Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

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An unmarried couple, K.L.T. and M.O.J., filed a petition on September 27, 2024, to adopt three children who had been in their care since early 2022. The Cass County District Court denied their petition on October 8, 2024, citing North Dakota Century Code § 14-15-03(2), which the court interpreted as not permitting unmarried couples to jointly adopt. The case was subsequently dismissed.Following the dismissal, K.L.T. and M.O.J. moved for reconsideration on October 14, 2024. Although the district court found them to be suitable adoptive parents, it denied the motion for reconsideration. The court then certified a question to the North Dakota Supreme Court, asking whether an unmarried couple can adopt children under N.D.C.C. § 14-15-03(2), noting the absence of controlling precedent in North Dakota.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed whether to answer the certified question. Under Rule 47.1 of the North Dakota Rules of Appellate Procedure, the court has the discretion to answer certified questions of law if they are determinative of the proceeding and if there is no controlling precedent. However, the court determined that answering the certified question would be purely advisory since the petition had been dismissed and the time to appeal had expired. Consequently, there was no existing case that could be resolved by answering the question.The North Dakota Supreme Court declined to answer the certified question and dismissed the proceeding. View "K.L.T. v. NDDHHS" on Justia Law

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In March 2023, the State charged Christopher Allman with multiple counts of domestic violence, felonious restraint, and terrorizing, alleging he assaulted his wife and their live-in girlfriend, locked them in a room, and refused to let them leave. The parties agreed Allman would undergo a mental health examination to determine his criminal responsibility. The examination was delayed due to issues with obtaining Allman’s records from the Veterans Administration. The evaluation, completed in August 2024, concluded Allman did not suffer from a mental condition precluding criminal liability. A jury trial in August 2024 resulted in guilty verdicts on all counts, and Allman was sentenced to consecutive five-year terms of imprisonment, with credit for time served on one count.The District Court of McKenzie County, Northwest Judicial District, oversaw the initial proceedings. Allman appealed, arguing errors related to the criminal responsibility evaluation, his fitness to stand trial, his right to a speedy trial, and the legality of his sentence. He claimed his constitutional rights were violated by the evaluation order, asserting it was against his will and violated his right against self-incrimination. He also argued the court should have ordered a fitness evaluation and that his right to a speedy trial was denied due to the delays in obtaining his mental health records.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case. It held that the district court did not err in ordering the criminal responsibility evaluation because the parties had stipulated to it. The court found no grounds to doubt Allman’s fitness to stand trial and noted he did not request a fitness evaluation. The court also determined that Allman’s right to a speedy trial was not violated, as the delays were not due to the State’s conduct, and Allman did not properly assert his right. Finally, the court affirmed the legality of Allman’s sentence, rejecting his argument about credit for time served. The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "State v. Allman" on Justia Law

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Cody Lee Littleghost was arrested in February 2023 for spitting on two officers and was charged with two counts of contact by bodily fluid and one count of attempted contact by bodily fluid. The attempted contact charge was dismissed. In June 2023, he was arrested again for shoplifting and spitting on an officer, leading to charges of failure to halt and contact by bodily fluids.The District Court of Cass County denied Littleghost's motions to suppress statements made to police, claiming he was not properly Mirandized. He pleaded guilty to all counts of contact by bodily fluids, reserving the right to appeal the suppression motions. The district court accepted his guilty pleas.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case. Littleghost argued that the district court violated N.D.R.Crim.P. 11 by accepting his guilty plea for the February charges without an adequate factual basis. The Supreme Court found that the district court did not make an inquiry to ensure a factual basis for the plea, which is required under Rule 11(b)(3). The court concluded that this was an obvious error affecting Littleghost's substantial rights, as it called into question the validity of his plea.Regarding the June charges, the Supreme Court upheld the district court's decision to deny the motion to suppress, finding no incriminating statements were made by Littleghost prior to being Mirandized. The court found sufficient evidence supporting the district court's findings.The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the judgment in the February case due to the lack of a factual basis for the guilty plea and affirmed the judgment in the June case, upholding the denial of the motion to suppress. View "State v. Littleghost" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Cody Lee Littleghost was arrested in February 2023 for spitting on two officers and was charged with two counts of contact by bodily fluid and one count of attempted contact by bodily fluid. The attempted contact charge was dismissed. In June 2023, he was arrested again for shoplifting and spitting on an officer, leading to charges of failure to halt and contact by bodily fluids.The District Court of Cass County denied Littleghost's motions to suppress statements made to police, claiming he was not properly Mirandized. He pleaded guilty to all counts of contact by bodily fluids, reserving the right to appeal the suppression motions. The district court accepted his guilty pleas, and Littleghost appealed.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case. Littleghost argued that the district court violated N.D.R.Crim.P. 11 by accepting his guilty plea for the February charges without an adequate factual basis. The Supreme Court found that the district court did not make an inquiry to ensure a factual basis for the plea, which is required by Rule 11(b)(3). The court concluded that this was an obvious error affecting Littleghost's substantial rights, as it called into question the validity of his plea.Regarding the June charges, the Supreme Court upheld the district court's denial of the motion to suppress, finding no incriminating statements were made by Littleghost before being Mirandized. The court found sufficient evidence supporting the district court's findings.The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the judgment in the February case due to the lack of a factual basis for the guilty plea and affirmed the judgment in the June case, upholding the denial of the motion to suppress. View "State v. Littleghost" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Robert Williamson pleaded guilty to two counts of gross sexual imposition and one count of luring a minor by electronic means. He was sentenced to incarceration with time suspended and did not appeal. In 2021, his probation was revoked, and he was resentenced. Williamson did not appeal the revocation. He then filed his first application for postconviction relief, which was denied. The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the denial due to procedural errors, but the district court again denied the application after a hearing, and this denial was summarily affirmed. Williamson also filed motions asserting an illegal sentence, which led to a remand for resentencing.Williamson filed a second application for postconviction relief in 2024, alleging new evidence and ineffective assistance of counsel during the revocation and first postconviction proceedings. The State denied the allegations and pleaded misuse of process. The district court denied the application, finding the claims barred by res judicata and statutory prohibition against claims of ineffective postconviction counsel.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the district court erred in applying res judicata because the State had waived this defense by not pleading it. However, the court affirmed the denial of Williamson’s application on the grounds of misuse of process, as the claims could have been raised earlier. The court also upheld the dismissal of Williamson’s claim of ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel, citing N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-09(2), which prohibits such claims. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order denying Williamson’s second application for postconviction relief. View "Williamson v. State" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Joe and Lora Killoran, along with their businesses, Maple Valley Ag Products, LLC, and Maple Valley Ag Chemicals, Inc., sued Kip Kaler for slander, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and unlawful interference with business. The Killorans alleged that Kaler made defamatory statements during Co-op meetings, calling them "crooks and thieves" and advising others not to do business with them. These statements allegedly caused significant reputational harm, economic losses, and mental distress to the Killorans and their businesses.The District Court of Cass County dismissed the complaint with prejudice. The court found that the slander claim was not well-pled, as the Killorans failed to provide sufficient factual support for the statements made by Kaler and did not adequately plead the falsity of the statements. The IIED claim was dismissed because the court determined that Kaler's conduct was not extreme and outrageous enough to permit recovery. The unlawful interference with business claim was dismissed due to the lack of an independent tort to support it, following the dismissal of the slander and IIED claims.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case. The court affirmed the dismissal of the IIED claim, agreeing that Kaler's conduct did not meet the threshold for extreme and outrageous behavior. However, the court reversed the dismissal of the slander claim, finding that the district court had improperly applied the pleading standards and failed to accept the allegations as true. The court also reversed the dismissal of the unlawful interference with business claim, as the potential for an independent tort (slander) existed. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. View "Killoran v. Kaler" on Justia Law

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In March 2024, the State charged Leon Helland with four counts of unlawful possession of a firearm, a class C felony, under N.D.C.C. § 62.1-02-01(1)(b). The charges were based on Helland's 2021 conviction for menacing, during which he allegedly used or possessed a firearm. At the preliminary hearing, the arresting officer testified that Helland had firearms in his possession and that his prior menacing conviction involved a firearm. However, on cross-examination, the officer admitted she did not review the charging document or know if Helland had completed a deferred imposition of sentence.The District Court of Burleigh County dismissed the charges, finding the State did not show probable cause that Helland's menacing conviction involved the use of a firearm. The court took judicial notice of the plea agreement and amended information from the menacing case, which did not mention a firearm. The court concluded that the State needed to prove the conviction involved a firearm, not just provide supplemental testimony.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by taking judicial notice of the court records from the menacing case. However, the Supreme Court found that the district court misinterpreted N.D.C.C. § 62.1-02-01(1)(b). The statute does not require the use or possession of a firearm to be an element of the predicate offense, only that the offense was committed while using or possessing a firearm. The Supreme Court concluded that the State had shown probable cause based on the officer's testimony.Despite this, the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal because Helland's menacing conviction had been set aside and dismissed over a year before the firearm charges, meaning it could not serve as a predicate offense under N.D.C.C. § 62.1-02-01(1)(b). View "State v. Helland" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Casey Hoff applied for a building permit from the City of Burlington to add an addition to his home, which is located within the city's floodplain. Hoff, an experienced contractor, provided appraisals and plans to the city officials, who approved the permit based on the information provided. However, after Hoff began construction, it was later determined that the remodel constituted a "substantial improvement" under the city's floodplain ordinances, requiring additional compliance measures. The city subsequently refused to issue a certificate of occupancy, leading Hoff to sue the city.The District Court of Ward County held a bench trial and denied Hoff's claims for a writ of mandamus, declaratory judgment, injunction, and inverse condemnation. The court found that Hoff did not comply with the city's floodplain ordinances and that the remodel was a substantial improvement. The court also granted summary judgment dismissing Hoff's negligence claim, concluding that the city was immune under N.D.C.C. § 32-12.1-03.The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Hoff did not establish a clear legal right to a certificate of occupancy, as he did not comply with the city's ordinances. The court also found no abuse of discretion in denying Hoff's declaratory judgment and injunction claims. Additionally, the court concluded that Hoff failed to establish a "special relationship" with the city, which is necessary to overcome the city's immunity from negligence claims. The court also rejected Hoff's inverse condemnation claim, finding no total regulatory taking occurred. View "Hoff v. City of Burlington" on Justia Law

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Benjamin Jones and Melanie Jones were married in 2003 and have two minor children. They resided in Glenburn, North Dakota, and purchased a modular home and surrounding acreage from Melanie's parents under a contract for deed. During the COVID-19 pandemic, payments on the contract were suspended, and no payments have been made since, leaving an outstanding debt. In March 2023, Benjamin filed for divorce. In February 2024, Melanie's father notified the parties of his intention to declare default and cancel the contract for deed. The trial was held later that month.The District Court of Renville County granted the divorce, awarded primary residential responsibility of the children to Benjamin, and divided the property and debts. The court found zero equity in the marital home due to nonpayment and the intention to foreclose. It reserved ruling on the final value of the marital home and debt consolidation loan for six months. The court awarded Melanie spousal support of $900 per month for 10 years and ordered her to pay $590 per month in child support.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case. It affirmed the award of primary residential responsibility to Benjamin, finding no clear error in the lower court's decision. However, it reversed the lower court's reservation of ruling on the marital home and debt consolidation loan valuations, as well as the valuation of the marital home and corresponding debt without specific findings on the valuation date. The Supreme Court also found error in the child support calculation for omitting spousal support and in-kind income.The Supreme Court remanded the case for the lower court to clarify the valuation date for the marital property and debt, make specific findings if another valuation date is fair and equitable, redistribute the marital estate if valuations change, reconsider spousal support in light of any redistribution, and recalculate child support to include spousal support. View "Jones v. Jones" on Justia Law

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Kareem Lee Byrd, Jr. was charged with murder and conspiracy to commit murder. He entered an Alford plea to the conspiracy charge, and the murder charge was dismissed. Byrd was sentenced to twenty-five years, with five years suspended. He later filed for postconviction relief, arguing that he was convicted of a non-cognizable offense, his plea was not knowing and voluntary, and he received ineffective assistance of counsel.The District Court of Cass County denied Byrd’s application for postconviction relief. The court found that Byrd failed to show his Alford plea was not knowing or voluntary, failed to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, and failed to demonstrate that withdrawal of his plea was necessary to correct a manifest injustice. Byrd appealed the decision.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that Byrd was convicted of a cognizable offense because he pled guilty to conspiracy to commit intentional murder, which is a cognizable offense. The court found that a sufficient factual basis supported Byrd’s plea and that his plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The court also concluded that Byrd failed to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, as he did not demonstrate that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different but for his counsel’s alleged errors. View "Byrd v. State" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law