Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After falling into arrears on his court-ordered child support obligation, the North Dakota suspended Joshua Rose's drivers license. In November 2018, Rose entered into a child support payment plan with the State which lifted his drivers license suspension. The payment plan required Rose to make a $1,000 down payment and pay $836 per month for his current child support obligation and $167.20 per month for his arrears. Rose stopped paying his child support obligation after December 31, 2018. Following Rose’s failure to comply with the payment plan, the State resuspended his drivers license. Rose requested a hearing in the district court and asked to appear telephonically to contest the license suspension. The court denied the motion on May 17, 2019, reasoning Rose “has failed to show any statutory, or procedural, basis for granting his requests.” The North Dakota Supreme Court determined the district court erred, reversed and remanded for a hearing as required by N.D.C.C. 50-09-08.6. View "North Dakota v. Rose" on Justia Law

Bile Salat appealed the discontinuation of his disability benefits. In 2016, Salat slipped and fell at work. On March 31, 2016, WSI accepted liability for a contusion of the lower back and pelvis and a right ankle sprain. By November 2016, an independent medical examination revealed Salat's ankle injury had not healed and was not at pre-injury status, but low back pain was unrelated to the work injury. Salat's personal physician reviewed the IME's opinion and did not have any "objective findings on physical exam to challenge or disagree with his medical opinion." On August 5, 2016, WSI issued an order discontinuing Salat’s disability benefits after June 29, 2016. On December 15, 2016, WSI issued a notice of decision denying further benefits of Salat’s lumbar spine after November 11, 2016. The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the discontinuation of benefits, finding Salat's physician's statement was misunderstood by the district court as a "blanket agreement" with the independent medical examiner: Salat's physician's "statement is better understood as stating she had no objective findings on physical exam to challenge or disagree with [the IME] opinion regarding the source of Salat’s back pain." On this record, the Supreme Court surmised the ALJ could have reasonably found the two physicians had conflicting medical opinions on the source of continued back pain, and that a "reasoning mind reasonably could determine" Salat suffered low back pain after November 11, 2016 that was attributable to the compensable work injury. View "WSI v. Salat, et al." on Justia Law

Donald Edwardson appealed a judgment dismissing his application for post-conviction relief. Edwardson was charged with failing to register as a sexual offender; the State alleged Edwardson had failed to register his temporary residence while he was residing at a hotel from March 1 through March 31, 2017. At Edwardson’s initial appearance he was informed of the minimum mandatory sentence for the offense. After a contested preliminary hearing, the district court found probable cause to bind the case over for further proceedings. Immediately after the conclusion of the preliminary hearing, there were brief discussions between counsel for the State and Edwardson’s attorney, followed by a brief discussion between Edwardson and his attorney. As a result of those discussions Edwardson decided to enter a plea of guilty to the charge. The parties informed the court they had reached an agreement, Edwardson was advised of his rights, he entered a guilty plea and he was sentenced. Edwardson argued he was entitled to post-conviction relief because he received ineffective assistance of counsel during the underlying criminal proceedings, he discovered new evidence justifying the withdrawal of his plea of guilty, the underlying criminal charge was unlawful, and he was not informed of the minimum mandatory sentence before he entered his plea of guilty. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "Edwardson v. North Dakota" on Justia Law

In September 2018, Western State Bank sued Swanson and James Lund to enforce commercial guaranties executed by Leland Swanson and Lund. Swanson and Lund consented to entry of judgment, and a $1,334,374.25 judgment was entered against Swanson and Lund. The judgment stated Swanson and Lund were jointly and severally liable. Swanson paid the judgment in full, and contemporaneously, Western State Bank assigned the judgment to Swanson. The next day, Swanson assigned his interest in the judgment to Open Road Trucking. The assignment from Swanson stated it assigned his contribution interest against Lund for $670,952.24, one-half of the judgment amount. Open Road Trucking, LLC, appealed district court orders: (1) denying Open Road’s application for a charging order lien against Lund; and (2) directing satisfaction of a judgment against Lund and Swanson. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded Open Road was entitled to take an assignment of the judgment for the purpose of enforcing contribution against Lund. The Court reversed the district court’s order denying Open Road’s application for a charging order, and remanded for entry of a charging order against Lund’s transferrable interests in the limited liability companies. The Court reversed a part of the court’s February 2019 order directing entry of satisfaction of the judgment. The Court affirmed that part of the order cancelling any execution of judgment for the full amount of the judgment. View "Open Road Trucking v. Swanson, et al." on Justia Law

Oil Capital Ready Mix, LLC; Agape Holdings, LLP; Scott Dyk; and Samuel Dyk (collectively “Dyk”) appealed a judgment awarding Skaw ND Precast LLC (“Skaw”) $69,295 in damages for conversion of its property. In March 2013, Skaw entered into a five-year agreement with Tioga Ready Mix (“Tioga”), a company which produced ready-mix concrete product, to rent a two-acre parcel of land to conduct its business. The base rent for the site was $700 per month, subject to reductions if Skaw purchased designated quantities of ready-mix product from Tioga. The agreement provided it would remain in effect until December 31, 2018, and it did not allow either party to unilaterally cancel the agreement. In spring 2015, Skaw learned that Tioga had arranged to sell Tioga’s assets at a public auction, including the two-acre parcel of property where Skaw conducted its business. Skaw’s owners attended the auction sale in May 2015. The auction service notified all attendees that Skaw’s assets on the premises were not part of the sale, that there was a lease in place between Skaw and Tioga, and that the lease went with the land. Dyk was the successful bidder at the auction and entered into a commercial purchase agreement with the sellers which did not include Skaw’s product inventory or equipment and stated the sale was subject to “rights of tenants,” but did not list Skaw as a tenant. Once Dyk got its ready-mix plant running, Skaw began purchasing concrete ready-mix product from Dyk for its business. When presented with the contract between Skaw and Tioga, Dyk renegotiated the terms; Dyk and Skaw agreed to increase monthly rental payments to $750 per month. During a scheduled shut down of both companies' operations, Dyk built an earthen berm around Skaw’s equipment which prevented Skaw from accessing it. Dyk also transported Skaw’s concrete pad and blocked inventory off of Skaw’s two acres to an area adjacent to Dyk’s offices. Other Skaw assets were transported to undisclosed locations. When Skaw discovered the berm, Dyk informed Skaw that Skaw abandoned their temporary rental agreement in December 2015 and that law enforcement would be notified if there were “any attempts to breach the peace or trespass” on the property. Skaw replied that the 2013 lease was still valid and had not been abandoned, and that Skaw planned to return to the property and continue operations. Dyk argued on appeal of the conversion damages award that the district court erred in ruling the 2013 agreement between Skaw and Tioga was a lease rather than a license. Because the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court’s findings of fact were not clearly erroneous, it affirmed the judgment. View "Skaw ND Precast, LLC v. Oil Capital Ready Mix, LLC, et al." on Justia Law

Brandon Lindstrom appealed the district court judgment affirming the hearing officer’s decision to suspend Lindstrom’s license for 180 days. On January 28, 2019, Lindstrom was arrested for driving under the influence and given a chemical breath test which showed he was over the legal limit for driving. Lindstrom requested an adminstrative hearing. The hearing officer found the Highway Patrol Trooper had reasonable grounds to believe Lindstrom was driving a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, and the Trooper who stopped Lindstrom forwarded the report and notice form and test results to the Department of Transportation by placing them in the mail in an in-house mailing bin on January 29, 2019. The hearing officer suspended Lindstrom’s driving priviledges for 180 days. Lindstrom appealed to the district court which affirmed the hearing officer’s decision. Lindstrom argued the report and notice was not forwarded to the Department within five days as required by law. Instead, Lindstrom claimed the Trooper placed the report and notice in an in-house mail bin on January 29, 2019, and an envelope postmark showed it was sent seven days later to the Department on February 4, 2019. In affirming the district court, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that because the Trooper testified he deposited the report and notice in an in-house mail bin on January 29, 2019, and the hearing officer relied on her common sense and experiences of how in house mailing bins operate, the hearing officer could have reasonably found the report and notice were mailed on January 29, 2019, and therefore were forwarded to the Department on the same day. View "Lindstrom v. N.D. Dept. of Transportation" on Justia Law

Chad Walker appealed an amended judgment that included an order to pay restitution. Walker pled guilty to theft for possession of a stolen motorcycle. The motorcycle owner filed a victim impact statement requesting restitution for the cost of repairing the motorcycle. A restitution hearing was held and an amended criminal judgment was entered, ordering Walker pay $2,410.69 in repairs for damage to the motorcycle. Walker argued he pled guilty to possession of stolen property and was not accused of stealing or damaging the motorcycle. He further argued the damages were not related to his criminal offense and were not a direct result of his criminal action. The North Dakota Supreme Court determined, after review of the trial court record, when returned, the motorcycle was physically damaged. Repairs included replacing multiple covers, two turn signals, fuel tank, and installing a missing heat shield. The Court found the damage to the motorcycle was directly related to the criminal offense, and it could have reasonably been inferred that damage was caused during possession of the stolen property. Therefore, the Court affirmed the restitution order. View "North Dakota v. Walker" on Justia Law

Marlon Comes appealed a Second Amended Criminal Judgment, asserting the judgment imposed an illegal sentence. In 1996, Comes pleaded guilty to a class AA felony charge of murder and a class A felony charge of robbery. On October 18, 1996, Comes was sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole on the murder charge and a concurrent ten years imprisonment on the Robbery charge, with credit for 307 days he had served in custody pending the disposition of his case. In 2018 the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation [DOCR], in conjunction with considering when Comes would be eligible for parole, requested the district court amend the judgment to include a calculation of Comes’ life expectancy as of the date of sentencing. Pursuant to the DOCR’s request, the district court issued an amended judgment on August 7, 2018, incorporating a life expectancy calculation. The Second Amended Criminal Judgment provided Comes would be eligible for consideration by the parole board after thirty years of imprisonment, less sentence reduction earned for good conduct. Comes argued the sentence was illegal because his eligibility for parole should have been determined by N.D.C.C. 12.1-32- 09.1 and be equal to 85% of his life expectancy calculation of 23.8 years, less any sentence reduction earned for good conduct. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "North Dakota v. Comes" on Justia Law

Rocky Stein appealed a district court order denying his application for post-conviction relief. Stein was charged with criminal vehicular homicide, a class A felony, and pled guilty to manslaughter, a class B felony. Stein entered an “open plea” and the judge sentenced Stein to ten years with the North Dakota Department of Corrections with three years suspended, and supervised probation for five years. In his application for post-conviction relief Stein claims ineffective assistance of counsel. Stein argues his trial attorney did not adequately inform him he was subject to a mandatory minimum sentence requiring him to serve 85 percent of the sentence imposed and that his trial attorney made assertions in the nature of a guarantee that he would serve a probation only sentence. Stein also urges this Court to overrule Sambursky v. North Dakota, 751 N.W.2d 247, and North Dakota v. Peterson, 927 N.W.2d 74, to the extent necessary, which he claims was essential to ensure defendants ere afforded sufficient information regarding the 85 percent rule to make an intelligent decision affecting the ultimate sentence in their criminal case. The North Dakota Supreme Court declined to overrule Sambursky and Peterson, and found no other reversible error, thus affirming the decision not to grant post-conviction relief. View "Stein v. North Dakota" on Justia Law

Larry Alber appealed a district court order denying his motion for injunctive relief against the City of Marion. Alber also appealed an order denying his motion for reconsideration. In 2003, the City sued Alber, alleging certain abandoned vehicles on Alber’s property violated a City ordinance and were a public nuisance. The district court entered a judgment against Alber finding the vehicles on Alber’s property were a public nuisance. The judgment required Alber to remove or lawfully maintain the vehicles. In 2013, the district court found Alber in contempt for violating the 2003 judgment’s requirement that he maintain the vehicles or remove them from his property. The court ordered Alber to remove all nuisance vehicles from his property. The court also ordered that any vehicles not removed by Alber could be removed by the City. In December 2016, Alber moved for injunctive relief, requesting a temporary restraining order prohibiting the City from entering his property to remove nuisance vehicles. As it related to the denial of his motion for injunctive relief, the North Dakota Supreme Court determined Alber’s brief failed to demonstrate that any of the injunctive relief factors weighed in his favor: he did not show a substantial probability of succeeding on the merits, proof of irreparable injury, harm to other interested parties, and how the public interest would be benefited by the granting of injunctive relief. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court. View "North Dakota ex rel. City of Marion v. Alber" on Justia Law