Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A person dealing with a personal representative does not receive the protections of N.D.C.C. 30.1-18-14 unless the person obtains the personal representative's letters of appointment or any other court order giving the personal representative authority to act in this state. Dudley Stuber, trustee of the D.J. Stuber Land and Royalty Trust, and Rocky Svihl, trustee of the RGKH Mineral & Royalty Trust (collectively "Plaintiffs") appealed a judgment deciding ownership of certain mineral interests in favor of the estates of Victoria Davis and Helen Jaumotte. Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment, arguing there were no genuine issues of material fact and they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. They claimed Jay Jaumotte, as personal representative of the estates, was authorized to sell property in North Dakota as a foreign personal representative, and Northland Royalty Corp. (to whom Jay Jaumotte first conveyed the interests) was a good-faith purchaser and was entitled to statutory protections under N.D.C.C. 30.1-18-14, and the statute of limitations had expired, precluding the heirs' claims. The heirs also moved for summary judgment. The heirs argued the deeds transferring the minerals to Northland were void because Jay Jaumotte lacked any authority to act on behalf of the Davis or Helen Jaumotte estates when dealing with North Dakota property, the Plaintiffs were not good-faith purchasers, and there were genuine issues of material fact about whether Northland was a good-faith purchaser. EOG Resources intervened and responded to the motions, arguing the Plaintiffs had no interest in the mineral estate, the Plaintiffs' predecessor-in-interest had notice of the heirs' potential interests in the property and failed to investigate, and the Plaintiffs and Northland were not good-faith purchasers. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision quieting title, but reversed its decision awarding damages to the Victoria Davis and Helen Jaumotte heirs. View "Stuber v. Engel" on Justia Law

Under an installment sales contract for patent from the State Board of University and School Lands, the State retains the legal title to the property and holds it in trust for the purchaser and as security for the purchaser's compliance with the contract. The purchaser of such land holds equitable title until the terms of the installment sales contract have been completed and a patent has been issued, at which time the legal title merges with the equitable title. Completion of the terms of the installment sales contract for patent perfects title relating back to the date of the contract. In 2014, Curtis and Joan Hokanson ("Hokansons") initiated a quiet title action naming Corrine Zeigler, Charles Zeigler, Bonnie Scharback, Terry Scharback, Bruce Bibler, Beverly Bibler, Delton R. Bibler, Lee Bibler, Curtis D. Bibler, Carol M. Bibler, Gerald Bibler, Alice Bibler, Trudy Mathae, Bruce Mathae, Howard L. Bibler, Continental Resources, Inc., and all other persons unknown ("Biblers") claiming any estate or interest in, or lien or encumbrance upon, the property described in the complaint as defendants. In 1957, the Board of University and School Lands of the State of North Dakota and Edson and June Bibler entered into an installment sale contract for the purchase of the land at issue here. Prior to the initiation of the quiet title action by the Hokansons, the Biblers entered into oil and gas leases in 2013. The Biblers were named as the lessors, and the lessee in all the leases was Continental Resources. All leases were dated July 9, 2013. The Hokansons claimed they had title to an undivided 50% mineral interest under the property. The Hokansons argued they received this interest because the subject property was conveyed to them from Hans Hanson (the Hokansons' predecessor-in-interest) with no reservations of mineral interest appearing in a 1971 Warranty Deed. The Hokansons argued the predecessor in interest to Hans Hanson was the State of North Dakota who conveyed to Hans Hanson the surface and 50% of the mineral interest by a 1971 Patent. The district court entered an order granting the Biblers' motion for summary judgment. After review, and finding no reversible error in that judgment, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "Hokanson v. Zeigler" on Justia Law

Christian Von Ruden appealed after he was convicted of driving under the influence after entering a conditional guilty plea. Von Ruden argued evidence of the breath test records and checklists should have been excluded at trial because the arresting officer did not administer the test sequences in accordance with the approved method, and the officer deprived him of his limited statutory right to counsel. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the officer "scrupulously" followed the approved method in administering the second breath test sequence and Von Ruden was not denied his limited statutory right to counsel. View "North Dakota v. Von Ruden" on Justia Law

Don Sorenson Investments owned residentially-zoned property. In 2015, Don Sorenson requested a zone change for the property from residential to commercial to "conduct small commercial business." A site inspection following Sorenson's request indicated the property was being used to store semi-trucks, gooseneck flatbed trailers, bulk fuel tanks, and shipping containers. A report prepared for the Williams County Board of County Commissioners stated Sorenson had been out of compliance since October 2014 for operating a trucking oilfield business on the property without the County's permission. The Board of County Commissioners denied Sorenson's request and ordered removal of all commercial items from the property. Sorenson appealed the Board's decision, and the district court affirmed. In October 2015, Williams County sued Sorenson for violating zoning ordinances and maintaining a public nuisance. In December 2015, the County moved for a preliminary injunction, alleging the Sorensons continued to use the property for commercial purposes. The Sorensons moved for summary judgment, arguing the County did not indicate which provisions of the zoning ordinances they violated and did not provide specific details regarding the commercial business alleged to have been operated on the property. The County opposed the Sorensons' motion and filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. The County argued administrative res judicata prevented the Sorensons from challenging the zoning violations on their property because the Board of County Commissioners had already determined they were in violation. The district court granted the Sorensons' motion for summary judgment and denied the County's cross-motion for summary judgment, concluding the zoning ordinances did not define "commercial," "commercial operation," or "commercial item" so as to give the Sorensons proper notice of what constituted a zoning violation. The court concluded res judicata did not apply, denied the County's request for sanctions for spoliation of evidence, denied its request for civil penalties, and dismissed the County's complaint. "Administrative res judicata is applied more cautiously than judicial res judicata," taking into consideration the subject matter decided by the administrative agency, the purpose of the administrative action, and the reasons for the later proceeding. On appeal, the party opposing a motion for summary judgment will be given all favorable inferences that may be reasonably drawn from the evidence. The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed that part of the judgment granting summary judgment in favor of the Sorensons, denying the County's cross-motion for summary judgment, and dismissing the County's complaint. View "Williams County v. Sorenson" on Justia Law

Under N.D.C.C. 12.1-32-08(1)(a), "directly related" and "direct result" require an immediate and intimate causal connection between the criminal conduct for which the defendant was convicted and the damages or expenses for which restitution is ordered. Mearlyse Carson appealed a restitution order entered following her guilty plea and conviction for possession of stolen property. The district court ordered her to pay restitution, which included restitution for other items stolen or damaged during a burglary for which she was not convicted. Carson appealed, asserting she should not have been required to pay restitution resulting from the burglary when she had been convicted only of possessing stolen property. The North Dakota Supreme Court determined there was no assertion that Carson's possessing the stolen rifles, ammunition, and tools, by itself, resulted in failure to recover the other items, an impounded vehicle, lawn chairs being left at the burglarized home, or damage to the trailer. The Supreme Court has held in the context of sustaining a criminal conviction of theft that "[u]nexplained possession of recently stolen property permits an incriminating implication." Precedents suggested such an inference be drawn in that context because the sufficiency of evidence was challenged, and the Court's review of the record was "to determine if there is competent evidence allowing the jury to draw an inference reasonably tending to prove guilt." No such evidence was presented here, and accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded for reconsideration of restitution. View "North Dakota v. Carson" on Justia Law

In North Dakota, an adult is guilty of patronizing a minor for commercial sexual activity when: (1) with the intent to engage in commercial sexual activity with a minor; (2) the individual gives, agrees to give, or offers to give anything of value to a minor or another person; and (3) for the purpose of obtaining commercial sexual activity with a minor. Nicholas Davison, James Heily, Jr., and Jesse Janke appeal from criminal judgments, entered after bench trials on stipulated facts, finding them guilty of patronizing a minor for commercial sexual activity in violation of N.D.C.C. 12.1-41-06(1)(a). The Defendants were each arrested as part of a multi-agency sting operation targeted at apprehending individuals paying, or attempting to pay, for sex with minors. The sting operation posted advertisements on the Internet, specifically in the "Casual Encounters" section of "Craigslist." The content of the advertisements in these cases sought sexual encounters, but did not claim to be posted by a minor. However, during communications with each of the Defendants, an undercover officer posing as a minor indicated to the Defendants she was a minor. In each of the communications, there were discussions of exchanging something of value for sexual services. Each of the Defendants arrived at the sting location set up at a hotel in Fargo, and each was arrested and charged with patronizing a minor for commercial sexual activity. On appeal, the Defendants argue the district court erred by denying their motions for judgment of acquittal. The Defendants argued N.D.C.C. 12.1-41-06(1)(a) required the presence of a minor; because there was no minor involved in Defendants' cases, the Defendants argued the State cannot meet its burden of proof. The State argued N.D.C.C. 12.1-41-06(1)(a) did not require the presence of a minor as an essential element of the crime of patronizing a minor for commercial sexual activity. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court properly denied Defendants' motions for judgment of acquittal. View "North Dakota v. Davison" on Justia Law

Floyd Hyde appealed a criminal judgment after entering a conditional plea of guilty to three drug charges. In his plea, Hyde reserved his right to appeal the district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence. Hyde argued the district court erred in finding the warrantless entry of his home fell within the emergency exception to the warrant requirement. The North Dakota Supreme Court agreed, reversed and remanded to allow him to withdraw his plea. View "North Dakota v. Hyde" on Justia Law

A district court has broad discretion on evidentiary matters and its decision to admit or exclude evidence will not be overturned unless it abused its discretion. Issues not raised before the district court will not be considered for the first time on appeal. Brian Linstrom and Leisa Bennett (collectively referred to as the "Linstroms") hired Mike Normile to complete a remodeling of their home for a price of $107,000.00. The Linstroms paid Normile the contract price plus an additional $30,000.00 for certain changes made during the remodel. Normile believed the Linstroms owed more money for the work that was completed. After failing to receive additional payment, Normile put a mechanic's lien on the home. The Linstroms commenced a breach of contract action against Normile after they were unsatisfied with the work completed on their home. The Linstroms' complaint also requested the lien on their home be discharged. Mike Normile appealed after a jury found him liable for breach of contract and awarded damages to the Linstroms. Because the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded each issue raised was either waived or was not error, it affirmed the judgment. View "Linstrom v. Normile" on Justia Law

A district court's decision on a motion for mistrial will not be reversed on appeal absent a showing the court abused its discretion or that a manifest injustice would occur. The cumulative effect of multiple errors may be productive of a manifest injustice which requires the district court to declare a mistrial. Brady Blotske appealed a criminal judgment entered after a jury found him guilty of gross sexual imposition, felonious restraint, and terrorizing. During the testimony of one of the detectives, the State offered the video interview of Blotske and stated, "pursuant to the previous stipulation where we admitted the tape, I would like to play about 13 minutes of the interview where they actually get into the specifics." The State played the video for the jury. Blotske's counsel objected because the video began to play content the parties had agreed to omit. The district court permitted the State to address the jury about the statement. Blotske requested a mistrial just before the second day of trial was set to begin. Blotske's counsel argued the statements on the video were prejudicial and when the State addressed the jury about the statements, it brought further attention to the misinformation and tainted the jury beyond repair. The State resisted the motion. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in denying Blotske's request for a mistrial, reverseed and remanded for a new trial. View "North Dakota v. Blotske" on Justia Law

Under North Dakota Rules of Evidence 804, it does not matter that the defendant may have had significantly less incentive to cross-examine the witness at the preliminary examination hearing than at the trial, the testimony is permissible at trial if it meets the requirements under the rule. If a prior consistent statement is to be admitted under Rule 801(d)(1)(B), the declarant must testify and be subject to cross-examination at the trial or hearing at which it is being offered. Duane Azure, Jr., appealed a criminal judgment after a jury found him guilty of aggravated assault. A deputy observed Yvette Belgarde lying on the floor in the living room when responding to a 911 call to the Azure residence. The deputy requested an ambulance to the residence and Belgarde was transported to the local emergency room. Her initial explanation to law enforcement and medical personnel about her injuries was that she fell on the deck. Approximately two weeks later, while in the hospital, Belgarde contacted law enforcement and stated her injuries were not caused by falling on the deck, but by Azure assaulting her. Belgarde was interviewed by Agent Allen Kluth of the North Dakota Bureau of Criminal Investigation. Belgarde restated to Agent Kluth that Azure had assaulted her and that she was afraid to say anything at first. Azure was subsequently charged with aggravated assault. Prior to trial, Belgarde died from causes unrelated to the assault. Azure argued the district court abused its discretion by allowing two prior statements of the State's witness into evidence at trial. Because the district court abused its discretion in allowing the victim's prior statement to police into evidence under North Dakota Rules of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B), the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed and remanded. View "North Dakota v. Azure" on Justia Law