Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Carolyn Vizenor and Leonard Vizenor were married and lived most of their lives together in Minnesota. Ragna Mesling, a widow and Carolyn Vizenor's mother, owned real estate outside of New England, in Hettinger County. The Stechers were long-time renters of the Mesling farmland. The Vizenors sued Mesling and the Stechers, seeking to avoid a deed executed in 2006, in which Mesling, as Carolyn Vizenor's attorney-in-fact, transferred certain real estate to the Stechers. The Vizenors alleged the transaction directly resulted from improper conduct by the Stechers. The Estates of Carolyn Vizenor and Leonard Vizenor appealed a judgment dismissing their action against Clifford and Linda Stecher and orders denying their post-judgment motions. The Stechers cross-appealed the judgment. The Supreme Court concluded Ragna Mesling, as her daughter Carolyn Vizenor's attorney-in-fact, was authorized under a power of attorney to transfer real estate to the Stechers and sufficient evidence supported the district court's findings the transfer was not the product of undue influence. Because the court did not err in dismissing the action and denying the post-judgment motions, the Court therefore affirmed. View "Estates of Vizenor and Vizenor v. Mesling" on Justia Law

Willard and Christi Pankonin owned real property in Logan County, which was mortgaged with Dakota Heritage Bank. The Bank brought a foreclosure action and a judgment was entered. Before the Pankonins' redemption period expired, Willard Pankonin filed for bankruptcy protection in federal court, his interest in the property was transferred to his bankruptcy estate and Michael Iaccone was appointed bankruptcy trustee. Pankonin and Iaccone (defendants), on behalf of Willard Pankonin's bankruptcy estate, moved for relief from the judgment. Attorney Timothy Lamb represented the defendants. The district court denied the motion for relief and awarded the Bank costs and disbursements without prejudice to any subsequent claim for attorney's fees. Christi Pankonin appealed award of attorney's fees to the Bank. Finding no abuse of the district court's discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Dakota Heritage Bank v. Pankonin" on Justia Law

Defendants Citation Oil & Gas Corp., Petro-Hunt LLC, and other working interest owners appealed a district court summary judgment quieting title to an oil and gas lease in Greggory Tank. In 1982, George and Phyllis Tank executed an oil and gas lease in favor of Petro-Lewis Funds, Inc. The parties agreed to extend the primary term of the lease for three more years, ending July 15, 1989. In May 1983, the Tank 3-10 well was spudded in the northwest quarter. The well produced until October 1996. In June 1998, the Tank 3-10R well was spudded and replaced the Tank 3-10 well. The Tank 3-10R well continues to produce oil or gas. In June 1988, the Tank 13-10 well was spudded in the southwest quarter. The well continuously produced oil or gas until October 2008, and intermittently produced oil or gas until January 2012. Tank was the successor in interest to George and Phyllis Tank and was the owner of minerals in the southwest quarter of section 10. In September 2011, Tank sued the defendants, seeking to cancel the oil and gas lease to the extent it covered the southwest quarter. The defendants moved for summary judgment, seeking dismissal of all of Tank's claims. The defendants argued the continued drilling and operation of oil and gas wells on the leased property maintained the lease beyond the primary term and the lease remained in full force and effect. The district court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment, ruling the lease had expired and was no longer valid on the southwest quarter. The court determined summary judgment was appropriate because there were only issues of law to resolve, including the interpretation of an unambiguous contract and the application of undisputed facts. Finding no reversible error in the district court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Tank v. Citation Oil & Gas Corp." on Justia Law

Robert Hale, individually and on behalf of the State of North Dakota, and Susan Hale appealed a summary judgment dismissing their public nuisance claim against Ward County and the City of Minot. The Hales had a house on agricultural land about one mile southeast of a shooting range in Ward County, which was used to train local, state, and federal law enforcement officers. Several other farms and homes are located near the Hales' property and the law enforcement shooting range, and County Road 12 runs adjacent to the west side of that shooting range. In "Gowan v. Ward Cnty. Comm.," (764 N.W.2d 425), the Supreme Court affirmed a Ward County Commission zoning decision denying an application to rezone neighboring land, which is about one-quarter mile downrange from the law enforcement shooting range, from agricultural to residential for construction of a residential subdivision. The Ward County Commission denied Gowan's application, citing safety concerns resulting from the proximity of his land to the law enforcement shooting range. In "Hale v. Ward Cnty.", the Supreme Court affirmed the summary judgment in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings on the Hales' public nuisance claim. The Court discussed the differences between a private and a public nuisance and explained different evidence was relevant to the Hales' claims for a private and a public nuisance. The Court affirmed the summary judgment dismissing the Hales' private nuisance claim, concluding they failed to present competent evidence supporting their claim the law enforcement shooting range posed a danger to their property. The Court reversed the summary judgment on the Hales' public nuisance claim about use of County Road 12 and remanded for further proceedings on that claim. The Court recognized, however, that Ward County and Minot had not argued the Hales failed to meet the "specially injurious" requirement for a public nuisance claim under N.D.C.C. 42-01-08, and neither the parties nor the district court had addressed the propriety of the Hales bringing an action to abate the law enforcement shooting range under N.D.C.C. ch. 42-02. On remand, the district court concluded "private citizens can bring an action 'ex rel.', but as a threshold matter, such citizens must first satisfy the special injury showing of N.D.C.C. § 42-01-08 or their public nuisance claim must be dismissed." The court granted Ward County and Minot summary judgment on the remanded claim for public nuisance regarding the Hales' use of County Road 12, concluding as a matter of law they failed to meet the "specially injurious" requirement for a private person to maintain a public nuisance claim under N.D.C.C. § 42-01-08. The court also denied the Hales' request to join additional neighbors as parties to their action. The Hales argue the district court erred in granting summary judgment on their public nuisance claim, and in denying their joinder request. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court. View "Hale v. Ward County" on Justia Law

American General Contractors, Inc. ("AGC"), appealed a judgment assessing liability and awarding damages and interest for the cost of delays in the construction of the Williams County Law Enforcement Center in Williston. C&C Plumbing and Heating, LLP ("C&C"), the successful bidder for the mechanical prime contract, filed suit when construction the center was delayed approximately two years after "substantial completion" was supposed to have happened. The district court concluded it was appropriate for the County and AGC to share responsibility for providing temporary shelter and heat on the project. The court apportioned 47 percent of the liability for the costs of the delay for the three and one-half months of active interference to the County and 53 percent to AGC, for the four months delay inherent to the industry. The court awarded C&C approximately $73,000 on its claim against the County. After offsetting amounts owed between the parties, the court awarded AGC approximately $424,000 on its claim against the County. The court awarded Davis Masonry approximately $96,000 from AGC for masonry work completed under its subcontract with AGC, and rejected AGC's claimed offsets to that amount. Davis had provided heat, cover and shelter for the project during cold weather and sought $649,000 from the County and AGC for that expense including prompt payment interest. Davis had settled with the County for $530,000, and the court ruled AGC was responsible for 53 percent of the remaining $119,000, or $63,070. AGC argues the district court erred in determining AGC was liable for any of the costs incurred from the delay under its contract with the County. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court. View "C&C Plumbing and Heating, LLP v. Williams County" on Justia Law

Monica Clark, as the personal representative of the estate of Lester Jasmanka, appealed a district court order denying her motion to vacate a 1990 default judgment quieting title to certain mineral interests in Jack and Eugene Peterson. Upon careful consideration of the facts of this case, the Supreme Court affirmed, concluding: (1) the 1990 judgment was not void and therefore could not be vacated; and (2) the motion to vacate the judgment for fraud and misrepresentation was untimely. View "Peterson v. Jasmanka" on Justia Law

The Zavadils alleged they loaned Jon and Hollie Rud $32,000 under an April 2008 verbal agreement. The loan was to be repaid when the Ruds sold their home or within six months. When the Ruds failed to repay the loan, the Zavadils agreed to renew and extend the original verbal loan agreement. In 2009, the Ruds executed a third mortgage on their property in favor of the Zavadils, and on a few months later, the Ruds executed a promissory note for $32,000 plus interest due and payable to the Zavadils a year later. The Ruds divorced in June 2009, between executions of the third mortgage and the promissory note. The Zavadils sued the Ruds to foreclose the third mortgage after the Ruds failed to make all payments required under the promissory note. Wells Fargo Bank subsequently brought an action against the Ruds, the Zavadils and others to foreclose its first position mortgage on the property. The Zavadils admitted their third mortgage was subordinate to the bank's mortgage on the property and stipulated to dismissal of their foreclosure action against the Ruds. Jon Rud appealed the grant of summary judgment that awarded Zavadils $33,490.19 in their action to recover on the promissory note. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the district court did not err in ruling no genuine issues of material fact existed and the Zavadils were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. View "Zavadil v. Rud" on Justia Law

Roger Sundsbak, George Bitz and Northern Livestock Auction appealed a district court judgment granting Craig Anderson's motion for summary judgment and denying Northern Livestock's motion to amend their counterclaim. Anderson was First Western Bank & Trust's assignee. Northern Livestock argued the district court erred as a matter of law by entering summary judgment in favor of Anderson, by failing to enter summary judgment in favor of Northern Livestock's counterclaim for specific performance and by failing to provide sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law to allow judicial review of its decision denying Northern Livestock's cross-motion for summary judgment. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Anderson v. Zimbelman" on Justia Law

Jeff Trosen appealed a district court judgment that dismissed his legal and equitable claims against Shirley Trosen and Brent Trosen. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, concluding the district court did not err by granting the Trosen's motion for judgment as a matter of law and dismissing Jeff Trosen's legal claims. Further, the Supreme Court concluded the district court reached the right result with respect to Jeff Trosen's equitable claims, but for the wrong reason. View "Trosen v. Trosen" on Justia Law

Bernice Gustafson, as personal representative of the estate of Leonard, Brian, and Michael Gustafson, initiated an action to quiet title to certain mineral interests located in Burke County in October 2011 by service by publication in the Burke County Tribune. Gustafson ultimately applied for default judgment to grant quiet title. After a hearing, the district court found that notice and the summons had been served upon the defendants in the action, that more than 21 days had elapsed since service, that no answer or other proper response was received on behalf of the defendants, and that each of the defendants was wholly in default. The court entered default judgment. Burton Imboden, trustee of the Evans Family Trust, in an affidavit in support of his motion to vacate the default judgment, stated that after he received the summons and complaint, he called the office of Gustafson's attorney, to ask about the complaint and to inform her that he was opposed to what she was trying to accomplish with the complaint. He stated he left a voice message requesting that the attorney return his call, but he never received a call back. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to vacate the default judgment, because a message left for the opposing attorney on an answering machine was not an appearance entitling Imboden to notice before entry of the default judgment. View "Gustafson v. Gustafson" on Justia Law