Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Dale Sundley appealed a judgment quieting title to certain real property in favor of Larry and Janice Moody, and that dismissed Sundley's adverse possession counterclaim. Sundley argued the district court erred in finding he did not acquire ownership of the disputed property by adverse possession and failing to find the boundary of his property was established by acquiescence. "All the elements for adverse possession must be satisfied for a claim of adverse possession under any of the statutory provisions, and if any element is not satisfied the possession will not confer title." Finding that Sundley failed to meet his burden of proving the elements of adverse possession, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Moody v. Sundley" on Justia Law

Eric Johnson and others appealed the grant of summary judgment quieting title to certain Williams County mineral interests in Suzanne Shield and others. Shield and the other defendants (collectively "Shield") were successors in interest to Eugenie and Roy Goldenberg, who in 1942, granted through a warranty deed a certain tract of Williams County property to Julian and Arthur Johnson. Johnson and the other plaintiffs (collectively "Johnson") were the successors in interest to Julian and Arthur Johnson. At the time of the conveyance, Eugenie and Roy Goldenberg were the owners of all of the minerals associated with the property. The granting clause in the warranty deed did not address mineral interests, but the warranty clause of the deed stated that the Goldenbergs "covenant . . . that they are well seized in fee of land, real estate and premises aforesaid, and have good right to sell and convey the same in manner and form aforesaid; that the same are free from all incumbrances, but reserving, however, to the grantor fifty per cent (50%) of all of the oil, gas, hydro-carbons and minerals in or with respect to said real property[.]" The last clause, beginning with "but reserving," was typed in a blank space on the printed deed form. Johnson brought this quiet title action against Shield, seeking a determination that Johnson was the owner of 100 percent of the minerals located in the tract of land conveyed by the Goldenbergs. Because the disputed language in the challenged warranty deed presented no genuine issue of material fact that the grantors intended to reserve to themselves 50 percent of the mineral interests in the conveyed property, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. View "Johnson v. Shield" on Justia Law

Phyllis Yesel and Gloria Van Dyke ("Yesel") appealed the grant of summary judgment, concluding the abandoned mineral statutes did not apply to royalty interests, and alternatively, if the statutes did apply, the royalty interests at issue here were not abandoned. Christian Teigen cross-appealed a judgment denying his motion to file a counterclaim and motion for attorneys' fees. Yesel was the surface owner of some real property located in McKenzie County. Teigen was also an heir to the named defendants ("Brandon defendants"), who owned nonparticipating royalty interests in the minerals in and under Yesel's real property. Yesel published a notice of lapse of mineral interest in the McKenzie County Farmer for each of the Section 25 and Section 26 properties, asserting Yesel succeeded to the ownership of the Brandon defendants' royalty interests in the property. In September 2011 ("first action") and April 2012 ("second action"), Yesel sued to quiet title to the Brandon defendants' royalty interests, claiming the interests were abandoned because they had not been used under the abandoned mineral statutes for more than 20 years before the first publication of the notice of lapse. The actions involved the same facts and parties; the only difference was the properties involved in each case. Yesel was granted a default judgment in the first action, but the judgment was vacated after Teigen answered in the second action. Teigen's answer alleged the Brandon defendants' royalty interests were used under the abandoned mineral statutes because the mineral interests related to the royalty interests in and under the subject property had been leased within the last 20 years, were subject to a pooling order issued from the North Dakota Industrial Commission, and an oil well had been spud and was producing. Approximately two weeks after Teigen was granted summary judgment, he moved to file counterclaims against Yesel, alleging unjust enrichment, conversion, slander of title, and negligence. The counterclaims pertained to royalty payments Yesel allegedly received attributable to the Brandon defendants' royalty interests. The court denied the motions, concluding Teigen should have asserted his counterclaims when he answered Yesel's complaint in the second action, and the quiet title actions were not frivolous or made in bad faith. The Supreme Court concluded that the district court did not err in granting Teigen summary judgment. However, the Court found the district court abused its discretion when it misapplied the law on compulsory counterclaims. The case was remanded for reconsideration of Teigen's motion to amend his answer to assert his counterclaims against Yesel. Yesel's claim that the abandoned mineral statutes applied to royalty interests was one of first impression, and through the Court did not decide that issue, it concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Teigen's motion for attorneys' fees. View "Yesel v. Brandon" on Justia Law

Soo Line Railroad Company and G-4, LLC appealed the grant of summary judgment declaring Soo Line did not own an interest in the minerals in and under certain Mountrail County property, and that G-4 did not hold a valid leasehold interest in the property. Soo Line and G-4 argued the district court erred in finding seven private deeds conveyed only easements and not a fee simple title to Soo Line's predecessor-in-interest. EOG Resources, Inc. had an interest in an oil and gas leasehold estate in Mountrail County and operated oil and gas wells. Soo Line operated in North Dakota. G-4 had exploration leases with Soo Line. EOG brought an action to quiet title to minerals in and under certain Mountrail County property against Soo Line, G-4, and other defendants claiming an interest in the property. EOG sought a declaration that Soo Line and G-4 had no interest in the minerals in and under the disputed property. Soo Line answered and brought counterclaims against EOG and cross-claims against the other defendants. G-4 filed a separate answer and brought counterclaims against EOG and cross-claims against the other defendants. The other defendants filed separate answers to EOG's complaint and Soo Line and G-4's cross-claims, aligning with EOG. After a hearing and based on the parties' stipulation, the district court partially granted EOG's motion for summary judgment and dismissed G-4's claims. After a hearing on the motion, the district court denied Soo Line and G-4's motions for summary judgment and granted the EOG parties' motion. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that several of the private deeds were unambiguous and conveyed a fee simple title to the railroad. One of the private deeds, the Court concluded, was ambiguous, but summary judgment was not appropriate. Accordingly, the Court reversed the summary judgment in favor of the EOG parties with respect to the deeds, and remanded the case for further proceedings on the "Faro" deed and for entry of judgment in favor of Soo Line and G-4 for the property covered by the unambiguous deeds. View "EOG Resources, Inc. v. Soo Line Railroad Co." on Justia Law

Jose Santoyo appealed a judgment that awarded damages to Darwin Savre for overpayments under the parties' lease and purchase option agreement and dismissed Santoyo's counterclaim for damages to the leased property. Savre owned and operated Savre's Heavy Truck & Auto Repair in Fargo. Santoyo owned the two parcels of real property and building that are the subject of the leases and option agreement in this case. The original lease term was from June 15, 2008, to June 15, 2010, with Savre paying rent of $2,300 per month until June 15, 2009, at which time the rent would increase to $2,708.33. About the time of the rent increase, Savre and Santoyo entered into a "Lease to Purchase Option Agreement." Although the lease and option agreement required Savre to pay his monthly rent payments on the first of each month, Savre was frequently late in his payments from the beginning of the lease. Santoyo accepted the payments and did not give Savre written notice of any intent to terminate the lease based on Savre's late payment. Savre made monthly payments in varying amounts under the option agreement, and the district court found he paid at least a total of $4,000 each month. In the fall of 2012, Savre and another individual formed JDDS, LLC, intending to use the entity to finance the purchase of Santoyo's property. The district court found, however, that Savre did not attempt to assign, convey, delegate or transfer his purchase option to JDDS. In late 2012, Savre made his first attempt to exercise his option to purchase the property with a handwritten notice to Santoyo. In early 2013, Savre made a second attempt to exercise the option with another handwritten notice to Santoyo. Santoyo did not respond to Savre. By the time of the second attempt to exercise the option, Savre had paid at least $180,000 in monthly payments, satisfying an option agreement requirement. After Santoyo did not sell him the property, Savre stopped making monthly payments. Santoyo initiated eviction proceedings against Savre in the district court. The court granted the eviction and entered judgment against Savre for unpaid rent and Santoyo's costs and disbursements. Savre vacated Santoyo's property at the end of June 2013 and began leasing a different space in Fargo. Savre subsequently commenced this action, alleging that Santoyo breached the option agreement when he failed to sell the property leased to Savre after he exercised his option and that Santoyo had been unjustly enriched. Santoyo denied the allegations and counterclaimed, alleging Savre violated his contractual and statutory duties by damaging the property upon being evicted from the premises. Santoyo argued the district court erred as a matter of law when the court concluded Santoyo had a contractual duty to sell his property to a third party that did not exist at the time of the agreement and had no rights under the agreement. The Supreme Court concluded the district court did not clearly err in finding that Santoyo had breached the agreement and that Santoyo had waived strict compliance with the option agreement's terms when he accepted Savre's late lease payments. Furthermore, the Court concluded the court failed to make sufficient findings of fact to explain dismissal of Santoyo's counterclaim for damages. The Court accordingly affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Savre v. Santoyo" on Justia Law

The Pifer Group, Inc., appealed, and Judith Liebelt and Sandra and Dennis Janke cross-appealed, a judgment awarding Pifer Group $8,215.81 for breach of two land auction sale agreements. Liebelt and the Jankes entered into separate land auction sale agreements with Pifer Group to auction their Cass County farmland. On the morning of the scheduled auction, Liebelt and the Jankes sent Pifer Group an email stating: "We are withdrawing from today's 11am land auction and will refuse any and all bids pursuant to our contract agreement." No auction sale was held. Pifer Group sued Liebelt and the Jankes for breach of the auction sale agreements and sought damages based on full sales commissions that would have been owed if the sales occurred. Construing the auction sale agreements, the district court on summary judgment awarded Pifer Group only cancellation fees of $8,215.81 and rejected the arguments of Liebelt and the Jankes that the agreements were void as a matter of law. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the auction sale agreements are enforceable and the district court did not err in its interpretation of them. View "Pifer Group, Inc. v. Liebelt" on Justia Law

Lori Ihli appealed a district court judgment dismissing her claims against Anthony Lazzaretto, d/b/a Lazzaretto Construction ("Lazzaretto"). In June 2011, Ihli's Minot home flooded. Ihli contacted Lazzaretto for an estimate to repair the home, and in February 2012, she accepted Lazzaretto's bid proposal. Lazzaretto began working on Ihli's home; however, a dispute arose between the parties regarding the quality of the work, and Lazzaretto ceased working on the home. In November 2012, Ihli applied for federal disaster relief funding to repair or replace her house through the City of Minot Disaster Recovery Homeowner Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Program. Ihli sought estimates from two construction companies, Real Builders, Inc. and Wright Brothers, to "repair" and complete the project. Ihli then sued Lazzaretto, alleging he damaged her property by performing remodeling work in a negligent manner. After commencing the suit against Lazzaretto, she learned she was eligible for the disaster relief funding in "late August 2013." In Ihli's deposition, Ihli stated that program administrators inspected the house and recommended the house be torn down and replaced, instead of being repaired. After Ihli commenced the suit against Lazzaretto and learned of her eligibility for disaster relief funding and after Ihli's counsel granted Lazzaretto's counsel an extension to file Lazzaretto's answer to Ihli's complaint, Ihli allowed the house to be demolished. Before the house was demolished, Ihli's attorney had advised Ihli to take photos or video of the property before the house was torn down. Ihli never informed Lazzaretto of the plan to demolish the house. After the house was demolished, Lazzaretto served its answer. In June 2014, Lazaretto moved for sanctions, requesting the case be dismissed due to Ihli's spoliation of evidence. Ihli then moved to amend her complaint, seeking to add a claim for breach of contract. After a hearing on both motions, the district court denied Ihli's motion to amend the complaint, granted Lazzaretto's motion for sanctions, and dismissed Ihli's claims. On appeal, Ihli argued the district court erred in dismissing her case as a sanction for spoliation of evidence because the sanction was overly severe and an abuse of discretion. Ihli also argued the district court erred in denying her motion to amend the complaint because Lazzaretto was on notice of the proposed breach of contract claim and would not have been prejudiced. Under the facts of this case, the Supreme Court concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the sanction of dismissal and denying Ihli's motion to amend. View "Ihli v. Lazzaretto" on Justia Law

Marlin and Tanya Sabinash appealed a corrected judgment quieting title to real property located in Stutsman County to Dana Baker. In 1992, Marlin Sabinash owned real property subject to a mortgage with the Bank of North Dakota. In 2001, Stutsman County property taxes were not paid on the property. The county provided both Marlin Sabinash and the Bank of North Dakota notice of a tax lien on the property requiring payment on or before October, 2006, and subsequently foreclosed on its lien. An auditor's tax deed was issued to the county in 2006, and the property was sold to Dana Baker at public auction. He received a county deed which was recorded. The Bank of North Dakota provided Baker notice of intent to foreclose on the same property in 2008 under its mortgage lien. The property was foreclosed upon and sold at a sheriff's sale to Raymond Sabinash. In 2009, Raymond Sabinash assigned his interest in the property to Marlin Sabinash, who received and recorded the sheriff's deed. Baker filed a quiet title action. Both parties moved for summary judgment to determine the superior interest and ownership of the property. The district court granted Baker's motion and denied the Sabinashes' motion, holding that the State, through the Bank of North Dakota, was never at anytime the property owner and only held a mortgage. Although prior precedent established that the State of North Dakota's mortgage lien could not be inferior to a county tax lien, the district court determined that was no longer applicable. Because the district court erred as a matter of law in determining the county tax lien was superior to the interest held by the State through a Bank of North Dakota mortgage on the property, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for entry of judgment quieting title to the property in favor of the Sabinashes and for further proceedings. View "Baker v. Sabinash" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the number of mineral acres owned by Todd Hall in a tract of land in Dunn County as a result of a conveyance from Harry L. Malloy to Todd Hall's predecessor in interest, Edwin Hall. Todd Hall claimed he owned 9 net mineral acres in the land and the "Family Mineral Trust" claimed he owns 4.5 net mineral acres in the land. After review of the chain of title for the disputed mineral interests, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court did not err in determining that the Family Mineral Trust had no right, title, or interest in disputed mineral interests in a tract of land in Dunn County and in quieting title in the disputed mineral interests to Todd Hall. The Court concluded Harry L. and Lorraine Malloy's 1983 divorce judgment did not convey Harry L. Malloy's after-acquired title in the disputed mineral interests to Lorraine Malloy, which then would have passed the interests to the Family Mineral Trust. View "Hall v. Malloy" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-appellants Arlen and Beverly Flynn appealed the dismissal of their action against Hurley Enterprises, Inc., for maintaining a public or private nuisance near their property in McKenzie County. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the district court erred in allowing the introduction of evidence concerning the reputation and good deeds of Vess Hurley and Hurley Enterprises and erred in instructing the jury. Those errors affected the Flynns' substantial rights. Therefore, the Court reversed the judgment and remanded for a new trial. View "Flynn v. Hurley Enterprises, Inc." on Justia Law