Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Robert and Laurie Banderet and other plaintiffs (“Landowners”) appealed a judgment dismissing their complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the Sargent County Water Resource District and Ransom County Water Resource District relating to a drainage project. The Landowners had sought a judgment declaring: (1) the Drain 11 project could not be funded as maintenance within six years at $4 per acre being assessed to the Landowners; (2) the Landowners were entitled to a hearing and vote on the project; and (3) benefited properties in Ransom County had to be included in the Drain 11 assessment district. The Landowners requested a permanent injunction restraining the Sargent County Water Resource District from proceeding with the Drain 11 project. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the Landowners were not entitled to equitable relief, and the district court properly dismissed the Landowners’ complaint. View "Banderet,et al. vs. Sargent Count Water Resource District, et al." on Justia Law

Mari Bindas appealed an order terminating Michael Bindas’ spousal support obligation. The parties filed a marital termination agreement, agreeing to spousal support and distribution of the marital estate. The parties agreed Michael Bindas would pay spousal support to Mari Bindas in the amount of $3,200 per month until she was 62 years old. The parties further agreed the spousal support would continue until the death of either party, Mari Bindas remarried, or the payment on February 1, 2023, had been made. The district court approved and adopted the parties’ termination agreement in its order. In November 2009, a judgment was entered incorporating the parties’ entire agreement. In January 2018, Michael moved to modify his spousal support obligation, arguing the spousal support should be terminated under N.D.C.C. 14-05- 24.1(3) because Mari had been habitually cohabiting with her boyfriend for more than one year. The North Dakota Supreme Court determined the parties’ written agreement satisfied the “[u]nless otherwise agreed to by the parties in writing” exception to N.D.C.C. 14-05-24.1(3); the statute did not require termination of Mari’s spousal support upon a finding of cohabitation. Therefore, the Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in granting Michael Bindas’ motion to modify spousal support, and misapplied the law by concluding it was required to terminate the spousal support under N.D.C.C. 14-05-24.1(3). View "Bindas v. Bindas" on Justia Law

Eric Smith appealed district court orders and judgment related to child custody, dismissal of motions for contempt and the court finding him a vexatious litigant. In November 2015, Smith commenced an action to determine primary residential responsibility, decision-making authority and child support. The first judgment was entered on January 8, 2016. Smith has represented himself since the district court entered the initial order. From January 2016 to date, over four-hundred docket entries appeared, including seven motions for contempt by Smith against Emily Erickson or her attorney, two requests for review by the district court, and several letters and communications from Smith to the referees or judges assigned to the matter. On January 5, 2018, a referee issued findings of fact, conclusions of law and an order for amended judgment granting Erickson primary residential responsibility and decisionmaking authority over the child. Smith requested review by a district court judge. On February 28, 2018, the district court found Smith in contempt for nonpayment of child support and issued an order with amended findings. On March 29, 2018, Smith filed a notice of appeal from the “final judgment issued on March 16, 2018.” No orders or judgments exist for that date. On April 23, 2018, the district court issued an order finding Smith a vexatious litigant and prohibiting him from filing new documents in the case without leave of court. Smith filed three additional notices of appeal, in total citing to seven separate orders and judgments. Smith submitted a one-page brief in support of the multiple notices of appeal. Smith did not file transcripts. The North Dakota Supreme Court held oral argument on November 21, 2018, and Smith did not appear. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s orders and judgment regarding parenting responsibility, contempt and finding Smith a vexatious litigant. View "Smith v. Erickson" on Justia Law

The State appealed a trial court order limiting the admission of video evidence, and an order denying the State's motion to amend the criminal information. In February 2018, Richard Powley was charged with two counts of gross sexual imposition, both class AA felonies. The charges resulted from a series of videos seized from Powley's phone; at least one of the videos depicted sexual acts with the alleged victim. The videos were recorded between June 3, 2017 and June 5, 2017. Before trial, Powley made a motion under N.D.R.Ev. 412, seeking to admit five of the videos in order to demonstrate specific instances of the alleged victim's consensual sexual behavior with Powley. Powley emphasized it was significant all eight videos were recorded "within 44 hours of each other and they need to be viewed in that light." At the hearing the State agreed that Videos 1 through 5 "look[ed] consensual," and submitted Video 6, Video 7, and Video 8 to show the nonconsensual acts giving rise to the gross sexual imposition charges. The State argued those videos depicted the alleged victim unconscious and limp. The State argued Videos 6, 7, and 8 spoke for themselves and therefore there was no need to introduce Videos 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5. The court excluded Videos 1 through 5, 7 and 8, and limited the admission of 6. On appeal, the State argued the district court erred by sua sponte excluding portions of allegedly relevant video and that the court erred by denying the motion to amend the information because the proposed additional charge was not a different offense. The State alternatively requested the North Dakota Supreme Court exercise supervisory authority to review the district court rulings. The Supreme Court concluded the State had no statutory right to appeal these issues, and declined to exercise supervisory authority. The Court therefore dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "North Dakota v. Powley" on Justia Law

The State appealed an order granting Robert Vetter's motion to suppress chemical test evidence and motion in limine. Vetter was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol under N.D.C.C. 39-08-01, a class B misdemeanor. He claimed the chemical test of his blood was conducted without a warrant, his consent was based on an inaccurate implied consent advisory, he did not voluntarily consent to the blood test, and therefore the search was unreasonable and violated his constitutional rights. Vetter also filed a motion in limine, arguing the evidence of the chemical test should be excluded under N.D.C.C. 39-20-01(3)(b) because the arresting officer did not read him the full post-arrest implied consent advisory. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court misapplied the law in interpreting statutory requirements under the implied consent law and the court failed to properly consider the totality of the circumstances to determine whether Vetter voluntarily consented to the blood test. The Court reversed the district court's order and remanded for additional findings and for the court to determine whether Vetter's consent was voluntary. View "North Dakota v. Vetter" on Justia Law

Kathleen Varty appeals from an amended divorce judgment, arguing the district court erred in reducing Thomas Varty's spousal support obligation. "The evidence supports the facts recited by the district court. The court did not misapply the law. Therefore, the court's findings are not clearly erroneous," and the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the amended judgment reducing Thomas Varty's spousal support obligation. View "Varty v. Varty" on Justia Law

Alexis Dowdy appealed after she conditionally pled guilty to driving under the influence of alcohol. Dowdy argued the arresting officer improperly added inaccurate and coercive language to the statutorily required implied consent advisory, and she did not voluntarily consent to chemical testing. The district court found Dowdy was read a complete implied consent advisory and she voluntarily consented to chemical testing. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "North Dakota v. Dowdy" on Justia Law

Samuel Hansford appealed a district court's order denying his motion to suppress after a jury found him guilty of gross sexual imposition. At the suppression hearing, the law enforcement agent testified his involvement in the case began when he was called to investigate whether 24-year-old Hansford had sexually assaulted a 16-year-old female who was unconscious at the time. The agent initially made contact with Hansford by going to Hansford's workplace. The agent testified he told Hansford he wanted to interview him but due to privacy issues he did not want to conduct the interview at Hansford's work place. After the agent suggested the interview take place at the police department, Hansford asked if the agent could give him a ride. The agent testified that before giving Hansford a ride, he explained to Hansford that he was not required to come to the police department and that he was not under arrest. Hansford rode unrestrained in an unmarked vehicle to the police station. During the ride, the agent and Hansford engaged in casual conversation. The agent testified that upon arriving at the police department, he and Hansford went into the interview room which was equipped with audio and visual recording capabilities. The agent testified he read a "soft version" of the Miranda warning. When Hansford expressed some confusion, the agent testified he provided Hansford with a card and read him "line for line" each element of the Miranda warning. After going through the card together, the agent testified Hansford acknowledged he understood the Miranda warning. On appeal, Hansford argued incriminating statements were obtained in violation of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, concluding Hansford was not in police custody when he made incriminating statements and his statements were voluntary. View "North Dakota v. Hansford" on Justia Law

Falesteni Ali Abuhamda appealed a trial court order approving pretrial diversion, an order deferring imposition of sentence, and an order denying his motion to dismiss. In March 2017, law enforcement officers executed a search warrant on two stores owned by Abuhamda, seizing items containing Cannabidiol ("CBD"), Delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol ("THC"), Hashish, and Cannabis (marijuana) as well as paraphernalia used to ingest those substances. Abuhamda was charged with seven counts relating to the confiscated items. Abuhamda moved to dismiss Counts 1, 2, 4, and 5, arguing CBD was neither an illegal drug nor a controlled substance, naturally occurring THC found in CBD products at certain levels is not illegal, CBD products are legal in North Dakota, and paraphernalia is only illegal if specifically used or intended to be used with a controlled substance. Abuhamda simultaneously moved to suppress any evidence seized during the searches of his stores, arguing the searches were unreasonable due to law enforcement's reliance on a federal agency ruling for guidance rather than the laws of North Dakota. At a hearing, the State called a forensic scientist from the North Dakota State Crime Laboratory Division, who testified that CBD and Delta-9-THC were controlled substances under North Dakota law and CBD was a controlled substance under the Federal Controlled Substances Act. The district court denied the motion to dismiss and suppress evidence, holding Abuhamda failed to provide any evidence to dispute or discredit the State's witness, and the potential illegality of the advertisement of alleged drug paraphernalia was a question for the jury. Following the motion hearing, Abuhamda entered a pretrial diversion agreement on Counts 1, 2, and 5, which was accepted by the district court. Abuhamda pleaded guilty on Counts 3, 4, 6, and 7 and the district court entered orders deferring imposition of sentence. He argued on appeal the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss Counts 1, 2, 4, and 5. The North Dakota Supreme Court dismissed the appeal on Counts 1, 2, and 5 for lack of jurisdiction because the order was not appealable under N.D.C.C. 29-28-06, and the Court declined to supervise. The Court affirmed on Count 4, concluding Abuhamda failed to preserve the issue because the record did not reflect his plea was conditional. View "North Dakota v. Abuhamda" on Justia Law

In August 2016, Riley Kuntz submitted written requests for documents under the North Dakota open records law to the Bureau of Criminal Investigation ("BCI"), the Department of Transportation ("DOT"), and the Criminal Justice Information Sharing ("CJIS") Director, seeking records relating to an agreement with "the FBI authorizing or allowing the search of any ND Driver License or non-photo identification database pursuant to a request from any government agency for the purposes of FACE or FIRS or NGI-IPS." BCI denied his request; the DOT provided a two-page attorney general opinion. In December, Kuntz submitted a request under FOIA to the federal Government Accountability Office ("GAO") requesting records related to an agreement between the FBI and any government agency authorizing the search of the North Dakota driver license information databases. In a February 2017 letter, the GAO responded and confirmed the existence of a Memorandum of Understanding ("MOU") between the FBI, CJIS, Attorney General, and BCI concerning searches of the North Dakota Attorney General BCI facial recognition photo repository. However, because the GAO obtained the MOU from the FBI, the GAO informed him it was GAO policy not to release records from its files that originated in another agency or organization. In July 2017, Kuntz submitted written requests under the open records law to the North Dakota Attorney General, BCI, CJIS Director, and DOT, stating in part seeking the MOU between the FBI, Criminal Justice Information Services Division and ND Attorney General. BCI requested clarification on Kuntz's request; the DOT requested payment of a fulfillment fee. Kuntz replied to the DOT but did not pay the fee. In September 2017, Kuntz commenced the underlying lawsuit, naming as defendants the State, the BCI, the CJIS Director, the DOT, the North Dakota Attorney General, the Deputy Director of BCI, and the individuals who responded to Kuntz's records requests (collectively, the "State"). The parties did not dispute on appeal that while the state Solicitor General accepted service on behalf of the defendants in this case, Kuntz did not personally serve any of the defendants in their individual capacities. Kuntz's complaint claims violations of state open records laws; alleges claims for fraud, federal civil rights violations and attorney's fees; and also seeks declaratory relief. His complaint essentially claims the State, through its various agencies, had denied the existence of, or failed to respond to his open records request for, the specified MOU document. Kuntz appealed when the district court granted the State's motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismissing his claims with prejudice against the State defendants. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in dismissing his open records law claim under N.D.C.C. 44-04-21.2. However, the court did not err in dismissing his remaining claims and in denying his motions for default judgment, to amend the complaint, and to award sanctions. View "Kuntz v. North Dakota" on Justia Law