Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

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Brett Kingstone and Trisa Tedrow Kingstone were married in Florida in July 2020 and have one minor child, L.R.K., born in 2021, who has hemophilia, Fragile X syndrome, and developmental and speech delays. The couple separated in August 2022, and Brett initiated a divorce action in Florida and a child custody action in North Dakota in March 2023. The Florida court granted the divorce in August 2023, but did not address child-related issues. In December 2023, the North Dakota district court awarded Trisa primary residential responsibility for L.R.K. and set Brett's child support at $5,000 per month, including an upward deviation of $1,500.Brett Kingstone appealed, arguing the district court erred in several aspects, including reliance on expert testimony, calculation of his net income, the upward deviation of child support, and refusal to amend the judgment. The district court had denied Brett's motion to amend the judgment but clarified the exchange location for L.R.K. would be at the child's home unless mutually agreed otherwise.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case. It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in relying on the expert witness to determine Brett's income, including income from irrevocable trusts and recurring capital gains. However, the Supreme Court found the district court's findings insufficient to support the upward deviation in child support under the guidelines and remanded for additional findings and redetermination. The Supreme Court also directed the district court to reconsider the amount of the life insurance policy based on the redetermined child support obligation. The court affirmed the district court's decision regarding the exchange provisions for L.R.K. and the requirement for Brett to maintain a life insurance policy for the child. View "Kingstone v. Kingstone" on Justia Law

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In March 2020, Valence Natural Gas Solutions issued a request for proposal for the rental of natural gas generators. Gravity Oilfield Services submitted a price quotation in April 2020. After a pause in communication, discussions resumed in January 2021, and Gravity delivered the equipment to Valence in March 2021. From April 2021 to April 2022, Gravity sent monthly sales orders and invoices to Valence, which from September 2021 included a reference to terms and conditions on Gravity’s website. In April 2022, the equipment was damaged in a fire, and Gravity invoiced Valence for the replacement cost, which Valence did not pay.The District Court of McKenzie County initially denied Gravity’s first motion for summary judgment due to disputed material facts regarding contract formation and terms. However, upon Gravity’s renewed motion for summary judgment in March 2024, the district court granted the motion. The court concluded that the contract was formed in April 2022 and included Gravity’s terms and conditions by reference, making Valence liable for the damaged equipment and awarding attorney’s fees to Gravity.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s judgment. The Supreme Court found that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding when the contract was formed and whether Gravity’s terms and conditions were incorporated into the agreement. The court noted that the terms and conditions referenced in the April 2022 sales order and invoice were sent after the equipment was damaged, and there was a dispute over whether these terms were part of the original agreement. Consequently, the Supreme Court concluded that summary judgment was inappropriate and also reversed the award of attorney’s fees. View "Gravity Oilfield Services v. Valence Natural Gas Solutions" on Justia Law

Posted in: Contracts
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In February 2024, Cailin Leann Gackle was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol. At the police department, Officer Cullen Hall conducted two breath test sequences using the Intoxilyzer 8000. The first test sequence was invalidated due to a "Difference Too Great" between the two samples. Officer Hall began the second test sequence 18 minutes after the first test ended, instead of the required 20 minutes. Gackle's driving privileges were suspended for 365 days based on the results of the second test.Gackle requested an administrative hearing, arguing that the breath test was not fairly administered because Officer Hall did not comply with the 20-minute waiting period required by the approved method. The hearing officer overruled her objection, admitted the test records, and upheld the suspension. Gackle appealed to the District Court of Ward County, which affirmed the Department of Transportation's decision.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the Department failed to establish the fair administration of the breath test. The court determined that the approved method requires a 20-minute wait before beginning a new test sequence after an invalid test. Since Officer Hall only waited 18 minutes, the test was not administered in accordance with the approved method. The court held that without expert testimony to address the deviation, the test results could not be considered reliable. Consequently, the court reversed the lower court's decision and remanded the case to the Department for reinstatement of Gackle's driving privileges. View "Gackle v. NDDOT" on Justia Law

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The case involves the distribution of trust assets following the death of the surviving trustor, G.I.C. The trust agreement initially provided for specific distributions of farmland to the trustors' five children. However, the land was sold to fund the trust before its termination, leading to a dispute over how the remaining liquidated assets should be distributed. Luke, one of the beneficiaries, argued that the assets should be distributed proportionately to the value of the specific land parcels each beneficiary would have received. The trustee, Bremer Trust, and Luke’s siblings contended that the assets should be distributed equally among the beneficiaries.The District Court of Sargent County, Southeast Judicial District, initially ordered an equal distribution of the liquidated assets among the five children. This decision was based on the interpretation that the trust agreement reflected an overall intent to treat the beneficiaries equally, despite the specific land distributions being impossible due to the sale of the land.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the trust agreement's primary intent was to provide for the trustors' care and support during their lifetimes, with a secondary intent to distribute specific parcels of land to the children upon the trust's termination. The court found that the most consistent interpretation with the trustors' intent was to distribute the remaining trust assets proportionately to the value of the specific land distributions each beneficiary would have received. The case was remanded for redistribution of the trust assets in accordance with this interpretation. View "Guardianship and Conservatorship of G.I.C." on Justia Law

Posted in: Trusts & Estates
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Coby Edwards was charged with class AA felony gross sexual imposition for allegedly engaging in a sexual act with a five-year-old child. The State intended to use statements made by the child during a recorded interview and a forensic medical examination, which were admitted under an exception to the hearsay rule. During the trial, various witnesses, including the child, testified. Edwards's counsel mentioned difficulties in communication due to Edwards's pretrial detention and failed to call an expert witness. The jury found Edwards guilty, and the conviction was affirmed on appeal.Edwards then filed for postconviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. He argued that his counsel's references to the child as "the victim," failure to object to hearsay, and failure to call an expert witness constituted ineffective representation. The district court held an evidentiary hearing and denied the application, finding that the counsel's decisions were strategic and that Edwards did not demonstrate how an expert witness would have changed the outcome. The court also found that the references to the child as a victim were deficient but did not prejudice the trial's outcome.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Edwards failed to show a reasonable probability that the trial outcome would have been different without the alleged deficiencies in his counsel's performance. The court noted that the evidence against Edwards, including the child's testimony and statements, was substantial and that the counsel's errors did not undermine confidence in the trial's outcome. View "Edwards v. State" on Justia Law

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Jared Peterka, a neighbor and tenant of John and Irene Janda, assumed the lease of their farmland in 2012. The lease was renewed every three years, and in 2019, a right of first refusal for Peterka to purchase the land was added. In October 2018, the Jandas established a living trust and conveyed the property into it, with their daughters as residuary beneficiaries. In June 2021, the Jandas and Peterka executed an option to purchase the property. Shortly after, guardianship proceedings were initiated, and the Jandas were found incapacitated. The guardians rescinded the option to purchase.Peterka filed a complaint for declaratory judgment to validate the option to purchase. The Defendants counterclaimed, arguing the option was the result of undue influence and that the Jandas lacked capacity. After a four-day bench trial, the District Court of Traill County found the option to purchase was facially valid and not a product of undue influence. However, it ruled the option was voidable under N.D.C.C. § 14-01-02 due to the Jandas' lack of capacity and dismissed Peterka’s complaint.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case. Peterka argued the district court erred in its findings on capacity. The Supreme Court clarified that the capacity to enter into a contract and the capacity under N.D.C.C. § 14-01-02 are distinct. The court found the district court did not misstate the law and its findings were supported by evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that the option to purchase was voidable under N.D.C.C. § 14-01-02 due to the Jandas being of unsound mind but not entirely without understanding. View "Peterka v. Janda" on Justia Law

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In 2018, Kevin Hoff pled guilty to murder and was sentenced to life without parole. Since his conviction, Hoff has filed three applications for postconviction relief. His first application, filed in May 2020, claimed ineffective assistance of counsel and newly discovered evidence. The amended application, which abandoned the newly discovered evidence claim, was denied, and the denial was affirmed on appeal. Hoff's second application, filed in December 2021, claimed his trial counsel incorrectly advised him about the defense of others. The State moved to dismiss this application as time-barred and for summary disposition based on res judicata and misuse of process. The district court granted the State's motions, and Hoff did not appeal.In his third application, Hoff claimed a mental disease excepted him from the two-year limitation, his trial counsel incorrectly advised him, and newly discovered evidence existed. He also filed a Rule 60(b) motion to vacate the order denying his second application. The district court consolidated the Rule 60(b) motion with the third application and held an evidentiary hearing. The court granted the State's motion to dismiss based on the two-year limitation, granted the State's motion for summary disposition based on res judicata and misuse of process, denied Hoff's application, and dismissed his Rule 60(b) motion.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's judgment. The court held that Hoff's third application was barred by the two-year limitation in N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-01(2) and that Hoff did not demonstrate a physical disability or mental disease that precluded timely assertion of his application. The court also concluded that Hoff waived the issue of the denial of his Rule 60(b) motion by not adequately briefing it on appeal. The court did not address the res judicata and misuse of process arguments, as the application was already precluded by the two-year limitation. View "Hoff v. State" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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McKenzie Electric Cooperative, Inc. ("McKenzie Electric") sought a supervisory writ from the North Dakota Supreme Court to direct the district court to vacate its order of recusal, deny the motion for recusal, and reassign the case back to Judge El-Dweek. The case began in November 2019, and in July 2020, Judge El-Dweek disclosed his membership in McKenzie Electric. Discovery continued through 2023, and McKenzie Electric disclosed it was seeking significant damages. In May 2024, the respondents filed a motion for a change of venue due to potential juror bias. Following a hearing, Judge El-Dweek recused himself, citing the appearance of impropriety.The district court's decision to recuse was challenged by McKenzie Electric, which argued that the recusal would cause delays and waste judicial resources. The North Dakota Supreme Court, however, emphasized that the justice system presumes judges impartially apply the law and that having a different judge decide the case does not merit the assertion of supervisory jurisdiction. The court noted that any error in granting or denying recusal could be remedied by appeal.The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that this case did not present extraordinary circumstances warranting the exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction. The court found that the claimed injustice from the delay was largely unavoidable and could not be remedied by granting the writ. Therefore, the petition for a supervisory writ was denied. View "McKenzie Electric Coop., Inc. v. El-Dweek" on Justia Law

Posted in: Civil Procedure
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The case involves Access Independent Health Services, Inc., doing business as Red River Women’s Clinic, and several physicians who challenged the constitutionality of North Dakota’s abortion regulation statutes, N.D.C.C. ch. 12.1-19.1. The plaintiffs argued that the law was unconstitutionally vague and violated pregnant women’s rights to life and health-preserving care under the North Dakota Constitution.The District Court of Burleigh County granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, declaring the law unconstitutionally vague and recognizing a fundamental right for pregnant women to choose abortion before viability under the North Dakota Constitution. The court found that the law’s language was ambiguous and did not provide clear guidelines for physicians, thus violating due process. The court also held that the law infringed on the fundamental rights of pregnant women.The State of North Dakota appealed to the Supreme Court of North Dakota, seeking a stay of the district court’s judgment pending appeal. The Supreme Court of North Dakota denied the motion for a stay. The court applied a four-factor test to determine whether to grant a stay: likelihood of success on appeal, irreparable injury to the appellant, substantial harm to any party, and harm to the public interest. The court found that the State was unlikely to succeed on the merits of the appeal, as the law was likely unconstitutionally vague and did not meet the strict scrutiny standard required for laws infringing on fundamental rights. The court also determined that the balance of harms and public interest did not favor granting a stay, noting that the law had never been enforced and that the state’s attorneys had agreed not to enforce it pending the outcome of the appeal. View "Access Independent Health Services, Inc. v. Wrigley" on Justia Law

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Northstar Center, LLC entered into a real estate contract with Lukenbill Family Partnership, LLLP to purchase a 120-acre parcel of land. The contract was later assigned to Northstar by Templeton Enterprises, LLC. The agreement included an option to purchase an additional 105-acre parcel, which was amended to a commitment to purchase. Northstar provided a promissory note for a tax increase payment due by January 1, 2014, but paid it late. Lukenbill sold the disputed property to Tundra Properties, LLC, leading Northstar to sue for breach of contract and intentional interference with contract.The District Court of Williams County granted summary judgment in favor of Northstar on its breach of contract claim against Lukenbill and its intentional interference with contract claim against Tundra. The court also granted summary judgment in favor of Lukenbill on its indemnification claim against Tundra and dismissed Tundra’s breach of warranty claim against Lukenbill. The court held a bench trial on Northstar’s damages due to Lukenbill’s breach.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for Northstar on its breach of contract and intentional interference claims. The Supreme Court determined that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding whether Northstar breached the contract by failing to make the tax increase payment on time and whether Tundra had knowledge of the contract amendments. The court also found that the district court improperly resolved factual disputes regarding Tundra’s knowledge and intent, and whether Tundra acted without justification.The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Tundra’s breach of warranty claim but reversed the summary judgments on Northstar’s breach of contract and intentional interference claims, as well as Lukenbill’s indemnification claim. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court’s opinion. View "Northstar Center v. Lukenbill Family Partnership" on Justia Law