Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

B.A.C. appealed a district court order for involuntary hospitalization and involuntary treatment with medication. B.A.C. was admitted to the North Dakota State Hospital on June 6, 2017. Prior to being admitted, B.A.C. drove his car into a pond near Devils Lake. He then walked barefoot away from the pond and invaded a private residence. When confronted inside, B.A.C. offered to buy the property. After B.A.C. was ordered to leave, he walked approximately two miles further before he was apprehended by police. In talking to the police officers, B.A.C. made several delusional statements about Bill Gates, Bill Clinton, and Donald Trump, which included stating that he himself was the richest man in the world and that was why Bill Clinton wanted to kill him. The police took B.A.C. to a hospital in Devils Lake. He was then transported to the North Dakota State Hospital in Jamestown. The State Hospital petitioned the district court for involuntary commitment of B.A.C. At the State Hospital, B.A.C. had refused to take prescribed medication and expressed his wish to leave the hospital. An examination was performed by a doctor of psychology at the State Hospital, who found B.A.C. to be mentally ill and noted that if "untreated on an inpatient basis he would likely place himself at risk, as he did just prior to the current admission." A psychiatrist performed an independent evaluation on B.A.C. and found him to have a primary psychotic disorder, and also believed releasing B.A.C. from the hospital without treatment would likely result in self-harm. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court order, concluding that B.A.C.'s release did not moot this appeal and that the district court did not clearly err when it found by clear and convincing evidence that B.A.C. was a mentally ill person requiring inpatient treatment. View "Interest of B.A.C." on Justia Law

Joan Hallin, John Hallin and Susan Bradford (collectively Hallin and Bradford) appeal from a judgment in favor of Inland Oil & Gas Corporation. In 2007, Hallin and Bradford each leased to Inland mineral interests they owned in 160 acres of land in Mountrail County. The leases provided Hallin and Bradford leased to Inland "all that certain tract of land situated in Mountrail County." Hallin and Bradford, along with members of their extended family, owned a fraction of the minerals in the entire 160 acres. On the basis of irregularities in the chain of title, it was unclear whether Hallin and Bradford collectively owned sixty net mineral acres or eighty net mineral acres when the parties executed the leases. Hallin and Bradford believed they owned sixty net mineral acres and their relatives owned sixty acres. When Hallin and Bradford executed the leases, they also received payment drafts for a rental bonus showing they each leased thirty acres to Inland. The leases provide royalty compensation based upon the number of net mineral acres. The North Dakota Supreme Court decided Hallin and Bradford collectively owned eighty net mineral acres and their relatives owned forty net mineral acres. Inland and Hallin and Bradford disagreed whether the leases covered all of Hallin and Bradford's mineral interests. Hallin and Bradford sued Inland, arguing they leased sixty acres and the remaining twenty acres were not leased. Inland argued Hallin and Bradford leased eighty acres because the leases cover all of their mineral interests. The district court granted summary judgment to Inland, concluding the leases were unambiguous and that "as a matter of law, the Hallins and Bradford leased to Inland whatever interest they had in the subject property at the time the leases were executed." Finding no reversible error in that judgment, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "Hallin v. Inland Oil & Gas Corporation" on Justia Law

The North Dakota Department of Transportation appealed a district court judgment reversing a Department hearing officer's decision to suspend Alexis Glaser's driving privileges for two years. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded Glaser failed to rebut the prima facie evidence of the time of the accident on the report and notice, showing her chemical Intoxilyzer test was administered within two hours of driving. Furthermore, the Court concluded a reasoning mind could reasonably conclude Glaser drove or was in physical control of a motor vehicle within two hours of performance of a chemical test was supported by a preponderance of the evidence on the entire record. The Court therefore reversed the judgment and reinstated the suspension of Glaser's driving privileges for two years. View "Glaser v. N.D. Dept. of Transportation" on Justia Law

Haruna Giwa appealed the summary dismissal of his application for post-conviction relief based on a newly adopted rule of criminal procedure. Giwa pleaded guilty to interference with a telephone during an emergency call, and the district court entered the criminal judgment on November 17, 2015. Giwa was not a citizen or permanent resident of the United States. Giwa was paroled into the United States in November 2014. In 2016, the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") terminated Giwa's parole status. As part of his guilty plea, Giwa signed an acknowledgment of rights, waiver of appearance, plea agreement, and plea on November 16, 2015. However, the acknowledgment and plea documents did not include information about the possible immigration consequences if Giwa was not a United States citizen. Giwa applied for post-conviction relief, arguing he was not advised of "the right to a jury trial, the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses, the right to be protected from compelled self-incrimination or to testify and present evidence." Giwa also argued he was not informed of the potential immigration status consequences if he pleaded guilty to interference with a telephone during an emergency call. Further, Giwa contends he did not know DHS would terminate his parole and detain him due to pleading guilty to a crime. The district court denied Giwa's application for post-conviction relief and granted the State's motion for summary disposition under N.D.C.C. 29-32.1-09. In granting the State's motion, the district court determined Giwa acknowledged his rights, including the waiver of his right to counsel. Additionally, the district court concluded the addition of N.D.R.Crim.P.11(b)(1)(j) did not apply retroactively, meaning neither the State nor the district court had an obligation to inform Giwa about the effect of a guilty plea on his immigration status. Finding no reversible error in that judgment, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "Giwa v. North Dakota" on Justia Law

Elda McKeown appealed a judgment ordering the distribution of Margie Eagon's estate to McKeown and her nine siblings. When the personal representative sought to close the estate, several of Margie Eagon's children objected to the proposed distribution, arguing the proposed distribution would reduce their inheritances but leave the inheritances of McKeown and Ronald Eagon intact. The district court determined that under the terms of the will the federal estate tax liability should be apportioned among all persons interested in the estate under N.D.C.C. 30.1-20-16(2) (U.P.C. 3-916) rather than abated under N.D.C.C. 30.1-20-02 (U.P.C. 3-902). The court found the proceeds of two $100,000 life insurance policies naming McKeown and Ronald Eagon as the beneficiaries should be used to reduce the estate tax liability. The court also awarded the parties who objected to the proposed distribution of the estate their reasonable costs and attorney fees in the amount of $23,549.26. Because the district court did not err in interpreting the will or the probate code, its findings regarding the use of life insurance proceeds were not clearly erroneous, and it did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney fees, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "Estate of Eagon" on Justia Law

Shawn Brew appealed a judgment granting him a divorce from Jennifer Brew, distributing their marital property, and ordering him to pay child support. Shawn argued the district court's property distribution was inequitable, the court improperly calculated his child support obligation, and the court erred in ordering him to pay attorney's fees. A district court is required to equitably distribute marital property in a divorce proceeding, and a property division does not need to be equal to be equitable. Under the child support guidelines, a district court averages a self-employed obligor's income over the most recent five years to determine income from self-employment. The district court has discretion to award attorney's fees when one party's actions have unreasonably increased the time spent on a case. Finding no clear error in the district court's judgment, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. View "Brew v. Brew" on Justia Law

Phyllis and Ronald Berry were divorced in a judgment entered on January 24, 2008. Following entry of the judgment, Phyllis Berry requested the district court reconsider its allocation of Ronald's military retirement benefits. The court entered an order denying her motion to reconsider on March 3, 2008. In 2014, both parties initiated post-judgment motions. Ronald sought modification of several provisions of the judgment including the allocation of his military retirement benefits. An Order for Amended Judgment and Judgment were entered on March 5, 2015, which included a denial of Ronald's request for modification of the allocation of his military retirement benefits and directing both parties to complete specific tasks. The district court denied Ronald's motion without prejudice, noted that he had failed to comply with the requirements of N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6). Because Ronald failed to file the additional materials, and after a show-cause hearing, the court eventually issued an order for a corrected amended judgment and entered a corrected amended judgment modifying the formula allocating Ronald's military retirement benefits. Phyllis appealed, arguing the district court erred in modifying the allocation of Ronald's military retirement benefits because he failed to satisfy the requirements under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60 for modification of the judgment. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, finding the district court's findings of fact explained the modification corrected the formula to reflect what the court had originally intended. The original and amended judgments overstated Ronald's years of service (26 rather than 24) and the REDUX percentage (40 percent rather than 30 percent). Absent a correction, Phyllis would have received a share of Ronald's retirement benefits different than what the court had always intended. In light of the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court concluded the district court's correction was not clearly erroneous. View "Berry v. Berry" on Justia Law

In 2015, Beach Railport, LLC commenced this action against the Donnell and Jeanne Michels, for the partition of real property in Golden Valley County. Beach Railport and the Michels each owned an undivided one-half interest in the subject property, consisting of two tracts of land totaling eighty acres: the "North Forty" and the "South Forty." Donnell Michels used the property for agricultural purposes. Beach Railport acquired its interest in the North Forty and various other tracts of land around the subject property as part of its planned construction of a rail trans-load facility. It sought and obtained changes in zoning for certain property parcels. Beach Railport's construction plan did not include development on the South Forty acres. The Michels appealed the ultimate judgment partitioning real property between the Michels and Beach Railport. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court erred by applying an incorrect legal standard to review and adopt the partition referee's report, and that the court erred by not holding an evidentiary hearing. The Court therefore reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Beach Railport, LLC v. Michels" on Justia Law

John Gassmann died in February 2012. Margaret Oakland was his only child. Under a generation-skipping trust created by his parents, Gassmann had a special power of appointment over the trust estate, which included family farmland. The power was exercisable "by appointment, outright or in trust, in such portions as my child may appoint in a valid testamentary instrument that specifically refers to this special power of appointment." The trust prohibited Gassmann from exercising the power in favor of himself, his estate, his creditors, or creditors of his estate. The generation-skipping trust provided that unless Gassmann exercised the power of appointment in a valid testamentary instrument, all trust assets would pass to Gassmann's descendants at Gassmann's death. Gassmann exercised the special power of appointment through both his will and revocable living trust executed in 2011. Gassmann exercised his special power of appointment by distributing all of the real estate in his generation-skipping trust to the Valley Township Land Trust ("land trust") and the residue of the trust estate to the Canadian Mineral Share Trust ("mineral trust"), which were both created under Gassmann's revocable living trust. Oakland was a primary beneficiary of the mineral trust, not of the land trust. After Gassmann's death, Oakland contested his will and revocable living trust. Oakland argued Gassmann's will was invalid, alleging he executed the will under an insane delusion. Oakland appealed the district court order granting Bell Bank's petition to approve the accounting, distribution, and termination of the John T. Gassmann generation-skipping trust. She also appealed an order denying her motion for relief from the order approving Bell Bank's petition, arguing Gassmann improperly exercised a special power of appointment over the trust estate and that Bell Bank breached its fiduciary duty of impartiality. Finding no reversible error in the district court judgment, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "Matter of John T. Gassmann Trust" on Justia Law

William Wilkinson and the other plaintiffs appeal and Statoil & Gas, LP and EOG Resources, Inc. cross-appeal from a summary judgment determining the Board of University and School Lands of the State of North Dakota ("Land Board") owns certain property below the ordinary high watermark of the Missouri River. Wilkinson argues the district court erred in determining ownership of the mineral interests. Chapter 61-33.1, N.D.C.C., became effective on April 21, 2017. The proceedings in this case began in 2012, and the trial court granted summary judgment in May 2016. Chapter 61-33.1, N.D.C.C., only applied to this case if it applied retroactively. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded N.D.C.C. ch. 61-33.1 applied retroactively, and that the district court did not have an opportunity to consider this statutory provisions when it decided ownership of the disputed minerals. The Supreme Court, therefore, remanded this case for the district court to determine whether N.D.C.C. ch. 61-33.1 applied and governs ownership of the minerals at issue in this case. View "Wilkinson v. Board of University and School Lands of the State of N.D." on Justia Law