Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Parke Little appealed the denial of his petition for a writ of mandamus. Little was a disabled veteran who formerly served in the Marine Corps and the Army. Little worked for Stark County as a special deputy from approximately 2008-2016. In July 2008, while employed as a special deputy, Little applied for a "deputy sheriff" position with Stark County. Little indicated his veteran's preference status in the application. Little was interviewed in November 2008. After the interview, Little became aware the deputy sheriff position was given to a non-veteran. Little continued to work in his capacity as a special deputy for Stark County until 2016. In March 2015, Little, through counsel, sent a letter to the Stark County Sheriff's Department requesting written notification why he was refused the 2008 deputy sheriff position. The Department responded, referring Little's attorney to direct the matter to the state's attorney's office. Little, through counsel, submitted a letter to the Stark County States Attorney and the Stark County Sheriff on March 4, 2016, and received no response. Little petitioned the court to compel the Sheriff’s office to respond to his request. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s order denying Little’s petition for a writ of mandamus:  Little was aware someone else was given the deputy sheriff position, continued to work for Stark County, and waited nearly eight years after the interview to inquire why he was refused employment. Little provides no reasonable excuse for the delay. It was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to consider the excessive delay in denying Little's petition. View "Little v. Stark County Sheriff" on Justia Law

Sandra Glass Lenertz ("Lenertz") appealed the district court's order granting James Glass's Motion for Deposit of Funds With Court and for Satisfaction of Judgment. In 1996, James Glass ("Glass") and Lenertz divorced. The divorce judgment required Glass to pay spousal support. Lenertz remarried in 2002. In 2015, Glass filed a motion to terminate his spousal support obligation. The district court granted Glass's motion and terminated spousal support at the time of Lenertz's remarriage. The district court also granted Lenertz a judgment for $26,903.37 because this was the amount that the court determined Glass owed on unpaid spousal support. Glass only started paying spousal support in 2001; thus he was behind on payments and interest. On the basis of the order granting the motion to terminate spousal support ("Termination Order"), the district court issued an Amended Judgment and Decree ("Amended Judgment"), which granted Lenertz the money judgment of $26,903.37. Glass attempted to satisfy the money judgment by paying Lenertz and obtaining a final satisfaction of judgment. Lenertz refused to accept the $26,903.37 payment because it was conditioned on her signing a final satisfaction of judgment, which she claimed would preclude her from appealing, and the amount did not include post-judgment interest. Glass moved the district court to deposit the $26,903.37 payment with the clerk of court. At the motion hearing, the district court concluded that the amount owed was interest, not principal, and thus post-judgment interest did not accrue. Further, the district court ordered that Glass be allowed to deposit the funds into the court and that a full satisfaction be provided. Lenertz argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the judgment of $26,903.37 awarded to her in the Termination Order was principal and thus she was owed post-judgment interest on that amount. Glass argued that because Lenertz did not raise this issue in her appeal of the Amended Judgment, this argument was barred by the law of the case doctrine. The Supreme Court affirmed under the law of the case doctrine. View "Glass v. Glass" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Jonathan Horvath of murder, reckless endangerment, two counts of terrorizing, and a felon in possession of a firearm, for which he was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Horvath appealed arguing insufficient evidence existed for a rational jury to find him guilty. Horvath filed a supplemental statement alleging perjury, improper closing statements, among other matters. Horvath filed an amended application for post-conviction relief and requested an evidentiary hearing. Horvath's amended application alleged he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel: (1) failed to subpoena an essential witness to rebut two of the State's witnesses; and (2) trial counsel failed to present exculpatory video evidence, when exhibit 24 was not shown in full. The court summarily dismissed Horvath's application for post-conviction relief without holding an evidentiary hearing. The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed and remanded for the court to hold an evidentiary hearing on Horvath’s application. View "Horvath v. North Dakota" on Justia Law

C.B. appealed a juvenile court order adopting a judicial referee's order finding C.B. failed to register as a sex offender. In June 2012, C.B. pled guilty to "assault IV with sexual motivation" in Washington state. The adjudication and disposition order did not require C.B. to register as a sex offender in Washington. In the fall of 2012, C.B. moved to North Dakota with his father. At the request of the juvenile court, C.B. registered as a sex offender in North Dakota in November 2013. In May 2015, C.B. updated his registration at the Bismarck Police Department. After updating his registration, an assistant Burleigh County state's attorney issued a juvenile petition to C.B. for committing the delinquent act of failure to register as a sex offender. The petition alleged C.B. failed to timely "alert law enforcement to a new job, a new place of residence, a telephone number or his facebook account." C.B. moved to dismiss the petition, arguing he should not be required to register. At an October 2015 hearing on the motion, an assistant attorney general testified C.B.'s assault IV with sexual motivation in Washington was equivalent to a class A misdemeanor sexual offense in North Dakota that required registration. At the conclusion of the hearing, the judicial referee stated he was dismissing the petition, and issued an order of dismissal. Shortly thereafter, the referee rescinded the order of dismissal, stating he decided the motion wrongly due to a legal error. The judicial referee provided notice to the parties the same day that they had the right to have the order reviewed by a juvenile court judge if the request was made within seven days. C.B. did not request review of the order. C.B. again moved to dismiss the petition in November 2015, arguing the judicial referee exceeded his authority when he rescinded the order dismissing the petition. The referee denied the motion. C.B. sought review of the referee's decision from the juvenile court. The juvenile court adopted the referee's decision denying the motion. C.B. filed another motion to dismiss in December 2015, arguing the State failed to give full faith and credit to the Washington order that did not require C.B. to register as a sex offender. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed: although C.B. was not required to register as a sex offender in Washington, Full Faith and Credit does not prohibit North Dakota from requiring C.B. to register. View "Interest of C.B." on Justia Law

Trent Guthmiller appealed a district court judgment affirming a North Dakota Department of Transportation ("DOT") decision to disqualify his commercial driving privileges for 60 days. In October 2016, the DOT notified Guthmiller that his commercial driving privileges were disqualified because he had committed two serious traffic violations within the last three years. Guthmiller committed the violations of speeding and aggravated reckless driving. The violations occurred within three years, but the convictions were approximately three years and ten months apart. At the administrative hearing on his commercial driving disqualification, Guthmiller did not contest the commission of the violations. On appeal to the North Dakota Supreme Court, Guthmiller argued the district court's order was not in accordance with the law. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's judgment and reinstated Guthmiller's commercial driving privileges: the statute unambiguously required two convictions within three years. View "Guthmiller v. N.D. Dep't of Transportation" on Justia Law

P&P Industries, LLC, d/b/a United Oilfield Services, and Pauper Industries, Inc., appealed a judgment entered in favor of Continental Resources, Inc., after a jury returned a verdict finding United and Pauper's conduct constituted fraud but they did not breach their contracts with Continental. Continental was an oil producer; United and Pauper provided transportation, water hauling, and related services and materials to Continental in North Dakota. Pauper signed a Master Service Contract with Continental, and United signed a Master Service Contract. Continental sued United and Pauper, seeking damages for claims of breach of contract, tortious breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and deceit. Continental alleged United and Pauper violated state and federal limits and regulations on the number of hours a truck driver may drive; they violated Continental's employee policies, and engaged in improper and fraudulent billing. After a hearing, the district court denied United's motion for summary judgment on Continental's claims; denied Continental's motion for summary judgment on United's breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and tortious breach of contract counterclaims; and denied Continental's motion for summary judgment on its fraud and breach of contract claims. The court granted Continental's motion for summary judgment against United's breach of fiduciary duty and constructive fraud counterclaims. The court also granted summary judgment on Continental's motion related to damages and ruled, if United prevailed at trial, its damages would be limited to the net profits it could have earned during the 30-day termination notice period, overall expenses of preparation, and its expenses in pursuit of reasonable efforts to avoid or minimize the damaging effects of the breach. United unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration of the damages issue. A jury trial was held. In deciding Continental's claims, the jury found neither United nor Pauper breached its contract obligations to Continental, both United and Pauper's conduct was fraudulent or accompanied by fraud, both United and Pauper's conduct was deceitful or accompanied by deceit, and the jury awarded Continental $2,415,000 in damages for its claims against United but did not award Continental any damages for its claims against Pauper. In deciding United's counterclaims, the jury found Continental breached its contract with United, but Continental was excused from performing based on United's prior material breach, United's failure to perform a condition precedent, United's fraud or deceit, and equitable estoppel. Judgment on the jury's findings was entered against Pauper. Continental was awarded its costs and disbursements against United and Pauper, jointly and severally. United and Pauper argued on appeal to the North Dakota Supreme Court that the verdicts were inconsistent and the district court erred in limiting the amount of damages United could seek on its counterclaim. The Supreme Court reversed, finding the "verdict is inconsistent and perverse and cannot be reconciled." The matter was remanded for a new trial. View "Continental Resources, Inc. v. P&P Industries, LLC I" on Justia Law

Counce Energy BC #1, LLC, appealed the judgment entered on a jury verdict awarding Continental Resources, Inc., $153,666.50 plus costs and disbursements for breaching its contract with Continental by failing to pay its share of expenses to drill an oil and gas well, and dismissing with prejudice Counce's counterclaims. Because the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Continental's breach of contract action and Counce's counterclaims, the North Dakota Supreme Court vacated the judgment. View "Continental Resources, Inc. v. Counce Energy BC #1, LLC" on Justia Law

John Dixon appealed the grant of summary judgment that dismissed his action to remove Billie Dixon as trustee of the Shirley A. Dixon Trust and sought reimbursement, an accounting and court supervision of the trust. In 2013 Billie, as trustee, sued John to reform a warranty deed their father executed conveying a tract of McKenzie County real property to John. Billie contended William Dixon intended to reserve the mineral interests as property of the trust. The district court agreed and reformed the warranty deed to reserve and except the minerals and retain the mineral interests as property of the trust to be distributed in accordance with the trust's terms and conditions. Shortly after the reformation action was commenced in 2013, John sued Billie seeking an accounting of the trust, her removal as trustee, court supervised administration of the trust, reimbursement of the trust for unauthorized distributions, and his attorney fees expended in the action. During multiple trial postponements, Shirley Dixon died in 2015. About two months before the scheduled February 2017 trial, Billie moved for summary judgment dismissal of the lawsuit. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the case was not moot and genuine issues of material fact precluded disposition by summary judgment. The Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Dixon v. Dixon" on Justia Law

Michele Brandt, as Trustee of the Michele L. Brandt Revocable Trust, appealed an order dismissing her appeal of the City of Fargo's resolution of necessity. Karen Wieland appealed a judgment dismissing her appeal to the district court from the City's resolution of necessity. In December 2016, the Fargo City Commission passed a resolution of necessity for property owned by Brandt related to construction of a flood protection project. Days later in a separate proceeding, the City passed a similar resolution of necessity for property owned by Wieland. Each resolution authorized the City to proceed with all legal means to obtain the property, including eminent domain. In each case the City filed a record on appeal in the district court and moved the court to dismiss the appeal. In Brandt's appeal, the City moved alternatively to consolidate Brandt's appeal with an eminent domain proceeding that the City also commenced in December 2016. In both appeals, Brandt and Wieland moved the district court to strike all materials from the record that had not specifically been placed in front of the city commission during the respective December 2016 meetings. After a February 22, 2017 hearing in Brandt's appeal, the district court entered an order granting the City's motion to dismiss and holding a resolution of necessity as a predicate to eminent domain is not subject to appellate review by the court. The court also held the City had not acted in bad faith, with a gross abuse of discretion, or fraudulently in passing the resolution of necessity. The order denied Brandt's motion to strike, concluding further consideration of the motion was moot. After a March 21, 2017 hearing in Wieland's appeal before a different judge, the district court entered an order and judgment dismissing Wieland's appeal. The court explained that the decision to go forward with an eminent domain proceeding is the City's political or legislative decision which the court could not review by appeal from issuance of the resolution. The City commenced an eminent domain proceeding for the Wieland property in April 2017. Because of similar dispositions, the North Dakota Supreme Court addressed both appeals in this decision and affirmed, concluding the court in each case did not err in dismissing the appeals because no statutory basis authorized an appeal to the district court from the City's resolutions of necessity. View "Brandt v. City of Fargo" on Justia Law

Craig Benson ("Benson") appealed a district court's judgment defining the boundaries of Outlot 11 and awarding Feland Brothers Properties ("the Felands") the northern portion of Outlot 53 through adverse possession. In 1951, Ruby Benson, Benson's grandmother, acquired a 600 by 450 foot tract to the west of Whiskey Bay on Lake Metigoshe. This tract of land was subdivided into several lots. The Felands owned Outlot 10, Craig and Brenda Benson ("the Bensons") owned Outlot 53, and Danny and Gwen Aftem ("the Aftems") owned Outlot 11. Outlot 53 was the result of a survey completed in 2010. The northern portion of Outlot 53 was largely ignored by the record owners, Richard Benson and then Craig Benson. Chris Romfo, a neighbor, testified that he rented Outlot 53 from Richard Benson for about nine years and understood that it was only for the southern part of Outlot 53. Romfo testified that Richard Benson never mentioned owning the northern part of Outlot 53. Although Craig Benson testified that he and his family regularly stayed at the lake for many years, he was vague as to the use of the northern part. He testified that he didn't build anything on the northern lot, except for a small bridge across the creek, apparently connecting the north and south portions of the lot. This bridge was later removed. After the 2010 survey was completed, he placed "no trespass" signs on the northern lot and cut trees down. He also began warning others not to use the property. The previous owners of Outlot 10 made a number of improvements to the northern portion of Outlot 53. The Bensons sued the Felands and Aftems to quiet title in all of Outlot 53. The Felands and Aftems counterclaimed, arguing that they own the northern portion of Outlot 53 and title should be quieted in their favor. Alternatively, the Felands and Aftems argued that they acquired the northern portion of Outlot 53 through adverse possession. After a bench trial, the district court defined the southeastern boundary of Outlot 11 as the corner of L-8 and L-9 on Outlot 53's plat, awarded the Felands the northern portion of Outlot 53 on the basis of adverse possession, and quieted title to the southern portion of Outlot 53 in favor of the Bensons. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the district court did not clearly err in defining the boundaries of Outlot 11 or in concluding the Felands adversely possessed the northern portion of Outlot 53. View "Benson v. Feland Brothers Properties" on Justia Law