification. View "Garaas v. NDIC" on Justia Law

Ashley Cull and Andrew Cull were married in 2013 and have two children, born in 2016 and 2019. After initiating a divorce in 2021, a stipulated judgment was entered in January 2022, with Andrew awarded primary residential responsibility for the children. An amended judgment in March 2022 reaffirmed this arrangement. In February 2025, Ashley filed a motion to modify primary residential responsibility, arguing that material changes had occurred since the prior order which warranted a shift in custody to her. She submitted declarations from herself and her parents, alleging that Andrew delegated parenting to his mother, lacked routine in his home, and made unsafe decisions affecting the children.The Northeast Judicial District Court, Pembina County, reviewed Ashley’s motion and supporting documents, along with Andrew’s fourteen counter-declarations. The district court denied Ashley’s motion, concluding that she failed to establish a prima facie case under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.6, as there was no material change in circumstances nor evidence that modification was necessary to serve the children’s best interests. The court found much of Ashley’s evidence was not based on firsthand knowledge or was not competent, and that extended family involvement and Andrew’s occupation as a farmer were known factors at the time of the original custody determination.The Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota reviewed the district court’s order de novo. It held that Ashley Cull did not provide competent evidence of a material change in circumstances or show that modification was necessary for the children's best interests. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to modify primary residential responsibility, concluding that the statutory requirements for a prima facie case were not met. View "Cull v. Cull" on Justia Law

The dispute arose after a citizen, Sanderson, served a summons and complaint on Kelley Cole, the Walsh County State’s Attorney, alleging that Cole failed to investigate crimes as required by law and deprived him of constitutional rights. Sanderson later claimed the complaint was mistakenly served and was only a draft, not intended for court filing. Cole, upon being served, filed the summons and complaint with the district court, moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and sought attorney’s fees, arguing the action was frivolous and barred by prosecutorial immunity.The District Court of Walsh County, Northeast Judicial District, reviewed the matter. Cole’s motion to dismiss was based on North Dakota’s procedural rules, which allow an action to commence upon service of summons, and permit a defendant to file the complaint. Sanderson responded by agreeing to dismiss but contested the court’s jurisdiction and objected to the lack of a hearing. The district court determined it had jurisdiction, found Sanderson had commenced the action, and concluded the complaint lacked factual allegations and was barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. The court dismissed the action, denied Sanderson’s subsequent motions, and awarded Cole attorney’s fees, finding the claims frivolous.The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the district court’s judgment. It held that jurisdiction was proper since Sanderson initiated the action by serving process, and procedural irregularities in filing did not affect substantial rights or deprive the court of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court agreed that the complaint failed to state a claim and that absolute prosecutorial immunity applied. It further upheld the finding of frivolousness and the award of attorney’s fees, determining there was no abuse of discretion or violation of procedural rights. View "Sanderson v. Cole" on Justia Law