Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In May 2023, Zeferino Rangel pleaded guilty to five felony counts, including patronizing a minor for commercial sexual activity, corruption or solicitation of minors, possession of certain prohibited materials, promoting or directing a sexual performance by a minor, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. In August 2023, the district court sentenced Rangel, including consecutive sentences on some counts. Rangel moved to withdraw his guilty plea in September 2023, asserting that he was surprised by the sentence imposed and that a manifest injustice would occur if he was not allowed to withdraw his plea.The district court denied Rangel's motion to withdraw his guilty plea after an evidentiary hearing in October 2023. The court found that Rangel's reasons for withdrawal did not amount to manifest injustice. The court held that the prison terms it imposed were within the latitude under the law for each count, and that it had the authority to order periods of incarceration to run consecutively.The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the district court's decision. The Supreme Court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Rangel's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The court did not act in an arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable manner, and did not misinterpret or misapply the law. The Supreme Court concluded that Rangel failed to show a manifest injustice necessitating the withdrawal of his guilty plea. Therefore, the district court's order was affirmed. View "State v. Rangel" on Justia Law

Joshua and Melissa Armitage were married in June 2019 and separated in February 2023. They have one child together, born in 2020. Melissa Armitage initiated a divorce action in February 2023. The district court held a bench trial in August 2023, and subsequently awarded Melissa Armitage primary residential responsibility of the minor child, subject to Joshua Armitage’s parenting time.Joshua Armitage appealed the district court's decision, arguing that the court erred in awarding Melissa Armitage primary residential responsibility of the minor child. He contended that many of the factors that the district court found favored neither party actually supported an award of equal residential responsibility.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case under the clearly erroneous standard, which does not allow for reweighing of evidence or reassessment of witness credibility. The court considered the best interests and welfare of the child, as required by North Dakota law. The court noted that the district court had considered the evidence and made findings on the best interest factors, providing specific analysis on twelve of the factors. The court found factors (a) and (c) favored Melissa Armitage, while the remaining factors favored neither party.The Supreme Court of North Dakota concluded that the district court's findings of fact were not induced by an erroneous view of the law, were supported by the evidence, and did not leave the court with a definite and firm conviction a mistake had been made. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment, upholding the award of primary residential responsibility to Melissa Armitage. View "Armitage v. Armitage" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Alvin Brown, who pleaded guilty to two counts of endangerment of a child. After serving his sentence, he was put on probation. However, the State filed a petition to revoke his probation after he violated its terms. The court ordered Brown to wear an alcohol SCRAM bracelet and remain in custody at the Lake Region Law Enforcement Center until a spot was available at a halfway house. Brown was warned that leaving the halfway house would be considered an escape, which would result in additional charges. Despite these warnings, Brown absconded from the Center and was subsequently charged with escape, to which he pleaded guilty.Brown later filed a petition for postconviction relief, arguing that his conviction was invalid and his trial attorney was ineffective. He claimed that he was not in official detention when he left the Center, and therefore, the State could not charge him with escape. The district court denied his petition, finding that Brown was indeed in official detention and that he failed to establish the second prong of the Strickland test, which requires showing a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the district court's decision. The court found no error in the lower court's determination that Brown was in official detention when he left the Center. It also agreed with the lower court's finding that Brown did not meet the second prong of the Strickland test. The court concluded that Brown's arguments were either unnecessary for the decision or without merit. View "Brown v. State" on Justia Law

The case involves Steven Aune, who was convicted of manslaughter. His conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court of North Dakota. Aune later applied for postconviction relief, but his application was dismissed by the district court as it was deemed untimely. Aune also requested a change of judge, which was denied. He then moved to have his application and demand for change of judge reconsidered, but both motions were denied. Aune appealed these decisions.The district court dismissed Aune's application for postconviction relief on the grounds that it was filed after the two-year limit from the date his conviction became final. The court also denied Aune's request for a change of judge, stating that postconviction relief proceedings are treated as a continuation of the criminal prosecution, and therefore, the applicant is not entitled to a new judge.The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the district court's decisions. The court held that the district court has the authority to summarily dismiss a postconviction relief application for being untimely. The court also ruled that a district court may summarily dismiss an application without notice if it concludes no set of facts would justify granting relief on the claims made in the application. Regarding Aune's request for a change of judge, the court held that a demand for a change of judge is not the proper route to remove a judge for bias. The court affirmed the orders denying the demand for a change of judge and the motions to reconsider the summary dismissal of the postconviction application and the denial of the demand for a change of judge. View "Aune v. State" on Justia Law

Brent Castleman was charged with 13 separate offenses, including stalking, harassment, tampering with physical evidence, and 10 counts of disobedience of a judicial order. Castleman filed a motion to sever the 13 counts into individual trials, arguing that the joinder of the offenses was prejudicial. The district court denied the motion, stating that the charges were connected with a common scheme or plan, and that trying them together would serve judicial economy. The court also found that Castleman would not be prejudiced by a single trial.The district court's decision was based on North Dakota Rule of Criminal Procedure 8, which allows for the joinder of offenses if they are of the same or similar character, or are connected with or constitute parts of a common scheme or plan. The court also referenced Rule 14, which allows for relief from prejudicial joinder. Castleman entered conditional Alford pleas on some of the charges, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to sever.In the Supreme Court of North Dakota, Castleman argued that the offenses should not have been joined due to extreme prejudice, as they involved different victims, times, locations, and methods of contact. He also claimed that the district court's decision was merely a recitation of Rule 14. The Supreme Court found that Castleman failed to provide specifics on what prejudice would occur or how the joinder would hinder his defense. The court concluded that the district court did not act arbitrarily, unreasonably, or unconscionably, and did not misinterpret or misapply the law. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision, finding no abuse of discretion in denying Castleman's motion to sever. View "State v. Castleman" on Justia Law

Glenn Solberg, representing himself, appealed against orders denying his motions for relief from judgment and for reconsideration. He also moved for a jury trial and disqualification of the Court, alleging bias and conflict of interest. Solberg's claims of bias were based on prior decisions that were adverse to him. Greg Hennessy, the defendant, argued that the appeal was frivolous and requested attorney’s fees and double costs.The District Court of Williams County had denied Solberg's motions for relief from judgment and for reconsideration. Solberg then appealed these decisions to the Supreme Court of North Dakota.The Supreme Court of North Dakota denied Solberg's motion for a jury trial and disqualification, stating that the law presumes a judge is unbiased and not prejudiced. The court also noted that adverse or erroneous rulings do not, by themselves, demonstrate bias. For recusal to be warranted, a judge must be partial or there must be some external influence that creates an appearance of impropriety. The court found that Solberg failed to allege facts showing bias or the existence of an external influence creating an appearance of impropriety. The court also concluded that Solberg's request for a jury trial was frivolous as the Supreme Court reviews the rulings of the district court and does not engage in fact finding. The court affirmed the orders of the district court under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(1) and (4), finding the appeal to be frivolous and completely without merit. The court also awarded Hennessy double costs and attorney’s fees in the amount of $15,697.50 for defending this frivolous appeal. View "Solberg v. Hennessy" on Justia Law

Scott and Traci Musland, married in 1997, separated in 2022, and Scott filed for divorce. The couple resolved several interim issues through mediation, including exclusive use of the marital and lake homes. A bench trial was held in July 2023, where both parties provided testimony and exhibits. The district court found the Musland marital estate to be valued at just over eight million dollars. Traci Musland was awarded sections of land, a lake home, all of the couple’s retirement funds, miscellaneous equipment, and personal property. She also received an “equity payment” of $700,000 and was allocated responsibility for the debt associated with her credit cards and appraisal fee, leaving her a net estate of $3,224,357. Scott Musland was awarded a net estate of $4,961,915, which included the marital home, farmland, and debt, totaling $2,388,931.Traci Musland appealed the district court's decision, arguing that the property division was clearly erroneous, that the court erred in setting a land rent value, and failing to award her rent for the 2023 tax year, and that the right of first refusal granted to Scott Musland was not appropriate. The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the district court’s distribution of marital property under a clearly erroneous standard. The court found that the district court provided a thorough analysis of the Ruff-Fischer guidelines and applied the law properly. The court concluded that the division of the marital estate was not clearly erroneous.However, the Supreme Court of North Dakota agreed with Traci Musland that the language of the right of first refusal as written was not appropriate. The court remanded that issue to the district court to modify the right of first refusal to provide that it is triggered by the acceptance of an offer by Traci Musland, subject to the right of first refusal. The court affirmed the district court’s distribution of the marital estate in all other respects. View "Musland v. Musland" on Justia Law

The case involves Kevin Hartson, who was charged with felony murder, with the underlying offenses of attempted robbery and attempted felonious restraint. Hartson argued that the charge of felony murder was not legally cognizable due to an inconsistency in the elements of criminal attempt and the elements of the underlying predicate felonies. He contended that the charge of criminal attempt requires the actor to have intended to complete the commission of the underlying crime, while the underlying offenses of robbery and felonious restraint only require the actor to act knowingly. Hartson's motion to dismiss the charge was denied by the district court, which held that any inconsistency could be reconciled by requiring the State to apply intentional culpability to both the attempt and the underlying predicate felonies. Hartson was subsequently found guilty of felony murder by a jury.On appeal, Hartson reiterated his argument that felony murder based on the predicate offenses of attempted robbery and attempted felonious restraint is not a cognizable offense. He also argued that the district court erred in allowing the State to remove “knowingly” from the charge of felony murder and use only the culpability level of “intentional”. Furthermore, he claimed that the court committed obvious error in instructing the jury by misstating the law and allowing for a verdict without a unanimous jury finding on the predicate felony offense.The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the district court did not err in modifying the level of culpability from "knowingly" to "intentionally". The court also found that the jury was properly instructed that they could convict Hartson on nothing less than intentional conduct with respect to the predicate felonies. Furthermore, the court concluded that Hartson failed to demonstrate an obvious error with regard to the absence of an instruction on attempt and the requirement of a unanimous decision on the attempted predicate offense. Lastly, the court found that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction. View "State v. Hartson" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a lawsuit filed by Kyle Harris against Oasis Petroleum, Inc., and other parties, alleging negligence, gross negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Harris claimed that he was injured in an explosion on an oil rig operated by Oasis while he was working as an employee of Frontier Pressure Testing, LLC. The district court dismissed the other parties from the action, leaving Oasis as the sole defendant.The case proceeded to a jury trial, where the jury found Oasis, Frontier, and Harris each at fault for and a proximate cause of Harris’s injuries. The jury apportioned the fault as follows: Oasis 15%; Frontier 65%; Harris 20%. The jury found $5,012,500 in monetary damages would compensate Harris for his injuries. The district court entered an order for judgment, applying N.D.C.C. § 32-03.2-02, and deducted 85% of fault attributable to Frontier and Harris from the total damages.Harris filed a statement of costs and disbursements, arguing he should be awarded certain costs and disbursements because he was the prevailing party under the special verdict of the jury. Oasis objected to Harris’s statement of costs and disbursements, challenging the amount of expert fees and that the testimony did not lead to a successful result. The district court approved Harris’s amended statement of costs and disbursements, concluding that Harris was the prevailing party and was entitled to costs and disbursements undiminished by the percentage of negligence attributed to him.Oasis appealed to the Supreme Court of North Dakota, arguing that the district court erred as a matter of law in determining Harris was a prevailing party and abused its discretion in awarding Harris costs and disbursements. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision, agreeing with Harris that he was the prevailing party. The court held that Harris was the prevailing party, and the court had the discretion to award Harris costs and disbursements under N.D.C.C. § 28-26-06, without reduction by his percentage of fault. View "Harris v. Oasis Petroleum" on Justia Law

The case involves Joseph Glaum, who had pleaded guilty to various criminal charges in several cases between 1997 and 2008. In 2023, Glaum moved to reopen these cases and withdraw his guilty pleas. Around the same time, he made similar motions in four other closed cases. All these motions were denied by the district court. In April 2023, the presiding judge of the Northeast Central Judicial District entered a proposed pre-filing order under N.D. Sup. Ct. Admin. R. 58, finding Glaum to be a vexatious litigant. This order prohibited Glaum from filing any new litigation or new documents in existing litigation as a self-represented party without first obtaining leave of the court. Glaum appealed this pre-filing order.The State moved to dismiss Glaum's appeal, arguing it was untimely. The State contended that Glaum's appeal of the pre-filing order was an appeal from an order in a criminal case, which should have been filed within 30 days after entry of the order being appealed. Glaum, however, argued that this was an appeal from an order in a civil case, which should be filed within 60 days from service of notice of entry of the judgment or order being appealed.The Supreme Court of North Dakota denied the State’s motion to dismiss, concluding the appeal was timely. The court determined that the pre-filing order was not an order in a criminal case, but rather an order in a civil case or a postconviction proceeding. The court noted that the time for filing an appeal did not begin to run because Glaum was not served with the notice of entry of the pre-filing order, nor was there evidence of actual knowledge of entry. The court affirmed the pre-filing order, finding Glaum to be a vexatious litigant. View "Glaum v. State" on Justia Law