Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Joseph Valles appealed a criminal judgment and an order denying his motion to suppress. Valles conditionally pled guilty, preserving the right to appeal the order denying his motion to suppress. Valles argues his cell phone was searched without a warrant in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The State argues the cell phone was abandoned and therefore no warrant was required to search the phone. We reverse the suppression order and criminal judgment and remand to allow Valles to withdraw his conditional plea of guilty. A cell phone was found in a Devils Lake apartment parking lot, and taken to the police station. Officer John Mickelson guessed the unlock pattern by trying patterns convenient to right-handed users and quickly unlocked the phone. Officer Mickelson then opened the photos application and looked at the stored photos, intending to identify the owner from “selfies” and other photos stored in the phone. He was able to identify both Valles and Jessica Bear from photos and a video. Officer Mickelson knew there was a restraining order against Valles from Bear. Officer Mickelson also saw in the photos what appeared to be drugs and drug paraphernalia. From the photos on the phone, police obtained a search warrant; while executing the warrant, officers found marijuana and marijuana paraphernalia. Valles conditionally pled guilty, preserving the right to appeal the order denying his motion to suppress. Valles argued his cell phone was searched without a warrant in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The State argued the cell phone was abandoned and therefore no warrant was required to search the phone. The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the suppression order and criminal judgment and remanded to allow Valles to withdraw his conditional plea of guilty. In finding the cell phone to be abandoned, the district court misapplied the law by shifting onto Valles the State’s burden to justify a warrantless search. View "North Dakota v. Valles" on Justia Law

Jean Valer and Jane Haught appealed a district court order denying their motion for reconsideration of a judgment determining they failed to rebut the presumption they exercised undue influence over their father. As Ralph Bartelson’s health declined, his children agreed that he would live with Valer and that she and Haught would be paid to provide care for him. During this time, Ralph Bartelson executed a power of attorney appointing Valer as his attorney in fact and established a joint checking account, naming both Valer and Haught co-owners with rights of survivorship and allowing them to issue checks from the account. Neil Bartelson ("Neil") and Diane Fischer claimed that Valer and Haught misappropriated money from their father, and they petitioned for appointment of a guardian and conservator for him. In July 2008, the parties stipulated to the appointment of Valer as guardian for Ralph Bartelson and the appointment of Guardian and Protective Services (“GAPS”) as conservator for him. The parties’ stipulation required GAPS to investigate and pursue the claimed misappropriation of money from Ralph Bartelson. Ralph Bartelson died in August 2008. His will was ultimately admitted to formal probate, and GAPS was appointed personal representative of his Estate. GAPS subsequently moved for court approval of requests for payments from the Estate to Valer and Haught. Neil and Fischer objected to their siblings’ requests and reasserted their allegation that Valer and Haught had misappropriated money from their father. The parties agreed to the payments requested by Valer and Haught, conditioned on a resolution of the misappropriation claim. GAPS retained a forensic accountant to review transfers of Ralph Bartelson’s assets to family members, and the accountant determined Valer had received funds in excess of $154,000 and Haught had received funds in excess of $132,000. However, the accountant was not able to ascertain the reasons for many of those transfers, because Valer and Haught failed to provide documentation for the transfers. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Valer and Haught's motion for reconsideration, and affirmed. View "Estate of Bartelson" on Justia Law

The State appealed a district court order granting Shannon Stenhoff’s motion to suppress evidence. Stenhoff was sentenced to two years of supervised probation, the terms of which included a search clause. After allegedly violating the conditions of his probation, a petition to revoke Stenhoff’s probation was filed, and an order to apprehend was issued. A cursory officer safety search of a residence was conducted. According to testimony of a deputy, while the officers were there, a child residing there questioned if the officers were there for “the drugs and [alluded] to the presence of the illegal narcotics in the residence.” A deputy who conducted the search testified the child’s statement caused him to attempt to contact Stenhoff’s probation officer to notify him of the search for Stenhoff, but the probation officer did not answer the call. The deputy testified there were no narcotics in plain view. Based on the evidence seized during the probationary search, the State filed charges in February 2018. In May 2018, Stenhoff moved to suppress the evidence against him, claiming the warrantless probationary search violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Following a suppression hearing, the district court granted Stenhoff’s motion to suppress, concluding the search was unreasonable and violated the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches, because law enforcement should have sought a warrant to search the residence. On appeal, the State argued the search at the residence where Stenhoff was arrested was reasonable because probationers have a lesser expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment, and the statements made to law enforcement by the child living at the residence regarding drugs provided reasonable suspicion of criminal activity at the residence. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded after review that under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable suspicion that drugs were in Stenhoff’s residence was supported by the child’s statement at the time Stenhoff was apprehended for a probation violation. The district court’s order granting Stenhoff’s motion to suppress evidence was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "North Dakota v. Stenhoff" on Justia Law

Josann Lupo appealed a district court judgment dismissing her complaint with prejudice. A car accident involving Lupo and Brianna McNeeley occurred in Dickinson, North Dakota on August 17, 2009. At that time McNeeley had a Minnesota address. Lupo sued McNeeley in North Dakota district court in August 2015, certifying that she sent the complaint and summons to a process server for service on McNeeley at an address in Battle Lake, Minnesota. The record did not reflect that service of process was effectuated through a process server. On August 15, 2016, the court filed a notice of intent to dismiss, to which Lupo replied requesting the court allow the case to remain pending on the grounds that “service of process upon the Defendant, by publication, will be perfected on September 6, 2016, the date that the last publication of the Summons is set to run in the Dickinson Press.” In October 2017, the court again filed a notice of intent to dismiss to which Lupo again responded seeking the court allow the case to remain pending. After a status conference in November 2017, Lupo filed an affidavit of service by publication in January 2018, and an affidavit of publication in February 2018. In April 2018, following a February 10, 2018 publication of the summons, McNeeley answered, raising the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense and also asserting insufficiency of service of process. In April 2018, McNeeley moved for summary judgment, arguing Lupo’s action was time-barred by the applicable six- year statute of limitations. Lupo opposed the motion, arguing the action was not time- barred because McNeeley was not a resident of North Dakota at the time of the accident and therefore the limitations period was tolled under N.D.C.C. 28-01-32. Lupo submitted the police report from the accident as an exhibit which reflected that, at the time of the accident, McNeeley had a Minnesota address. The district court granted McNeeley’s motion, dismissing Lupo’s complaint with prejudice as a matter of law. The North Dakota Supreme Court agreed N.D.C.C. 28-01-32 did not toll the statute of limitations, and affirmed dismissal with prejudice. View "Lupo v. McNeeley, et al." on Justia Law

Marlon Comes appealed a district court’s second amended criminal judgment entered over twenty years after the original criminal judgment. In 1996, North Dakota charged Comes with murder (class AA felony) and robbery (class A felony). Comes pleaded guilty to both charges and the district court sentenced him on the murder charge to life imprisonment at the North Dakota Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“DOCR”) with the possibility of parole, and a concurrent 10 years for robbery, with 307 days credit for time served. Comes has filed several previous post-conviction relief petitions that were denied. In August 2018, the district court issued a memorandum of law and order for second amended judgment. No post-conviction relief petition was filed prompting the court’s action. While there was nothing in the record to reflect why the court acted, based on the court’s memorandum, the court was apparently responding to a request from DOCR for an amended judgment “that contains a calculation of [Comes’] life expectancy, in order for DOC[R] to determine when he becomes eligible for parole.” The court relied on a table specific to American Indian mortality rates to calculate Comes’ life expectancy of 52 years rather than following the mortality table promulgated by N.D. Sup. Ct. Admin. R. 51. The court’s second amended judgment indicates Comes must serve 44 years and 73 days, taking into account the credit for 307 days previously served. Because the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the trial court abused its discretion in sua sponte amending the judgment without providing notice, the arguments Comes made regarding the propriety of the court’s application of N.D.C.C. 12.1-32-09.1, including its 1997 amendments, to his second amended judgment could be considered on remand once notice was provided to both parties. View "North Dakota v. Comes" on Justia Law

Barry Garcia appealed a district court's denial of his request for a new trial and determining N.D.C.C. 12.1-32-13.1 did not apply to his criminal sentence. In 1996, Garcia was found guilty of the offense of murder, committed while he was a juvenile, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. In 2016, Garcia filed a petition for post-conviction relief arguing that imposing a sentence of life without parole on a juvenile violated the constitutional standards set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S.Ct. 718 (2016). While Garcia’s appeal was pending, the North Dakota legislature passed HB 1195, which was enacted on April 17, 2017 as N.D.C.C. 12.1-32-13.1 and effective August 1, 2017. The North Dakota Supreme Court declined to rule on Garcia’s request to apply N.D.C.C. 12.1-32-13.1 because it had not been raised at the district court, and ruled without remanding the issue. Following the appeal of the 2016 denial of post-conviction relief, Garcia filed a motion for a new trial in the district court. The court found that a motion for a new trial was not the correct vehicle for requesting relief under N.D.C.C. 12.1-32-13.1, but pursuant to the consent of both parties, agreed to consider whether N.D.C.C. 12.1-32-13.1 applied to Garcia. After a hearing, the court issued an order denying the motion for a new trial and finding N.D.C.C. 12.1-32-13.1 did not apply. The Supreme Court determined Garcia’s conviction was final before the statute’s effective date; granting his requested relief would require retroactive application of the statute and would constitute an infringement on the executive pardoning power. Furthermore, Garcia failed to provide newly discovered evidence to support his motion for a new trial. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order. View "Garcia v. North Dakota" on Justia Law

Eight Ball Trucking, Inc., and David and Laurie Horrocks (collectively “defendants”) appealed from an order entered after the district court denied their motion under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b) for relief from a summary judgment. The Horrocks are officers of Eight Ball, a Utah trucking company doing business in North Dakota during the relevant time period. A dispute arose over Eight Ball’s allocation of employees between North Dakota and Utah and Eight Ball’s obligation to procure North Dakota workers compensation insurance for its North Dakota employees. In late March and early April 2016, Workforce Safety & Insurance (“WSI”) commenced an action against the defendants by serving them with a summons and complaint to enjoin them from employing individuals in North Dakota and to collect $802,689.84 in unpaid workers compensation insurance premiums, penalties, and interest. The complaint alleged that WSI had issued an August 28, 2015 notice of an administrative decision finding the Horrocks personally liable for unpaid premiums and penalties owed by Eight Ball, that the Horrocks did not request reconsideration nor appeal from that decision, and that the administrative decision was res judicata. WSI filed the pending lawsuit in district court and moved for summary judgment. According to the Horrocks, they did not respond to the summary judgment motion because they thought they had submitted necessary documentation to WSI to resolve the issue. The district court ultimately granted WSI’s motion for summary judgment, awarding WSI $812,702.79 in premiums, penalties, and costs and disbursements and enjoining Eight Ball from engaging in employment in North Dakota. On December 19, 2016, WSI sent the Horrocks a letter, informing them the judgment had been entered against them on December 15, 2016, and requesting payment. The defendants did not appeal the summary judgment. Defendants moved to set aside the summary judgment on grounds of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect. The district court denied the motion, determining the defendants’ disregard and neglect of the legal process was not excusable neglect and failed to establish extraordinary circumstances necessary to set aside the judgment under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b). After review of the district court record, the North Dakota Supreme Court concurred and affirmed judgment. View "WSI v. Eight Ball Trucking, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Abdiwali Mohamud was convicted by jury of aggravated assault - domestic violence, interference with telephone during an emergency call, and terrorizing. On appeal, Mohamud argued the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss for unnecessary delay, there was insufficient evidence to convict him of the three charges, and he was given an illegal sentence. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed judgment denying Mohamud’s motion to dismiss, concluded there was sufficient evidence to convict Mohamud of the three charges, and found the no-contact order issued by the district court to be a condition of probation. View "North Dakota v. Mohamud" on Justia Law

The State appealed a district court order granting post-conviction relief and reducing the sentence of Julie Roubideaux Lavallie from a twenty-year term of imprisonment to a ten-year term. In 2017, Lavallie pleaded guilty to a third delivery offense of methamphetamine and she was sentenced to the mandatory minimum twenty-year sentence consistent with the then applicable law. Prior to Lavallie pleading guilty, the legislature had reduced the mandatory sentence from twenty years to ten years for a third delivery of methamphetamine offense. However, she pleaded guilty, was sentenced, and the judgment was entered before August 1, 2017, the effective date of the legislative change. On March 19, 2018, Lavallie filed a request for post-conviction relief under N.D.C.C. 29-32.1-01(f), arguing the modification of the mandatory sentence was a significant change in the law which, in the interest of justice, should be applied retroactively. The district court issued findings and an order granting Lavallie post-conviction relief. Because Lavallie’s sentence was final before the change to the statute took effect, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in reducing her sentence. View "Lavallie v. North Dakota" on Justia Law

James Sabo and Fun-Co., Inc., appealed a judgment affirming a decision of Job Service North Dakota determining Sabo was overpaid unemployment benefits in the amount of $14,638 and requiring him to refund those previously paid benefits. Sabo was an officer, employee, and owner of all shares of stock in Fun-Co., Inc., which operated a bar and restaurant in Fargo. After a fire damaged the building which housed the bar and restaurant, Sabo filed a claim for unemployment benefits. Job Service mailed a reconsidered monetary determination informing Sabo he was entitled to $67 per week for 26 weeks because he failed to disclose that he had a one-fourth or greater ownership interest in Fun-Co., Inc. The reconsidered monetary determination informed Sabo that if he disagreed with the determination, he “must file an appeal no later than 11/21/2017.” Sabo did not appeal. On December 1, 2017, Job Service issued a notice of overpayment and informed Sabo he had twelve calendar days to appeal the overpayment amount. Then, Sabo appealed. Because Job Service’s decision was in accordance with the law and was supported by a preponderance of the evidence, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. View "Sabo, et al. v. Job Service" on Justia Law