Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The case involves Mariya Stephens and Kevin Lee, who were married in 2017 and have a child together. After their divorce in 2020, Stephens was granted primary residential responsibility of their child, with Lee receiving parenting time. The divorce judgment stated that if Stephens had a permanent change of duty station, the child would relocate with her. In 2021, Stephens married Charles Stephens and they had two children together. In 2022, the Stephens family contracted to build a home in Virginia and informed Lee of their plans to relocate. Stephens believed she had Lee's consent to relocate either under the divorce judgment or his text messages and emails. In April 2023, Stephens filed a motion for relocation and relocated before the district court could act on the motion.Lee objected to Stephens's relocation and requested the district court to deny her motion to relocate to Virginia. He also moved to amend the divorce judgment to give him primary residential responsibility for their child and filed a motion for contempt due to Stephens's alleged violations of the judgment. In May 2023, the district court required the Stephens family to return to North Dakota with their child. In October 2023, the district court denied Stephens's motion to relocate, awarded Lee primary residential responsibility, and granted his motion to amend the judgment.In the Supreme Court of North Dakota, Stephens argued that the district court erred in denying her motion to relocate. She claimed that she did not need Lee's consent due to language in the divorce judgment and, alternatively, that Lee consented to the relocation through text messages and emails. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision, concluding that the divorce judgment did not provide Stephens with Lee's consent for her to move their child out of state, and did not err by denying her motion and by granting Lee's motion to change primary residential responsibility. View "Stephens v. Lee" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Richard Dean Anderson, Jr., who was stopped by law enforcement for a broken tail light. During the stop, Anderson was questioned about his activities, to which he responded that he had been grocery shopping in West Fargo and was heading home to Hunter, a location more than 35 miles away. The officers found his story suspicious due to the late hour and the lack of visible groceries in the car. They conducted a background check, revealing Anderson's prior drug convictions. Based on this information, the officers called a K-9 unit, which detected drugs in Anderson's vehicle. Anderson was subsequently charged with possession of drug paraphernalia.Prior to his trial, Anderson moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the search, arguing that the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to expand the traffic stop into a drug investigation. The district court denied his motion, and Anderson entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress.The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the officers did not expand the scope of the traffic stop until after they discovered Anderson's criminal history. Until that point, the officers were diligently pursuing the mission of the traffic stop. After learning of the drug convictions, the officers shifted their focus to a drug investigation. The court found that the officers had reasonable suspicion to extend the traffic stop and start a new investigation based on the totality of the circumstances, including the late hour, Anderson's vague explanation for his travel, the lack of visible groceries in the car, Anderson's change in demeanor when questioned, and his prior drug convictions. View "State v. Anderson" on Justia Law

James Massey was charged with gross sexual imposition, a class AA felony, and child abuse, a class C felony. The charges stemmed from an incident involving a minor, identified as T.T. During the trial, the State presented testimonies from T.T., law enforcement, medical staff, and a psychologist. Massey, in his defense, testified on his own behalf. The jury found Massey guilty of both charges.The case was first heard in the District Court of Cass County, East Central Judicial District. At the close of the State's case, Massey moved for a judgment of acquittal under N.D.R.Crim.P. 29, which the court denied. The jury found Massey guilty of both charges, and he subsequently appealed the convictions.The case was then reviewed by the Supreme Court of North Dakota. Massey argued that the jury instruction for gross sexual imposition was improper and that the State's closing arguments constituted prosecutorial misconduct. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found no error in the use of "willfully" as the required mens rea in the jury instructions. Although the court acknowledged that the State made an improper "golden rule" argument during closing arguments, it concluded that Massey failed to demonstrate how he was prejudiced by these comments. The court affirmed the judgment of conviction. View "State v. Massey" on Justia Law

The Ward family, who own extensive acreage in Bismarck, North Dakota, initiated a quiet title action against 152 adjacent landowners, including Dan and Lindsey Herbel, to determine adverse claims to their property. The Wards did not make any claims against the defendants personally but sought a decree that the defendants had no estate, interest, lien, or encumbrance upon their property. The Herbels moved to dismiss the action, arguing they were not proper defendants under chapter 32-17, N.D.C.C., as neither the Wards nor the Herbels claimed an adverse interest against the other’s property. The Herbels also sought recovery of attorney’s fees. The district court denied the motion despite finding the Wards were not aware if any of the named defendants were claiming title to any of the property. Following a bench trial, the court granted the judicial remedy of quiet title and a judgment dismissing the Herbels’ action was entered.The Herbels appealed to the Supreme Court of North Dakota, arguing that because neither party made an adverse claim against the other’s property, the Wards lacked standing to sue under section 32-17-01, N.D.C.C. The Supreme Court agreed, stating that the plain language of N.D.C.C. § 32-17-01 requires the existence of an adverse claim. The court found that the parties’ properties did not share a fence line or a common boundary without any intervening land, and a well-traveled roadway separated the properties. The Herbels never claimed an interest in the Wards’ real property, and the Wards never asserted there was an adverse interest between the parties. The court concluded that a direct suit against the Herbels was not authorized by N.D.C.C. § 32-17-01.The Herbels also argued that the district court abused its discretion when it denied their request for attorney’s fees. The Supreme Court agreed, stating that the district court has discretion to determine whether a claim is frivolous and to determine the reasonable amount of an award of attorney’s fees. The court remanded the case to determine if the claim was frivolous and, if it was, to determine attorney’s fees. The court affirmed the judgment dismissing the claims against the Herbels. View "Ward v. Herbel" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between Mary Roth and Gary Meyer, who were in a long-term relationship but never married. They cohabitated and ran a cattle operation together on a property that had a complex ownership history involving various members of Meyer's family. The couple's relationship ended, and Roth sued Meyer, alleging that he had converted some of her cattle and failed to repay loans she had given him.The District Court of Grant County, South Central Judicial District, found in favor of Roth. It ruled that Meyer had gained title to the disputed property through adverse possession and had transferred it to Roth in 2010. The court also found that Meyer had converted 13 of Roth's cattle and breached oral loan agreements with her, ordering him to pay her $52,500.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota reversed the lower court's decision. It found that the lower court had erred in its findings on adverse possession, the admissibility of certain evidence, the timing of the alleged conversion of cattle, the valuation of the converted cattle, and the enforceability of the loan contracts. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the lower court for further proceedings, instructing it to make new findings based on the existing record. View "Roth v. Meyer" on Justia Law

The defendant, Roland Riemers, was found guilty of disorderly conduct by a jury after he pursued a train that was blocking a street for longer than twenty minutes, a violation of a city ordinance. Riemers parked his car near the tracks, approached the train, informed the employees of the violation, and ignited a road flare. Both Riemers and the train employees called the police, and Riemers was subsequently charged.Riemers transferred his case from the Grand Forks Municipal Court to the District Court for a jury trial. He was found guilty of disorderly conduct under the Grand Forks City Code. Riemers appealed, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction due to procedural errors, that he should have been prosecuted under state law rather than city ordinance, and that the court erred by not instructing the jury about the right to conduct a citizen's arrest. He also argued that no victim was identified and that there was insufficient evidence for a conviction.The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that the district court did not lack jurisdiction, as the city was not required to serve the criminal information on Riemers. The court also ruled that Riemers could be prosecuted under city ordinance, as the city's disorderly conduct ordinance did not supersede state law. The court rejected Riemers' argument about the right to conduct a citizen's arrest, as he had waived any claim of error by expressing satisfaction with the jury instructions. The court also found that the criminal information was sufficient to protect Riemers from a subsequent prosecution for the same offense. Finally, the court declined to review Riemers' argument about the sufficiency of the evidence, as he had not moved for a judgment of acquittal at trial. View "City of Grand Forks v. Riemers" on Justia Law

The case involves a personal injury action initiated by Torrey Kath against Michael Prochnow and Prochnow Farms. After the parties filed a "Stipulation of Dismissal with Prejudice," the district court dismissed the case. Kath then filed a separate declaratory judgment action against Agraria Insurance Company, doing business as Farmers Union Mutual Insurance Company (FUMIC), seeking an order that FUMIC had a duty to indemnify Prochnow under an insurance policy. While FUMIC's motion in the declaratory judgment action was pending, Kath and Prochnow filed a "Joint Rule 60 Motion to Vacate Dismissal with Prejudice" in the original case, seeking an amended judgment.The district court had previously dismissed the case with prejudice. However, Kath and Prochnow filed a motion to vacate the dismissal, which the court granted. FUMIC then filed a motion to intervene, arguing that Kath and Prochnow were seeking to impair its rights. The district court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to decide on FUMIC's intervention motion because the case had been dismissed.The Supreme Court of North Dakota disagreed with the district court's decision. The court noted that Kath and Prochnow's motion to vacate the dismissal re-invoked the district court's jurisdiction. Furthermore, FUMIC's intervention motion initiated a special proceeding, which also invoked the court's jurisdiction. Therefore, the Supreme Court held that the district court erred in ruling that it lacked jurisdiction to consider FUMIC's motion to intervene. The case was remanded for the district court to decide on FUMIC's motion to intervene and, if necessary, to conduct additional proceedings consistent with its disposition of the motion. View "Kath v. Prochnow" on Justia Law

The case involves Jay Jelinek, who was appealing an order denying his motion to suppress evidence and challenging evidentiary rulings made by the district court during his trial. Jelinek was found by a North Dakota Game and Fish Department Warden in a field during deer hunting season. The Warden recognized Jelinek from previous encounters and knew that his hunting privileges were suspended. Jelinek was replacing batteries in a trail camera and stated that he had been sitting in a deer stand with his wife, who had a deer tag, earlier that day. Jelinek moved to suppress evidence gathered during his encounter with the Warden, arguing that he was unlawfully seized and that the Warden did not have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.The District Court of Grand Forks County denied Jelinek's motion to suppress, finding that he was not subject to an improper seizure prior to his arrest and that the Warden had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Jelinek also argued that the court erred in denying his motion for acquittal on one count, as the State's only evidence of guilt was his own statements. He further argued that the court erred in allowing evidence of his criminal history to go to the jury and that his 6th Amendment rights were violated.The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court found that the district court did not err in denying Jelinek's motion to suppress, as there was sufficient evidence supporting the district court's findings that Jelinek was not unlawfully seized. The court also found that the district court did not err in denying Jelinek's motion for acquittal, as there was substantial independent evidence establishing the trustworthiness of Jelinek's statements to law enforcement. However, the court found that the district court erred in allowing Jelinek's criminal history to be considered by the jury after one count was dismissed. The case was remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Jelinek" on Justia Law

Regina Goodale was found guilty of accomplice to murder—extreme indifference for the murder of her husband. The State alleged that Goodale had conspired with Mathew Anderson, who was believed to have committed the murder. The State's evidence included testimony from several witnesses, including acquaintances of Goodale, the investigating officer, and her co-defendant, Whitney Racine. Goodale did not present any additional evidence and was convicted by a jury.Prior to the trial, the State had moved to join Anderson’s and Goodale’s cases, to which Goodale did not respond. The district court permitted the joinder. During the trial, Goodale moved for a judgment of acquittal, which the district court denied. The jury found Goodale guilty, and she appealed the decision.In the Supreme Court of North Dakota, Goodale argued that the jury instructions were improper, there was insufficient evidence to support the guilty verdict, the district court erred in allowing the State to join her and Anderson’s cases for trial, and that the court imposed an illegal sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that the jury instructions, while containing an error, did not prejudice Goodale. The court also found that there was sufficient evidence to convict Goodale and that the district court did not err in permitting the joinder of the defendants or in sentencing Goodale. View "State v. Goodale" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Richard Sargent, who was charged with 17 counts of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, 17 counts of theft of a firearm, and one count of theft of $500-$1000. The charges were based on evidence obtained during a traffic stop, where law enforcement officers found firearms in a vehicle being towed by Sargent. The stop was initiated based on an anonymous tip and a traffic violation committed by Sargent. Sargent filed a motion to suppress the evidence, arguing that the traffic stop and subsequent search were unlawful.The District Court of Williams County denied Sargent's motion to suppress the evidence. The court found that the traffic stop was valid due to a traffic violation committed by Sargent. It also ruled that the officers had reasonable suspicion to extend the traffic stop and call in a K-9 unit, based on Sargent's extreme nervousness, his criminal history, his probation status, and the inconsistencies in his travel plans. The court further held that the automobile exception to the warrant requirement allowed the officers to search the vehicle being towed by Sargent.Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the lower court's decision. The Supreme Court agreed that the traffic stop was valid and that the officers had reasonable suspicion to extend the stop. It also held that the automobile exception permitted the officers to search the towed vehicle. The court concluded that the district court did not err in denying Sargent's motion to suppress evidence, thereby affirming the lower court's decision. View "State v. Sargent" on Justia Law