Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In the early 1980s, the cities of Harwood and Reiles Acres entered a series of agreements to address common waste water treatment problems. In June 1985, they agreed in writing to construct and operate the Harwood Lagoon near the municipalities. Under that agreement, Harwood was responsible for 68 percent and Reiles Acres for 32 percent of the acquisition and construction costs of the Harwood Lagoon. Each municipality was responsible for maintenance and operational costs of their own collection system, and Harwood was responsible for administering and managing the operation of the facility. Their agreement allocated 68 percent of the maintenance costs for the facility to Harwood and 32 percent of those costs to Reiles Acres and also allotted 68 percent of the facility's capacity to Harwood's customers and users and 32 percent of the facility's capacity to Reiles Acres' customers and users. The agreement ultimately resulted in Harwood owning an undivided 68 percent interest and Reiles Acres owning an undivided 32 percent interest in the Harwood Lagoon. In July 1985, Lake Shure Properties purchased from Reiles Acres the right to use 50 percent of Reiles Acres' volumetric capacity in the lagoon, which constituted 16 percent of the total capacity of the lagoon. The agreement between Lake Shure Properties and Reiles Acres permitted each party to buy, sell, or otherwise deal with their respective share of the facility's volume. In 1993, Lake Shure Properties transferred 56.5 percent of its interest in the volumetric capacity in the Harwood Lagoon to Lake Shure Estates, Inc., a North Dakota nonprofit corporation consisting of homeowners residing in the Lake Shure Estates' subdivision near Harwood and Reiles Acres. The transfer resulted in Lake Shure Estates obtaining 9.04 percent of the total waste water treatment capacity of the Harwood Lagoon. Harwood's state certified operator for the lagoon testified that the facility was designed to provide waste water treatment services for approximately 500 people, and the population growth of Harwood and Reiles Acres made it difficult for the municipalities to continue to provide the required 180 days of winter storage capacity for the facility. In 1998, Reiles Acres contracted with Fargo for treatment of Reiles Acres' waste water, and since that time, it has not used the Harwood Lagoon for waste water treatment services. In 2009, Harwood contracted with Fargo for waste water treatment services, and in 2010, Lake Shure Estates contracted with Fargo for waste water treatment services. Neither Harwood nor Lake Shure Estates has used the Harwood Lagoon for municipal waste water treatment services since they contracted with Fargo for those services. Harwood and Lake Shure Estates sued Reiles Acres and all other persons unknown claiming any interest in the Harwood Lagoon, seeking a declaration of the parties' interests and obligations under their contracts and a partition of the Harwood Lagoon property. Reiles Acres appealed the judgment entered after a bench trial declaring the contractual obligations of Reiles Acres and the City of Harwood under the 1985 contract for construction and operation Harwood Lagoon were discharged by frustration of purpose and the order confirming a partition by public sale of the land encompassing the Harwood Lagoon. Reiles Acres argues the district court lacked subject matter and personal jurisdiction to enter a declaratory judgment nullifying the parties' contractual obligations and to order a partition sale of the land. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the court had jurisdiction to construe contracts in the declaratory judgment action and the court did not err in construing a 1985 contract between Harwood and Reiles Acres and determining the principal purpose of the contract was frustrated. Furthermore, the Court concluded the court did not err in ordering partition by public sale of the land. View "City of Harwood v. City of Reiles Acres" on Justia Law

A jury found defendant-appellant Rodney Brossart guilty of terrorizing, preventing arrest, and failing to comply with the law for estray animals. In 2011, two of Brossart's adult children observed three cow-calf pairs loose on or near Brossart's property and they determined the cattle did not belong to Brossart. The cattle were secured in a fenced "missile site" Brossart leased. One of Brossart's children told him about the cattle after the cattle were secured. The following day, neighbor Chris Anderson discovered three cow-calf pairs had escaped from his fenced property. Anderson tracked the cattle to Brossart's property and spoke to Brossart about the cattle. According to Anderson, Brossart informed him that he would have to buy the cattle back. Anderson returned to his farm and contacted the Nelson County Sheriff's Department. Eric Braathen, a deputy for the Nelson County Sheriff's Department, contacted Fred Frederikson, a licensed peace officer and a brand inspector for the North Dakota Stockmen's Association. While driving to Brossart's farm, Braathen and Frederikson saw Brossart pumping water from a field. Braathen introduced Frederikson to Brossart and Frederikson asked about the cattle and whether he could go look at them. According to Braathen, Brossart informed the officers "if you step foot on my property, you are going to not be walking away." The situation quickly escalated, Braathen attempted to arrest Brossart, Brossart resisted, and Braathen used a taser on Brossart multiple times before he was handcuffed. Brossart was charged with failing to comply with the estray chapter and preventing arrest. He appealed his conviction. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court did not give the jury any instructions explaining what constituted a threat and that communications that are not a "true threat" are protected speech. The district court therefore did not correctly and adequately inform the jury of the applicable law and erred by failing to include a jury instruction defining what constituted a "threat." Brossart's terrorizing conviction was reversed and the case remanded for a new trial on that charge. The Supreme Court affirmed in all other respects. View "North Dakota v. Brossart" on Justia Law

Craig and Julie Nelson appealed a judgment quieting title in certain real property in Harry and Linda Chornuk and awarding the Chornuks damages for conversion, and from an amended judgment modifying the damage award. In January 1986, Norman and Mildred Dahl conveyed the property to the Chornuks by warranty deed, but the deed was not recorded until June 24, 2010. On June 17, 2005, after Norman Dahl's death, Mildred Dahl conveyed the same property by warranty deed to the Nelsons as part of the conveyance of approximately 44.5 acres. The deed was recorded on July 5, 2005. In September 2010, the Chornuks sued the Nelsons to quiet title to the property and sought damages for claims of trespass and conversion. The Nelsons moved for summary judgment, arguing they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law and to have title quieted in their favor because they recorded their deed to the property more than five years before the Chornuks recorded their deed. The trial court found the Chornuks mowed the property three or four times per year, planted trees on the property, installed drip irrigation lines for the trees, installed flower boxes on the property and performed other general maintenance. The court found that the Chornuks' actions were sufficient to put a prudent person on notice someone else had an interest in the property and that the Nelsons were required to conduct further inquiry before purchasing the property from Mildred Dahl. The court found the Nelsons had constructive notice of the Chornuks' interest and were not good-faith purchasers. The court awarded the Chornuks $2,830 in damages for trees the Nelsons cut down on the property. The Nelsons moved for reconsideration, arguing the damage award was not supported by the evidence. The court granted the Nelsons' motion. After a hearing, the court ordered the damage award be reduced to $360 and entered an amended judgment. The Nelsons argued the district court erroneously found they did not purchase the property in good faith and erred in quieting title of the property in favor of the Chornuks. Finding no reversible error after its review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. View "Chornuk v. Nelson" on Justia Law

SmartLease USA, LLC was a limited liability company with three principals, Kent Guthrie, Tony Marshall, and Steve Furst, which described itself in a business proposal as an entity seeking "to capitalize on the demand for quality housing [in the Williston Basin] by providing a high quality, exceptionally clean and professionally managed RV/mobile park" in partnership with a landowner. The Abelmanns owned farmland in the Williston Basin. They executed a written agreement to lease approximately 110 acres of their farmland to SmartLease for the stated purpose of "use as a short/long term RV (recreational vehicle), mobile home, cabin units, and truck parking." According to the Abelmanns, SmartLease agreed to develop the leased land into a high quality, clean, and professionally managed full service RV and mobile home park for housing and accommodations for the labor force in northwestern North Dakota. They claimed SmartLease started to develop the land, but thereafter neglected its obligations under the written lease. They claimed SmartLease failed to pay them rent or the security deposits required by the lease and failed to provide proper management for the land. According to them, a property manager hired by SmartLease, Aaron Smith, failed to provide proper on-sight management for the property and eventually quit, which resulted in no on-site management for the property. The Ablemanns claimed they provided SmartLease with written notice of termination of the lease in February 2013, and claimed SmartLease refused to vacate the premises and attempted to transfer the lease to a third party. In May 2013, the Abelmanns served SmartLease with a notice of intention to evict. The Abelmanns appealed the dismissal of their eviction action against SmartLease. The Abelmanns argued the district court erred as a matter of law in construing their written lease with SmartLease and in determining any breaches of the lease by SmartLease were immaterial and of nonessential terms. The Supreme Court agreed, reversed and remanded. The Court concluded the district court erred in interpreting the purpose of the parties' lease and failed to make adequate findings to understand the basis for its decision. View "Abelmann v. SmartLease USA, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Pro se appellant Cody Schmitt appealed a district court's eviction order, arguing service of an amended notice of eviction was insufficient. Schmitt and Lisa Stahlberg resided in a mobile home located on property owned by Rodney and Pamela Schmitt. Stahlberg resided on the property since April 25, 2013, and Schmitt resided on the property prior to that. There was no written lease between the parties. On March 19, 2014, Rodney and Pamela Schmitt sent Cody Schmitt and Stahlberg an amended notice of eviction, directing Cody Schmitt vacate by April 15, 2014, and Stahlberg vacate within three days. Cody Schmitt and Stahlberg did not vacate the property by April 15, 2014. On April 17, 2014, the Pierce County Sheriff's Office served Cody Schmitt and Stahlberg with the notice of intention to evict them from the property. According to the notice of intention to evict, Cody Schmitt and Stahlberg had three days to vacate the property. After three days elapsed, Cody Schmitt and Stahlberg remained on the property. Accordingly, Rodney and Pamela Schmitt started this eviction action requesting the district court order Cody Schmitt and Stahlberg to vacate the property. A hearing was held on the eviction action. On May 2, 2014, the district court issued an Eviction Order requiring Cody Schmitt and Stahlberg vacate the property by May 13, 2014. Cody Schmitt appealed the district court's decision. Having no transcript to review of the district court's evidentiary hearing, the Supreme Court concluded the district court's finding that service of the notice of termination was proper was not clearly erroneous, and affirmed. View "Schmitt v. Schmitt" on Justia Law

Dennis and Charlene Deckert appealed the grant of summary judgment dismissing their action for a declaratory judgment and specific performance of an option to purchase certain Burleigh County real property and quieting title to the property in Margaret McCormick and Judy Hertz. Because the Supreme Court concluded there was no genuine issue of material fact that the Deckerts did not properly exercise the gratuitous option before it was revoked, the Court affirmed the judgment. View "Deckert v. McCormick" on Justia Law

Patricia Capps and others appealed, and Colleen Weflen and others cross-appealed a judgment quieting title to certain Mountrail County mineral interests in the Capps and the heirs of Ruth Nelson's estate. Because the district court erred as a matter of law in ruling the Weflens did not comply with the notice requirements in the abandoned mineral statutes, and because those requirements were constitutional, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for entry of judgment quieting title to the subject mineral interests in the Weflens. View "Capps v. Weflen" on Justia Law

Desert Partners IV, L.P., and Family Tree Corporation ("Desert Partners") sued to quiet title to certain mineral interests in McKenzie County to Desert Partners. Numerous parties were included in the action. Self-represented litigants John Benson and Brian Benson answered, counterclaiming ownership of the disputed mineral interests. Desert Partners and Benson both moved for summary judgment. No other parties responded to the motions for summary judgment. Desert Partners did not request a hearing on its motion. Benson requested a hearing on the summary judgment motions and then filed a notice of hearing. Benson's notice of hearing stated oral arguments would be heard "on October 30, 2013 at 10:00 am, or as soon as counsel may be heard." On December 3, 2013, the district court ordered summary judgment in favor of Desert Partners, noting there was no dispute as to material facts and no one had appeared for the hearing on November 1, 2013. The judgment was entered December 5, 2013. Benson emailed an unsigned notice of appeal and faxed a signed notice of appeal on February 3, 2014. The next day, the clerk of district court sent Benson an email stating the clerks' offices are unable to file documents submitted by email or fax. Further, the email stated the original documents could be mailed to the office. Benson mailed the notice of appeal on February 4, 2014. According to documentation submitted by Benson, the clerk of district court received the mailed noticed of appeal on February 7, 2014, and recorded the notice of appeal as filed on February 12, 2014. Upon receiving the notice of appeal from the district court, the Chief Deputy Clerk of the Supreme Court emailed Benson informing him the timeliness of his appeal was in question, as the deadline for filing was February 6, 2014. Further, the Chief Deputy Clerk advised Benson he may seek an extension of time from the district court to file the notice of appeal under N.D.R.App.P. 4(a)(4), if he could show excusable neglect or good cause. Benson did not move for an extension to file the notice of appeal. Desert Partners petitioned the Supreme Court to dismiss the appeal as untimely and Benson responded. In response, Benson argued his appeal should be treated as timely, and that summary judgment was improperly granted because he requested a hearing on the motions for summary judgment, but did not receive one. Desert Partners did not file a brief in response. The Supreme Court denied Desert Partners' motion to dismiss. Further, the Court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment against Benson and remanded for a hearing on the motions, concluding the district court did not properly notice the hearing it held. View "Desert Partners IV, L.P. v. Benson" on Justia Law

Rita Sue Rasnic, (f/k/a Johnson) appealed the grant of summary judgment quieting title to disputed mineral interests in McKenzie County to Norris and Beverly Hildre. Rasnic argues she was entitled to the disputed mineral interests because those mineral interests were subject to a mortgage held by her predecessor in interest, American State Bank. Upon review, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the plain language of the Hildres' 1988 mortgage applied only to mineral interests owned by them when the mortgage was executed and title to the disputed mineral interests, which was acquired by the Hildres after the mortgage was executed, did not inure to American State Bank as security for the Hildres' debt under N.D.C.C. section 35-03-01.2(4). Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment quieting title in the disputed mineral interests to the Hildres. View "Rasnic v. ConocoPhillips Co." on Justia Law

John and Lori Finstad owned 80 acres of a section of land in Ransom County and leased 240 adjacent acres in the same section from Willis and Doris Olson. The Ranson-Sargent Water Users District was considering this tract of land as a potential site to drill water wells. In 1997, the Finstads and the Olsons granted to the District options to purchase the land. The options also allowed the Finstads and the Olsons to lease back the property for five years, after which they had a nonassignable right of first refusal to lease back the property for an additional five years. The Finstads appealed from a judgment awarding them $53,000.99 in damages and interest in their action against the District for breach of the lease-back provisions of an option agreement between the parties. The District cross-appealed. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court erred as a matter of law in ruling the economic duress doctrine relieved the Finstads of their obligations under a subsequent agreement and release they had entered into with the District. Because the agreement and release is valid and enforceable, the Court reversed the judgment. View "Finstad v. Ransom-Sargent Water Users, Inc." on Justia Law