Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Police responded to a house fire in Grand Forks, North Dakota, where an officer observed Antonio Medina behaving evasively and distancing himself from law enforcement. Medina left the scene in his red Ford Explorer and later returned on foot. Officers located Medina’s unattended, unlocked vehicle in a commercial parking lot nearby. Through the window, they observed keys, a cut straw with white residue, and a box for a digital scale. Officers conducted a warrantless search of the vehicle, seizing the straw, an electronic scale with residue, and small baggies. The residue tested positive for cocaine.Medina was charged with possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia, both class A misdemeanors. He moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the search was unconstitutional. The Northeast Central Judicial District Court denied the motion, ruling the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement applied because there was probable cause to believe the vehicle contained evidence of a crime. Medina entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion. The North Dakota Supreme Court previously remanded the case for correction of the criminal judgment to specify that the plea was conditional, as required by state procedural rules. After the district court entered an amended judgment, Medina appealed again.The Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota reviewed whether the warrantless search was justified under the automobile exception. The court held the exception applied because the vehicle, though parked and unoccupied, was readily mobile and located in a public commercial lot. The court found probable cause based on Medina’s suspicious behavior and the drug-related items visible inside the vehicle. The court concluded that the search was valid under the automobile exception and affirmed the amended judgment. View "State v. Medina" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted by a jury of murder, tampering with evidence, unlawful possession of a firearm, and giving false information to law enforcement following the shooting death of Mark Ramon McMillan in the basement of a barbershop in Minot, North Dakota. Both the victim and defendant had been staying in the basement, and the victim’s body was later found wrapped and bound in the boiler room. The defendant admitted to shooting McMillan, claiming self-defense. The prosecution originally charged the defendant with theft of property—firearm, but later moved to amend this count to unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon after considering a plea agreement.The District Court of Ward County granted the prosecution’s unopposed motion to amend the criminal information. After the plea agreement was rejected, the amended information remained, and the defendant entered a not guilty plea. At trial, the prosecution introduced evidence of the defendant’s prior felony conviction and recent probation termination to prove the elements of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. The jury found the defendant guilty on all counts.On appeal, the defendant argued that the district court violated North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure 7(e) by allowing the amendment to the criminal information and committed obvious error by admitting evidence of his prior conviction and probation status, allegedly in violation of Rule 403 and Old Chief v. United States. The Supreme Court of North Dakota declined to review the Rule 7(e) claim because the issue was not preserved or briefed under the obvious error standard. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of the prior conviction, as it was necessary to prove an element of the offense and no stipulation was made. The judgment of conviction was affirmed. View "State v. Davis" on Justia Law

A driver was cited for failing to display license plates on his vehicle, an infraction under a municipal ordinance. The matter was transferred from municipal court to the District Court of Stark County for a jury trial. Before trial, the defendant filed multiple motions, including to disqualify both the prosecutor and judge, to continue or stay the proceedings, and to dismiss the case, most of which were denied. Ultimately, a jury found that the defendant had committed the violation. Following these proceedings, the district court designated the defendant as a vexatious litigant, citing his numerous and largely meritless filings. After the jury’s verdict, the defendant appealed the vexatious litigant order to the Supreme Court of North Dakota, arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction because he claimed the underlying proceeding was criminal, not civil, and further contending that the vexatious litigant designation violated his constitutional rights. He also challenged the district court’s findings, asserting abuse of discretion. The City of Dickinson responded by seeking sanctions, alleging the defendant’s appellate brief cited fictitious cases. The Supreme Court of North Dakota held that the underlying proceeding was a noncriminal infraction under state law, so the district court had jurisdiction to issue a vexatious litigant order under the applicable administrative rule. The Court determined that the district court did not abuse its discretion in designating the defendant a vexatious litigant, finding ample evidence of frivolous and burdensome litigation tactics. The constitutional challenges were rejected, as the vexatious litigant rule provided sufficient procedural safeguards. Additionally, the Court found that the defendant’s use of fictitious case citations warranted sanctions and ordered him to pay $500 to the City. The district court’s vexatious litigant order was affirmed. View "City of Dickinson v. Helgeson" on Justia Law

A father with a high monthly income was ordered to pay $5,000 per month in child support for his minor child, which included a $1,500 upward deviation above the presumptive guideline amount. The deviation was based on the child’s significant disabling conditions and the father’s substantial income and assets. In addition, the father was required to maintain a $750,000 life insurance policy to secure his child support obligation. The mother documented considerable ongoing expenses for the child’s developmental and medical needs, including frequent travel for therapy and care. The District Court of Eddy County initially entered this support order, but on appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota found the lower court’s findings insufficient to support the upward deviation and remanded for more explicit findings and reconsideration of the life insurance amount. On remand, the district court provided additional findings, detailing the child’s medical needs, the family’s prior standard of living, and specific expenses justifying the deviation. The court again found the deviation in the child’s best interest due to her lifelong health conditions and the desire for her to maintain a standard of living similar to that before the divorce. The court attributed $750 per month to the child’s medical needs and $750 per month to maintaining her standard of living, and reinstated the $750,000 life insurance requirement. Reviewing the case, the Supreme Court of North Dakota held that the district court’s findings were explicit and supported by evidence. The court affirmed that the upward deviation in child support and the life insurance requirement were in the child’s best interest and not clearly erroneous or an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the district court’s order in all respects. View "Kingstone v. Kingstone" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with multiple counts of terrorizing with a dangerous weapon or firearm and one count of preventing arrest after allegedly threatening to shoot or kill people at a restaurant in Minot, North Dakota. The prosecution claimed that the defendant made verbal threats, stated he had a gun in his backpack, gestured toward the backpack, and was later found to possess a firearm in the backpack after his arrest. The restaurant manager and a patron testified that, while they did not see the firearm, the defendant claimed to have it and threatened to use it.The District Court of Ward County dismissed seven of the eight terrorizing counts before trial. The defendant proceeded to a bench trial on one count of terrorizing and one count of preventing arrest. He stipulated to the essential elements of the terrorizing offense, disputing only whether the mandatory minimum sentence for use of a firearm applied. The trial judge found the defendant guilty on both counts and made a special finding that he possessed a firearm during the offense. The court concluded that the armed offender statute applied, ruling that possession and threat to injure using a firearm sufficed, without requiring the gun to be brandished or displayed.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed whether the district court properly interpreted and applied N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-02.1, which mandates a minimum sentence for certain offenses involving firearms. The Supreme Court held that the statute does not require a firearm to be brandished or displayed; it is sufficient if the offender threatens to injure another through the use or means of a firearm while possessing it. The court found the district court’s interpretation reasonable and supported by the evidence and affirmed the judgment, including the mandatory minimum sentence. View "State v. Reese" on Justia Law

A field consultant for a public teachers’ union brought a lawsuit after a school board held a closed executive session during a grievance hearing involving a teacher’s transfer and removal of extracurricular duties. The board’s attorney presented the school district’s legal position and rationale in an open meeting before the board entered executive session to receive additional legal advice. The board later voted in public to deny the grievance, and the plaintiff, who was not the aggrieved teacher, claimed the executive session violated North Dakota’s open meetings laws. She sought disclosure of the executive session recording as a remedy. The District Court of Grand Forks County granted summary judgment to the school district, finding no waiver of the right to enter executive session, that the requirements for the attorney consultation exemption were met, and that the plaintiff’s due process rights were not violated by her lack of access to the executive session transcript. The court declined to review the executive session recording, relying instead on declarations from board representatives and the parties’ stipulation that no material facts were in dispute. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court held that the school board did not waive its right to an executive session by publicly stating its legal position and that the statutory requirements for entering executive session were satisfied. The court also found no due process violation from not providing the plaintiff access to the transcript. However, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court abused its discretion by not conducting an in camera review of the executive session recording before granting summary judgment. The judgment of dismissal and the award of costs to the school district were reversed, and the case was remanded for the district court to review the recording and proceed accordingly. View "Haskell v. Grand Forks Public Schools" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with terrorizing—domestic violence, a class C felony, after an incident involving his ex-wife, who is also the mother of his minor child. The district court imposed a pre-dispositional order prohibiting contact with the victim, initially for thirty days. After the defendant pled guilty, the court sentenced him to two years, including three days to serve (with credit for time served) and two years of supervised probation. As a condition of probation, the court extended the no-contact order for two years, prohibiting all direct or indirect contact with the victim, including communication relevant to their minor child.After sentencing, the defendant requested an exception to allow necessary communications with the victim regarding court-ordered parenting time with their child. The district court declined, stating the defendant was not prohibited from having contact with his child but failed to provide any method for arranging parenting time, given the victim’s residential responsibility and the communication restrictions. The defendant appealed the judgment and the order extending the no-contact provision.The Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota reviewed the case. It held that, although the district court acted within statutory limits and did not rely on any impermissible factor (so the sentence was not illegal), it abused its discretion by failing to provide a means for the defendant to arrange contact with his child or to explain why no such method was allowed. The court determined that, under these circumstances, the blanket prohibition on contact with the victim—including for purposes of exercising parental rights—was arbitrary and not the result of a reasoned decision. The Supreme Court of North Dakota reversed the criminal judgment and the order extending the order prohibiting contact and remanded for resentencing, instructing the district court to consider alternatives that would permit the defendant to exercise his parental rights. View "State v. Maher" on Justia Law

The case concerns divorced parents who share a minor child. After their 2019 divorce, the mother was awarded primary residential responsibility, with the judgment affirmed on appeal. In 2024, the father moved to modify the custody arrangement, citing a material change in circumstances and seeking joint, and later, primary residential responsibility. Following hearings in 2025, the District Court of Burleigh County granted the father primary residential responsibility, established a parenting plan for the mother, and entered a second amended judgment. The mother appealed, arguing that the district court erred by modifying custody without finding a material change in circumstances, violated her due process rights, improperly delegated authority to the child and a counselor regarding parenting time, and suspended child support without adequate findings. She also asserted cumulative errors and alleged parental alienation. The Supreme Court of North Dakota found that the district court’s findings on the material change of circumstances, best interests factors, and award of primary residential responsibility were not clearly erroneous. The court determined that most of the mother’s arguments were inadequately briefed and thus were not considered on appeal, except for her claim regarding the delegation of parenting time authority. The Supreme Court of North Dakota held that the district court improperly delegated its authority over parenting time to both the minor child and her therapist, allowing them to determine the conditions and occurrence of the mother’s contact with the child. The court found that the district court failed to provide sufficient findings or a clear link between the mother’s conduct and potential harm to the child that would justify such a restriction. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment in part, reversed it in part, and remanded for further proceedings limited to parenting time. View "Vetter v. Vetter" on Justia Law

Two children were removed from their parents’ home in June 2020 and subsequently found by the Juvenile Court of Williams County, North Dakota, to be children in need of protection. The children remained in the custody of North Star Human Service Zone. In 2022, the State petitioned to terminate the parental rights of both parents, but those petitions were denied. On April 1, 2025, the State filed new petitions to terminate parental rights. Following a hearing, the juvenile court found that termination was in the children’s best interests and ordered that the parental rights of G.G. (the father) and S.F. (the mother) be terminated. The court issued oral and written findings supporting its decision, but neither addressed whether the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) applied. G.G. appealed the termination of his parental rights, contending that the juvenile court’s findings were inadequate because they failed to determine whether ICWA applied. The State responded that ICWA was not applicable. The Supreme Court of North Dakota noted that in termination proceedings, a juvenile court must make a threshold inquiry and finding as to whether ICWA applies whenever there is reason to know the child may be an Indian child. The Supreme Court further explained that this inquiry is required for each new petition, and the absence of such a finding constitutes clear error. The Supreme Court of North Dakota held that the juvenile court’s failure to make a threshold finding on ICWA applicability was clearly erroneous. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the juvenile court with instructions to make a finding on whether ICWA applies, based on the existing record or with additional evidence if necessary. The Supreme Court retained jurisdiction during the remand. View "Interest of D.G." on Justia Law

David Hughes and Dana Waters were in a relationship beginning in 2016 while living in Washington. During their relationship, Hughes raised Waters’s son, C.H., as his own, and later they had another son, D.H. Following their separation, they shared custody on a rotating basis. Hughes moved to North Dakota in late 2020, and the children visited him there during holidays and summers. In April 2023, Waters moved with the children to California. That summer, Hughes flew the children to North Dakota for vacation and later informed Waters he would not return them, citing concerns for their safety.After Hughes’s decision to keep the children, both parties initiated legal proceedings: Waters filed a complaint in California on August 9, 2023, but did not serve Hughes until October 20, 2023. Hughes began a child custody action in North Dakota by serving Waters on August 30, 2023. The California court issued ex parte orders for the return of the children, first claiming emergency jurisdiction, then issuing a non-temporary order, both before Hughes was served. The North Dakota District Court of McKenzie County held a hearing, invited arguments on jurisdiction, and communicated with the California court. Eventually, California transferred its case to Washington, although there was no evidence of a pending Washington action.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed whether the district court properly exercised jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA). The court held that neither California nor North Dakota was the children’s “home state,” and no other state had a pending child custody action or declined jurisdiction. North Dakota properly assumed jurisdiction under N.D.C.C. § 14-14.1-12(1)(d). The court affirmed the district court’s order granting primary residential responsibility of D.H. and C.H. to Hughes and rejected Waters’s additional challenges. View "Hughes v. Waters" on Justia Law