Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Jared Taylor appealed a domestic violence protection order prohibiting him from coming within 300 feet of Brianne Clarke for two years. Taylor argued the district court erred in finding he committed domestic violence, failed to make a specific finding about the threat made to Clarke, and failed to find that Clarke was in actual or imminent fear of harm. Concluding the district court’s findings were sufficient to support the issuance of a protection order, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "Clarke v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Glen Baltrusch appeals from a criminal judgment entered after a jury found him guilty of four counts of disobedience of a judicial order. Gary, Milo, and Glen Baltrusch were sons of Delores Baltrusch. Gary was the trustee of the Delores Baltrusch Irrevocable Trust. The Trust owned a house in the City of Harvey, North Dakota. Delores was allowed to reside in the home as long as she is able. Glen also resided in the home with Delores. Gary and Milo were concerned that Glen was taking advantage of their elderly mother, and in July 2017 they asked him to vacate the property. He refused to do so. In response to Glen's refusal to leave the property, Gary, as trustee, brought an action under N.D.C.C. ch. 47-32 to evict Glen from the premises. A final judgment was entered ordering Glen to vacate the property no later than October 20, 2017. On April 11, 2018, a special writ of execution was issued ordering the sheriff to remove Glen from the property. A sheriff’s return of service indicated the special writ of execution was served on April 11, 2018, and the sheriff testified that Glen left the premises with the sheriff when the writ was served. Because the evidence was sufficient to sustain the verdicts and the district court did not commit obvious error in failing to dismiss counts two through four on double jeopardy grounds, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "North Dakota v. Baltrusch" on Justia Law

Paul Herman appealed a judgment entered in favor of the trustees of a family trust [collectively the Trustees] following the district court’s granting of the Trust’s motion for summary judgment. Herman argued the district court erred by finding the 120 day period to challenge the actions of the Trustees expired before he initiated these proceedings without providing him an opportunity to conduct discovery. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the 120 day limitation period under N.D.C.C. 59-10.1-03(1) did not begin until receipt of the notice of the Trustees actions, reversed the judgment of the district court, and remanded with instructions to allow Herman additional time to conduct discovery pursuant to his request under N.D.R.Civ.P. 56(f). View "Herman v. Herman, et al." on Justia Law

Terrance Tyler appealed his conviction for Aggravated Assault in violation of N.D.C.C. 12.1-17-02(1)(a). Tyler was charged with Aggravated Assault following an altercation with the victim. The victim was subpoenaed by the State and was called as a witness during the presentation of the State’s case. Following her direct testimony, the victim was subject to cross-examination by Tyler’s counsel. At the conclusion of her testimony, the district court informed the victim she had not been released from her subpoena, excluded the victim from the courtroom, and told the victim she could be recalled as a witness for either the State or the Defendant. The victim went into premature labor after her testimony and before the start of the next day of trial. Tyler moved for a mistrial asserting he was prejudiced by the unavailability of the victim to provide additional testimony. The district court denied the motion for a mistrial. The State called three additional witnesses and rested its case. Tyler moved for a mistrial for a second time based on the absence of the victim and the district court again denied the request for a mistrial. Tyler immediately requested that the district court allow the victim to be recalled to testify by telephone, the State opposed, and the district court denied the request to recall the victim as a witness by telephone. Tyler contended that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motions for mistrial when the victim became unavailable to provide additional testimony after testifying earlier in the trial, the district court improperly altered the order of the trial, and the unavailability of the victim to provide additional testimony resulted in a manifest injustice. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court. View "North Dakota v. Tyler" on Justia Law

Curtis and Lesley Trulson appealed a judgment quieting title to a mineral royalty interest in John (“Tony”) and Jean Meiers. The district court ruled a royalty deed from the Meiers was not delivered and did not convey a royalty interest to the Trulsons. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court misapplied the law because the Meiers failed to rebut the presumption that the deed was delivered to the Trulsons. View "Trulson, et al. v. Meiers, et al." on Justia Law

Huey Brock appealed judgments dismissing his negligence action against Richard Price and KS Industries, LLC (“LLC”) and awarding Price and LLC costs and disbursements in the amount of $181,467. Price and LLC cross-appealed the judgment awarding costs and disbursements. In 2011, Brock was severely injured in a traffic accident while traveling in a company-owned vehicle with Price and another LLC employee, resulting in Brock becoming quadriplegic. Days later WSI accepted his claim for benefits. In June 2012, Brock, WSI, and LLC entered into a stipulation that Brock would continue to receive WSI benefits while seeking workers’ compensation benefits in California from KS Industries, LP (“LP”). The stipulation further provided that WSI would cease paying benefits if his claim against LP’s insurance carrier were accepted and his attorney would act in trust for WSI in pursuing reimbursement of funds paid in connection with Brock’s claim. Brock then filed an application for California workers’ compensation benefits claiming he was employed by LP at the time of the accident. Based on a California administrative decision, LP’s workers’ compensation carrier commenced paying benefits to Brock and reimbursed WSI all funds expended on Brock. In 2014, WSI issued a notice of decision reversing its prior decision accepting Brock’s claim. In February 2015, Brock brought this negligence action against Price and LLC. Brock moved for summary judgment arguing collateral estoppel based on the California administrative proceedings precluded Price and LLC from arguing LLC was Brock’s employer rather than LP, and therefore his action was not barred by the exclusive remedy provisions of North Dakota law. In November 2018, Price and LLC filed a motion for summary judgment arguing collateral estoppel did not apply and the exclusive remedy provisions applied to bar Brock’s action against LLC and his co-worker, Price. The district court agreed and dismissed the action. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of the negligence action because it was indeed barred by the Workforce Safety and Insurance Act’s exclusive remedy provisions. The Court reversed the award of costs and disbursements and remanded for the court to hold a hearing on Brock’s objections required by N.D.R.Civ.P. 54(e)(2). View "Brock v. Price, et al." on Justia Law

Jason Vogt appealed a district court’s orders summarily dismissing his motion to vacate judgment and withdraw guilty plea. In 2014, Vogt pleaded guilty to one felony count of gross sexual imposition and was sentenced. In 2015, Vogt applied for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court denied Vogt’s application. Vogt appealed and the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. In 2017, Vogt filed a second application for post-conviction relief. The application was denied, and Vogt did not appeal. On March 7, 2019, Vogt filed a N.D.R.Ct. 3.2 motion to vacate judgment and withdraw guilty plea under N.D.R.Crim.P. 11(d). Vogt alleged: (1) his confession was coerced; (2) his attorney misinformed him of the sentence he would receive if he pleaded guilty; and (3) his plea was not entered into voluntarily, knowingly, or intelligently. Without explicitly asserting them, the State raised the affirmative defenses of res judicata and misuse of process. The State argued that Vogt’s claims were barred because the basis for his claims had already been litigated in his previous applications for post-conviction relief. The State did not move for summary disposition. Without a response from Vogt, the district court issued its order denying Vogt’s motion. Vogt argued the district court erred by denying his motion before allowing him time to respond pursuant to N.D.R.Ct. 3.2(a)(2). The Supreme Court concurred, reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "North Dakota v. Vogt" on Justia Law

Marquis Smith appealed after a jury found him guilty of two counts of gross sexual imposition. The State alleged Smith had sexual contact with a seven-year-old child on December 9-10, 2017. The alleged victim was the child of Smith’s girlfriend. Smith argued the district court erred by failing to exclude evidence that he accessed pornographic websites and by failing to give the jury an instruction limiting the use of the evidence. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "North Dakota v. Smith" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed the district court’s judgment and amended judgment dismissing their complaint. In May 2016, Lyle Lima was driving his truck on a highway when he collided with a horse-drawn hay trailer. The collision killed one of the five passengers on the horse-drawn trailer and injured the others. In April 2015, a doctor at Dakota Eye Institute determined Lima to be legally blind, prepared a certificate of blindness, and instructed Lima and his spouse that he was not to drive. In April 2016, about six weeks before the collision, a second Dakota Eye Institute doctor, Briana Bohn, examined Lima. Dr. Bohn measured Lima’s vision as being “improved” and “told Lyle Lima he could drive, with some restrictions.” Plaintiffs claimed Dr. Bohn was liable for medical malpractice because Lima’s eyesight, although improved, was still below the minimum vision standards required to operate a vehicle in North Dakota under N.D. Admin. Code ch. 37-08-01. The injured parties and their representatives made a claim against Lima, which he could not fully satisfy. In partial settlement of the claim, Lima assigned his medical malpractice claim against Dakota Eye Institute and any recovery he might receive to the other plaintiffs. The injured parties and Lima then filed this suit individually and as assignees of Lima against Dr. Bohn, Dakota Eye Institute P.C., and Dakota Eye Institute LLC. The defendants filed two motions to dismiss: one arguing Lima’s claims were not assignable and should be dismissed under N.D.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), and one arguing the affidavit failed to meet the requirements of N.D.C.C. § 28-01-46. At the hearing on the motions, the parties also argued whether North Dakota law extends liability for medical malpractice to a third party who was not a patient. The district court granted the motions to dismiss. Before the North Dakota Supreme Court, the parties disputed whether a physician in North Dakota owed a duty to third parties to warn a patient regarding vision impairments to driving; whether medical malpractice claims were assignable; and whether the medical expert affidavit met the requirements of N.D.C.C. 28-01-46. The Supreme Court concluded physicians did not owe a duty to third parties under these circumstances, Lima’s malpractice claim was assignable, and the expert affidavit was sufficient to avoid dismissal. The matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "Cichos, et al. v. Dakota Eye Institute, P.C., et al." on Justia Law

On August 14, 2017, Susan Franciere and her dog were attacked by another dog in Mandan. Two days later, she went to the Mandan Police Department, asserted her rights under Article I, section 25 of the North Dakota Constitution, and requested a copy of the police report on the incident under the open records law. On August 17, 2017, she called the police department and was informed the dog was undergoing a 10-day rabies quarantine. On August 18, 2017, Franciere sent a letter to the chief of police requesting the police report. On August 22, 2017, she received a phone call from a police lieutenant who told her she would not receive the report because the case was still active and no information would be released until the case was closed. In September 2017, she contacted the city attorney about the incident. In October, she filed suit in another attempt to get the records. On November 1, 2017, Franciere received a redacted version of the report. On January 13, 2018, she received an unredacted report. She appealed when her case was dismissed as moot, because Franciere eventually received the records she requested. The district court specifically declined to rule on the City’s motion to dismiss the proceedings for insufficient service of process and lack of personal jurisdiction. The North Dakota Supreme Court determined that because a determination of subject matter and personal jurisdiction had to precede any dismissal with prejudice, the court was required to resolve the motion to dismiss for insufficiency of service and lack of personal jurisdiction before dismissing the claims with prejudice on the grounds that they were moot. The judgment was vacated and the matter remanded for a ruling on the City's motion to dismiss. View "Franciere v. City of Mandan" on Justia Law