Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Brent Castleman was charged with 13 separate offenses, including stalking, harassment, tampering with physical evidence, and 10 counts of disobedience of a judicial order. Castleman filed a motion to sever the 13 counts into individual trials, arguing that the joinder of the offenses was prejudicial. The district court denied the motion, stating that the charges were connected with a common scheme or plan, and that trying them together would serve judicial economy. The court also found that Castleman would not be prejudiced by a single trial.The district court's decision was based on North Dakota Rule of Criminal Procedure 8, which allows for the joinder of offenses if they are of the same or similar character, or are connected with or constitute parts of a common scheme or plan. The court also referenced Rule 14, which allows for relief from prejudicial joinder. Castleman entered conditional Alford pleas on some of the charges, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to sever.In the Supreme Court of North Dakota, Castleman argued that the offenses should not have been joined due to extreme prejudice, as they involved different victims, times, locations, and methods of contact. He also claimed that the district court's decision was merely a recitation of Rule 14. The Supreme Court found that Castleman failed to provide specifics on what prejudice would occur or how the joinder would hinder his defense. The court concluded that the district court did not act arbitrarily, unreasonably, or unconscionably, and did not misinterpret or misapply the law. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision, finding no abuse of discretion in denying Castleman's motion to sever. View "State v. Castleman" on Justia Law

Glenn Solberg, representing himself, appealed against orders denying his motions for relief from judgment and for reconsideration. He also moved for a jury trial and disqualification of the Court, alleging bias and conflict of interest. Solberg's claims of bias were based on prior decisions that were adverse to him. Greg Hennessy, the defendant, argued that the appeal was frivolous and requested attorney’s fees and double costs.The District Court of Williams County had denied Solberg's motions for relief from judgment and for reconsideration. Solberg then appealed these decisions to the Supreme Court of North Dakota.The Supreme Court of North Dakota denied Solberg's motion for a jury trial and disqualification, stating that the law presumes a judge is unbiased and not prejudiced. The court also noted that adverse or erroneous rulings do not, by themselves, demonstrate bias. For recusal to be warranted, a judge must be partial or there must be some external influence that creates an appearance of impropriety. The court found that Solberg failed to allege facts showing bias or the existence of an external influence creating an appearance of impropriety. The court also concluded that Solberg's request for a jury trial was frivolous as the Supreme Court reviews the rulings of the district court and does not engage in fact finding. The court affirmed the orders of the district court under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(1) and (4), finding the appeal to be frivolous and completely without merit. The court also awarded Hennessy double costs and attorney’s fees in the amount of $15,697.50 for defending this frivolous appeal. View "Solberg v. Hennessy" on Justia Law

Scott and Traci Musland, married in 1997, separated in 2022, and Scott filed for divorce. The couple resolved several interim issues through mediation, including exclusive use of the marital and lake homes. A bench trial was held in July 2023, where both parties provided testimony and exhibits. The district court found the Musland marital estate to be valued at just over eight million dollars. Traci Musland was awarded sections of land, a lake home, all of the couple’s retirement funds, miscellaneous equipment, and personal property. She also received an “equity payment” of $700,000 and was allocated responsibility for the debt associated with her credit cards and appraisal fee, leaving her a net estate of $3,224,357. Scott Musland was awarded a net estate of $4,961,915, which included the marital home, farmland, and debt, totaling $2,388,931.Traci Musland appealed the district court's decision, arguing that the property division was clearly erroneous, that the court erred in setting a land rent value, and failing to award her rent for the 2023 tax year, and that the right of first refusal granted to Scott Musland was not appropriate. The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the district court’s distribution of marital property under a clearly erroneous standard. The court found that the district court provided a thorough analysis of the Ruff-Fischer guidelines and applied the law properly. The court concluded that the division of the marital estate was not clearly erroneous.However, the Supreme Court of North Dakota agreed with Traci Musland that the language of the right of first refusal as written was not appropriate. The court remanded that issue to the district court to modify the right of first refusal to provide that it is triggered by the acceptance of an offer by Traci Musland, subject to the right of first refusal. The court affirmed the district court’s distribution of the marital estate in all other respects. View "Musland v. Musland" on Justia Law

The case involves Kevin Hartson, who was charged with felony murder, with the underlying offenses of attempted robbery and attempted felonious restraint. Hartson argued that the charge of felony murder was not legally cognizable due to an inconsistency in the elements of criminal attempt and the elements of the underlying predicate felonies. He contended that the charge of criminal attempt requires the actor to have intended to complete the commission of the underlying crime, while the underlying offenses of robbery and felonious restraint only require the actor to act knowingly. Hartson's motion to dismiss the charge was denied by the district court, which held that any inconsistency could be reconciled by requiring the State to apply intentional culpability to both the attempt and the underlying predicate felonies. Hartson was subsequently found guilty of felony murder by a jury.On appeal, Hartson reiterated his argument that felony murder based on the predicate offenses of attempted robbery and attempted felonious restraint is not a cognizable offense. He also argued that the district court erred in allowing the State to remove “knowingly” from the charge of felony murder and use only the culpability level of “intentional”. Furthermore, he claimed that the court committed obvious error in instructing the jury by misstating the law and allowing for a verdict without a unanimous jury finding on the predicate felony offense.The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the district court did not err in modifying the level of culpability from "knowingly" to "intentionally". The court also found that the jury was properly instructed that they could convict Hartson on nothing less than intentional conduct with respect to the predicate felonies. Furthermore, the court concluded that Hartson failed to demonstrate an obvious error with regard to the absence of an instruction on attempt and the requirement of a unanimous decision on the attempted predicate offense. Lastly, the court found that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction. View "State v. Hartson" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a lawsuit filed by Kyle Harris against Oasis Petroleum, Inc., and other parties, alleging negligence, gross negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Harris claimed that he was injured in an explosion on an oil rig operated by Oasis while he was working as an employee of Frontier Pressure Testing, LLC. The district court dismissed the other parties from the action, leaving Oasis as the sole defendant.The case proceeded to a jury trial, where the jury found Oasis, Frontier, and Harris each at fault for and a proximate cause of Harris’s injuries. The jury apportioned the fault as follows: Oasis 15%; Frontier 65%; Harris 20%. The jury found $5,012,500 in monetary damages would compensate Harris for his injuries. The district court entered an order for judgment, applying N.D.C.C. § 32-03.2-02, and deducted 85% of fault attributable to Frontier and Harris from the total damages.Harris filed a statement of costs and disbursements, arguing he should be awarded certain costs and disbursements because he was the prevailing party under the special verdict of the jury. Oasis objected to Harris’s statement of costs and disbursements, challenging the amount of expert fees and that the testimony did not lead to a successful result. The district court approved Harris’s amended statement of costs and disbursements, concluding that Harris was the prevailing party and was entitled to costs and disbursements undiminished by the percentage of negligence attributed to him.Oasis appealed to the Supreme Court of North Dakota, arguing that the district court erred as a matter of law in determining Harris was a prevailing party and abused its discretion in awarding Harris costs and disbursements. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision, agreeing with Harris that he was the prevailing party. The court held that Harris was the prevailing party, and the court had the discretion to award Harris costs and disbursements under N.D.C.C. § 28-26-06, without reduction by his percentage of fault. View "Harris v. Oasis Petroleum" on Justia Law

The case involves Joseph Glaum, who had pleaded guilty to various criminal charges in several cases between 1997 and 2008. In 2023, Glaum moved to reopen these cases and withdraw his guilty pleas. Around the same time, he made similar motions in four other closed cases. All these motions were denied by the district court. In April 2023, the presiding judge of the Northeast Central Judicial District entered a proposed pre-filing order under N.D. Sup. Ct. Admin. R. 58, finding Glaum to be a vexatious litigant. This order prohibited Glaum from filing any new litigation or new documents in existing litigation as a self-represented party without first obtaining leave of the court. Glaum appealed this pre-filing order.The State moved to dismiss Glaum's appeal, arguing it was untimely. The State contended that Glaum's appeal of the pre-filing order was an appeal from an order in a criminal case, which should have been filed within 30 days after entry of the order being appealed. Glaum, however, argued that this was an appeal from an order in a civil case, which should be filed within 60 days from service of notice of entry of the judgment or order being appealed.The Supreme Court of North Dakota denied the State’s motion to dismiss, concluding the appeal was timely. The court determined that the pre-filing order was not an order in a criminal case, but rather an order in a civil case or a postconviction proceeding. The court noted that the time for filing an appeal did not begin to run because Glaum was not served with the notice of entry of the pre-filing order, nor was there evidence of actual knowledge of entry. The court affirmed the pre-filing order, finding Glaum to be a vexatious litigant. View "Glaum v. State" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute over oil and gas interests between Spottie, Inc., a Nevada corporation, and several other Nevada corporations and a limited liability company. Spottie alleged that the defendants had wrongfully claimed title to these interests, which were once owned by Edward Davis, who had formed Spottie as a holding company. The defendants countered that they had entered into an agreement with Davis to acquire these interests, and that Davis and Spottie had transferred the disputed interests to one of the defendants via an assignment in 2016.The district court dismissed several of Spottie's claims, leaving only a quiet title claim and a claim for unjust enrichment. After a three-day bench trial, the court ruled in favor of the defendants, finding that the assignment from Davis and Spottie to one of the defendants was valid. The court also found that Spottie had erroneously received revenue from the disputed interests and awarded damages to the defendants.Spottie appealed the decision, arguing that the district court had erred in its ownership determination, its rejection of Spottie's laches defense, its binding of a non-party to the judgment, and its award of attorney fees and costs. The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed in part, concluding that the district court did not err in its ownership determination and its award of attorney fees. However, it reversed in part, finding that the court had erred in awarding costs for non-legal expenses. The case was remanded for the court to recalculate its cost award and to consider the defendants' request for additional attorney fees and legal costs. View "SPOTTIE v. BAIUL-FARINA" on Justia Law

The case involves Timothy Morales, who was injured when he was hit by a vehicle driven by Ruby Junewal within the Weatherford Distribution Facility in Williston. Morales filed a lawsuit alleging negligence against Weatherford U.S., L.P., Junewal, and Junewal's employer, Wilhoit Properties, Inc. He also claimed that Weatherford was negligent for failing to install proper lighting, road signs, or sidewalks near the road.The District Court of Williams County dismissed Morales's claims against Wilhoit with prejudice after the parties did not oppose Wilhoit’s motion for summary judgment. Later, Weatherford moved for summary judgment, arguing that it owed no duty to Morales because he was aware of the obvious danger posed by vehicles on the roadway. The district court granted Weatherford’s motion, and Morales appealed.Meanwhile, Junewal notified the court that she and Morales had reached a settlement. However, no concluding documents were filed. The district court then entered an order for judgment under its order granting Weatherford summary judgment. Morales appealed again, but the Supreme Court of North Dakota dismissed his appeal because claims against Junewal remained pending in the district court.In the Supreme Court of North Dakota, the court concluded that the district court misapplied the law when it treated Morales’s request as a Rule 60(b) motion and held it “no longer has jurisdiction.” The Supreme Court reversed the district court's order denying Morales's request and remanded the case with instructions for the district court to enter a single final judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties’ rights and liabilities within twenty days from the filing of the Supreme Court's opinion. View "Morales v. Weatherford U.S., L.P." on Justia Law

The defendant, Jason Pederson, was found guilty of one count of terrorizing following a jury trial. The charge was based on two emails Pederson sent to her former employer, threatening to retrieve damages through the taking of physical assets and warning employees to stay out of the way to avoid unnecessary deaths. These emails were sent after Pederson had filed an employment discrimination lawsuit against her former employer. After receiving the emails, the employer contacted law enforcement, leading to Pederson's arrest.The case was first heard in the District Court of Cass County, East Central Judicial District. During the trial, Pederson, who represented herself, argued that the State had violated her rights under Brady v. Maryland by failing to provide her with a recording of a conversation she had with Officer Tanner Anderson, who had informed her that she was trespassed from her former employer's property. The State argued that the recording was not relevant to the terrorizing charge and had been filed under a civil trespass file, not the criminal case. The court ruled that the State's failure to disclose the recording was not intentional and that the State must provide it before Officer Anderson was called as a witness.The case was then appealed to the Supreme Court of North Dakota. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision, concluding that Pederson did not establish a Brady violation. The court found that although the State had possessed the recording and did not disclose it to Pederson, Pederson had not demonstrated that the recording was favorable to her or plainly exculpatory. The court also concluded that Pederson did not preserve the issue of insufficient evidence because she failed to move for acquittal under N.D.R.Crim.P. 29 and did not argue obvious error. View "State v. Pederson" on Justia Law

In June 2015, Jordan Morsette was driving on the wrong side of the road when his vehicle collided head-on with another vehicle driven by Shayna Monson. Monson suffered serious bodily injuries, while two passengers in her vehicle, Taylor Goven and Abby Renschler, died at the scene. Morsette admitted liability for the collision, and a jury trial was held to determine the amount of compensatory damages. The jury awarded the plaintiffs a total of $242 million in noneconomic compensatory damages and $895 million in punitive damages.Morsette appealed the verdict, and the Supreme Court of North Dakota reversed and remanded the case, holding that the lower court erred in admitting evidence of Morsette’s intoxication when liability was admitted, and in allowing a claim for punitive damages. On remand, the district court held another jury trial, which resulted in a verdict awarding a total of $175 million in noneconomic damages. Morsette again appealed, arguing that the plaintiffs improperly referred to alcohol at the trial on remand, that the damages award was excessive, and that the jury improperly speculated as to the damages.The Supreme Court of North Dakota found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Morsette a new trial based on the limited references to alcohol during the trial on remand. However, the court concluded that the district court did abuse its discretion by not providing an explanation of the evidence supporting the jury’s award of noneconomic damages, and by concluding the damages award was not excessive. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment and the order denying Morsette’s motion for new trial, and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. View "Zander v. Morsette" on Justia Law