Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota considered an appeal by Michelle Vetter against a district court judgment which found her liable for unpaid legal fees to Larson Latham Huettl LLP, a law firm she'd hired for her divorce proceedings. The firm had sued Vetter for a balance of $552 which exceeded an initial retainer of $6,000. Vetter disputed the claim, arguing that the firm had unilaterally altered the agreement's terms, breached the contract, and committed fraud or deceit. She alleged she'd been billed at $200 per hour instead of the agreed $180. The district court dismissed Vetter's counterclaim, upheld the validity and enforceability of the fee agreement (which included a provision that the hourly rate could increase during representation), and awarded judgment to the law firm for the unpaid fees, interest, costs, and attorney’s fees.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the district court's decision, finding that its conclusions were supported by the record and not clearly erroneous. The court ruled that attorney's fees were reasonable and enforceable under the contract. The court also remanded the case to the district court to determine a reasonable amount for attorney’s fees for the appeal, as per the North Dakota Century Code, which allows a prevailing plaintiff to be awarded attorney’s fees when the defendant elects to remove the action from small claims court to district court and appeals the district court judgment to the supreme court. View "Vetter v. Larson Latham Huettl LLP" on Justia Law

In this case, the State of North Dakota appealed an order transferring a criminal case involving the defendant, A.J.H., who was charged with six counts of gross sexual imposition, to the juvenile court. The transfer was based on a newly amended definition of "Child" in the North Dakota Century Code, which the district court concluded applied to this case. However, A.J.H. moved to dismiss the State's appeals, arguing that there was no appealable order.The Supreme Court of North Dakota considered whether the transfer order qualifies as an appealable order under the state's laws. The State argued that the transfer order was effectively an order quashing the criminal information, a type of order that it could appeal. However, the Supreme Court rejected this argument, noting that the district court did not dismiss the case but simply transferred it to the juvenile court. The court also rejected the State's argument that the transfer order was an order made after judgment affecting any substantial right of the state, because no judgment had been entered in the case.Based on these considerations, the Supreme Court held that the State did not have the right to appeal under the relevant statute, and dismissed the appeals for lack of an appealable order. The court also denied A.J.H.'s request for costs and attorney’s fees, finding that the State's appeal was not frivolous. View "State v. A.J.H." on Justia Law

In the State of North Dakota, defendant Ibrahim Salou was convicted of possession with intent to manufacture or deliver a controlled substance while in possession of a firearm, and possession of a controlled substance. Salou appealed his conviction, alleging the district court erred in allowing evidence obtained from his phone under Rule 404(b) of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence and there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction.The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the lower court's decision. The court noted that Salou had preserved his claims of error related to the relevance and unfair prejudice of the evidence but had not preserved his objection to the Rule 404(b) issue, meaning it would only be reviewed for obvious error. The court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's determination that the evidence was relevant and not more prejudicial than probative. The court further found that the district court did not obviously err in its handling of Rule 404(b) as Salou had not raised this issue at trial.The Supreme Court also found that there was sufficient evidence to support Salou's conviction. The court noted that the evidence indicated that the backpack containing marijuana was located at Salou's feet during a traffic stop, and neither he nor the driver claimed possession of the backpack. The packaging of the marijuana found in the backpack was similar in appearance to the marijuana shown in a photograph found on Salou's phone. As such, the court concluded that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to draw an inference that Salou was in possession of the backpack. View "State v. Salou" on Justia Law

In the case at hand, Wilmot Yalartai, the plaintiff and appellant, appealed against an order dismissing his case against Jamesetta Miller, the respondent. The two are married with minor children and Yalartai had filed two cases against Miller - one for parenting responsibility and the other for divorce. After a hearing, a judicial referee dismissed the parenting responsibility case, stating that issues concerning parenting responsibility could be resolved in the divorce case. The referee's dismissal order was given without notice to the parties, and Yalartai appealed against this order.The Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota, in its decision, stated that the dismissal order is not appealable under N.D.C.C. § 28-27-02 because it was issued without notice. Thus, the court dismissed Yalartai's appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court explained that under N.D.C.C. § 28-27-02(7), orders issued without notice to the parties are not appealable and litigants must first seek relief in the district court from an order made without notice. The court further explained that an adversarial record, which does not exist in this case, is required for their review. Hence, Yalartai's failure to seek relief from the dismissal order as required by law led to the dismissal of his appeal. View "Yalartai v. Miller" on Justia Law

In the state of North Dakota, Garron Gonzalez was initially charged with two counts of gross sexual imposition, both class A felonies, in September 2003. Gonzalez pleaded guilty to the charges and was sentenced to five years' imprisonment on each count, all but 130 days suspended, and placed on probation for five years. The sentences were to be served concurrently. After his probation was twice revoked, Gonzalez was resentenced to additional time. However, in the second amended judgment, the sentences were to be served consecutively.In 2012 and again in 2022, Gonzalez filed petitions for post-conviction relief. The court granted both petitions, finding that the sentences imposed in 2014 were greater than the time originally suspended and were therefore deemed illegal. In April 2023, a new sentencing hearing was held wherein Gonzalez was sentenced again to five years' imprisonment for each count, to be served consecutively, thus totaling ten years.Gonzalez appealed, arguing that his sentences are illegal under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-07(6) because the amended judgment imposes more severe sentences than the original sentences and retroactively increases the punishment for his prior conduct.The Supreme Court of North Dakota agreed with Gonzalez's argument. The court found that the district court had effectively increased Gonzalez’s total term of imprisonment to 10 years, exceeding the suspended sentences originally imposed. Therefore, the sentences were deemed illegal under the pre-amended version of N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-07(6). The court reversed the decision and remanded the case for resentencing consistent with its opinion. View "State v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the appeal of Christopher Lamm against a disorderly conduct restraining order issued by the District Court, preventing him from having contact with Amanda Anderson, the mother of his child. Anderson claimed that Lamm had threatened her, made false child abuse allegations, and exhibited other threatening behavior. The District Court issued the order based on Lamm's visit to the town where Anderson resided, which it deemed as disorderly conduct. Lamm appealed the decision, and even though the restraining order had expired by the time of the appeal, the Supreme Court acknowledged potential adverse collateral consequences for Lamm and considered the appeal on its merits. The Supreme Court determined that the evidence provided was insufficient to prove that Lamm's presence in the town where Anderson lived constituted disorderly conduct. The court clarified that mere subjective fear of the petitioner or the respondent's unwanted presence was not enough to qualify as disorderly conduct or to justify a restraining order. The court found that Anderson failed to demonstrate how Lamm's actions adversely affected her safety, security, or privacy, and therefore, the District Court's decision to issue the restraining order was deemed as an abuse of discretion. In conclusion, the Supreme Court of North Dakota reversed the District Court's disorderly conduct restraining order against Lamm. View "Anderson v. Lamm" on Justia Law

In this case, Jerome Wesseh Koon, Jr. appealed from a district court judgment that denied his application for postconviction relief. Koon had been convicted of reckless endangerment, tampering with physical evidence, unlawful possession of a firearm, and terrorizing. His postconviction relief application was based on two main claims. Firstly, he argued that the district court erred by considering evidence outside the record, specifically the clerk's trial notes. Secondly, he claimed that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.The Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota affirmed the district court's judgment. The court rejected Koon's first argument, finding that the district court did not err in considering the clerk's trial notes. The court noted that the district court had provided notice to the parties of its intent to judicially notice the clerk's trial notes, and ultimately did not rely on the notes in its findings. The court also rejected Koon's argument that the district court's review of the clerk's notes automatically created a biased factfinder.Regarding Koon's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Supreme Court found that Koon had failed to show that there was a reasonable probability that the result of his trial would have been different had his counsel acted differently. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's denial of postconviction relief. View "Koon v. State" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant, Mathew Nelson, appealed his sentence for sexual assault, gross sexual imposition, and corruption of a minor. He argued that the district court relied on impermissible factors when determining his sentence and that his sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment.The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the district court's decision. The Court found that the district court had the discretion to consider the sentencing factors provided in N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-04 and that it had not relied on impermissible factors. The Court noted that there was evidence in the record to support the court’s consideration of Nelson’s ability to control his behavior when considering the length of his sentence and that the future harm caused by Nelson’s conduct was a permissible sentencing factor to consider.The Court also found that Nelson’s argument that his sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment was not adequately articulated or supported, and therefore did not need to be addressed further. Therefore, the Court affirmed the district court’s criminal judgments. View "State v. Nelson" on Justia Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of North Dakota, Russell Everett Jr., the appellant, sought to appeal a district court's order dismissing his application for post-conviction relief. Everett contended that he had not been served with two orders from his first post-conviction relief proceeding, thereby denying him the right to appeal those orders. He also alleged that the discovery of these orders constituted newly discovered evidence, and that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel during his direct appeal.Everett had been convicted of two counts of gross sexual imposition and had been sentenced to two life sentences with the possibility of parole. His conviction was affirmed by this court. In his first application for post-conviction relief, Everett argued that the witness's testimony had been coerced by their family and that he had discovered new evidence that could overturn his conviction. He also claimed ineffective assistance of counsel and a violation of his right to a fair trial as the victim-witness did not attend the trial. The district court denied this application, and neither the order nor notice of entry of the order was served on Everett.In response to Everett's second application for post-conviction relief, the court summarily dismissed it. Everett subsequently appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of North Dakota.The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the district court's dismissal of Everett's second application for post-conviction relief. The court determined that Everett's claim of "newly discovered evidence" did not meet the statutory requirements as it did not pertain to his original conviction. Furthermore, the court found that Everett's appeal had been filed beyond the two-year statute of limitations for filing post-conviction relief claims, and no exception to this statute applied in this case. Additionally, his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was also deemed to have been filed after the statute of limitations had expired. Therefore, the court concluded that the district court had not erred in dismissing Everett's claims for post-conviction relief and ineffective assistance of counsel. View "Everett v. State" on Justia Law

The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed a district court's judgment, which had dismissed the claims of Jacob Ebel, John Ebel, and Ordeen Ebel (collectively, "the Ebels") for declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, breach of contract, and tortious interference. The Ebels had sought enforcement of contracts they claimed were formed when their bids for parcels of real property owned by the estate of Mark Engelhardt were accepted. The district court had dismissed the Ebels' claims, asserting that the parties did not satisfy the statute of frauds, which requires contracts for the sale of real property to be in writing. The Supreme Court found that the district court misapplied the law because the statute of frauds was not specifically pled or otherwise raised by the parties. The Supreme Court noted that under Rule 8 of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure, the statute of frauds must be specifically pled as an affirmative defense. Therefore, the case was reversed on the ground that the district court incorrectly applied the statute of frauds when the defense was not properly raised. View "Ebel v. Engelhart" on Justia Law