Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries
North Dakota v. Groce
Dylan Groce appealed after a jury found him guilty of aggravated assault. Groce argued the district court abused its discretion by quashing subpoenas for two witnesses and denying a motion for mistrial. After review of the trial court record, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the district court did not err by quashing the subpoenas and did not abuse its discretion in denying Groce's motion for a mistrial. View "North Dakota v. Groce" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
North Dakota v. Isom
John Isom appeals from a criminal judgment entered after a jury found him guilty of aggravated assault--domestic violence. Isom argues the district court imposed an illegal sentence, abused its discretion in substituting a juror after empanelment, and erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal. Specifically, Isom argued the district court imposed an illegal sentence of five years supervised probation when N.D.C.C. 12.1-32-06.1(2) provided a maximum of three years for aggravated assault--domestic violence. Furthermore, Isom argued the district court abused its discretion and committed reversible error under N.D.R.Crim.P. 24 substituting a juror after jeopardy attached. The North Dakota Supreme Court agreed with Isom that the sentence he received was not in accordance with N.D.C.C. 12.1-32-06.1(2). The Court disagreed with Isom’s contention with respect to the juror substitution. The Court therefore affirmed in part and reversed in part and remanded for resentencing. View "North Dakota v. Isom" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
North Dakota v. Kremer
James Kremer appealed an order calling for the forfeiture and destruction of property involved in his criminal convictions for possessing images of sexual conduct by minors. In 2016 Kremer pled guilty to three class C felony counts of possessing prohibited materials. for which he was sentenced to serve ten years in prison followed by three years of supervised probation. During the first year after his release from incarceration, Kremer was prohibited from possessing "any equipment which allows you to access the internet." During the final two years of his probation, Kremer was allowed "to access the internet as per your probation officer." In December 2016, the State moved for the items to be forfeited and destroyed because the State alleged the items had been used or intended to be used to facilitate the commission of a criminal offense and because the items were illegal for Defendant to possess based upon Defendant's sentence in this matter. Defendant argued he did not want to possess the items, but all tax information, personal documents, personal photos, business documents, school e-books and documents, and account information contained on the items needed to be saved, and that after saving such information Defendant's family would then be able to sell the items, and such would not be "illegal" based upon Defendant's sentence. Rejecting this premise, the district court ordered forfeiture and destruction of Kremer's X-Box, PlayStation, laptop, and portable hard drive which were in the custody of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The court found the laptop and hard drive "were used in the commission of the crime" and all four items "were either used in the commission of the crime . . . and/or enable the defendant to have access to the internet, an action specifically prohibited by his Criminal Judgment." The North Dakota Supreme Court determined the district court did not err in ordering forfeiture and destruction of the laptop and hard drive, but erred with respect to the X-Box and Playstation. With regard to the game systems, the State argued the "only way that we know that Mr. Kremer is not going to get these items back and access the internet when he is released from prison is to forfeit them." The Supreme Court found the State cited no authority for its proposition that the possibility defendant might use otherwise unforfeitable property in an unlawful manner after completion of his criminal sentence rendered the property forfeitable. View "North Dakota v. Kremer" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
North Dakota v. Fleckenstein
The State appealed a district court order granting Tyler Fleckenstein's motion to suppress. Fleckenstein was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol (third offense). Fleckenstein moved to suppress the blood test. At the motion hearing, only the arresting officer testified. The district court concluded that the consent to the blood test was involuntary and granted the motion to suppress the blood test. The North Dakota Supreme Court determined the district court misapplied the law by ruling Fleckenstein's consent to a blood test was per se involuntary and thus did not consider the totality of the circumstances. The Court reversed the district court's order and remanded for additional findings of fact and a determination of voluntariness on the basis of the totality of the circumstances. View "North Dakota v. Fleckenstein" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
North Dakota v. Decker
A jury found Kevin Decker guilty of disorderly conduct. Decker argued on appeal the district court created a structural error by denying his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial when court staff excluded one member of the public from jury selection proceedings. He also argued the State presented insufficient evidence for the jury to find him guilty of disorderly conduct. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, concluding the district court's exclusion of one member of the public was too trivial to amount to structural error and the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction. View "North Dakota v. Decker" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Snider v. Dickinson Elks Building, LLC
Dickinson Elks Building, LLC, appealed a judgment awarding Rick and Janan Snider, doing business as RJ Snider Construction ("RJ Snider"), $198,255.08 for unjust enrichment and quantum meruit claims. In 2011, RJ Snider contracted with Granville Brinkman to furnish materials and labor for construction work on real property owned by Dickinson Elks. RJ Snider's principal place of business was located in Washington. In 2012, RJ Snider applied for a contractor license from the North Dakota Secretary of State, and the license was issued on in February 2012. RJ Snider provided services and materials for Dickinson Elks' property from December 26, 2011, to November 30, 2012. Dickinson Elks paid RJ Snider for all of the services and materials it provided between December 26, 2011, and February 1, 2012. RJ Snider billed Dickinson Elks $174,642.10 for the services and materials it provided from March 15, 2012, until November 30, 2012. Dickinson Elks did not pay any of this amount. In January 2013, RJ Snider recorded a construction lien against Dickinson Elks' property. In May 2014, Dickinson Elks served RJ Snider with a demand to start a lawsuit to enforce the lien and record a lis pendens within 30 days of the demand. RJ Snider sued Dickinson Elks in June 2014, seeking foreclosure of the construction lien and a money judgment. RJ Snider recorded a notice of lis pendens on July 28, 2014. Dickinson Elks moved for summary judgment, arguing RJ Snider's complaint should be dismissed under N.D.C.C. 43-07-02 because RJ Snider was not a licensed contractor when it started work on the property. Dickinson Elks also argued RJ Snider did not have a valid construction lien, because RJ Snider did not record a lis pendens within 30 days of receiving the demand to enforce the lien. The district court partially granted the motion and entered a judgment forfeiting RJ Snider's construction lien because RJ Snider did not record a lis pendens within 30 days of receiving Dickinson Elks' demand to enforce the lien as required under N.D.C.C. 35-27-25. The court concluded RJ Snider's claims were not precluded under N.D.C.C. 43-07-02. RJ Snider amended its complaint, claiming it was entitled to a money judgment against Dickinson Elks under the principles of quantum meruit and unjust enrichment. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded RJ Snider was not precluded from maintaining its claims; however, the Court reversed and remanded for the district court to determine whether any of the damages awarded were for services and materials provided before RJ Snider was licensed. View "Snider v. Dickinson Elks Building, LLC" on Justia Law
Snider v. Dickinson Elks Building, LLC
Dickinson Elks Building, LLC, appealed a judgment awarding Rick and Janan Snider, doing business as RJ Snider Construction ("RJ Snider"), $198,255.08 for unjust enrichment and quantum meruit claims. In 2011, RJ Snider contracted with Granville Brinkman to furnish materials and labor for construction work on real property owned by Dickinson Elks. RJ Snider's principal place of business was located in Washington. In 2012, RJ Snider applied for a contractor license from the North Dakota Secretary of State, and the license was issued on in February 2012. RJ Snider provided services and materials for Dickinson Elks' property from December 26, 2011, to November 30, 2012. Dickinson Elks paid RJ Snider for all of the services and materials it provided between December 26, 2011, and February 1, 2012. RJ Snider billed Dickinson Elks $174,642.10 for the services and materials it provided from March 15, 2012, until November 30, 2012. Dickinson Elks did not pay any of this amount. In January 2013, RJ Snider recorded a construction lien against Dickinson Elks' property. In May 2014, Dickinson Elks served RJ Snider with a demand to start a lawsuit to enforce the lien and record a lis pendens within 30 days of the demand. RJ Snider sued Dickinson Elks in June 2014, seeking foreclosure of the construction lien and a money judgment. RJ Snider recorded a notice of lis pendens on July 28, 2014. Dickinson Elks moved for summary judgment, arguing RJ Snider's complaint should be dismissed under N.D.C.C. 43-07-02 because RJ Snider was not a licensed contractor when it started work on the property. Dickinson Elks also argued RJ Snider did not have a valid construction lien, because RJ Snider did not record a lis pendens within 30 days of receiving the demand to enforce the lien. The district court partially granted the motion and entered a judgment forfeiting RJ Snider's construction lien because RJ Snider did not record a lis pendens within 30 days of receiving Dickinson Elks' demand to enforce the lien as required under N.D.C.C. 35-27-25. The court concluded RJ Snider's claims were not precluded under N.D.C.C. 43-07-02. RJ Snider amended its complaint, claiming it was entitled to a money judgment against Dickinson Elks under the principles of quantum meruit and unjust enrichment. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded RJ Snider was not precluded from maintaining its claims; however, the Court reversed and remanded for the district court to determine whether any of the damages awarded were for services and materials provided before RJ Snider was licensed. View "Snider v. Dickinson Elks Building, LLC" on Justia Law
Sauter v. Miller
James and Carol Miller appealed the quieting of title to certain real property in favor of Julie Sauter. The Millers argued the district court erred in finding Sauter acquired ownership of the disputed property by adverse possession, finding the boundary of the property was established by acquiescence, finding the Millers breached their contract and trespassed on Julie Sauter's property, and awarding Julie Sauter attorney's fees. Prior to taking ownership in 2013, the Miller property was owned by Kurt and Katina Heinrich. In 2012, Julie Sauter and the Heinrichs entered into a grazing lease for a two-year period expiring in 2014. However, before the lease expired, the Heinrichs sold their property to the Millers and no longer had use for the Sauter property. The Millers did not have the property surveyed prior to the purchase. Julie Sauter allowed the Heinrichs to sublease the land to the Millers for the 2013 grazing year. For the 2014 grazing season, Julie Sauter and the Millers entered into a new lease. In 2013, the Millers wanted to drill a water well on their property which required the land to be surveyed. The survey revealed the Original fence did not follow the actual boundary line of the two properties. The Millers tore down the Original fence, constructed a new fence on the surveyed boundary line, and drilled a water well on the disputed property. The right to ownership of land and passage of title, as a consequence of adverse possession or acquiescence, occur when the statutory period for possession has been satisfied. The continuous possession requirement for adverse possession and acquiescence is not disturbed by a nonacquiescent action that brings rise to the quiet title action. The Millers argued the district court erred because there was no proof of acquiescence by themselves or their predecessors in interest, the statutory period for possession was disturbed, and acquiescence was inapplicable because the Original fence was nothing more than a barrier. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the judgment on acquiescence, breach of contract, trespass, and attorney's fees. Because the Court affirmed on the issue of acquiescence, it did not reach the issue of adverse possession. View "Sauter v. Miller" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Real Estate & Property Law
North Dakota v. Bruce
Aaron Bruce appealed a district court's amended criminal judgment awarding restitution. In December 2015, the State charged Bruce with unlawful manufacturing, delivering, or possession with intent to deliver heroin; manslaughter; tampering in a criminal investigation; ingestion of a controlled substance; and theft of property. The charges arose from an incident in July 2015. In March 2017, pursuant to an agreement, the State amended the manslaughter charge to negligent homicide, and dismissed three of the charges. Bruce pled guilty to negligent homicide and manufacturing, delivering, or possession with intent to deliver heroin. The State requested $6,165 for funeral expenses for Aidan Vanderhoef, the victim of the negligent homicide charge, $500 for a cell phone that was allegedly stolen from Vanderhoef, and $492.20 for his father's transportation costs to and from the court proceedings. The court ordered Bruce to pay restitution in the amount of $7,157.20. Bruce argues the district court abused its discretion in ordering restitution for funeral expenses, a cell phone, and transportation costs to and from the court proceedings for Vanderhoef's father. Bruce also argues the district court abused its discretion when ordering restitution without considering his ability to pay. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the restitution award. View "North Dakota v. Bruce" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Rebenitsch v. Rebenitsch
Janiece Rebenitsch appealed a district court's judgment awarding primary residential responsibility of their child to Dustin Rebenitsch. Janiece and Dustin married in 2011 and had a child, H.J.R., in 2012. In 2014, the district court issued an order divorcing the parties and awarding equal residential responsibility. When the parties divorced, they both resided in the Bismarck area. In February 2017, Dustin moved to modify residential responsibility based on allegations of domestic violence in Janiece's home. After an investigation, social services found no evidence of abuse in Janiece's home. However, both Dustin and Janiece also sought modification because H.J.R. would be starting school, and equal residential responsibility was no longer feasible due to Janiece's move to Dickinson. At the time of the hearing, Janiece was living in Dickinson with her other daughter from a different relationship; her boyfriend, Jordan Kessel; and his two sons. Dustin lived in Bismarck with his wife, Jessica, and her two sons. At the June 2017 hearing on residential responsibility modification, several witnesses testified about Janiece and Dustin's character and ability to parent H.J.R. After the hearing, the district court found N.D.C.C. 14-09-06.2 factors (a), (b), (c), (e), (f), (g), (h), and (k) favored neither party; factors (i) and (j) were inapplicable; and factor (d) favored Dustin. The district court determined the best interest factors weighed in favor of Dustin and awarded him primary residential responsibility, subject to Janiece's reasonable parenting time. On appeal, Janiece argued the district court's findings regarding factors (b) and (k) were clearly erroneous. Janiece also argued it was clear, based on the entire record, that the district court made a mistake in awarding Dustin primary residential responsibility. Finding the district court did not clearly err in awarding primary residential responsibility to Dustin, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "Rebenitsch v. Rebenitsch" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Family Law