Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this case, the Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the lower court's ruling in favor of the North Dakota Industrial Commission (NDIC), acting through the North Dakota Housing Finance Agency (NDHFA), in a dispute over a lien on a property. The property in question was part of a housing development built by the Fendee Group, and was purchased by Carinne Gould, who obtained a mortgage through Guaranteed Rate, Inc., which was later assigned to the NDIC. After Gould defaulted on her payments, both the NDIC and Fendee filed liens on the property. Fendee argued that its liens were superior to the NDHFA's mortgage, but the court ruled that since the NDHFA's lien was perfected (or legally finalized) before Fendee's liens, the NDHFA held the superior lien. The court also rejected Fendee's claim of a "super lien," which would have given it priority over all other liens, and denied Fendee's request for attorney's fees. The court found that the dispute over the super lien was a question of first impression, meaning it was the first time such a question had come before the court, and therefore the appeal was not frivolous and did not warrant attorney’s fees. View "NDIC v. Gould" on Justia Law

In this case, Jonathan Garaas and David Garaas, serving as co-trustees of multiple family trusts, appealed a dismissal of their complaint against Petro-Hunt, L.L.C., an oil company operating on land in which the trusts own mineral interests. The trusts claimed that Petro-Hunt had decreased their royalty interest without proper basis and sought both a declaratory judgment affirming their higher royalty interest and damages for underpayment. The district court dismissed the complaint without prejudice, stating that the trusts had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies before the North Dakota Industrial Commission.The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision, stating that the trusts needed to exhaust their administrative remedies before bringing their claims to the court. The court reasoned that the issues raised by the trusts involved factual matters related to the correlative rights of landowners within the drilling unit, which fall within the jurisdiction of the Industrial Commission. The court held that the commission should first consider these issues, make findings of fact, and develop a complete record before the case proceeds to the district court. It further noted that, after exhausting their administrative remedies, the trusts could then bring an appropriate action for declaratory relief or damages in district court. View "Garaas v. Petro-Hunt" on Justia Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of North Dakota, Rozalyn Rinde appealed from a criminal judgment after the district court revoked her probation and resentenced her. Rinde was initially charged with five counts, including unlawful possession of a controlled substance and endangerment of a child or vulnerable adult. She pleaded guilty to both charges and was sentenced to 360 days with the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, with all but 63 days suspended for two years of supervised probation. However, after multiple violations of her probation, the court revoked her probation and resentenced her to 360 days on the misdemeanor count and to five years on the felony count. Rinde argued that the court imposed an illegal sentence, exceeding the maximum penalty allowed at the time of her original offenses. She also claimed that the sentence violated the prohibition on ex post facto laws.The Supreme Court of North Dakota found that the district court had not imposed an illegal sentence. The court stated that the determining factor in applying the statute governing probation revocation (N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-07(6)) was the date of the original convictions and sentencing, not the date of the offense. Since Rinde’s original conviction and sentencing occurred after the August 2021 amendment of the statute, which removed the restriction on a court’s ability to resentence a defendant in the case of a suspended sentence, the court was not limited by the pre-amendment version of the statute. Therefore, the court was within its rights to resentence Rinde to five years on her felony count. The court also rejected Rinde's claim of an "ex post facto application," stating that the amendment did not increase the maximum possible punishment for her crime, nor did it make an innocent act criminal, aggravate the crime, or relax the evidence required to prove the offense. As such, the court affirmed the lower court's decision. View "State v. Rinde" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of North Dakota had to decide whether the district court had implicitly accepted a plea agreement by accepting a guilty plea from the defendant, Devin Fischer. Fischer had initially entered a plea agreement with the State, in which he would plead guilty to a reduced charge of menacing, with the remaining charges of burglary, reckless endangerment, and tampering with physical evidence being dismissed. The district court accepted Fischer's guilty plea, but ultimately rejected the plea agreement after hearing victim impact statements and viewing video evidence of the crime. Fischer was subsequently tried and found guilty of terrorizing and reckless endangerment.Fischer appealed, arguing that by accepting his guilty plea, the district court had implicitly accepted the plea agreement. The Supreme Court of North Dakota disagreed, ruling that a court can accept a guilty plea without accepting an associated plea agreement. The court found that the district court had acted within its discretion to separately consider the guilty plea and the plea agreement.Fischer also argued that the district court judge should have recused himself after making a comment that, after viewing the video evidence, he did not see how Fischer could be found not guilty of all charges. The Supreme Court of North Dakota rejected this argument, finding that the judge had not demonstrated bias as the comments were made outside of the presence of the jury and were a necessary part of the judge's explanation for rejecting the plea agreement.The court affirmed Fischer's convictions for terrorizing and reckless endangerment, as well as the district court's denial of Fischer's motion for recusal. View "State v. Fischer" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of North Dakota was tasked with reviewing a lower court's decision to grant a mother's request to relocate her children to Minnesota after she remarried. The father contested the relocation, claiming that the lower court misapplied certain factors when making its decision and placed too much emphasis on the mother's new marriage.In the original divorce settlement, the mother received primary residential responsibility, and the father was granted weekly parenting time. However, after the mother remarried and sought to move to Minnesota to live with her new husband, she requested permission from the court to relocate the children. The father opposed the move.The lower court ruled in favor of the mother, finding that the move was in the best interests of the children. The court considered the Stout-Hawkinson factors, which include the prospective advantages of the move, the integrity of the custodial parent's motive for relocation, the integrity of the noncustodial parent's motives for opposing the move, and the potential negative impact on the relationship between the noncustodial parent and the child. The court found that the first two factors favored the mother, and that while the fourth factor was not in her favor, it did not outweigh the strength of the other factors.On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that the lower court had not erred in its application of the Stout-Hawkinson factors, and that the evidence supported the lower court's findings. The court also rejected the father's claim that the lower court had created a "super factor" by placing too much emphasis on the mother's new marriage, noting that the lower court had considered all relevant factors in making its decision. View "Nelson v. Nelson" on Justia Law

In this case from the Supreme Court of North Dakota, Alexander Williams, the appellant, appealed the dismissal of his petition for nonparent visitation rights to I.H.L., a child from his ex-wife's previous relationship. Williams had been a consistent caretaker of I.H.L. since 2014 and had maintained a close relationship with the child, even after his divorce from the child's mother, Stefaney Vraa. However, following a disagreement with Vraa, Williams was denied visitation rights. The district court dismissed Williams’ petition on the grounds that he had failed to establish a prima facie case for nonparent visitation, specifically that he did not satisfy the requirements of a consistent caretaker.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reversed and remanded the decision, concluding that Williams had indeed established a prima facie case for nonparent visitation, warranting an evidentiary hearing. The court decided that Williams had shown he was a consistent caretaker for I.H.L., having lived with and cared for the child for more than 12 months, made day-to-day decisions for the child, and established a bonded and dependent relationship with the child. The court also found that Williams had shown a substantial relationship with the child, and that denying him visitation would result in harm to the child, given the evidence of increased anxiety and distress in the child following the denial of visitation. View "Williams v. Vraa" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota dealt with a dispute between divorced parents, Nickolette Keller and Michael Keller, over tax exemptions for their children. The divorce judgement had allocated the right to claim the oldest child to Michael Keller and the younger child to Nickolette Keller. In 2023, Michael Keller attempted to claim his eldest child on his taxes, but received a letter from the child, facilitated by Nickolette Keller, stating the child would be filing his own taxes. Consequently, Michael Keller filed a motion for contempt against Nickolette Keller.The district court found Nickolette Keller in contempt for willful and inexcusable intent to violate the court order and awarded Michael Keller attorney’s fees up to when Nickolette Keller provided the necessary tax form. The Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota affirmed the district court's decision, holding that Nickolette Keller's refusal to comply with the divorce judgement and her facilitation of the child's letter constituted contempt.Michael Keller cross-appealed, arguing the district court erred in not awarding him the full amount of attorney’s fees. The Supreme Court denied his claim, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in not awarding Michael Keller attorney’s fees incurred after Nickolette Keller provided him the IRS form. Michael Keller also unsuccessfully requested attorney’s fees on appeal, which the Supreme Court denied due to inadequate briefing and argument. View "Keller v. Keller" on Justia Law

In this case from the Supreme Court of North Dakota, Ryan Kratz, who had entered into a purchase agreement to buy a business and building from Donald and Carol McIlravy, failed to make the agreed-upon payments. The McIlravys initiated two eviction actions, and a separate action seeking damages, cancellation of the contract, and release of funds held in a trust account. The district court initially dismissed one of the eviction actions, but eventually ruled in favor of the McIlravys, awarding them damages and ordering release of the trust funds. Several years later, Kratz filed a motion under Rule 60(b), alleging the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the eviction actions and seeking to vacate or void all findings, conclusions, and orders, except the dismissals of the eviction actions. The district court denied this motion and awarded attorney’s fees to the McIlravys.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota held that Kratz's appeal was limited to the judgment denying his Rule 60(b) motion and that the motion was timely. The court determined that the district court had jurisdiction over the eviction cases and that any violation of N.D.R.Ct. 7.1(b)(1) was harmless error. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees. Consequently, the court affirmed the decision of the lower court. View "Don's Garden Center v. The Garden District" on Justia Law

In the State of North Dakota, Dale Kringlie suffered a work-related injury to his right shoulder and wrist while using a concrete drill in April 2019. Workforce Safety and Insurance (WSI) accepted the claim and paid the associated medical expenses and disability benefits. WSI later issued a vocational rehabilitation plan for Kringlie, which he contested, asserting his inability to perform any of the jobs due to a neuropsychological condition. Kringlie sought the opinion of Dr. Swenson, who supported his claim. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) reversed WSI’s decision, basing his judgment heavily on Dr. Swenson's opinion. WSI appealed this decision to the district court, arguing that the ALJ erred by considering Kringlie’s functional limitations at the time of the vocational rehabilitation report issuance. The district court reversed the ALJ's decision, stating that WSI was only required to consider Kringlie's functional limitations at the time of his work-related injury. The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the district court's decision, agreeing that the ALJ misapplied the law. The court held that the ALJ erred in considering Kringlie’s functional limitations at the time WSI issued the vocational rehabilitation report, rather than at the time of the work-related injury. Furthermore, the court ruled that the ALJ wrongfully relied on Dr. Swenson's opinion, which was not permitted under N.D.C.C. § 65-05-08.1. View "Workforce Safety and Insurance v. Kringlie" on Justia Law

In this case from the Supreme Court of North Dakota, Derrick Sherwood appealed a district court order denying his motion to vacate a domestic violence protection order (DVPO) under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60. The court held a hearing and entered a DVPO restraining Derrick Sherwood from having contact with Valerie Sherwood, his ex-wife, and their two minor children. The order also required Derrick Sherwood to surrender his firearms to law enforcement. Later, the court amended the DVPO to remove the restriction on Derrick Sherwood’s possession of firearms. Derrick Sherwood later moved to vacate the DVPO altogether.The Supreme Court of North Dakota held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Derrick Sherwood’s request to treat Valerie Sherwood as a hostile witness or in denying Derrick Sherwood’s motion to vacate the DVPO. The court also held that the district court did not err in awarding Valerie Sherwood attorney’s fees.Furthermore, the court held that Derrick Sherwood did not have standing to challenge the constitutionality of N.D.C.C. § 14-07.1-02(4)(g), which allows a DVPO to require, under certain circumstances, that the respondent surrender any firearm or other specified dangerous weapon. As the DVPO was amended to allow Derrick Sherwood to possess firearms, he did not have a justiciable controversy regarding the constitutionality of this statute.The court affirmed the district court's decision. View "Sherwood v. Sherwood" on Justia Law