Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Greg Grengs appeals from district court orders interpreting Anita Grengs' will and approving the final accounting and distribution of Anita Grengs' estate. After review of the specific facts of this case, the Supreme Court held that an option to purchase provision of the will was ambiguous and evidence indicated Anita Grengs intended Greg Grengs to have an option to purchase property that was not conditioned on the landowner's willingness to sell, and the evidence supported the district court's interpretation of the option to lease provision of the will. The district court's contrary ruling was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Estate of Grengs" on Justia Law

Neil Bartelson appealed an order denying his petition to remove Guardian and Protective Services ("GAPS") as personal representative of Ralph Bartelson's estate and to appoint him as successor personal representative. Ralph Bartelson had four children: Neil Bartelson, Diane Fischer, Jean Valer, and Jane Haught. Because of Ralph Bartelson's declining health, the children agreed Ralph Bartelson would reside with Valer and she and Haught would receive compensation for the care they provided. While living under the care of Valer, Ralph Bartelson gave her a power of attorney and established a joint checking account, naming both Valer and Haught co-owners with rights of survivorship and allowing them to issue checks from the account. Alleging Valer and Haught had misappropriated funds, Neil Bartelson and Fischer petitioned for the appointment of Neil Bartelson as Ralph Bartelson's guardian and conservator. In July 2008, the parties stipulated that Valer would act as guardian with limitations and GAPS would be appointed conservator and be responsible for investigating the alleged misappropriation of funds. The parties remained unable to reach a settlement in regard to the misappropriation allegations, and as a result a bench trial was held. Following trial, the district court entered an order disclaiming jurisdiction over the misappropriation that allegedly occurred prior to Ralph Bartelson's death. Neil Bartelson and Fischer appealed. On remand, Neil Bartelson and Fischer argued they had standing to bring a misappropriation claim against Valer and Haught and the district court was required to apply the presumption of undue influence. The district court, however, held Neil Bartelson and Fischer did not have independent standing to assert misappropriation claims against Valer and Haught when they did not allege that GAPS breached its fiduciary duty by failing to pursue such claims against Valer and Haught. After unsuccessfully petitioning for reconsideration, Neil Bartelson then petitioned to remove GAPS as personal representative and to be appointed as successor personal representative, arguing GAPS breached its fiduciary duty by failing to pursue the collection of assets belonging to the estate and by failing to bring an action against Valer and Haught for misappropriation. The district court denied the petition, holding Neil Bartelson was not an interested person and therefore lacked standing to petition for removal of the personal representative. The court also stated it had previously determined GAPS was qualified to act as the personal representative and competently performed its responsibilities. Because the district court failed to apply the presumption of undue influence and incorrectly presumed there can be no undue influence if the principal is lucid, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded. View "Estate of Bartelson" on Justia Law

Glenn Solberg appealed a district court judgment dismissing his petition for allowance of a claim against the estate of Lyle Nelson, his deceased mother's second husband. Lyle Nelson died in 2012. He was married to Solberg's mother, Lillian (Solberg) Nelson, who died in 2003. Solberg's father died in the 1960s. Under Lillian Nelson's will, Solberg was devised 25 mineral acres located in Williams County. He also was devised "one hundred (100) mineral acres out of what I have remaining at the time of my death in and under other real property, in appreciation for breaking up some of my land during my lifetime." A codicil to his mother's will devised Solberg an option to purchase certain farmland in Williams County previously owned by his parents at $275 per acre. The option was for two years from the date of his mother's death. In the probate of Lillian Nelson's estate in 2003, Solberg received 25 mineral acres located in Williams County. Solberg filed a claim against Lyle Nelson's estate, claiming under his mother's will and codicil that he was entitled to 100 mineral acres and to purchase farmland owned by his parents at $275 per acre. First National Bank and Trust of Williston, as personal representative of Lyle Nelson's estate, disallowed the claim, stating Lillian Nelson owned only 25 mineral acres at her death, which were conveyed to Solberg. Solberg then petitioned the district court to allow the claim. The Bank moved to dismiss the claim, arguing Lillian Nelson did not own any additional mineral acres at the time of her death, Lyle Nelson did not own or possess any of Lillian Nelson's mineral acres and the claim was barred by the statute of limitations. Solberg opposed the motion and requested the court to take judicial notice of his parents' Williams County probate documents. The court granted the Bank's motion to dismiss. The district court granted the Bank's motion to dismiss Solberg's claim, stating "grounds for dismissal exist as argued in the [Bank's] Brief." No further explanation was provided. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the court's order did not provide an adequate explanation of the legal basis for its decision, and it was unable to properly review the case. The district court also erred under N.D.R.Ev. 201(c) by not addressing Solberg's request to take judicial notice of his parents' Williams County probate documents. The Court reversed the judgment dismissing Solberg's claim against Lyle Nelson's estate and remanded to the district court with directions to explain the legal basis for its decision and address Solberg's judicial notice request. View "Estate of Nelson" on Justia Law

Rodney Hogen appealed and Steven Hogen, as personal representative of the estate of Arline Hogen, cross-appealed an order approving a final accounting and settlement in the probate of the estate of Arline Hogen. After review, the Supreme Court held the district court did not err in concluding the devolution of real property to Rodney Hogen was subject to the personal representative's power during administration of the estate to seek a retainer for any noncontingent indebtedness Rodney Hogen owed Arline Hogen or the estate. The Supreme Court concluded the court erred to the extent it calculated the estate's retainer based on Barnes County conservation reserve program land, but we otherwise conclude the court did not clearly err in determining the estate's retainer against Rodney Hogen's interest in the estate. Furthermore, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding personal representative fees and attorney fees. In affirming in part, and reversing in part, the Court remanded the case for recalculation of the retainer against Rodney Hogen's interest in the estate after considering the effect of the Barnes County conservation reserve program land on the cash rent for the Barnes County land and on the average per acre cost of production for the Cass County Land. View "Estate of Hogen" on Justia Law

James Broten, Louise Broten, and Linda Schuler are the children of Olaf Broten and Helen Broten ("the parents"). The parents originally owned approximately 480 acres of farmland in Barnes County. In 1979, they executed a quitclaim deed granting the father sole ownership of the farmland, and also entered into a contract for deed with James Broten agreeing to convey him the farmland for $200,000 plus six percent interest paid annually through 2006. The contract for deed was prepared by James Broten's attorney but never recorded. Also in 1979, the parents each executed a last will and testament in which the farmland was to be placed in trust, with the mother receiving the income for life, and the principal distributed equally to the children upon her death. After his father's death, James Broten was appointed as personal representative of the estate. He obtained written waivers of appointment from the mother and his siblings granting him the right to waive all rights of service of notice from his actions, including an inventory and final accounting of the estate. He filed an informal probate of the father's will and conveyed the farmland to himself with his mother receiving a life estate. The deed was recorded. He continued to pay for his mother's living expenses until her death in 2010, but he occasionally withdrew funds from his mother's checking account. After the mother's death in 2010, the sisters were appointed the co-representatives of the mother's estate. Louise Broten became aware of James Broten's conveyance of the farmland to himself. The sisters, as personal representatives and individually, sued James. James appealed a judgment and amended judgment, following a bench trial, finding that as personal representative to Olaf Broten's estate, he had breached his fiduciary duties by transferring real property to himself, and awarding Louise Broten damages in the amount of the fair market value of the property. Finding no reversible error in the district court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Broten v. Broten" on Justia Law

Jeanne Johnson died in June 2010. Her survivors included her children, Sandra Mark, Stuart Johnson, and Steven Johnson, and her grandson, Scott Johnson. Her will was admitted to informal probate, and Mark was appointed personal representative of the estate in August 2010. Under Jeanne Johnson's will, her residuary estate was devised to Stuart Johnson, Mark and Scott Johnson. Scott and Steven appealed a judgment denying their application for an order directing distribution of farmland to them and restraining Sandra, as personal representative of Jeanne Johnson's estate, from selling the farmland to Stuart. The estate argued the appeal was moot because the farmland was sold. The Supreme Court concluded the appeal was not moot and the evidence was insufficient to support the district court's finding that Mark was acting reasonably for the benefit of the interested persons. The Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Estate of Johnson" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the number of mineral acres owned by Todd Hall in a tract of land in Dunn County as a result of a conveyance from Harry L. Malloy to Todd Hall's predecessor in interest, Edwin Hall. Todd Hall claimed he owned 9 net mineral acres in the land and the "Family Mineral Trust" claimed he owns 4.5 net mineral acres in the land. After review of the chain of title for the disputed mineral interests, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court did not err in determining that the Family Mineral Trust had no right, title, or interest in disputed mineral interests in a tract of land in Dunn County and in quieting title in the disputed mineral interests to Todd Hall. The Court concluded Harry L. and Lorraine Malloy's 1983 divorce judgment did not convey Harry L. Malloy's after-acquired title in the disputed mineral interests to Lorraine Malloy, which then would have passed the interests to the Family Mineral Trust. View "Hall v. Malloy" on Justia Law

Sherri Light, individually and as personal representative of the estate of Steven Light, appealed a judgment entered after a bench trial determining GRB Financial Corporation held a valid and enforceable security interest in a ring purchased from Royal Jewelers, Inc., and authorizing GRB Financial to foreclose its security interest in the ring. Royal Jewelers was a jewelry store in Fargo operated by three brothers, Richard, Brent and Gregory Olson. The brothers also owned a separate corporation, GRB Financial, which operated as an indirect lender taking assignments of loans from retailers, including Royal Jewelers. Steven Light was a customer of Royal Jewelers for several years. In September 2009, Steven owed about $40,000 on an open credit account with Royal Jewelers. Steven Light purchased a wedding ring for Sherri on his open credit account (for over $50,000). At some point, Steven issued a $25,500 check to Royal Jewelers, which was applied to the oldest purchases on his account. That check was returned for insufficient funds. Royal Jewelers' monthly statements reflected Steven thereafter paid about $65,000 on his account from October 2009 through December 2010. Sherri stated Steven's payments were applied to the invoice number on the charge receipt for the ring and the ring was paid for by December 2010. In December 2010, Royal Jewelers, with Steven's consent, assigned Steven Light's debt with Royal Jewelers and the security for that debt to GRB Financial. Steven Light and GRB Financial executed a note modification agreement changing repayment terms, extending the maturity date of a prior note modification agreement between the parties and pledging nine additional items as security for modification. The exhibit describing the items was not separately signed by Steven Light, but included the ring on a list of nine items. Steven died in February 2012. Royal Jewelers and GRB Financial sued Sherri, individually and as personal representative of Steven Light's estate, for a determination that GRB Financial had a valid security interest in the ring. After a bench trial, the district court found no stated preference or agreement existed between the Lights and Royal Jewelers that Steven's payments would be first applied to the ring. The court found even if an agreement existed, it was unenforceable under the statute of frauds because it was not in writing. The court determined that in the absence of any agreement or designation about how payments would be applied to Steven's debt, Royal Jewelers was entitled to apply his payments to first reduce the amount owed on his oldest purchases. The court also determined the evidence did not establish the Lights detrimentally relied on Royal Jewelers' monthly account statements about application of payments to Steven Light's account. The court further concluded Steven's gift of the ring to Sherri was subject to Royal Jewelers' security interest in the ring and GRB Financial, as an assignee of Royal Jewelers, had a valid and enforceable security interest in the ring. Sherri Light argued on appeal that the district court clearly erred in determining the Lights did not manifest an intent or desire under N.D.C.C. 9-12-07(1) that Steven's payments on his account would be applied first to pay for the ring. She argued her testimony about Steven's assurances that he made arrangements with Royal Jewelers for application of his payments to the ring and about witnessing Steven's manifestation of that intent when the ring was purchased on October 2, 2009, was corroborated by Royal Jewelers' monthly account statements, indicating Steven's payments were applied to pay for the ring and not for his prior purchases. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court did not clearly err in finding the Lights did not manifest an intent that payments on an open credit account with Royal Jewelers would be applied first to the purchase price of the ring and in finding the Lights did not detrimentally rely on Royal Jewelers' monthly account statements. Furthermore, the Court concluded the court did not err in determining GRB Financial had a valid and enforceable security interest in the ring. View "Royal Jewelers, Inc. v. Light" on Justia Law

J.G.S. was a 90-year-old retired attorney and owned a number of multi-family rental properties. In 2008, J.G.S. suffered a stroke. In 2013, the Petitioners in this proceeding, J.G.S.'s four children, C.C., C.S., J.F.S., and J.S., became significantly concerned J.G.S. was no longer able to care for himself or his financial affairs. Petitioners were specifically concerned that J.G.S. was no longer able to maintain and repair the rental properties, was failing to collect rent from some tenants, and had gifted three multi-family rental properties to a tenant who had managed the properties for him. Petitioners filed an ex parte petition in the district court for the appointment of a temporary guardian and temporary conservator, seeking an immediate emergency guardianship and conservatorship. The court appointed a temporary guardian and a temporary conservator. Shortly thereafter, Petitioners filed a petition seeking a permanent or indefinite guardianship and conservatorship. On that same day, J.G.S. was personally served with a notice of the hearing on the petition for appointment of a guardian and conservator, with a copy of the temporary petition attached as an exhibit to the notice. The district court held a hearing on the temporary order, found that an emergency guardianship was not necessary, and vacated the temporary order. The court appointed a visitor and psychologist to evaluate J.G.S. In October 2013, the court held a three-day hearing on Petitioners' request for a permanent or indefinite guardianship and conservatorship. The court ultimately held that while a guardianship was not necessary, there was clear and convincing evidence of a need for a conservatorship to manage J.G.S.'s financial affairs. The court appointed a conservator for an indefinite period. J.G.S. argued to the Supreme Court that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over him because of a failure of service of process. J.G.S. claimed that Petitioners did not personally serve him with the petition seeking permanent or indefinite appointment of a guardian and conservator, or with any of the supporting affidavits, which J.G.S. contended the law required. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court had personal jurisdiction over J.G.S. and the court did not clearly err in finding clear and convincing evidence supported the appointment of a conservator. As such, the Court affirmed. View "Guardianship & Conservatorship of J.G.S." on Justia Law

Margaret Pedro was domiciled in Nevada and died in 1997. In March 1999, one of Pedro's children, Jack Scheeler, filed an application in the North Dakota district court, seeking informal probate of Margaret Pedro's will and appointment as personal representative, in addition to filing Pedro's 1990 Last Will and Testament. Letters testamentary were issued on March 18, 1999, appointing Jack Scheeler as the Estate's personal representative. No subsequent inventory or closing documents were filed. In August 2011, Daniel Scheeler, another child, petitioned the district court for a hearing and for an order restraining the personal representative. Daniel Scheeler thereafter retained counsel and joined in a motion with Jack Scheeler and Denan Pedro, additional siblings, seeking a declaratory judgment regarding the proper interpretation of the will. The parties stipulated to waive a hearing, and in July 2012 the court entered an order and judgment construing the will and concluding Denan Pedro inherited the entire Estate. No appeal was taken from that judgment. Appearing pro se, Daniel Scheeler continued to file voluminous documents in the district court, including letters with attachments, a purported inventory and appraisement and purported supplementary inventory information with attachments. In November 2013, Daniel Scheeler moved the district court to order the Estate's personal representative to file a supplementary inventory. The personal representative responded by arguing Daniel Scheeler's motion did not comply with North Dakota court rules, was barred by res judicata and was frivolous. In December, the district court denied Daniel Scheeler's motion, holding his filing failed to meet basic requirements for a motion under North Dakota law, was frivolous and was an attempt to relitigate an issue previously decided. The court also awarded attorney fees for the personal representative having to defend the frivolous motion and barred Daniel Scheeler from filing anything further in the case. Daniel Scheeler argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the district court erred in denying his request to order the personal representative to file a supplementary inventory for the Estate. The Court concluded the dispositive issue was whether Daniel Scheeler established any legal grounds for the relief sought in his motion. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Estate of Pedro" on Justia Law