Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plains Marketing, LP and Van Hook Crude Terminal, LLC, appealed an order affirming a Mountrail County Board of County Commissioners' decision to deny their application for an abatement of 2013 real estate taxes for three parcels of land in Mountrail County. They argued the North Dakota Supreme Court should reverse the County Board's denial of their application for an abatement because the County Board incorrectly applied the omitted property provisions in N.D.C.C. ch. 57-14. After review of the Commissioners' decision, the Supreme Court agreed and reversed the order. View "Plains Marketing, LP v. Mountrail Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs" on Justia Law

William Rakowski appealed after a district court granted summary judgment in favor of the City of Fargo. Rakowski owned rental houses in Fargo. In November 2011, Fargo inspected one of the houses and found the garage was deteriorating, the siding on the house was deteriorating, two egress window wells were collapsing and one window was broken. Fargo notified Rakowski of the need for repairs and re-inspection. The house was re-inspected a month later, and three once a month, three months after that. Fargo charged Rakowski a single $100 fee for a January 2012 re-inspection, which Rakowski did not pay. Fargo brought a small claims action to collect the fee, Rakowski removed the claim to district court and both parties moved for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Fargo and Rakowski appeals. Rakowski argued the district court erred because Fargo did not have authority to assess a re-inspection fee, Fargo was required to have a search warrant before re-inspecting the house, the re-inspection fee constituted an illegal bill of attainder, Fargo's claim was barred by double jeopardy and res judicata and he was entitled to relief under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "City of Fargo v. Rakowski" on Justia Law

In November 2012, the Sargent County Water Resource District filed a declaratory action regarding the ownership and control of property in Sargent County, including all property located south of the north boundary of Drain 11. The District claimed ownership as the successor in interest to the Sargent County Board of Drain Commissioners, which had obtained its interest in the property by right-of-way deeds signed in 1917 and 1918 and recorded in the Sargent County register of deeds office. The District sought declaratory relief because Paul Mathews sought to exert control over the property, claiming a property interest through his rental agreement with Phyllis Delahoyde and Nancy Mathews, the purported owners of the property. Nancy Mathews and Paul Mathews answered the complaint and raised a number of defenses and a counterclaim against the District (Delahoyde did not claim an interest in the disputed property, nor did she join the codefendants in the appeal). Nancy Mathews and Paul Mathews appealed the judgment determining language of the 1917 and 1918 deeds granted fee title in the disputed property to the District's predecessor. The Supreme Court reversed after review, concluding the plain language of the 1917 and 1918 right-of-way deeds at issue conveyed easements. View "Sargent County Water Resource District v. Mathews" on Justia Law

Robert Hale, doing business as Bullwinkle Builders, Inc., ("Hale") appealed a district court order affirming a City of Minot Board of Appeals decision to affirm the denial of Hale's application for a building permit. In December 2013, after a series of conversations and exchanges of information between the City's building official and Hale and his representatives, the building official denied the permit application for failure to submit certain required documentation. At issue was the building official's determination under the 2009 International Building Code ("IBC"), as adopted by the City, that Hale's facility was an "assisted living facility" classified as Institutional Group I-1, rather than an apartment building classified as Residential Group R-2. An applicant for a Institutional Group I-1 building permit was required to submit additional documentation prepared by a registered design professional and had to install more expensive wiring. The Supreme Court concluded after its review, that the Board did not act arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably in affirming a City building official's decision to deny the application and that substantial evidence supports the Board's decision. The Court therefore affirmed the district court order. View "Hale v. City of Minot" on Justia Law

Thane and Nicole Dockter appealed a judgment affirming a Burleigh County Board of County Commissioners' decision to rezone a 311 acre tract of land in Menoken Township from agricultural to industrial use. In affirming the Commissioners' decision, the Supreme Court concluded the County Commissioners' decision did not constitute impermissible spot zoning, and the decision was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable and was supported by substantial evidence. View "Dockter v. Burleigh Cty. Bd. of Cty. Commn'rs" on Justia Law

Nandan, LLP, and Border States Paving, Inc., (collectively, "Border States") appealed a district court judgment dismissing its amended complaint against the City of Fargo for failing to state a claim on which relief could be granted. Nandan, LLP, and Border States Paving, Inc., owned real property in Fargo. In 2012, a landslide occurred along 32nd Street North adjacent to the industrial facility of Border States. According to a report, the landslide likely originated from a stockpile of granular material located on Border States' property. The landslide ruptured a water main and storm sewer, and damaged 32nd Street North and Drain No. 10. Drain No. 10 was owned, operated, and maintained by the Southeast Cass Water Resource District. Fargo owned the street, water main, and storm sewer. Border States received a notice from Fargo stating that it created "Improvement District 6237" to fund a portion of the local share of a project that would provide for drain, water main and sanitary sewer repairs on a portion of Drain No. 10. The notice indicated Fargo would contribute approximately $600,000 to the project, paid for through special assessments assessed to real property owners within the improvement district. The only real property within the improvement district to be assessed was owned by Border States. In September 2013, Border States sued Fargo to determine whether Fargo properly created Improvement District No. 6237. Border States' amended complaint sought relief asserting the improvement district was made without a resolution of necessity and without providing Border States adequate notice and depriving it of the right to protest the creation of the improvement district. Fargo moved to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state a claim, and for judgment on the pleadings. Border States opposed Fargo's motion. The district court concluded Border States' amended complaint provided no right to relief under N.D.C.C. sections 40-22-06 and 40-22-15. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the part of the district court judgment that concluded Border States had no right to relief against Fargo under N.D.C.C. 40-22-06, relating to when a resolution of necessity was required and the right of public protest arises under an agreement between a municipality and another entity. The Court reversed and remanded the part of the judgment concluding Border States had no right to relief under N.D.C.C. 40-22-15, relating to the requirements for resolutions declaring an improvement necessary, because viewing the allegations in the amended complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the Court was not certain of the impossibility of proving a claim upon which relief can be granted. View "Nandan, LLP v. City of Fargo" on Justia Law

In the early 1980s, the cities of Harwood and Reiles Acres entered a series of agreements to address common waste water treatment problems. In June 1985, they agreed in writing to construct and operate the Harwood Lagoon near the municipalities. Under that agreement, Harwood was responsible for 68 percent and Reiles Acres for 32 percent of the acquisition and construction costs of the Harwood Lagoon. Each municipality was responsible for maintenance and operational costs of their own collection system, and Harwood was responsible for administering and managing the operation of the facility. Their agreement allocated 68 percent of the maintenance costs for the facility to Harwood and 32 percent of those costs to Reiles Acres and also allotted 68 percent of the facility's capacity to Harwood's customers and users and 32 percent of the facility's capacity to Reiles Acres' customers and users. The agreement ultimately resulted in Harwood owning an undivided 68 percent interest and Reiles Acres owning an undivided 32 percent interest in the Harwood Lagoon. In July 1985, Lake Shure Properties purchased from Reiles Acres the right to use 50 percent of Reiles Acres' volumetric capacity in the lagoon, which constituted 16 percent of the total capacity of the lagoon. The agreement between Lake Shure Properties and Reiles Acres permitted each party to buy, sell, or otherwise deal with their respective share of the facility's volume. In 1993, Lake Shure Properties transferred 56.5 percent of its interest in the volumetric capacity in the Harwood Lagoon to Lake Shure Estates, Inc., a North Dakota nonprofit corporation consisting of homeowners residing in the Lake Shure Estates' subdivision near Harwood and Reiles Acres. The transfer resulted in Lake Shure Estates obtaining 9.04 percent of the total waste water treatment capacity of the Harwood Lagoon. Harwood's state certified operator for the lagoon testified that the facility was designed to provide waste water treatment services for approximately 500 people, and the population growth of Harwood and Reiles Acres made it difficult for the municipalities to continue to provide the required 180 days of winter storage capacity for the facility. In 1998, Reiles Acres contracted with Fargo for treatment of Reiles Acres' waste water, and since that time, it has not used the Harwood Lagoon for waste water treatment services. In 2009, Harwood contracted with Fargo for waste water treatment services, and in 2010, Lake Shure Estates contracted with Fargo for waste water treatment services. Neither Harwood nor Lake Shure Estates has used the Harwood Lagoon for municipal waste water treatment services since they contracted with Fargo for those services. Harwood and Lake Shure Estates sued Reiles Acres and all other persons unknown claiming any interest in the Harwood Lagoon, seeking a declaration of the parties' interests and obligations under their contracts and a partition of the Harwood Lagoon property. Reiles Acres appealed the judgment entered after a bench trial declaring the contractual obligations of Reiles Acres and the City of Harwood under the 1985 contract for construction and operation Harwood Lagoon were discharged by frustration of purpose and the order confirming a partition by public sale of the land encompassing the Harwood Lagoon. Reiles Acres argues the district court lacked subject matter and personal jurisdiction to enter a declaratory judgment nullifying the parties' contractual obligations and to order a partition sale of the land. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the court had jurisdiction to construe contracts in the declaratory judgment action and the court did not err in construing a 1985 contract between Harwood and Reiles Acres and determining the principal purpose of the contract was frustrated. Furthermore, the Court concluded the court did not err in ordering partition by public sale of the land. View "City of Harwood v. City of Reiles Acres" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Fred Hector appealed the grant of summary judgment that dismissed his action against the City of Fargo for claims involving special assessments against his land. He argued the district court erred in granting Fargo summary judgment, because N.D.C.C. 40-26-07 authorized his action to judicially establish Fargo's special assessments as void to the extent the assessments exceeded Fargo's actual costs of improvements, and his claims were not barred by administrative res judicata. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded N.D.C.C. sections 40-26-01 and 40-26-07 authorized a court to review issues about a municipality's special assessments in the context of the adequate legal remedy of an appeal. Furthermore, the issues Hector raised in this action were res judicata. View "Hector v. City of Fargo" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Erling "Curly" Haugland appealed the grant of summary judgment that dismissed his action against the City of Bismarck for declaratory relief involving Bismarck's implementation of an urban renewal plan and use of tax increment financing to fund renewal projects in its renewal area. Haugland argued Bismarck failed to establish as a matter of law that it complied with the procedural requirements of N.D.C.C. 40-58-06 for substantially modifying its urban renewal plan in 1994. On remand, the district court decided an appropriate 1994 resolution existed to add six city blocks to the renewal area and authorized renewal projects in the renewal area were pending in January 2011. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, and reversed in part. The Court affirmed that portion of the summary judgment concerning Bismarck's urban renewal plan including pending authorized projects for the existing renewal area when the district court decided the case in January 2011. However, the Court reversed and remanded summary judgment with respect to approval of the 1994 plan, finding no disputed issues of material fact existed regarding approval.View "Haugland v. City of Bismarck" on Justia Law

Robert Hale, individually and on behalf of the State of North Dakota, and Susan Hale appealed a summary judgment dismissing their public nuisance claim against Ward County and the City of Minot. The Hales had a house on agricultural land about one mile southeast of a shooting range in Ward County, which was used to train local, state, and federal law enforcement officers. Several other farms and homes are located near the Hales' property and the law enforcement shooting range, and County Road 12 runs adjacent to the west side of that shooting range. In "Gowan v. Ward Cnty. Comm.," (764 N.W.2d 425), the Supreme Court affirmed a Ward County Commission zoning decision denying an application to rezone neighboring land, which is about one-quarter mile downrange from the law enforcement shooting range, from agricultural to residential for construction of a residential subdivision. The Ward County Commission denied Gowan's application, citing safety concerns resulting from the proximity of his land to the law enforcement shooting range. In "Hale v. Ward Cnty.", the Supreme Court affirmed the summary judgment in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings on the Hales' public nuisance claim. The Court discussed the differences between a private and a public nuisance and explained different evidence was relevant to the Hales' claims for a private and a public nuisance. The Court affirmed the summary judgment dismissing the Hales' private nuisance claim, concluding they failed to present competent evidence supporting their claim the law enforcement shooting range posed a danger to their property. The Court reversed the summary judgment on the Hales' public nuisance claim about use of County Road 12 and remanded for further proceedings on that claim. The Court recognized, however, that Ward County and Minot had not argued the Hales failed to meet the "specially injurious" requirement for a public nuisance claim under N.D.C.C. 42-01-08, and neither the parties nor the district court had addressed the propriety of the Hales bringing an action to abate the law enforcement shooting range under N.D.C.C. ch. 42-02. On remand, the district court concluded "private citizens can bring an action 'ex rel.', but as a threshold matter, such citizens must first satisfy the special injury showing of N.D.C.C. § 42-01-08 or their public nuisance claim must be dismissed." The court granted Ward County and Minot summary judgment on the remanded claim for public nuisance regarding the Hales' use of County Road 12, concluding as a matter of law they failed to meet the "specially injurious" requirement for a private person to maintain a public nuisance claim under N.D.C.C. § 42-01-08. The court also denied the Hales' request to join additional neighbors as parties to their action. The Hales argue the district court erred in granting summary judgment on their public nuisance claim, and in denying their joinder request. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court. View "Hale v. Ward County" on Justia Law