Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

K.P. appealed an order appointing a conservator and co-guardians for his adult uncle, R.G. In September 2014, R.G. lived in one of several mobile homes on land in rural McKenzie County owned by him and members of his family. R.G.'s brother helped care for him until that brother died in May 2014. According to R.G., his niece, S.P., became his caregiver after his brother's death, and she lived near Billings and usually saw him once or twice a month. In September 2014, law enforcement officers raided the property where R.G.'s mobile home was located as part of an investigation of others. According to a McKenzie County Deputy Sheriff, R.G.'s mobile home had dog feces throughout and did not have running water, a sewer or septic system, a furnace, a working refrigerator, or an adequate food supply. After the law enforcement raid, C.G., a niece of R.G.'s, petitioned for appointment of an emergency conservator and guardian for her uncle, alleging he was between 86 and 87 years old and was being unduly influenced by S.P., who was nominated as his attorney-in-fact under a July 2014 durable power of attorney. C.G.'s petition sought to have R.G. declared an incapacitated person and to establish protective proceedings for his residential, medical, and financial affairs. C.G. thereafter petitioned for appointment of a conservator and a guardian for R.G. At the hearing, K.P. testified his sister, S.P., was willing to waive her appointment as her uncle's designated attorney-in-fact and healthcare agent under the July 2014 power of attorney and K.P. sought to be appointed as his uncle's conservator and guardian as the named alternate under that document. The court appointed GAPS, K.N., and S.S., a granddaughter of R.G.'s brother, as co-guardians and appointed American State Bank & Trust as conservator for R.G. K.P. appealed that decision. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court did not clearly err in finding good cause not to appoint K.P. as guardian and conservator for R.G. and did not abuse its discretion in appointing other individuals and entities as conservator and co-guardians for R.G. View "Guardianship/Conservatorship of R.G." on Justia Law

Correne Vaage, surviving spouse and special personal representative of the Estate of Lowell H. Vaage, appealed a judgment dismissing its claim to reform a personal representative's deed issued by the John Vaage estate to Lowell Vaage. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the district court's finding the Lowell Vaage estate failed to prove fraud or mistake sufficient to reform the personal representative's deed was not clearly erroneous. View "Estate of Vaage" on Justia Law

Appellants Dean Olsen, Susan Olsen, Bobby Olsen, Clee Raye Olsen, and Marion Bergquist, three stepchildren of Clarence Erickson and two spouses of the stepchildren, appealed a judgment granting a motion by Clarence Erickson's biological son, Curtis Erickson, to correct the judgment under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(a). After Clarence Erickson died in December 2010, Curtis petitioned to rescind certain real and personal property transfers by Clarence to the appellants and to invalidate his September 2010 will. After a bench trial, the district court entered a judgment concluding that undue influence was exerted over Clarence when executing his will and while transferring real and personal property to the appellants, that Clarence lacked capacity to transfer money and real property, and that Clarence lacked testamentary capacity to execute the will. The court denied the appellants' motion to amend the findings and judgment under N.D.R.Civ.P. 52(b). The appellants then moved to correct the judgment under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(a), asking the district court to require repayment of the purchase prices the appellants paid for real property transfers invalidated by the court's judgment. The Supreme Court concluded the district court misapplied the law for clerical errors or mistakes arising from oversight or omission under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(a). Therefore, the trial court abused its discretion in granting Curtis Erickson's motion to correct the judgment under Rule 60(a). View "Erickson v. Olsen" on Justia Law

Darwin Glasoe was the record title holder to a home in Williston when he died in 2003. His widow was appointed the personal representative of the estate, but she died shortly thereafter. No action was taken to further estate administration until a successor personal representative was appointed in December 2013. LeAnne Glasoe and Kris Glasoe were Darwin Glasoe's surviving children, and LeAnne Glasoe lived in the home during all pertinent times. The Williams County Auditor continued to mail its annual tax statements to the record title holder, Darwin Glasoe, after his death. Although real estate taxes were paid on the property through 2009, no taxes were paid on the property from 2010 through 2013. The County placed a tax lien on the property for delinquent taxes in May 2013. A tax deed issued to the County dated October 2, 2013, was filed on October 7, 2013. The County sold the property at public auction to Bradley and Brenda Parker a month later. On November 21, 2013, LeAnne Glasoe attempted to repurchase the property, but the County would not allow her to do so. The County issued the Parkers a deed to the property, which was filed on December 4, 2013. The Estate of Darwin Glasoe, LeAnne Glasoe, and Kris Glasoe appealed a judgment dismissing their action to recover and quiet title to property. Because the Glasoes failed to establish any jurisdictional defects in the tax lien foreclosure proceedings and LeAnne Glasoe's attempt to repurchase the property was too late, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Estate of Glasoe v. Williams County" on Justia Law

Between May 2002 and September 2004, David Robb received multiple loans from his mother, Ruby Robb. On September 13, 2004, Ruby Robb created a living trust identified as the Ruby M. Robb Living Trust ("Trust"), and she named American State Bank as the trustee. In October 2004, David signed a promissory note made payable to Ruby M. Robb. The note did not contain a due date or repayment schedule. David made a number of payments on the note; he made these payments payable to the Trust. However, he stopped making payments after American State Bank ceased administering the Trust. Debbie Rooks, David Robb's sister, became the successor trustee. In 2013, Rooks, in her capacity as trustee, served a complaint on David to recover the amount due on the note David signed, as well as an additional note that he did not sign. Rooks ultimately voluntarily dismissed her claim based on the unsigned note. Both parties moved for summary judgment. In support of Rooks' motion, she filed an affidavit made by the vice president and trust manager of American State Bank that alleged the note was assigned to the Trust (she filed this affidavit because the schedule of trust assets had been lost, and there was no record evidencing the assignment of the note to the Trust). At the hearing on the cross-motions for summary judgment, David argued the Trust did not have standing to sue because Rooks did not present evidence sufficient to show the Trust owned the note. The court found the trust manager's affidavit was sufficient to establish the note had been transferred to the Trust. The court found there were no genuine issues of fact and the note was payable on demand as a matter of law. Robb appealed the district court's order awarding summary judgment in favor of Rooks. Because the Supreme Court concluded the district court erred when it found there was no genuine dispute of material fact, the Court reversed and remanded. View "Rooks v. Robb" on Justia Law

The last will and testament of Donald Amundson provided for his entire estate to be distributed to the Donald G. Amundson Trust. The Trust owned farmland jointly with the Kenneth Amundson Trust, which was set up by Donald Amundson's brother. Donald Amundson's Trust declaration directed the Trust assets were to be distributed upon his death to four charities, with the remainder distributed to ten nieces and nephews. Debra Magers and Gladys Gleason were initially appointed as co-personal representatives of the Estate. Magers, Gleason, and Todd Graveline were appointed as co-trustees of the Trust. John Widdel, Jr. represented all parties in relation to the administration of the estate. Magers eventually became sole personal representative and trustee of the Trust and Estate. In August 2013, the beneficiaries of the Estate petitioned for court determination of reasonableness of fees and for settlement and distribution of estate. The petition objected to the fees charged by Magers and Widdel for their services to the Estate and Trust. In September 2014, the district court found Magers had breached her fiduciary duty in several ways, which included paying Widdel large fees without question. The court also found administration of the Estate and Trust was not complicated and Widdel's fees were unreasonable in light of the nature of the work performed. The court ordered Widdel to return attorney's fees in the amount of $95,000. Widdel appealed the district court judgment ordering him to repay $95,000 of the attorney's fees he charged in the administration of the Estate. He argued the district court abused its discretion in finding the attorney's fees were unreasonable, and that the district court abused its discretion by not holding an evidentiary hearing on the issue of substituting his professional corporation as the named party on the judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court, concluding the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding the fees charged by Widdel were unreasonable and in finding Widdel could properly be held personally liable on the judgment. View "Estate of Amundson" on Justia Law

In December 2012, P.M., the son of V.A.M., petitioned for the appointment of a guardian and conservator for his father. V.A.M. was 81 years old at the time of the petition; he had seven children. A guardian ad litem recommended the district court appoint a third-party limited corporate guardian and a third-party limited corporate conservator. In May 2013, V.A.M. and some of his children, including D.N., P.M., K.J., and T.M., reached an agreement and stipulated a limited guardianship and limited conservatorship were necessary. The stipulation specified V.A.M.'s rights and the guardian and conservator's duties. The court appointed Guardian, Fiduciary & Advocacy Services as the limited guardian and First International Bank & Trust of Fargo ("Bank") as the limited conservator. T.M. and K.J. responded to the Bank's petition to sell V.A.M.’s farmstead. T.M. stated that he was not opposed to leasing the farmstead, but he was in favor of purchasing the property. T.M. and K.J. opposed the request to assign V.A.M.'s legal claims and claimed V.A.M. had no desire to pursue any legal claims and should not have to pay for pursuing any claims. D.N. responded to the petition, requesting V.A.M. be able to retain his farmstead and the court grant the petition to allow the Bank to assign V.A.M.'s possible legal claims to his children. V.A.M. also responded to the petition. He stated that he was in favor of selling the farmstead to T.M. He also stated that he did not have any claims against T.M., that he was opposed to the Bank assigning any of his claims to his children, and that he was opposed to the Bank providing his financial information and tax returns to his children. After a hearing, the district court approved the sale of the real property and the assignment of claims. The court authorized the Bank to sell the farmstead to T.M. The court also authorized the Bank to assign to V.A.M.'s children, in equal shares, any and all possible claims V.A.M. held for undue influence, lack of capacity, or breach of fiduciary duty. The court ordered the Bank was not authorized to disclose any of V.A.M.'s financial information or tax returns to V.A.M.'s children. T.M. and K.J. appealed the order authorizing V.A.M.'s conservator to assign V.A.M.'s legal claims, arguing that the district court erred in creating a "sub-conservator" to investigate and decide whether to pursue V.A.M.'s legal claims. D.N. argued the court assigned V.A.M.'s legal claims to his children and did not create a "sub-conservator." The Supreme Court was unable to understand the basis for the district court's order, reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Guardianship/Conservatorship of V.A.M." on Justia Law

B.K.J. appealed a district court order appointing J.W. and Guardian and Protective Services, Inc. ("G.A.P.S"), as her co-guardians. B.K.J.'s niece, J.W., petitioned for the appointment of a guardian and a conservator on grounds B.K.J. suffered mild to moderate Alzheimer's disease and dementia and had shown decline in her ability to care for herself and her finances. Particularly, J.W. asserted B.K.J. had over $600,000 in unpaid taxes, interest, and penalties and had allegedly been taken advantage of monetarily by certain friends and family members. After a hearing for emergency guardianship, the district court appointed J.W. and G.A.P.S. as emergency co-guardians to B.K.J. pending further hearing. The district court appointed a physician and a visitor to examine B.K.J., and an attorney to represent B.K.J. as guardian ad litem. A hearing was held on the petition. At the beginning of the hearing, the parties stipulated that a guardianship was necessary for B.K.J., and that she did not oppose the appointment of First International Bank as her conservator. The court-appointed physician, the court-appointed visitor, B.K.J.'s guardian ad litem, and others testified regarding the extent of B.K.J.'s incapacity, the necessity of a guardian, and who should be appointed as B.K.J.'s guardian. B.K.J. testified that she did not want J.W. appointed as her guardian and nominated two of her friends, F.C. and T.C., to be appointed as her co-guardians. The district court appointed First International Bank as B.K.J.'s conservator and appointed J.W. and G.A.P.S. as B.K.J.'s co-guardians, concluding the evidence established they were the proper and best qualified persons to serve as her guardians and represent the best interests of B.K.J. B.K.J. appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the district court did not abuse its discretion in appointing J.W. and G.A.P.S. as B.K.J.'s co-guardians. View "Guardianship/Conservatorship of B.K.J." on Justia Law

Margaret Oakland appealed a judgment dismissing her objection to the probate of the will of her father, John Gassmann, after a jury found she failed to establish his will was the product of an insane delusion. She also appealed an order denying her motion for a new trial. Oakland was Gassmann's only biological child. Her parents separated and subsequently divorced after Gassmann experienced incidents in which he believed his wife and others were involved in a conspiracy to poison him for his farmland. In the divorce proceeding, a psychiatric and psychological evaluation by a psychiatrist and a clinical psychologist diagnosed Gassmann with a "delusional disorder." After divorcing Oakland's mother, Gassmann began a relationship with Bonnie Bowman, which lasted until his death in February 2012, and he developed a close relationship with Bowman's three children. In December 2011, Gassmann executed a will after he was diagnosed with terminal cancer. Gassmann's estate plan devised certain property to Oakland and his will operated with a revocable living trust to devise his interest in his family's farmland to other individuals, including some of Bowman's children. According to Oakland, Gassmann would have devised his farmland to her but for his insane delusion. According to Bell State Bank & Trust, Gassmann was misdiagnosed with a delusional disorder in the 1993 divorce, but actually suffered from a brain tumor and related acromegaly, and he had the tumor removed in 1995. According to Bell State, Gassmann's symptoms disappeared after the surgery, but his relationship with Oakland remained distant and disconnected because Gassmann did not approve of her decisions about education, employment, and marriage. The district court granted Bell State's motions in limine, but generally informed Oakland the motions could be revisited in the context of the evidence presented at trial, including the parties' experts' opinions about the symptoms of Gassmann's alleged insane delusion. The court advised Oakland it did not then know the extent of the experts' testimony about Gassmann's alleged insane delusion and would allow her to introduce evidence covered by the motions in limine to the extent her experts relied on that evidence to conclude Gassmann was suffering from an insane delusion. A jury returned a verdict finding Oakland failed to establish Gassmann's will was the product of an insane delusion, and the district court thereafter denied her motion for a new trial. Upon further review of Oakland's arguments on appeal, the Supreme Court found no reason to disturb the trial court's order, and affirmed. View "Estate of Gassmann" on Justia Law

As surviving spouse of Frank Mattern, Jeanette Mattern appealed a district court judgment dividing the couple's marital homestead into three individual apartments and ordering Jeanette Mattern to pay rent retroactively and in the future while she lived in the homestead. Under the specific facts of this case, the Supreme Court affirmed the portion of the district court judgment granting Jeanette Mattern a homestead in the second-floor residence of the property, but reversed the portion of the judgment ordering her to pay rent for residing there. "If property claimed as a homestead exceeds the value of the homestead exemption, the homestead must be set off in such form as to exclude the excess, unless the homestead cannot be divided without material harm. If the homestead cannot be divided without material injury, the family home must be preserved intact as against heirs even though the homestead exceeds the homestead exemption amount." View "Mattern v. Frank J. Mattern Estate" on Justia Law