Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Two individuals formed a partnership to operate a business, with one contributing property and inventory, and the other providing labor, management, and assuming operational expenses. Disputes arose regarding the dissolution of the partnership and the distribution of remaining assets. The central issues concerned whether the partners had an agreement that would override the statutory default rules for capital accounts and partnership winding up, and whether one partner was entitled to a credit for “sweat equity” or an in-kind distribution of inventory.The District Court of McLean County, South Central Judicial District, initially found that the parties formed a partnership, that property was contributed, and that the partnership’s inventory was partnership property. It dismissed certain tort claims and awarded costs to one party. However, the court did not apply North Dakota’s statutory default rules for partnership dissolution and winding up. On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota in Ziemann v. Grosz, 2024 ND 166, affirmed in part and reversed in part, remanding with instructions for the district court to apply the statutory default winding up provisions under N.D.C.C. § 45-20-07 and to enter judgment consistent with its decision.On remand, the district court found no evidence of an agreement to vary the statutory defaults, credited the partner who contributed property with the appropriate capital credit, found no evidence of significant contributions from the other partner outside a small deposit, held that an in-kind distribution of inventory was not required, and ordered dissolution and winding up. Upon further appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota held that the district court properly followed its mandate, did not clearly err in its factual findings, and correctly applied the statutory provisions regarding partnership dissolution and distributions. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s remand order and judgment. View "Ziemann v. Grosz" on Justia Law

The case centers on the disappearance of Alice Queirolo in Minot, North Dakota, in December 2020. Queirolo, who was medically vulnerable due to a brain tumor and lived with two roommates, including Shawnee Krall, maintained daily contact with her family and coworkers to monitor her health. After she failed to report to work and did not respond to welfare checks, law enforcement investigated and discovered a series of circumstantial evidence including surveillance footage, witness testimony, and Krall’s behavior following her disappearance. The prosecution presented evidence suggesting that Queirolo’s disappearance was uncharacteristic, that Krall was uncooperative during the investigation, and that Krall made statements to another inmate admitting to killing the victim. There was no direct evidence, such as a body or autopsy results, due to suppression of evidence from a warrantless search.The District Court of Ward County, North Central Judicial District, presided over a five-day jury trial. The jury found Krall guilty of intentional or knowing murder under North Dakota law. Krall was sentenced to life in prison without parole. On appeal, Krall argued that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, primarily because it was circumstantial and did not conclusively tie him to Queirolo’s death. He also challenged the district court’s refusal to give his requested jury instruction that circumstantial evidence must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case. It held that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient for a rational jury to find Krall guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, reasoning that circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence. The court also held that the district court did not err in giving the standard pattern jury instruction on circumstantial evidence and explicitly overruled prior decisions requiring the “exclude every reasonable hypothesis” instruction. The conviction and judgment were affirmed. View "State v. Krall" on Justia Law

After filing a federal discrimination lawsuit against her former employer, which was dismissed, the petitioner sent emails to the employer’s counsel that led to state criminal charges for terrorizing in Cass County, North Dakota. At trial in state district court, the petitioner was convicted by a jury and sentenced to jail time with probation. During her probation, she was found to possess a firearm, resulting in revocation of probation and a new sentence.The petitioner appealed her criminal conviction to the North Dakota Supreme Court, arguing, among other things, that the State’s failure to preserve and disclose evidence constituted a Brady violation and that the evidence was insufficient to sustain her conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed her conviction. Subsequently, in the district court, the petitioner sought postconviction relief, alleging constitutional violations, lack of subject matter jurisdiction, unlawful withholding of evidence, and ineffective assistance of counsel. She also moved to disqualify the presiding judge. The district court summarily dismissed her application, finding most claims barred by res judicata or misuse of process, and denied the motion for disqualification after a hearing.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the district court’s rulings. It held that the district court erred by summarily dismissing the ineffective assistance of counsel claim without an evidentiary hearing, as the State had not moved for summary disposition on those claims. The court reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing on that issue. It affirmed the dismissal of the other claims, finding the district court had subject matter jurisdiction, correctly denied the motion to disqualify the judge, and properly dismissed other claims as procedurally barred or lacking merit. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings on the ineffective assistance claim. View "Pederson v. State" on Justia Law

A healthcare clinic and several physicians providing abortion services in North Dakota challenged the constitutionality of N.D.C.C. ch. 12.1-19.1, a law criminalizing most abortions with certain exceptions. The plaintiffs argued that the statute was unconstitutionally vague regarding when abortions could be performed to preserve the life or health of a pregnant woman. They asserted that the law's language failed to provide clear guidance to physicians about permissible conduct, especially given the severe criminal penalties for violations. Testimony from medical experts detailed the unpredictable and rapidly evolving risks that pregnancy can pose to a mother's health, and highlighted the difficulties in interpreting the statutory terms such as “serious health risk,” “substantial physical impairment,” and “major bodily function.”The District Court of Burleigh County, South Central Judicial District, granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs. The court found that the statute was impermissibly vague, concluding that its unclear language chilled physicians from providing constitutionally protected medical care. The court also determined that the law infringed on pregnant women’s fundamental rights under the North Dakota Constitution and was not narrowly tailored to promote health or protect life. As a result, the court declared N.D.C.C. ch. 12.1-19.1 unconstitutional and void.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the district court’s judgment. The justices issued separate opinions, but did not reach the four-member majority required by the state constitution to declare a legislative enactment unconstitutional. Therefore, the effect was that the district court’s judgment was reversed, and N.D.C.C. ch. 12.1-19.1 was not declared unconstitutional. The main holding is that, due to the lack of a sufficient majority, the abortion law was not invalidated and the lower court's judgment was reversed. View "Access Independent Health Services, Inc. v. Wrigley" on Justia Law

Antonio Eugenio Medina entered a guilty plea following the denial of his motion to suppress evidence in a criminal case. Medina, his attorney, the prosecutor, and the district court discussed and appeared to agree that his plea was conditional, allowing him to reserve the right to appeal the suppression ruling. However, the written judgment did not specify that the plea was conditional as required by the applicable procedural rule.The District Court of Grand Forks County, Northeast Central Judicial District, presided over Medina’s plea hearing and subsequent proceedings. Despite indications in the transcript that all parties consented to a conditional plea, the court did not issue a written order or judgment expressly stating that the plea was conditional, nor did the record contain written consents as required by N.D.R.Crim.P. 11(a)(2). Medina appealed, arguing that his plea should be recognized as conditional so that he could pursue an appeal of the suppression decision.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the record and found that while the transcript reflected substantial compliance with the requirements for a conditional plea, the absence of a written order and a judgment specifying that the plea was conditional did not satisfy the explicit requirements of N.D.R.Crim.P. 11(a)(2), as amended in 2017. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the district court with instructions to clarify whether it accepted a conditional plea and, if so, to enter an order and correct the judgment to properly reflect the conditional nature of the plea. The Supreme Court retained jurisdiction pending the district court’s clarification. The holding requires district courts to strictly comply with the procedural requirements for conditional pleas under Rule 11(a)(2), including written consents, a court order, and a judgment specifying the plea is conditional. View "State v. Medina" on Justia Law

Kyle Wardner and Tamara Porath were the parents of a minor child, E.M.M.W., who was born in 2017 while the parents resided in different countries—Wardner in North Dakota and Tamara Porath in Canada. After Tamara Porath’s death in November 2020, her sister, Rebecca Porath, sought legal guardianship of the child in Canada. Wardner opposed the application, and the Canadian court ultimately awarded him primary residential responsibility for E.M.M.W., who then moved to North Dakota. In May 2022, both parties stipulated to a final Canadian order that established Wardner’s custody and the Poraths’ visitation rights. Wardner registered this order in North Dakota in May 2024.Subsequently, Wardner filed a motion in the District Court of McLean County, South Central Judicial District, seeking to modify the Canadian visitation order. After a hearing in January 2025, during which both sides testified, the district court denied Wardner’s motion. The court found that Wardner had not demonstrated a material change in circumstances required for modification under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.6, the statute it applied to the case. The Poraths also argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction but conceded North Dakota was the child’s home state.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota held that the district court had jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), and that it erred by applying the wrong statutory standard. The Supreme Court determined that N.D.C.C. § 14-09.4-14, governing modification of nonparent visitation, was the correct statute to apply to Wardner’s motion, rather than the statute for modifying primary residential responsibility. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s order and remanded the case with instructions for further proceedings under the proper law. View "Wardner v. Porath" on Justia Law

Evan Markestad and Joy Markestad, who divorced in early 2023, share two minor children. Joy was awarded primary residential responsibility, while Evan received parenting time. In summer 2024, Evan agreed that Joy and the children could temporarily reside in Bismarck. Joy later decided to remain in Bismarck permanently and enrolled the children in school there. In March 2025, Evan moved to modify parenting time due to the changed circumstances. Joy partially agreed, asking the district court to alter the school-year schedule but not the summer and holiday arrangements. The district court held a hearing and issued an order and amended judgment modifying parenting time.In the District Court of Ramsey County, Northeast Judicial District, the court examined both parties’ proposals for summer parenting time. Evan requested the entire summer, whereas Joy proposed alternating weekends and two additional weeks. The court considered their respective work schedules, finding Joy, as a teacher with summers off, more available and able to transport the children. The court also considered Evan’s farming obligations, noting his work frequently interrupted the prior parenting schedule. The court ultimately awarded Evan two consecutive weeks in July, Father’s Day, and an additional two-week vacation period, rather than adopting either party’s full proposal. The court also considered the conduct of both parties, including Joy’s lack of candor regarding her move and Evan’s demeaning language, but concluded the record supported its findings.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the district court’s decision under the clearly erroneous standard and affirmed both the order modifying parenting time and the amended judgment. The Supreme Court held that the district court did not misapply the law or prioritize Joy’s wishes over the children’s best interests, and its findings were supported by the record. Requests for attorney’s fees by both parties were denied, and the Supreme Court found the appeal was not frivolous. View "Markestad v. Markestad" on Justia Law

Niko Solis was charged with indecent exposure, a class A misdemeanor, after engaging in conduct outside a courthouse near a school. He entered a guilty plea to the charge. The State requested that Solis be required to register as a sex offender, while Solis argued that the court should exercise its discretion to deviate from the registration requirement, citing statutory criteria that permit deviation under certain circumstances.The District Court of Ward County, North Central Judicial District, presided by Judge Stacy J. Louser, sentenced Solis to 360 days’ imprisonment with all but one day suspended, imposed two years of supervised probation, and required Solis to register as a sex offender under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-15(2)(b). The court acknowledged its discretion to deviate from registration but ultimately declined to do so, citing concerns about the nature of Solis’s conduct and his explanation for it. Solis appealed, arguing that the court abused its discretion and failed to make specific findings required for deviation.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the appeal under an abuse of discretion standard. It held that the statute’s language allows the court discretion to deviate from the registration requirement if certain criteria are met, but does not mandate deviation even if those criteria are satisfied. The Supreme Court determined that the district court’s decision was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, and that it was the result of a rational process. The Supreme Court affirmed the criminal judgment and the requirement that Solis register as a sex offender. View "State v. Solis" on Justia Law

This case concerns a dispute among siblings regarding the partition of farmland in Grant County, North Dakota, originally owned by their parents. After the parents conveyed the land to their children as tenants in common, reserving life estates, four siblings transferred their interests into a family trust in 2017, leaving Bryan Tischmak as the sole sibling outside the trust. In 2022, the trust entered into an agreement for rock, sand, and gravel extraction on portions of the property. Bryan initiated a partition action in 2023, seeking division of the land and an accounting of income.The District Court of Grant County, South Central Judicial District, presided over a bench trial, during which the parties stipulated to the appointment of a referee to recommend partition options. Bryan advocated for an option that would award him sections including the family homeplace, but the court adopted a different recommendation (Recommendation 5), granting him the S1/2 of Section 33 and the NW1/4 of Section 34, and ordering the trust to pay him a sum based on the property’s value and his share of land income. The court later corrected a clerical mistake that had mistakenly awarded Bryan all of Section 33 instead of the S1/2, and denied Bryan's motions to alter or amend the judgment.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed whether the district court abused its discretion in adopting the referee’s recommendation, correcting clerical errors, and calculating Bryan’s share of income and expenses. The Supreme Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion and that its findings were not clearly erroneous. However, the Supreme Court modified the judgment to require the trust to reimburse Bryan $2,417.20 for certain trust-exclusive expenses. The judgment was otherwise affirmed as modified. View "Tischmak v. Theurer" on Justia Law

In March 2024, Christopher Bauer was charged with disorderly conduct following an incident in Williston, North Dakota. He retained legal counsel and the case proceeded to a jury trial, at the conclusion of which Bauer was acquitted. After his acquittal, Bauer submitted a motion seeking reimbursement for attorney’s fees and costs incurred during the defense of his criminal prosecution.The District Court of Williams County, Northwest Judicial District, presided over by Judge Kirsten M. Sjue, reviewed Bauer’s post-judgment motion. The court denied his request for attorney’s fees and costs, determining that Bauer had not established a legal basis for recovering such expenses in the context of the criminal proceeding. Bauer also argued that the district court judge committed misconduct warranting discipline, but the court’s order did not address this allegation, and there was no indication that the issue had been properly raised or preserved during district court proceedings.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota considered whether the district court’s post-judgment order was appealable and addressed the merits of Bauer’s requests. The Supreme Court held that Bauer’s motion for recovery of attorney’s fees, which sought reimbursement of property allegedly expended in connection with the criminal action, constituted a substantial right under N.D.C.C. § 29-28-06(5), making the order appealable. However, the Court affirmed the district court’s denial of Bauer’s motion, finding he had not shown entitlement to attorney’s fees and costs in the criminal case. The Supreme Court also declined to consider Bauer’s judicial misconduct claim on appeal, as it had not been preserved in the trial court. The district court’s order was affirmed. View "City of Williston v. Bauer" on Justia Law