Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Jason Vogt appealed a district court’s orders summarily dismissing his motion to vacate judgment and withdraw guilty plea. In 2014, Vogt pleaded guilty to one felony count of gross sexual imposition and was sentenced. In 2015, Vogt applied for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court denied Vogt’s application. Vogt appealed and the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. In 2017, Vogt filed a second application for post-conviction relief. The application was denied, and Vogt did not appeal. On March 7, 2019, Vogt filed a N.D.R.Ct. 3.2 motion to vacate judgment and withdraw guilty plea under N.D.R.Crim.P. 11(d). Vogt alleged: (1) his confession was coerced; (2) his attorney misinformed him of the sentence he would receive if he pleaded guilty; and (3) his plea was not entered into voluntarily, knowingly, or intelligently. Without explicitly asserting them, the State raised the affirmative defenses of res judicata and misuse of process. The State argued that Vogt’s claims were barred because the basis for his claims had already been litigated in his previous applications for post-conviction relief. The State did not move for summary disposition. Without a response from Vogt, the district court issued its order denying Vogt’s motion. Vogt argued the district court erred by denying his motion before allowing him time to respond pursuant to N.D.R.Ct. 3.2(a)(2). The Supreme Court concurred, reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "North Dakota v. Vogt" on Justia Law

Marquis Smith appealed after a jury found him guilty of two counts of gross sexual imposition. The State alleged Smith had sexual contact with a seven-year-old child on December 9-10, 2017. The alleged victim was the child of Smith’s girlfriend. Smith argued the district court erred by failing to exclude evidence that he accessed pornographic websites and by failing to give the jury an instruction limiting the use of the evidence. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "North Dakota v. Smith" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed the district court’s judgment and amended judgment dismissing their complaint. In May 2016, Lyle Lima was driving his truck on a highway when he collided with a horse-drawn hay trailer. The collision killed one of the five passengers on the horse-drawn trailer and injured the others. In April 2015, a doctor at Dakota Eye Institute determined Lima to be legally blind, prepared a certificate of blindness, and instructed Lima and his spouse that he was not to drive. In April 2016, about six weeks before the collision, a second Dakota Eye Institute doctor, Briana Bohn, examined Lima. Dr. Bohn measured Lima’s vision as being “improved” and “told Lyle Lima he could drive, with some restrictions.” Plaintiffs claimed Dr. Bohn was liable for medical malpractice because Lima’s eyesight, although improved, was still below the minimum vision standards required to operate a vehicle in North Dakota under N.D. Admin. Code ch. 37-08-01. The injured parties and their representatives made a claim against Lima, which he could not fully satisfy. In partial settlement of the claim, Lima assigned his medical malpractice claim against Dakota Eye Institute and any recovery he might receive to the other plaintiffs. The injured parties and Lima then filed this suit individually and as assignees of Lima against Dr. Bohn, Dakota Eye Institute P.C., and Dakota Eye Institute LLC. The defendants filed two motions to dismiss: one arguing Lima’s claims were not assignable and should be dismissed under N.D.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), and one arguing the affidavit failed to meet the requirements of N.D.C.C. § 28-01-46. At the hearing on the motions, the parties also argued whether North Dakota law extends liability for medical malpractice to a third party who was not a patient. The district court granted the motions to dismiss. Before the North Dakota Supreme Court, the parties disputed whether a physician in North Dakota owed a duty to third parties to warn a patient regarding vision impairments to driving; whether medical malpractice claims were assignable; and whether the medical expert affidavit met the requirements of N.D.C.C. 28-01-46. The Supreme Court concluded physicians did not owe a duty to third parties under these circumstances, Lima’s malpractice claim was assignable, and the expert affidavit was sufficient to avoid dismissal. The matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "Cichos, et al. v. Dakota Eye Institute, P.C., et al." on Justia Law

On August 14, 2017, Susan Franciere and her dog were attacked by another dog in Mandan. Two days later, she went to the Mandan Police Department, asserted her rights under Article I, section 25 of the North Dakota Constitution, and requested a copy of the police report on the incident under the open records law. On August 17, 2017, she called the police department and was informed the dog was undergoing a 10-day rabies quarantine. On August 18, 2017, Franciere sent a letter to the chief of police requesting the police report. On August 22, 2017, she received a phone call from a police lieutenant who told her she would not receive the report because the case was still active and no information would be released until the case was closed. In September 2017, she contacted the city attorney about the incident. In October, she filed suit in another attempt to get the records. On November 1, 2017, Franciere received a redacted version of the report. On January 13, 2018, she received an unredacted report. She appealed when her case was dismissed as moot, because Franciere eventually received the records she requested. The district court specifically declined to rule on the City’s motion to dismiss the proceedings for insufficient service of process and lack of personal jurisdiction. The North Dakota Supreme Court determined that because a determination of subject matter and personal jurisdiction had to precede any dismissal with prejudice, the court was required to resolve the motion to dismiss for insufficiency of service and lack of personal jurisdiction before dismissing the claims with prejudice on the grounds that they were moot. The judgment was vacated and the matter remanded for a ruling on the City's motion to dismiss. View "Franciere v. City of Mandan" on Justia Law

The North Dakota Department of Transportation (NDDOT) appealed a district court judgment reversing an administrative hearing officer's decision to revoke Ewer Alvarado's driving privileges for 180 days. NDDOT argued the district court erred in finding that a partial reading of the implied consent advisory rendered Alvarado's refusal to submit to a chemical test invalid. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded North Dakota law required an operator to refuse a request "to submit to a test under section 39-20-01." A request for testing preceded by an incomplete or inaccurate advisory was not a request "to submit to a test under section 39-20-01." Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court and reinstated Alvarado's driving privileges. View "Alvarado v. N.D. Dept. of Transportation" on Justia Law

Jon Tonneson and Mary Issendorf, in her personal capacity and as personal representative of the estate of Vesper Shirley, (“defendants”) appealed a judgment quieting title to certain property in Teresa Larson, Janet Schelling, and Lynette Helgeson (“plaintiffs”). Plaintiffs and defendants were successors in interest to certain property at Lake Metigoshe in Bottineau County, North Dakota. The parties acquired their respective properties through their families beginning in the 1950s. In 2012, plaintiffs became aware of property boundary issues after a survey was conducted when plaintiffs were attempting to replace a mobile home on the property. At that time, plaintiffs also discovered a platted roadway ran through their property, though no such roadway existed on the property. Plaintiffs thereafter took steps to vacate the road. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court did not clearly err in finding Larson, Schelling, and Helgeson acquired the disputed property by adverse possession. Therefore, the Court affirmed the judgment, but remanded the case for entry of a corrected judgment. View "Larson, et al. v. Tonneson, et al." on Justia Law

The State of North Dakota appealed an order dismissing a criminal complaint charging Jerome Greenshields with two counts of sexual assault and one count of gross sexual imposition. In February 2018, the State charged Greenshields with one count of sexual assault under N.D.C.C. 12.1-20-07(1)(f) alleged to have occurred between June 1, 1997, and August 30, 1997, and one count of gross sexual imposition under N.D.C.C. 12.1-20-03(2)(a) and (c) alleged to have occurred between September 1, 2001, and September 31, 2001. In August 2018, Greenshields moved for a bill of particulars setting forth the specific date of the allegation of sexual assault because, effective August 1, 1997, the penalty for a violation of N.D.C.C. 12.1-20-07(1)(f) changed from a class A misdemeanor to a class C felony. Greenshields argued the bill of particulars was necessary to adequately inform him of “his right to be free from ex post facto prosecution.” In October 2018, the district court granted the motion and ordered the State to file a bill of particulars. After the State failed to timely produce the bill of particulars, Greenshields moved for an order dismissing the case “for systemic disregard of the law” because the State had violated the district court’s “explicit orders” and “[d]ismissal is required to prophylactically ensure the State’s future compliance.” Greenshields’ motion and brief in support of the motion did not state whether he sought dismissal with or without prejudice. The State opposed the motion, arguing the victim could not remember the specific dates of the alleged offense. In his reply brief in support of the motion, Greenshields once again urged the court to “dismiss” for willfully disobeying its order. No hearing was requested or held on the motion. Then the court granted Greenshields' motion to dismiss. The North Dakota Supreme Court found that because there was no evidence to support the district court’s ruling that an earlier order dismissing a similar criminal complaint and information was intended to be “with prejudice,” the Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "North Dakota v. Greenshields" on Justia Law

In 2011, Plaintiffs Rhonda Pennington, Steven Nelson, Donald Nelson, and Charlene Bjornson executed oil and gas leases for property in McKenzie County, North Dakota. Each lease term was three years with a lessee option to extend for an additional year. The leases were assigned to Continental Resources in September 2014, and it exercised an extension option. The leases included a provision that the leases would not terminate if drilling operations were delayed by an inability to obtain permits. In May 2012, Continental applied for a drilling permit on a 2,560-acre spacing unit that included the lands covered by the leases. The 2,560 acres included lands inhabited by the Dakota Skipper butterfly, which was listed as threatened under the Endangered Species Act. Continental could not begin drilling operations until receiving federal approval. In August 2015, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service issued a biological opinion relating to the impact of Continental’s proposed drilling on the Dakota Skipper. On October 1, 2015, Continental proposed measures to minimize the impact of its operations on the Dakota Skipper. On October 21, 2015, Continental recorded an affidavit of regulation and delay, stating it had not yet obtained federal regulatory approval to drill, and the primary term of the leases was extended under the “regulation and delay” paragraph of the leases. The following day, Continental applied to terminate the 2,560-acre spacing unit and create a 1,920-acre spacing unit to remove the Dakota Skipper habitat. In November 2015, the Industrial Commission approved the 1,920-acre spacing unit. In January 2016, the commission pooled all of the oil and gas interests in the 1,920-acre spacing unit for the development and operation of the spacing unit. Following the January 2016 order, Continental began drilling operations. In August 2017, the Plaintiffs sued Continental, alleging the leases expired on October 25, 2015, and Continental’s delay in obtaining regulatory approval to drill did not extend the leases. Plaintiffs appealed a district court ruling the “regulation and delay” provision in their oil and gas leases with Continental Resources extended the term of the leases. The North Dakota Supreme Court determined the district court concluded the delay in obtaining drilling permits for the 2,560-acre spacing unit was beyond Continental’s control and was not because of Continental’s fault or negligence. However, the court did not address whether Continental acted diligently and in good faith in pursuing a permit to drill the 2,560-acre spacing unit for more than three years. Viewing the evidence and inferences to be drawn from the evidence in a light favorable to the Plaintiffs, a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether Continental acted diligently and in good faith. The Supreme Court therefore reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings on that issue. View "Pennington, et al. v. Continental Resources, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2018, the State charged Joe Johns with unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia as a class C felony second offense under N.D.C.C. 19-03.4-03(2), which enhanced the charge from a class A misdemeanor to a class C felony if the person previously has been convicted of an offense under N.D.C.C. title 19. The criminal information alleged that on August 29, 2018, Johns used or possessed with intent to use a glass smoking device for use with methamphetamine and that he “has a prior conviction in case no. 08-2016-CR-00295.” Johns conditionally pled guilty after the district court denied his motion to dismiss a charge for unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia as a class C felony second offense. Johns argued on appeal he did not have a prior conviction for enhancement purposes because a deferred imposition of sentence for a prior charge under N.D.C.C. title 19 resulted in a dismissal of that charge. The North Dakota Supreme Court concurred: the language of N.D.C.C. 19-03.4-03(2), authorized enhancement for unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia “[i]f a person previously has been convicted of an offense under this title, other than an offense related to marijuana.” That language, when read together with N.D.C.C. sections 12.1-32-02(4) and 12.1-32-07.1 and the Court’s decision in North Dakota v. Nelson, 2019 ND 204, referred to a conviction for a deferred sentence that had not been dismissed. Johns’ prior case had been dismissed. Therefore, the court could not consider Johns’ prior conviction to enhance the charge in this case. The Court reversed and remanded to allow Johns to withdraw his conditional guilty plea to the enhanced charge. View "North Dakota v. Johns" on Justia Law

Melanie Vagts appealed after the district court denied her motion to suppress evidence and she conditionally pled guilty to a charge of actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. After review of her case, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded law enforcement officers’ encounter with Vagts was not an illegal search and seizure, but an officer’s implied consent advisory did not substantively comply with the statutory requirements of N.D.C.C. 39-20-01(3)(a) and the results of her breath test were not admissible under N.D.C.C. 39-20-01(3)(b). Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded to allow Vagts to withdraw her conditional guilty plea. View "City of Bismarck v. Vagts" on Justia Law