Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

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Harold Olson appealed a district court order affirming the North Dakota Department of Transportation's ("Department") revocation of his driving privileges for two years, following an arrest for driving under the influence. The revocation of driving privileges for refusal to submit to chemical testing requires a valid arrest; in the absence of authority from Congress, the State lacks criminal jurisdiction over crimes committed by non-member Indians on tribal land. Whether an officer has jurisdiction to arrest depends on the law of the place where the arrest is made. Olson argued the deputy lacked the authority to arrest him on tribal land and that a valid arrest was a prerequisite to revocation of his driving privileges. Absent a valid arrest, Olson argued the revocation order was not in accordance with the law. The North Dakota Supreme Court determined the deputy lacked authority to arrest Olson, a non-member Indian, on Mandan, Hidatsa and Arikara Nation tribal land. The Court therefore reversed the district court's order affirming the Department's revocation of Olson's driving privileges and reinstated Olson's driving privileges. View "Olson v. N.D. Dep't of Transportation" on Justia Law

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A.D., the mother of P.T.D., C.R.D., P.A.D., P.P.D., and N.A.D., appealed a juvenile court order finding her five children were deprived under N.D.C.C. 27-20-02(8). The North Dakota Supreme Court previously concluded the juvenile court did not make sufficient findings of fact and remanded the case for further findings. Upon review of the additional findings, the Court affirmed the juvenile court's Amended Juvenile Findings of Fact and Order for Disposition entered on December 15, 2017. Those additional findings included: (1)one or more of the children were afraid in the family home because of the respondents' arguing and fighting; (2) one or more of the children did not feel safe in the family home; (3) one or more of the children had been physically harmed from being slapped, "smacked," or thrown; (4) one or more of the children usually "got crackers for breakfast when the parents would sleep in, and sometimes toast;" (5) the oldest child (then approximately 11 years old) would assume parental responsibilities when the respondents would sleep in until 11:00 a.m. or noon and when the respondents would leave the home sometimes as late as 9:00 p.m.; (6) the living conditions for the children were unsanitary and unsafe, including the house being a mess with garbage, dirty dishes, and dirty diapers; (7) the children were exposed to domestic violence; (8) one of the respondents broke down a door into a bedroom where the other respondent had fled with the children following an argument; and (9) respondents did not make sufficient efforts to participate in the recommended marriage counseling, anger and depression counseling, or counseling for coping with stress. View "Interest of P.T.D.; C.R.D.; P.A.D.; P.P.D.; and N.A.D." on Justia Law

Posted in: Family Law
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Gene Grasser appealed an amended judgment entered from March 2017, awarding primary residential responsibility to Stephanie Grasser and distributing marital property and debts. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Gene's request for recusal or by finding Gene in contempt and awarding sanctions which it did not reimburse. Furthermore, the Court concluded the court did not clearly err by awarding Stephanie primary residential responsibility of the parties' child or by distributing the parties' marital property and debts. View "Grasser v. Grasser" on Justia Law

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Gene Grasser appealed an amended judgment entered from March 2017, awarding primary residential responsibility to Stephanie Grasser and distributing marital property and debts. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Gene's request for recusal or by finding Gene in contempt and awarding sanctions which it did not reimburse. Furthermore, the Court concluded the court did not clearly err by awarding Stephanie primary residential responsibility of the parties' child or by distributing the parties' marital property and debts. View "Grasser v. Grasser" on Justia Law

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Michael Terrill appealed a criminal judgment entered upon a conditional guilty plea to possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver and possession of drug paraphernalia. Terrill argued the district court improperly denied his motion to suppress evidence. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "North Dakota v. Terrill" on Justia Law

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Steven Sauter appealed a judgment entered upon a conditional guilty plea to criminal vehicular homicide, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress the results of a warrantless blood-alcohol test. Sauter argued there was not sufficient evidence to support the district court's decision that exigent circumstances permitted the warrantless blood-alcohol test. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the warrantless blood-alcohol test was authorized under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement, and thus affirmed the trial court’s denial of Sauter’s suppression motion. View "North Dakota v. Sauter" on Justia Law

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Thomas Solwey (Solwey) appealed the first amended judgment awarding split residential responsibility of his and Lisa Solwey-Hilbert's (Hilbert) minor children. Solwey and Hilbert were married in 1998 and divorced in 2013. Hilbert was awarded primary residential responsibility of all four children (M.L.S., C.T.S., K.E.S., and K.D.S.). Solwey was ordered to pay $1,247 per month in child support. In August 2015, Solwey moved to modify primary residential responsibility. Under the heightened standard for such motions within two years of the previous order, the district court dismissed the motion without an evidentiary hearing for lack of prima facie case. Solwey did not appeal that order. In November 2015, Solwey moved to modify primary residential responsibility under N.D.C.C. 14-09-06.6(4) and (6). The district court again denied for lack of prima facie case. Solwey appealed to the North Dakota Supreme Court and the district court order was reversed and remanded with an order for evidentiary hearing. An evidentiary hearing was held in March 2017; the district court ruled at the outset of the hearing that only C.T.S. and K.E.S. (twins) would be considered under the motion to modify. Solwey argued the family should be treated as a cohesive unit and therefore K.D.S., the youngest, should also be considered under the motion to modify. The district court ruled the Supreme Court's mandate for evidentiary hearing did not apply to K.D.S. The parties mutually agreed M.L.S., who was no longer a minor, would not be considered. The first amended judgment was entered in August 2017, awarding Hilbert primary residential responsibility of M.L.S. and K.D.S., awarding Solwey primary residential responsibility of C.T.S., and awarding shared joint equal residential responsibility of K.E.S. The district court ordered that Solwey's new child support obligation of $436 per month commence June 2017. Solwey appealed, but only filed a partial transcript of the evidentiary hearing. "The North Dakota Supreme Court has said repeatedly: "The appellant assumes the consequences and the risk for the failure to file a complete transcript. If the record on appeal does not allow for a meaningful and intelligent review of alleged error, we will decline review of the issue." Because the Supreme Court did not have the benefit of a transcript to review the testimony heard by the district court, it concluded Solwey failed to meet his burden of proving the court's findings were clearly erroneous, and “we are not left with a definite and firm conviction a mistake has been made.” View "Solwey v. Solwey" on Justia Law

Posted in: Family Law
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R.B. appealed a district court order granting J.B. a two-year disorderly conduct restraining order against him. R.B. and J.B. began dating in April 2017 when they both lived in Vermont. Each was sixteen years old at the time. J.B. and her mother, Jodie Jacobs ("Jacobs"), moved to North Dakota. Jacobs stated that she noticed a change in J.B.'s behavior after the move, including J.B. being more distant from Jacobs and spending more time on her cell phone. Jacobs attributed this change to J.B.'s relationship with R.B. Jacobs, on behalf of J.B., petitioned a North Dakota district court for a disorderly conduct restraining order against R.B. The petition alleged: R.B. threatened suicide, which caused J.B. to visit a counselor for three hours; R.B. stated that "J.B. is mine" to Jacobs; R.B. told J.B. to stop posting pictures of herself smiling because he didn't want to see her happy without him; R.B. told J.B. to not be friends with girls that smoke cigarettes because doing so would prevent her from becoming "the doctor she wanted to be"; R.B. told J.B. to wear his ring and sweatshirt, to not speak to any guys "ever," and to disrespect Jacobs; R.B. indicated to J.B. that if she did not do what she said she was going to do, "he would possibly hurt himself"; J.B. cried and told Jacobs that she did not want to see R.B. die; R.B. told Jacobs that "he will not stop" and that she could not control J.B. when she is eighteen; and R.B. sent a message to J.B.'s Snapchat account that said "bad mother alert." The district court issued a temporary restraining order; then after a hearing, the district court issued a two-year restraining order against R.B. R.B. argued the petition lacked reasonable grounds showing that he engaged in "intrusive or unwanted acts, words, or gestures that are intended to adversely affect the safety, security, or privacy" of J.B. The North Dakota Supreme Court stated that "[i]t is not enough under the statute that the petitioner for a restraining order wants the other person out of the petitioner's life. . . . Subjective fear is insufficient to support a disorderly conduct restraining order." Because the Court concluded the district court abused its discretion in granting the disorderly conduct restraining order against R.B., it reversed. View "J.B. v. R.B." on Justia Law

Posted in: Civil Procedure
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The City of Bismarck appealed a district court’s suppression order. In December 2016, at about 10:10 p.m., a Bismarck police officer observed a vehicle fail to negotiate a turn and slide into a snowbank on the side of the road. The officer then observed the vehicle back out of the snowbank and proceed to fishtail down the street. The officer testified he suspected the driver was driving at an unsafe speed for the road conditions. The police officer followed the vehicle, and activated his overhead lights, but the driver, defendant Deanne Brekhus, did not stop. The vehicle made several turns before entering a parking lot, and after about thirty seconds of pursuit, stopped in front of a garage door, waited for the door to open, and entered the garage. The garage was not attached to the defendant's residence, and the overhead garage door remained open. The officer commanded Brekhus to stay in the vehicle when she attempted to exit her vehicle. At this point the police officer entered the garage on foot and made contact with the defendant, immediately noting the odor of burnt marijuana and alcohol. The officer observed Brekhus was slurring her speech; had bloodshot, glossy eyes; and had difficulty keeping her eyes open while speaking with the officer. The officer had her come out of the garage and perform field sobriety tests. Brekhus was unable to follow directions for the horizontal gaze nystagmus test. The City ultimately charged Brekhus with driving under the influence, possession of drug paraphernalia, and possession of marijuana. In February 2017 Brekhus moved the district court to suppress evidence, arguing that her rights under the Fourth Amendment and North Dakota Constitution were violated when the police entered her garage and searched her vehicle. She also contended her statutory right to consult counsel before chemical testing was violated. The City opposed both motions. The district court granted Brekhus's motion to suppress the basis of the police officer's initial entry into the open, detached garage without a warrant or an exception to the warrant requirement. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the police officer's warrantless limited entry into her open garage while in "hot pursuit" did not violate Brekhus’ Constitutional rights under the federal or North Dakota Constitutions. The matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "City of Bismarck v. Brekhus" on Justia Law

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A.D.C. appealed a juvenile court's judgments and orders terminating her parental rights. Because A.D.C.'s notice of appeal was untimely, the North Dakota Supreme Court found itself without jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal. View "Interest of T.S.C." on Justia Law

Posted in: Family Law