Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Between May 2002 and September 2004, David Robb received multiple loans from his mother, Ruby Robb. On September 13, 2004, Ruby Robb created a living trust identified as the Ruby M. Robb Living Trust ("Trust"), and she named American State Bank as the trustee. In October 2004, David signed a promissory note made payable to Ruby M. Robb. The note did not contain a due date or repayment schedule. David made a number of payments on the note; he made these payments payable to the Trust. However, he stopped making payments after American State Bank ceased administering the Trust. Debbie Rooks, David Robb's sister, became the successor trustee. In 2013, Rooks, in her capacity as trustee, served a complaint on David to recover the amount due on the note David signed, as well as an additional note that he did not sign. Rooks ultimately voluntarily dismissed her claim based on the unsigned note. Both parties moved for summary judgment. In support of Rooks' motion, she filed an affidavit made by the vice president and trust manager of American State Bank that alleged the note was assigned to the Trust (she filed this affidavit because the schedule of trust assets had been lost, and there was no record evidencing the assignment of the note to the Trust). At the hearing on the cross-motions for summary judgment, David argued the Trust did not have standing to sue because Rooks did not present evidence sufficient to show the Trust owned the note. The court found the trust manager's affidavit was sufficient to establish the note had been transferred to the Trust. The court found there were no genuine issues of fact and the note was payable on demand as a matter of law. Robb appealed the district court's order awarding summary judgment in favor of Rooks. Because the Supreme Court concluded the district court erred when it found there was no genuine dispute of material fact, the Court reversed and remanded. View "Rooks v. Robb" on Justia Law

The last will and testament of Donald Amundson provided for his entire estate to be distributed to the Donald G. Amundson Trust. The Trust owned farmland jointly with the Kenneth Amundson Trust, which was set up by Donald Amundson's brother. Donald Amundson's Trust declaration directed the Trust assets were to be distributed upon his death to four charities, with the remainder distributed to ten nieces and nephews. Debra Magers and Gladys Gleason were initially appointed as co-personal representatives of the Estate. Magers, Gleason, and Todd Graveline were appointed as co-trustees of the Trust. John Widdel, Jr. represented all parties in relation to the administration of the estate. Magers eventually became sole personal representative and trustee of the Trust and Estate. In August 2013, the beneficiaries of the Estate petitioned for court determination of reasonableness of fees and for settlement and distribution of estate. The petition objected to the fees charged by Magers and Widdel for their services to the Estate and Trust. In September 2014, the district court found Magers had breached her fiduciary duty in several ways, which included paying Widdel large fees without question. The court also found administration of the Estate and Trust was not complicated and Widdel's fees were unreasonable in light of the nature of the work performed. The court ordered Widdel to return attorney's fees in the amount of $95,000. Widdel appealed the district court judgment ordering him to repay $95,000 of the attorney's fees he charged in the administration of the Estate. He argued the district court abused its discretion in finding the attorney's fees were unreasonable, and that the district court abused its discretion by not holding an evidentiary hearing on the issue of substituting his professional corporation as the named party on the judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court, concluding the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding the fees charged by Widdel were unreasonable and in finding Widdel could properly be held personally liable on the judgment. View "Estate of Amundson" on Justia Law

In December 2012, P.M., the son of V.A.M., petitioned for the appointment of a guardian and conservator for his father. V.A.M. was 81 years old at the time of the petition; he had seven children. A guardian ad litem recommended the district court appoint a third-party limited corporate guardian and a third-party limited corporate conservator. In May 2013, V.A.M. and some of his children, including D.N., P.M., K.J., and T.M., reached an agreement and stipulated a limited guardianship and limited conservatorship were necessary. The stipulation specified V.A.M.'s rights and the guardian and conservator's duties. The court appointed Guardian, Fiduciary & Advocacy Services as the limited guardian and First International Bank & Trust of Fargo ("Bank") as the limited conservator. T.M. and K.J. responded to the Bank's petition to sell V.A.M.’s farmstead. T.M. stated that he was not opposed to leasing the farmstead, but he was in favor of purchasing the property. T.M. and K.J. opposed the request to assign V.A.M.'s legal claims and claimed V.A.M. had no desire to pursue any legal claims and should not have to pay for pursuing any claims. D.N. responded to the petition, requesting V.A.M. be able to retain his farmstead and the court grant the petition to allow the Bank to assign V.A.M.'s possible legal claims to his children. V.A.M. also responded to the petition. He stated that he was in favor of selling the farmstead to T.M. He also stated that he did not have any claims against T.M., that he was opposed to the Bank assigning any of his claims to his children, and that he was opposed to the Bank providing his financial information and tax returns to his children. After a hearing, the district court approved the sale of the real property and the assignment of claims. The court authorized the Bank to sell the farmstead to T.M. The court also authorized the Bank to assign to V.A.M.'s children, in equal shares, any and all possible claims V.A.M. held for undue influence, lack of capacity, or breach of fiduciary duty. The court ordered the Bank was not authorized to disclose any of V.A.M.'s financial information or tax returns to V.A.M.'s children. T.M. and K.J. appealed the order authorizing V.A.M.'s conservator to assign V.A.M.'s legal claims, arguing that the district court erred in creating a "sub-conservator" to investigate and decide whether to pursue V.A.M.'s legal claims. D.N. argued the court assigned V.A.M.'s legal claims to his children and did not create a "sub-conservator." The Supreme Court was unable to understand the basis for the district court's order, reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Guardianship/Conservatorship of V.A.M." on Justia Law

B.K.J. appealed a district court order appointing J.W. and Guardian and Protective Services, Inc. ("G.A.P.S"), as her co-guardians. B.K.J.'s niece, J.W., petitioned for the appointment of a guardian and a conservator on grounds B.K.J. suffered mild to moderate Alzheimer's disease and dementia and had shown decline in her ability to care for herself and her finances. Particularly, J.W. asserted B.K.J. had over $600,000 in unpaid taxes, interest, and penalties and had allegedly been taken advantage of monetarily by certain friends and family members. After a hearing for emergency guardianship, the district court appointed J.W. and G.A.P.S. as emergency co-guardians to B.K.J. pending further hearing. The district court appointed a physician and a visitor to examine B.K.J., and an attorney to represent B.K.J. as guardian ad litem. A hearing was held on the petition. At the beginning of the hearing, the parties stipulated that a guardianship was necessary for B.K.J., and that she did not oppose the appointment of First International Bank as her conservator. The court-appointed physician, the court-appointed visitor, B.K.J.'s guardian ad litem, and others testified regarding the extent of B.K.J.'s incapacity, the necessity of a guardian, and who should be appointed as B.K.J.'s guardian. B.K.J. testified that she did not want J.W. appointed as her guardian and nominated two of her friends, F.C. and T.C., to be appointed as her co-guardians. The district court appointed First International Bank as B.K.J.'s conservator and appointed J.W. and G.A.P.S. as B.K.J.'s co-guardians, concluding the evidence established they were the proper and best qualified persons to serve as her guardians and represent the best interests of B.K.J. B.K.J. appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the district court did not abuse its discretion in appointing J.W. and G.A.P.S. as B.K.J.'s co-guardians. View "Guardianship/Conservatorship of B.K.J." on Justia Law

Margaret Oakland appealed a judgment dismissing her objection to the probate of the will of her father, John Gassmann, after a jury found she failed to establish his will was the product of an insane delusion. She also appealed an order denying her motion for a new trial. Oakland was Gassmann's only biological child. Her parents separated and subsequently divorced after Gassmann experienced incidents in which he believed his wife and others were involved in a conspiracy to poison him for his farmland. In the divorce proceeding, a psychiatric and psychological evaluation by a psychiatrist and a clinical psychologist diagnosed Gassmann with a "delusional disorder." After divorcing Oakland's mother, Gassmann began a relationship with Bonnie Bowman, which lasted until his death in February 2012, and he developed a close relationship with Bowman's three children. In December 2011, Gassmann executed a will after he was diagnosed with terminal cancer. Gassmann's estate plan devised certain property to Oakland and his will operated with a revocable living trust to devise his interest in his family's farmland to other individuals, including some of Bowman's children. According to Oakland, Gassmann would have devised his farmland to her but for his insane delusion. According to Bell State Bank & Trust, Gassmann was misdiagnosed with a delusional disorder in the 1993 divorce, but actually suffered from a brain tumor and related acromegaly, and he had the tumor removed in 1995. According to Bell State, Gassmann's symptoms disappeared after the surgery, but his relationship with Oakland remained distant and disconnected because Gassmann did not approve of her decisions about education, employment, and marriage. The district court granted Bell State's motions in limine, but generally informed Oakland the motions could be revisited in the context of the evidence presented at trial, including the parties' experts' opinions about the symptoms of Gassmann's alleged insane delusion. The court advised Oakland it did not then know the extent of the experts' testimony about Gassmann's alleged insane delusion and would allow her to introduce evidence covered by the motions in limine to the extent her experts relied on that evidence to conclude Gassmann was suffering from an insane delusion. A jury returned a verdict finding Oakland failed to establish Gassmann's will was the product of an insane delusion, and the district court thereafter denied her motion for a new trial. Upon further review of Oakland's arguments on appeal, the Supreme Court found no reason to disturb the trial court's order, and affirmed. View "Estate of Gassmann" on Justia Law

As surviving spouse of Frank Mattern, Jeanette Mattern appealed a district court judgment dividing the couple's marital homestead into three individual apartments and ordering Jeanette Mattern to pay rent retroactively and in the future while she lived in the homestead. Under the specific facts of this case, the Supreme Court affirmed the portion of the district court judgment granting Jeanette Mattern a homestead in the second-floor residence of the property, but reversed the portion of the judgment ordering her to pay rent for residing there. "If property claimed as a homestead exceeds the value of the homestead exemption, the homestead must be set off in such form as to exclude the excess, unless the homestead cannot be divided without material harm. If the homestead cannot be divided without material injury, the family home must be preserved intact as against heirs even though the homestead exceeds the homestead exemption amount." View "Mattern v. Frank J. Mattern Estate" on Justia Law

Greg Grengs appeals from district court orders interpreting Anita Grengs' will and approving the final accounting and distribution of Anita Grengs' estate. After review of the specific facts of this case, the Supreme Court held that an option to purchase provision of the will was ambiguous and evidence indicated Anita Grengs intended Greg Grengs to have an option to purchase property that was not conditioned on the landowner's willingness to sell, and the evidence supported the district court's interpretation of the option to lease provision of the will. The district court's contrary ruling was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Estate of Grengs" on Justia Law

Neil Bartelson appealed an order denying his petition to remove Guardian and Protective Services ("GAPS") as personal representative of Ralph Bartelson's estate and to appoint him as successor personal representative. Ralph Bartelson had four children: Neil Bartelson, Diane Fischer, Jean Valer, and Jane Haught. Because of Ralph Bartelson's declining health, the children agreed Ralph Bartelson would reside with Valer and she and Haught would receive compensation for the care they provided. While living under the care of Valer, Ralph Bartelson gave her a power of attorney and established a joint checking account, naming both Valer and Haught co-owners with rights of survivorship and allowing them to issue checks from the account. Alleging Valer and Haught had misappropriated funds, Neil Bartelson and Fischer petitioned for the appointment of Neil Bartelson as Ralph Bartelson's guardian and conservator. In July 2008, the parties stipulated that Valer would act as guardian with limitations and GAPS would be appointed conservator and be responsible for investigating the alleged misappropriation of funds. The parties remained unable to reach a settlement in regard to the misappropriation allegations, and as a result a bench trial was held. Following trial, the district court entered an order disclaiming jurisdiction over the misappropriation that allegedly occurred prior to Ralph Bartelson's death. Neil Bartelson and Fischer appealed. On remand, Neil Bartelson and Fischer argued they had standing to bring a misappropriation claim against Valer and Haught and the district court was required to apply the presumption of undue influence. The district court, however, held Neil Bartelson and Fischer did not have independent standing to assert misappropriation claims against Valer and Haught when they did not allege that GAPS breached its fiduciary duty by failing to pursue such claims against Valer and Haught. After unsuccessfully petitioning for reconsideration, Neil Bartelson then petitioned to remove GAPS as personal representative and to be appointed as successor personal representative, arguing GAPS breached its fiduciary duty by failing to pursue the collection of assets belonging to the estate and by failing to bring an action against Valer and Haught for misappropriation. The district court denied the petition, holding Neil Bartelson was not an interested person and therefore lacked standing to petition for removal of the personal representative. The court also stated it had previously determined GAPS was qualified to act as the personal representative and competently performed its responsibilities. Because the district court failed to apply the presumption of undue influence and incorrectly presumed there can be no undue influence if the principal is lucid, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded. View "Estate of Bartelson" on Justia Law

Glenn Solberg appealed a district court judgment dismissing his petition for allowance of a claim against the estate of Lyle Nelson, his deceased mother's second husband. Lyle Nelson died in 2012. He was married to Solberg's mother, Lillian (Solberg) Nelson, who died in 2003. Solberg's father died in the 1960s. Under Lillian Nelson's will, Solberg was devised 25 mineral acres located in Williams County. He also was devised "one hundred (100) mineral acres out of what I have remaining at the time of my death in and under other real property, in appreciation for breaking up some of my land during my lifetime." A codicil to his mother's will devised Solberg an option to purchase certain farmland in Williams County previously owned by his parents at $275 per acre. The option was for two years from the date of his mother's death. In the probate of Lillian Nelson's estate in 2003, Solberg received 25 mineral acres located in Williams County. Solberg filed a claim against Lyle Nelson's estate, claiming under his mother's will and codicil that he was entitled to 100 mineral acres and to purchase farmland owned by his parents at $275 per acre. First National Bank and Trust of Williston, as personal representative of Lyle Nelson's estate, disallowed the claim, stating Lillian Nelson owned only 25 mineral acres at her death, which were conveyed to Solberg. Solberg then petitioned the district court to allow the claim. The Bank moved to dismiss the claim, arguing Lillian Nelson did not own any additional mineral acres at the time of her death, Lyle Nelson did not own or possess any of Lillian Nelson's mineral acres and the claim was barred by the statute of limitations. Solberg opposed the motion and requested the court to take judicial notice of his parents' Williams County probate documents. The court granted the Bank's motion to dismiss. The district court granted the Bank's motion to dismiss Solberg's claim, stating "grounds for dismissal exist as argued in the [Bank's] Brief." No further explanation was provided. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the court's order did not provide an adequate explanation of the legal basis for its decision, and it was unable to properly review the case. The district court also erred under N.D.R.Ev. 201(c) by not addressing Solberg's request to take judicial notice of his parents' Williams County probate documents. The Court reversed the judgment dismissing Solberg's claim against Lyle Nelson's estate and remanded to the district court with directions to explain the legal basis for its decision and address Solberg's judicial notice request. View "Estate of Nelson" on Justia Law

Rodney Hogen appealed and Steven Hogen, as personal representative of the estate of Arline Hogen, cross-appealed an order approving a final accounting and settlement in the probate of the estate of Arline Hogen. After review, the Supreme Court held the district court did not err in concluding the devolution of real property to Rodney Hogen was subject to the personal representative's power during administration of the estate to seek a retainer for any noncontingent indebtedness Rodney Hogen owed Arline Hogen or the estate. The Supreme Court concluded the court erred to the extent it calculated the estate's retainer based on Barnes County conservation reserve program land, but we otherwise conclude the court did not clearly err in determining the estate's retainer against Rodney Hogen's interest in the estate. Furthermore, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding personal representative fees and attorney fees. In affirming in part, and reversing in part, the Court remanded the case for recalculation of the retainer against Rodney Hogen's interest in the estate after considering the effect of the Barnes County conservation reserve program land on the cash rent for the Barnes County land and on the average per acre cost of production for the Cass County Land. View "Estate of Hogen" on Justia Law