Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Marcus Chatman appealed an order summarily dismissing his second application for post-conviction relief. Chatman was charged with possession of heroin with intent to deliver or manufacture, a class A felony; possession of cocaine, a class C felony; and possession of marijuana by a driver, a class A misdemeanor. Chatman argues the district court erred in denying his request for an evidentiary hearing on newly discovered evidence, abused its discretion in granting summary dismissal prior to ruling on outstanding motions, and erred in determining the anticipatory search warrant in the underlying case was legal. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the order summarily dismissing Chatman's application for post-conviction relief, finding Chatman did not provide competent, admissible, newly discovered evidence sufficient to grant an evidentiary hearing, did not show an abuse of discretion in the district court's order summarily dismissing his application before ruling on his discovery motions, and the legality of the anticipatory search warrant issued for his criminal conviction could not be challenged at this stage of post-conviction relief. View "Chatman v. North Dakota" on Justia Law

Sergei Carlson appealed a district court order summarily dismissing his post-conviction relief application. In July 2007, law enforcement officers responded to a report of a non-responsive female. When they arrived, officers found W.P.C., a 16-year-old girl, lying in bed not breathing. W.P.C. was pronounced dead. Carlson, the victim's adoptive brother, and P.R., the victim's mother, were the only other people present in the home at the time of W.P.C.'s death. An autopsy of W.P.C. indicated the cause of death was suffocation and/or asphyxiation. Carlson told the officers during an interview that he strangled W.P.C. with his hands and placed pillows over her face to muffle the sound. Carlson then indicated he had sexual contact with W.P.C. after strangling/suffocating her. In September 2008, Carlson pled guilty to murder and performing a deviant sexual act. Carlson was 15 years old at the time and was initially charged in juvenile court before the case was transferred to adult court. He was sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole in October 2008. Carlson filed a post-conviction relief application in October 2016. The district court appointed Carlson counsel at his request. The State answered Carlson's pro se application for post-conviction relief in November 2016. The State subsequently moved for summary disposition, specifically asserting the application should be barred by the two-year statute of limitations under N.D.C.C. 29-32.1-01. Carlson responded to the motion through his counsel and the parties stipulated that the court could address the matter of timeliness of Carlson's application based on the written pleadings before the court. The court dismissed Carlson's application as untimely in June 2017, because it did not meet an exception to the two-year statute of limitations. Carlson filed a notice of appeal in July 2017. In this matter before the North Dakota Supreme Court, Carlson argued the district court erred in summarily dismissing his post-conviction relief application based on the statute of limitations. The Supreme Court concluded the district court did not err by summarily dismissing Carlson's post-conviction relief application. View "Carlson v. North Dakota" on Justia Law

Ricky and Darcy Berg married in 1984 and separated in January 2016. The district court held a trial in June 2017 to determine the distribution of marital property and spousal support. At trial, both parties testified about their marital property, marital debts, income, and expenses. Ricky Berg was represented by counsel, and Darcy Berg represented herself at trial. Ricky Berg appealed the district court’s judgment dividing his and Darcy's marital estate and award to Darcy spousal support. The North Dakota Supreme Court found the district court did not clearly err in dividing property and awarding spousal support when it considered the “Ruff-Fischer” factors and adequately explained its findings regarding property division and spousal support. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Berg v. Berg" on Justia Law

Cameron and Mary Susan Arnegard appealed a trial court judgment relating to a conditional use permit (CUP) obtained from Arnegard Township in McKenzie County, North Dakota. The Arnegards argued the district court erred in granting the Township's motion in limine to exclude a buy-sell agreement; denying their motion to amend their complaint on a due process claim; granting summary judgment dismissing their breach of contract, actual fraud and equitable estoppel claims; dismissing their negligence and deceit claims by directed verdict; and determining no party prevailed in the action. The Arnegards also argued the district court abused its discretion by denying their motion to amend their complaint at trial. The Township cross-appealed, arguing the district court erred in granting judgment as a matter of law in favor of the Arnegards' due process claim. Zoning ordinances and amendments are valid if a township follows the statutory procedures. A conditional use permit does not by itself create a contract between a township and a landowner. A township has no duty to disclose validly enacted zoning ordinances or amendments beyond the notice and filing procedures provided by statute. A claim of constitutional due process violation first requires a protected property interest created by an independent source of law. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court regarding dismissal of the Arnegards' breach of contract, actual fraud and equitable estoppel claims. The Court affirmed the judgment regarding directed verdicts in favor of the Township on the negligence and deceit claims. However, the Court reversed the judgment regarding the Arnegards' due process claim and the award of nominal damages, and remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "Arnegard v. Arnegard Township" on Justia Law

The parents of nine minor children, individually and as guardians of the children, appealed a district court judgment determining the statutory damage cap for tort claims against a political subdivision was constitutional. In January 2015, a collision occurred between a Larimore Public School District bus and a BNSF Railway train. At the time, there were thirteen School District students riding home from school on the bus. One child died as a result of injuries sustained in the accident and the other children suffered serious injuries. The accident resulted in the potential for multiple damage claims in excess of the School District's aggregate statutory cap on liability under the codification of N.D.C.C. 32-12.1-03(2) in effect at the time of the accident, which limited the liability of political subdivisions "to a total of two hundred fifty thousand dollars per person and five hundred thousand dollars for injury to three or more persons during any single occurrence regardless of the number of political subdivisions, or employees of such political subdivisions, which are involved in that occurrence." The School District and its government self-insurance pool, the North Dakota Insurance Reserve Fund, brought this interpleader action and deposited five hundred thousand dollars with the district court to satisfy the damage cap for claims arising from the accident under the applicable language of N.D.C.C. 32-12.1-03(2). The parents and guardians for some of the children answered and counterclaimed, asserting the damage cap was unconstitutional. The parents argued the damage cap violated the open court, jury trial, equal protection, and special law provisions of the state constitution. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the damage cap did not violate those constitutional provisions, and affirmed the judgment. View "Larimore Public School District No. 44 v. Aamodt" on Justia Law

The parents of nine minor children, individually and as guardians of the children, appealed a district court judgment determining the statutory damage cap for tort claims against a political subdivision was constitutional. In January 2015, a collision occurred between a Larimore Public School District bus and a BNSF Railway train. At the time, there were thirteen School District students riding home from school on the bus. One child died as a result of injuries sustained in the accident and the other children suffered serious injuries. The accident resulted in the potential for multiple damage claims in excess of the School District's aggregate statutory cap on liability under the codification of N.D.C.C. 32-12.1-03(2) in effect at the time of the accident, which limited the liability of political subdivisions "to a total of two hundred fifty thousand dollars per person and five hundred thousand dollars for injury to three or more persons during any single occurrence regardless of the number of political subdivisions, or employees of such political subdivisions, which are involved in that occurrence." The School District and its government self-insurance pool, the North Dakota Insurance Reserve Fund, brought this interpleader action and deposited five hundred thousand dollars with the district court to satisfy the damage cap for claims arising from the accident under the applicable language of N.D.C.C. 32-12.1-03(2). The parents and guardians for some of the children answered and counterclaimed, asserting the damage cap was unconstitutional. The parents argued the damage cap violated the open court, jury trial, equal protection, and special law provisions of the state constitution. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the damage cap did not violate those constitutional provisions, and affirmed the judgment. View "Larimore Public School District No. 44 v. Aamodt" on Justia Law

Russell Parshall appealed a district court order denying his application for post-conviction relief. In 2015 Parshall pled guilty to "Driving Under the Influence N.D.C.C. 39-08-01 (First Offense Refusal)" by a N.D.R.Crim.P. 43 plea agreement. Parshall's Rule 43 Change of Plea and Sentencing Appearance Waiver listed the charge without the parenthetical "(First Offense Refusal);" however, both the formal plea agreement section of the document and the later criminal judgment included the parenthetical. Parshall applied for post-conviction relief, arguing the United States Supreme Court's holding in Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016), was a retroactively applicable substantive rule of constitutional law that prohibited the State from imposing criminal liability for refusing a warrantless blood test. In opposing Parshall's application the State argued the factual basis in the plea agreement supported both general driving while impaired and refusal to submit to the blood test. The district court found Parshall entered a guilty plea to the general charge of driving under the influence, not merely refusal. The district court declined to rule on the retroactivity of Birchfield, "The Court need not make that ruling, as the Court finds that the ruling in Birchfield made the statute regarding conviction by refusal to provide a blood sample unconstitutional from the moment of passage." The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding the parties' intent could be ascertained from the plea agreement itself. The plea agreement signed by Parshall stated "Defendant hereby pleads guilty to a charge of COUNT I DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE N.D.C.C. 39-08-01 (First Offense Refusal) a Class B Misdemeanor." The criminal judgment mirrored this language. From this the Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in interpreting the factual basis following the plea agreement to determine Parshall pled guilty to general driving under the influence when the plain language indicated refusal. With respect to Birchfield, because the district court did not rule on that issue, the matter was remanded for resolution. View "Parshall v. North Dakota" on Justia Law

Leon Pfingsten appealed a district court order granting Owego Township's motion to dismiss an appeal. In 2015, several Owego Township residents petitioned for alteration of what was known as Bagoon Road. In April 2015 the Township sued Pfingsten to have that portion of Bagoon Road on Pfingsten's property declared a public road by prescriptive easement, to prevent Pfingsten from claiming any adverse interest in the road and to have damages awarded for Pfingsten's intentional injury to the road. The Township also sought access to Pfingsten's property for surveying. Pfingsten counterclaimed for trespass. The district court entered a stipulated order providing that the Township had the right to survey Pfingsten's land before December 31, 2016 and, upon completion of the survey, the Township would proceed with a taking action. The district court stayed the action until December 31, 2016. On September 26, 2016, the Township acted on the March 2015 petition and adopted and filed with the Township Clerk an order to alter highway and a statement of damages. The order to alter highway changed the location of Bagoon Road on Pfingsten's property; the statement of damages valued Pfingsten's two acres at $9,000. Pfingsten did not appeal the Township's award of damages. On December 3, 2016 the Township adopted a confirmation of order to alter highway and confirmation of statement of damages. On December 22, 2016 Pfingsten received a $9,000 check from the Township. He appealed to the district court on January 19, 2017. The Township moved to dismiss the appeal. The district court ruled that Pfingsten's appeal was untimely under N.D.C.C. sections 24-07-22 and 28-34-01 and granted the Township's motion to dismiss the appeal. Pfingsten argued on appeal to the North Dakota Supreme Court the district court erred by concluding his appeal was untimely. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed: a township's determination or award of damages must be appealed within thirty days of filing under N.D.C.C. Sections 24-07-22 and 28-34-01. View "Owego Township v. Pfingsten" on Justia Law

Leon Pfingsten appealed a district court order granting Owego Township's motion to dismiss an appeal. In 2015, several Owego Township residents petitioned for alteration of what was known as Bagoon Road. In April 2015 the Township sued Pfingsten to have that portion of Bagoon Road on Pfingsten's property declared a public road by prescriptive easement, to prevent Pfingsten from claiming any adverse interest in the road and to have damages awarded for Pfingsten's intentional injury to the road. The Township also sought access to Pfingsten's property for surveying. Pfingsten counterclaimed for trespass. The district court entered a stipulated order providing that the Township had the right to survey Pfingsten's land before December 31, 2016 and, upon completion of the survey, the Township would proceed with a taking action. The district court stayed the action until December 31, 2016. On September 26, 2016, the Township acted on the March 2015 petition and adopted and filed with the Township Clerk an order to alter highway and a statement of damages. The order to alter highway changed the location of Bagoon Road on Pfingsten's property; the statement of damages valued Pfingsten's two acres at $9,000. Pfingsten did not appeal the Township's award of damages. On December 3, 2016 the Township adopted a confirmation of order to alter highway and confirmation of statement of damages. On December 22, 2016 Pfingsten received a $9,000 check from the Township. He appealed to the district court on January 19, 2017. The Township moved to dismiss the appeal. The district court ruled that Pfingsten's appeal was untimely under N.D.C.C. sections 24-07-22 and 28-34-01 and granted the Township's motion to dismiss the appeal. Pfingsten argued on appeal to the North Dakota Supreme Court the district court erred by concluding his appeal was untimely. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed: a township's determination or award of damages must be appealed within thirty days of filing under N.D.C.C. Sections 24-07-22 and 28-34-01. View "Owego Township v. Pfingsten" on Justia Law

Merritt Charles Horning III; Riggers Store Holdings, LLC; Riggers Store 1, LLC; Chase Merritt Management, Inc.; Chase Merritt, LP; and Racers Store Management, LLC (collectively the "Horning defendants") appealed a district court order denying their motion to compel arbitration of Raymond Melendez's lawsuit against them. The issues in this appeal centered on whether Melendez's claims against the Horning defendants concerning the operation of a convenience store in Williston were arbitrable under an arbitration clause in an operating agreement for Riggers Store Holdings. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in deciding Melendez's claims were not arbitrable, and reversed the order denying arbitration and remanded for entry of an order compelling arbitration. View "Melendez v. Horning III" on Justia Law