Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The case involves SCS Carbon Transport LLC ("Summit") and a group of landowners. Summit plans to construct an interstate pipeline to transport carbon dioxide to sequestration sites in North Dakota and four other states. To determine the appropriate pipeline route, Summit needs to access the landowners' properties. However, the landowners denied Summit permission to enter their lands. Consequently, Summit filed lawsuits against the landowners, seeking a court order confirming its right under North Dakota law to enter the lands to conduct pre-condemnation surveys and examinations. The landowners counterclaimed, arguing that the statute authorizing entry is unconstitutional.The district courts granted summary judgment to Summit, concluding that the statute does not constitute an unconstitutional per se taking, Summit is a common carrier authorized to exercise eminent domain, and the proposed surveys and examinations are the type of minimally invasive surveys and examinations allowed under the statute. The courts confirmed Summit's right to enter the lands to complete civil, environmental, and archaeological/cultural surveys and examinations, including any necessary geotechnical/soil borings, archaeological/cultural resource surveys and examinations, and including any necessary core or water sampling activities subject to any conditions.The landowners appealed the judgments and order granting summary judgment, arguing that the statute is unconstitutional on its face and as applied to them under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment and article I, § 16 of the North Dakota Constitution.The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court concluded that the landowners have not established a constitutional violation on the face of the entry statute or as applied to them, and the judgments and order do not exceed the scope of the entry statute. The court also found that the district court's judgment does not grant Summit an indefinite or perpetual right of access. The court held that a constitutionally permissible entry may not be longer or more invasive than necessary to complete the examination or survey needed to confirm and minimize the scope of the anticipated taking of private property. View "SCS Carbon Transport v. Malloy" on Justia Law

The case involves Howard Studhorse, who was charged with five counts of gross sexual imposition and one count of contributing to the deprivation or delinquency of minors. The charges were based on allegations involving three victims, identified as Jane Doe 1, Jane Doe 2, and Jane Doe 3. After a jury trial, Studhorse was found guilty on all six charges. He appealed, raising several issues including the district court's application of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence, the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions, and potential violations of his right to remain silent and his protection against double jeopardy.Studhorse argued that the district court misapplied the North Dakota Rules of Evidence by allowing Jane Doe 3 to testify without taking an oath or affirmation to tell the truth. The Supreme Court of North Dakota found that the district court's discussion with Jane Doe 3 impressed upon her the duty to tell the truth, which complied with the rules. Therefore, this was not an obvious error.Studhorse also claimed that the State improperly elicited testimony about his silence, implying his guilt. The court found that any error in this regard was harmless and did not require reversal of Studhorse's convictions.Studhorse further argued that he was convicted of non-cognizable offenses on counts IV and V because the jury instructions did not require that he touched the victims on "sexual or other intimate parts," as required by the statute. The court found that the lack of specificity in the jury instructions did not create a non-cognizable crime.Studhorse also claimed that his convictions on counts II and V violated his right against double jeopardy. The court found that the jury instructions for counts IV and V permitted a conviction for both counts on the basis of the same conduct, which was an obvious error. Therefore, the court reversed Studhorse's conviction on count V as duplicative to count IV.Finally, Studhorse argued that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of counts I and II. The court found that the evidence was insufficient to prove a sexual act in count I, and reversed Studhorse's conviction on that count. However, the court affirmed the conviction on count II. View "State v. Studhorse" on Justia Law

The case revolves around the estate of Merle Almer, who passed away in 2016. Almer owned a construction business and a farm, and his will named his daughter, Linda Moe, as the personal representative. The will contained bequests to various individuals, including a life estate in the farm and farming assets to Casey Almer, Merle Almer's grandson. The will also directed the personal representative to use harvested and unharvested grain to pay costs of administration and taxes for the estate. However, at the time of Merle Almer's death, the grain discovered in his grain bins was less than expected, leading to a dispute between the personal representative and Casey Almer.The dispute led to a lawsuit, where the personal representative accused Almer of conversion of grain and other farm assets. Almer counterclaimed with allegations of conversion and breach of fiduciary duty. The counterclaims were dismissed, and a jury found that Almer did not convert property. Almer then filed a petition alleging that the personal representative breached her fiduciary duties. The district court heard testimony and took evidence over five days.The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the personal representative did not breach her fiduciary duties while administering the estate. The court also found that the will's abatement provisions were ambiguous due to the will's nonstandard use of the term "specific devise." The court made findings concerning the testator's intent based on testimony from the attorney who prepared the will. The court denied Almer's application for surcharge, granted the personal representative's motion to approve final distribution, and approved approximately $760,000 in attorney’s fees. Almer appealed, challenging the court's interpretation of the will, the court’s findings concerning the personal representative’s conduct during administration, and the court’s approval of attorney’s fees. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. View "In re Estate of Almer" on Justia Law

The defendant, Rolanda Doyle, was charged with murder in the course of a felony and child abuse of a victim under six years old, following the death of a child at her home. The State presented testimony from two doctors, one of whom conducted the autopsy of the child. Doyle objected to portions of their testimony, arguing that they constituted expert testimony and the State had not provided the required expert witness summaries.The district court overruled Doyle's objections and the jury found her guilty on both counts. Doyle appealed, arguing that the doctors had testified as expert witnesses and the State had not complied with the requirements for expert witness summaries.The Supreme Court of North Dakota agreed with Doyle. It found that the State had introduced expert testimony and had not complied with the requirements for expert witness summaries. The court also found that the district court had abused its discretion by allowing the State's expert to testify without the required summaries. The court concluded that this error was not harmless and reversed the judgment, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "State v. Doyle" on Justia Law

In May 2023, Zeferino Rangel pleaded guilty to five felony counts, including patronizing a minor for commercial sexual activity, corruption or solicitation of minors, possession of certain prohibited materials, promoting or directing a sexual performance by a minor, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. In August 2023, the district court sentenced Rangel, including consecutive sentences on some counts. Rangel moved to withdraw his guilty plea in September 2023, asserting that he was surprised by the sentence imposed and that a manifest injustice would occur if he was not allowed to withdraw his plea.The district court denied Rangel's motion to withdraw his guilty plea after an evidentiary hearing in October 2023. The court found that Rangel's reasons for withdrawal did not amount to manifest injustice. The court held that the prison terms it imposed were within the latitude under the law for each count, and that it had the authority to order periods of incarceration to run consecutively.The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the district court's decision. The Supreme Court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Rangel's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The court did not act in an arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable manner, and did not misinterpret or misapply the law. The Supreme Court concluded that Rangel failed to show a manifest injustice necessitating the withdrawal of his guilty plea. Therefore, the district court's order was affirmed. View "State v. Rangel" on Justia Law

Joshua and Melissa Armitage were married in June 2019 and separated in February 2023. They have one child together, born in 2020. Melissa Armitage initiated a divorce action in February 2023. The district court held a bench trial in August 2023, and subsequently awarded Melissa Armitage primary residential responsibility of the minor child, subject to Joshua Armitage’s parenting time.Joshua Armitage appealed the district court's decision, arguing that the court erred in awarding Melissa Armitage primary residential responsibility of the minor child. He contended that many of the factors that the district court found favored neither party actually supported an award of equal residential responsibility.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case under the clearly erroneous standard, which does not allow for reweighing of evidence or reassessment of witness credibility. The court considered the best interests and welfare of the child, as required by North Dakota law. The court noted that the district court had considered the evidence and made findings on the best interest factors, providing specific analysis on twelve of the factors. The court found factors (a) and (c) favored Melissa Armitage, while the remaining factors favored neither party.The Supreme Court of North Dakota concluded that the district court's findings of fact were not induced by an erroneous view of the law, were supported by the evidence, and did not leave the court with a definite and firm conviction a mistake had been made. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment, upholding the award of primary residential responsibility to Melissa Armitage. View "Armitage v. Armitage" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Alvin Brown, who pleaded guilty to two counts of endangerment of a child. After serving his sentence, he was put on probation. However, the State filed a petition to revoke his probation after he violated its terms. The court ordered Brown to wear an alcohol SCRAM bracelet and remain in custody at the Lake Region Law Enforcement Center until a spot was available at a halfway house. Brown was warned that leaving the halfway house would be considered an escape, which would result in additional charges. Despite these warnings, Brown absconded from the Center and was subsequently charged with escape, to which he pleaded guilty.Brown later filed a petition for postconviction relief, arguing that his conviction was invalid and his trial attorney was ineffective. He claimed that he was not in official detention when he left the Center, and therefore, the State could not charge him with escape. The district court denied his petition, finding that Brown was indeed in official detention and that he failed to establish the second prong of the Strickland test, which requires showing a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the district court's decision. The court found no error in the lower court's determination that Brown was in official detention when he left the Center. It also agreed with the lower court's finding that Brown did not meet the second prong of the Strickland test. The court concluded that Brown's arguments were either unnecessary for the decision or without merit. View "Brown v. State" on Justia Law

The case involves Steven Aune, who was convicted of manslaughter. His conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court of North Dakota. Aune later applied for postconviction relief, but his application was dismissed by the district court as it was deemed untimely. Aune also requested a change of judge, which was denied. He then moved to have his application and demand for change of judge reconsidered, but both motions were denied. Aune appealed these decisions.The district court dismissed Aune's application for postconviction relief on the grounds that it was filed after the two-year limit from the date his conviction became final. The court also denied Aune's request for a change of judge, stating that postconviction relief proceedings are treated as a continuation of the criminal prosecution, and therefore, the applicant is not entitled to a new judge.The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the district court's decisions. The court held that the district court has the authority to summarily dismiss a postconviction relief application for being untimely. The court also ruled that a district court may summarily dismiss an application without notice if it concludes no set of facts would justify granting relief on the claims made in the application. Regarding Aune's request for a change of judge, the court held that a demand for a change of judge is not the proper route to remove a judge for bias. The court affirmed the orders denying the demand for a change of judge and the motions to reconsider the summary dismissal of the postconviction application and the denial of the demand for a change of judge. View "Aune v. State" on Justia Law

Brent Castleman was charged with 13 separate offenses, including stalking, harassment, tampering with physical evidence, and 10 counts of disobedience of a judicial order. Castleman filed a motion to sever the 13 counts into individual trials, arguing that the joinder of the offenses was prejudicial. The district court denied the motion, stating that the charges were connected with a common scheme or plan, and that trying them together would serve judicial economy. The court also found that Castleman would not be prejudiced by a single trial.The district court's decision was based on North Dakota Rule of Criminal Procedure 8, which allows for the joinder of offenses if they are of the same or similar character, or are connected with or constitute parts of a common scheme or plan. The court also referenced Rule 14, which allows for relief from prejudicial joinder. Castleman entered conditional Alford pleas on some of the charges, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to sever.In the Supreme Court of North Dakota, Castleman argued that the offenses should not have been joined due to extreme prejudice, as they involved different victims, times, locations, and methods of contact. He also claimed that the district court's decision was merely a recitation of Rule 14. The Supreme Court found that Castleman failed to provide specifics on what prejudice would occur or how the joinder would hinder his defense. The court concluded that the district court did not act arbitrarily, unreasonably, or unconscionably, and did not misinterpret or misapply the law. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision, finding no abuse of discretion in denying Castleman's motion to sever. View "State v. Castleman" on Justia Law

Glenn Solberg, representing himself, appealed against orders denying his motions for relief from judgment and for reconsideration. He also moved for a jury trial and disqualification of the Court, alleging bias and conflict of interest. Solberg's claims of bias were based on prior decisions that were adverse to him. Greg Hennessy, the defendant, argued that the appeal was frivolous and requested attorney’s fees and double costs.The District Court of Williams County had denied Solberg's motions for relief from judgment and for reconsideration. Solberg then appealed these decisions to the Supreme Court of North Dakota.The Supreme Court of North Dakota denied Solberg's motion for a jury trial and disqualification, stating that the law presumes a judge is unbiased and not prejudiced. The court also noted that adverse or erroneous rulings do not, by themselves, demonstrate bias. For recusal to be warranted, a judge must be partial or there must be some external influence that creates an appearance of impropriety. The court found that Solberg failed to allege facts showing bias or the existence of an external influence creating an appearance of impropriety. The court also concluded that Solberg's request for a jury trial was frivolous as the Supreme Court reviews the rulings of the district court and does not engage in fact finding. The court affirmed the orders of the district court under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(1) and (4), finding the appeal to be frivolous and completely without merit. The court also awarded Hennessy double costs and attorney’s fees in the amount of $15,697.50 for defending this frivolous appeal. View "Solberg v. Hennessy" on Justia Law