Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

James Broten appealed the dismissal of his attorney malpractice claim. Broten was appointed to serve as the personal representative of his father’s estate. Broten was sued by his sisters who claimed Broten had breached his fiduciary duties as personal representative by transferring land held in the trust to himself. In 2011, Broten retained attorney Ralph Carter to defend him against his sisters’ claims. During Carter’s representation, Broten showed Carter approximately sixty boxes of records Broten believed documented payments to his parents and provided a defense to his sisters’ claims. Broten repeatedly inquired with Carter about his review of the records. The records were not disclosed to the opposing party during discovery but disclosed after Carter was replaced as Broten’s counsel in March of 2013. In August 2013, the district court entered an order finding Broten had breached his fiduciary duties as personal representative of his father’s estate, ultimately requiring Broten to pay damages to his sisters in an amount of $1,300,054. Broten alleged Carter’s failure to review and disclose the documents prevented all of the records from being introduced as evidence and resulted in the liability to his sisters. Carter moved for summary judgment, arguing the applicable two year statute of limitations barred Broten’s claim. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Carter and awarded to Carter the recovery of costs and fees, including the costs expended for expert witnesses who were unnecessary for resolution of the statute of limitations issue. Broten argued the district court erred in granting summary judgment after finding his claim was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. He also challenged the inclusion of expert witness fees within the expenses awarded by the district court for experts who were unnecessary for resolution of the statute of limitations issue. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "Broten v. Carter, et al." on Justia Law

A district court certified a question of law to the North Dakota Supreme Court on whether a married person under the age of eighteen was considered a “child” under the Juvenile Court Act. G.C.H. was charged with five crimes which allegedly occurred when G.C.H. was sixteen and seventeen years old. G.C.H. was married when the alleged crimes occurred and still was married. G.C.H. moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to his age, claiming the proper jurisdiction was in juvenile court. The district court denied the motion, finding G.C.H. was not a child under North Dakota law because he was married. The North Dakota Supreme Court has discretion to hear certified questions of law by the district court and may refuse to consider a certified question if it is frivolous, interlocutory in nature, or not dispositive of the issues before the district court. Here, neither a negative nor affirmative answer would be dispositive of the case. "If G.C.H. is a child under N.D.C.C. 27-20-02(4), the juvenile court still would need to determine whether he was delinquent. If G.C.H. is not a child under N.D.C.C. 27-20-02(4), a jury still would need to determine if G.C.H. is guilty of the alleged crimes. Therefore, the certified question is not determinative of the proceedings. We decline to answer the certified question." Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's declination to answering the certified question, it concluded this case justified exercising supervisory jurisdiction. The district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over G.C.H. because was a “child” under N.D.C.C. 27-20-02(4)(b). The Supreme Court exercised its supervisory jurisdiction and reversed and remanded with directions to vacate the judgment and dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "North Dakota v. G.C.H." on Justia Law

Sharron and Jennifer Jensen appealed district court orders: (1) admitting a copy of Jacquelynn Blikre’s will to formal probate; (2) ruling Blikre’s will was valid; and (3) denying a petition for formal probate of Blikre’s alleged holographic will. Blikre executed a will in 2005 leaving her estate, including real property and minerals, to her sister, Sandra Nordahl, and named Nordahl personal representative of the estate. Blikre’s other sister, Sharron, was excluded from the will. In April 2016, Blikre was hospitalized after suffering from several health issues. In May 2016, she was moved to a Bismarck nursing home and resided there until her death in September 2016. While she was hospitalized, Blikre appointed Sharron as Blikre’s attorney-in-fact for financial matters. Blikre had also appointed Sandra's husband, Jean Nordahl, as Blikre’s attorney-in-fact under a durable power of attorney in March 2016. After Blikre’s death, Sandra petitioned for formal probate of Blikre’s will, attaching a copy the petition because the original will was missing. Jensen objected to Nordahl’s petition, claiming Blikre’s will should have been considered revoked because the original was missing. The district court appointed Nordahl personal representative subject to a decision on whether the copy of Blikre’s will would be admitted to probate. Sandra died after her appointment as personal representative. Jean petitioned for appointment as successor personal representative. Sharron also petitioned for appointment. At an October 2017 hearing, the parties presented evidence on the existence of Blikre’s will and whether she intended to revoke it before her death. In February 2018, the district court entered an order finding sufficient evidence existed to rebut the presumption that Blikre intended to revoke her will. The court ordered formal probate of the copy of the will and appointed Jean as personal representative. In April 2018, Sharron appealed the district court’s order, and Jennifer petitioned for formal probate of a holographic will and to vacate the February 2018 order admitting the copy of Blikre’s will to probate. Jennifer's petition alleged Blikre wrote instructions in 2016 relating to her estate. Jensen claimed the handwritten documents were a holographic will that revoked the 2005 will and distributed Blikre’s estate to her sisters and nieces. In December 2018, Jennifer and Sharron moved for partial summary judgment. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court dismissed Jensen’s petition, finding Blikre’s handwritten documents did not express her testamentary intent to distribute her estate and did not revoke her 2005 will. The court also found Blikre’s 2005 will was valid because credible evidence showed the will was executed in front of two witnesses. Finding no reversible error in the district court's judgment, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "Estate of Blikre" on Justia Law

Anton Jacob Fettig appealed two district court judgments quieting title to real property in McKenzie County, North Dakota. Anton owned three parcels of real property. In 2001, Anton L. Fetting (Anton) executed a warranty deed conveying sections 5, 17, and 22 to his two minor children, A.J.F. and S.F.F. Anton recorded the deed the same day. At the time of the conveyance, A.J.F. and S.F.F. were approximately three and five years of age. In 2004, Anton received an email from an attorney with the United States Department of Agriculture, stating that the Department considered the 2001 deed void, and that Anton still owned the land. As a result of this email, and in an attempt to clear title to the land, Anton executed a warranty deed in 2004, conveying the land back to himself. The deed named Anton as both the grantor and grantee. The deed was recorded the same day. The next year, Anton executed quitclaim deeds conveying parcels 5, 17 and 22 to his sons Charles, Howard and Morgen, respectively. These deeds were recorded in 2006. In January 2016, Charles Fettig filed suit seeking to quiet title to section 5. Because the district court ruled for Charles, Howard and Morgen filed separate suits seeking to quiet title to the sections previously conveyed to them. The district court concluded that the 2001 deed conveying the land to A.J.F. and S.F.F. was void under N.D.C.C. sections 9-02-02 and 14-10-10, that Howard was the true and correct owner of section 17, and that Morgen was the true and correct owner of section 22. A.J.F. timely appealed the district court’s orders. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in determining that the deed conveying the property was void, but that the issue was barred by collateral estoppel. Therefore, judgment was affirmed. View "Fettig v. Fettig, et al." on Justia Law

Lawrence Didier appeals from an order denying his petition for discharge from civil commitment as a sexually dangerous individual. On appeal, Didier argues the district court’s factual basis was insufficient to legally conclude he met the substantive due process requirement of the inability to control his behavior. Didier also argues he did not receive a fair hearing that comports with procedural due process. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "Matter of Didier" on Justia Law

J.B. appealed an order denying his petition for discharge from commitment as a sexually dangerous individual. J.B. argued the district court erred in determining he remains a sexually dangerous individual because the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he had serious difficulty controlling his behavior. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded clear and convincing evidence supported the court’s finding J.B. had serious difficulty controlling his behavior, and affirmed. View "Interest of J.B." on Justia Law

The State appealed an order granting Derek Grzadzieleski’s motion to suppress hospital records disclosing that his blood-alcohol content was above the legal limit after an all-terrain vehicle accident. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the State had no statutory right to appeal the order and the Supreme Court declined to exercise our supervisory authority. It therefore dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "North Dakota v. Grzadzieleski" on Justia Law

Rocky Mountain Steel Foundations, Inc. appealed an amended judgment ordering Mitchell’s Oil Field Services, Inc. and Travelers Casualty and Surety Company of America (collectively “Mitchell’s”) to pay Rocky Mountain attorney’s fees. Rocky Mountain argued the district court erred by failing to award it all of the attorney’s fees it requested. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the portion of the judgment awarding Rocky Mountain attorney’s fees incurred before the prior appeal, but reversed the portion of the judgment denying the attorney’s fees Rocky Mountain requested for the prior appeal and on remand. The matter was remanded for the trial court to properly determine a reasonable amount of attorney’s fees. View "Rocky Mountain Steel Foundations. v. Brockett Co., et al." on Justia Law

K.V.'s parents, A.V. and E.D., appealed a juvenile court order K.V. committed the delinquent acts of criminal trespass, fleeing or attempting to elude a peace officer, and reckless driving. They argued N.D.C.C. 12.1-22-03(3)(b) was void for vagueness and insufficient evidence supported finding K.V. committed criminal trespass, fled or attempted to elude a police officer, and drove recklessly. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court determined that because the constitutional argument was not raised in the juvenile court and K.V. did not argue obvious error, the argument was forfeited. With regard to the trespassing charge, the Supreme Court determined an element of the offense was not proven, making the juvenile court’s finding K.V. committed criminal trespass is not supported by the evidence. That finding of delinquency was reversed. The juvenile court’s finding K.V. committed the delinquent acts of fleeing or attempting to elude a peace officer and reckless driving were supported by the evidence and, therefore, not clearly erroneous. The Court therefore affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for entry of an appropriate order consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. View "Interest of K.V." on Justia Law

Michelle Vetter appealed an order deferring imposition of sentence entered after a jury convicted her of child abuse. On appeal, Vetter asked the North Dakota Supreme Court to take judicial notice of filings from her divorce case against the complainant. She also argued the definition of “bodily injury” in N.D.C.C. 12.1-01-04 was unconstitutionally vague. In addition, she argued the evidence at trial was insufficient to sustain a verdict of guilty. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "North Dakota v. Vetter" on Justia Law