Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Rocky Norby appealed, and the Estate of Kuykendall and others cross-appealed, a judgment quieting title to certain McKenzie County property in James Kuykendall and dismissing Norby's action to eject Kuykendall from the disputed property. Because Norby could not claim title to accretions beyond the fixed boundary line set forth in his deed, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. View "Norby v. Estate of Kuykendall" on Justia Law

Greg Holverson sued Susan Lundberg to quiet title to a tract of land in Burleigh County, alleging he executed a contract for deed to purchase land from the Trust in 1978. He defaulted on payments under the contract for deed and Lundberg sent him a notice of statutory cancellation of the contract on December 13, 2012, which required him to satisfy the contract by June 17, 2013. Holverson alleged he presented a cashier's check to Lundberg for the balance due under the contract for deed on June 14, 2013, but she refused to accept the check. He sought to require Lundberg to accept the check, convey the land to him and to quiet title to the land. Lundberg answered and counterclaimed, seeking to rescind the 1978 contract for deed and a 1997 amended contract for deed and a mortgage, alleging Holverson's fraud and false representations induced her to forebear from cancelling the contract for deed before 2012, and she instead agreed to amend the contract for deed and a mortgage in 1997 to extend his time to pay and to reduce the amount owed the Trust. She alternatively claimed that if she was not entitled to rescind the contract for deed, she was entitled to damages for Holverson's fraud and misrepresentation. The district court granted Holverson summary judgment, dismissing Lundberg's counterclaims, directing her to accept Holverson's cashier's check and convey the land to him, and quieting title in the land to him. Lundberg appealed the grant of summary judgment. The Supreme Court concluded it did not have jurisdiction over this case because the district court had ordered but not yet determined the amount of attorney fees due Holverson. Accordingly, the Court dismissed this appeal. View "Holverson v. Lundberg" on Justia Law

Ronald Olson and Marlys Kjellberg appealed the grant of summary judgment dismissing their action for damages against Alerus Financial Corporation, Alerus Financial, National Association ("Alerus Entities") and Jayson Menke, and an order denying leave to amend their complaint. Robert Olson, Ronald Olson and Marlys Kjellberg ("Olsons") are siblings who owned farm real estate in Grand Forks County, North Dakota. Jayson Menke was a real estate agent with Botsford & Qualey Land Company of Grand Forks. On June 9, 2011, the Olsons signed a real estate listing agreement with Botsford Qualey and Menke that provided Botsford Qualey with the exclusive right to sell 200 acres of the Olsons' farmland. The listing agreement stated, "Seller is solely responsible for determining the appropriate listing price and has elected to offer the property by Conventional Sale." Menke provided the Olsons an analysis of their farmland, estimating the fair market value at $1,500 per acre. The Olsons increased the listing price to $1,700 per acre. The listing agreement shows an initially proposed sale price of $225,000, which the Olsons increased when they crossed out that amount and inserted $340,000 as the selling price. The Olsons' long-time tenant made a written offer to buy the land at the full asking price of $1,700 per acre. he Olsons and Menke subsequently learned the tenant was attempting to resell the farmland at a higher price than he agreed to pay the Olsons. On August 30, 2011, the tenant closed on his purchase from the Olsons. That same day, the tenant closed on the sale of the same farmland to a nearby farmer for $500 more per acre than he paid the Olsons. On December 15, 2011, Alerus Financial, N.A. acquired the stock of Botsford Qualey and Botsford Qualey filed notice of intent to dissolve. the Olsons sued "Alerus Financial Corporation (former parent company of Botsford & Qualey Land Company)." Alerus Financial Corporation answered. At about the same time, Botsford Qualey and Menke served a joint answer to the complaint even though they were not listed as defendants or served with the summons. The Olsons moved to amend the complaint to add Alerus Financial, N.A., Menke and Botsford Qualey as defendants. On April 4, 2014, the district court granted the Olsons leave to add Alerus Financial, N.A. and Menke as defendants but did not allow the Olsons to add Botsford Qualey. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the district court's order denying leave to amend the complaint and remanded for further proceedings. The Court also reversed the district court's order granting summary judgment dismissing the Olsons' claims against Menke for breach of fiduciary duty. The Court affirmed the district court's order for summary judgment dismissing the Olsons' claims seeking to impose respondeat superior liability on the Alerus entities and to pierce the Alerus entities' corporate veil. View "Olson v. Alerus Financial Corp." on Justia Law

Laura Weed appeals from a judgment reforming a warranty deed and quieting title in a tract of land to Allan and Robin Freidig. In 2003, Weed hired David Hovendick, a registered land surveyor, to survey her house and a five-acre tract of land around her house on the east side of Devils Lake for her lender. According to Hovendick, Weed informed him that she did not want to include any land under Devils Lake in the survey because she did not want the submerged land encumbered by her mortgage. Hovendick's certificate of survey followed Weed's instructions and did not reference the Devils Lake shoreline nor did it extend her property's boundary line below the shoreline. In 2004, Weed hired Hovendick to survey and evenly divide another tract of land south of her five-acre parcel into two lots, each about one acre in size. According to Hovendick, he used witness corners for those two lake front lots rather than monument corners so an owner could identify the property line as the water rises or falls and he would have used monument corners if Weed had instructed him to set the property corners of those two lots at the shoreline. In 2004, Weed employed the Freidigs' real estate firm to sell one of the lots as "lake front property" with "excellent slope to water." The lot was sold to John and LaMae Henry by warranty deed describing the west boundary of the conveyed land in language tracking Hovendick's certificate of survey that the property lines shall extend or shorten to the water's edge with the rise and fall of Devils Lake dictating the west boundary of the lot. In 2005, Weed employed the Freidigs' firm to sell the other lot as "lake front property" with "excellent slope to water." The lot was sold to Marty Robertson by warranty deed describing the west boundary of the lot "along said water's edge" of Devils Lake and containing "0.97 acres more or less." The deed was prepared by the same attorney who prepared the earlier Weed-Henry deed and stated the legal description for the lot was obtained from Hovendick's certificate of survey, but the deed did not contain the language describing the west boundary of the lot as extending or shortening to the water's edge with the rise and fall of Devils Lake. In 2009, Robertson sold the lot to the Freidigs by warranty deed using the same property description as the Weed-Robertson warranty deed. In 2013, a discrepancy in the lake side boundary of the property described in the Weed-Robertson and Robertson-Freidig warranty deeds was discovered. The Freidigs sued Weed and all others claiming an interest in the lot for reformation to reflect the property line for the lot extended to the water's edge with the rise and fall of Devils Lake and to quiet title in the disputed tract of land to the Freidigs. Weed argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the district court erred in reforming that warranty deed. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court did not clearly err in determining a mutual mistake was made in describing the property conveyed in the warranty deed. View "Freidig v. Weed" on Justia Law

Dale Sundley appealed a judgment quieting title to certain real property in favor of Larry and Janice Moody, and that dismissed Sundley's adverse possession counterclaim. Sundley argued the district court erred in finding he did not acquire ownership of the disputed property by adverse possession and failing to find the boundary of his property was established by acquiescence. "All the elements for adverse possession must be satisfied for a claim of adverse possession under any of the statutory provisions, and if any element is not satisfied the possession will not confer title." Finding that Sundley failed to meet his burden of proving the elements of adverse possession, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Moody v. Sundley" on Justia Law

Eric Johnson and others appealed the grant of summary judgment quieting title to certain Williams County mineral interests in Suzanne Shield and others. Shield and the other defendants (collectively "Shield") were successors in interest to Eugenie and Roy Goldenberg, who in 1942, granted through a warranty deed a certain tract of Williams County property to Julian and Arthur Johnson. Johnson and the other plaintiffs (collectively "Johnson") were the successors in interest to Julian and Arthur Johnson. At the time of the conveyance, Eugenie and Roy Goldenberg were the owners of all of the minerals associated with the property. The granting clause in the warranty deed did not address mineral interests, but the warranty clause of the deed stated that the Goldenbergs "covenant . . . that they are well seized in fee of land, real estate and premises aforesaid, and have good right to sell and convey the same in manner and form aforesaid; that the same are free from all incumbrances, but reserving, however, to the grantor fifty per cent (50%) of all of the oil, gas, hydro-carbons and minerals in or with respect to said real property[.]" The last clause, beginning with "but reserving," was typed in a blank space on the printed deed form. Johnson brought this quiet title action against Shield, seeking a determination that Johnson was the owner of 100 percent of the minerals located in the tract of land conveyed by the Goldenbergs. Because the disputed language in the challenged warranty deed presented no genuine issue of material fact that the grantors intended to reserve to themselves 50 percent of the mineral interests in the conveyed property, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. View "Johnson v. Shield" on Justia Law

Phyllis Yesel and Gloria Van Dyke ("Yesel") appealed the grant of summary judgment, concluding the abandoned mineral statutes did not apply to royalty interests, and alternatively, if the statutes did apply, the royalty interests at issue here were not abandoned. Christian Teigen cross-appealed a judgment denying his motion to file a counterclaim and motion for attorneys' fees. Yesel was the surface owner of some real property located in McKenzie County. Teigen was also an heir to the named defendants ("Brandon defendants"), who owned nonparticipating royalty interests in the minerals in and under Yesel's real property. Yesel published a notice of lapse of mineral interest in the McKenzie County Farmer for each of the Section 25 and Section 26 properties, asserting Yesel succeeded to the ownership of the Brandon defendants' royalty interests in the property. In September 2011 ("first action") and April 2012 ("second action"), Yesel sued to quiet title to the Brandon defendants' royalty interests, claiming the interests were abandoned because they had not been used under the abandoned mineral statutes for more than 20 years before the first publication of the notice of lapse. The actions involved the same facts and parties; the only difference was the properties involved in each case. Yesel was granted a default judgment in the first action, but the judgment was vacated after Teigen answered in the second action. Teigen's answer alleged the Brandon defendants' royalty interests were used under the abandoned mineral statutes because the mineral interests related to the royalty interests in and under the subject property had been leased within the last 20 years, were subject to a pooling order issued from the North Dakota Industrial Commission, and an oil well had been spud and was producing. Approximately two weeks after Teigen was granted summary judgment, he moved to file counterclaims against Yesel, alleging unjust enrichment, conversion, slander of title, and negligence. The counterclaims pertained to royalty payments Yesel allegedly received attributable to the Brandon defendants' royalty interests. The court denied the motions, concluding Teigen should have asserted his counterclaims when he answered Yesel's complaint in the second action, and the quiet title actions were not frivolous or made in bad faith. The Supreme Court concluded that the district court did not err in granting Teigen summary judgment. However, the Court found the district court abused its discretion when it misapplied the law on compulsory counterclaims. The case was remanded for reconsideration of Teigen's motion to amend his answer to assert his counterclaims against Yesel. Yesel's claim that the abandoned mineral statutes applied to royalty interests was one of first impression, and through the Court did not decide that issue, it concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Teigen's motion for attorneys' fees. View "Yesel v. Brandon" on Justia Law

Soo Line Railroad Company and G-4, LLC appealed the grant of summary judgment declaring Soo Line did not own an interest in the minerals in and under certain Mountrail County property, and that G-4 did not hold a valid leasehold interest in the property. Soo Line and G-4 argued the district court erred in finding seven private deeds conveyed only easements and not a fee simple title to Soo Line's predecessor-in-interest. EOG Resources, Inc. had an interest in an oil and gas leasehold estate in Mountrail County and operated oil and gas wells. Soo Line operated in North Dakota. G-4 had exploration leases with Soo Line. EOG brought an action to quiet title to minerals in and under certain Mountrail County property against Soo Line, G-4, and other defendants claiming an interest in the property. EOG sought a declaration that Soo Line and G-4 had no interest in the minerals in and under the disputed property. Soo Line answered and brought counterclaims against EOG and cross-claims against the other defendants. G-4 filed a separate answer and brought counterclaims against EOG and cross-claims against the other defendants. The other defendants filed separate answers to EOG's complaint and Soo Line and G-4's cross-claims, aligning with EOG. After a hearing and based on the parties' stipulation, the district court partially granted EOG's motion for summary judgment and dismissed G-4's claims. After a hearing on the motion, the district court denied Soo Line and G-4's motions for summary judgment and granted the EOG parties' motion. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that several of the private deeds were unambiguous and conveyed a fee simple title to the railroad. One of the private deeds, the Court concluded, was ambiguous, but summary judgment was not appropriate. Accordingly, the Court reversed the summary judgment in favor of the EOG parties with respect to the deeds, and remanded the case for further proceedings on the "Faro" deed and for entry of judgment in favor of Soo Line and G-4 for the property covered by the unambiguous deeds. View "EOG Resources, Inc. v. Soo Line Railroad Co." on Justia Law

Jose Santoyo appealed a judgment that awarded damages to Darwin Savre for overpayments under the parties' lease and purchase option agreement and dismissed Santoyo's counterclaim for damages to the leased property. Savre owned and operated Savre's Heavy Truck & Auto Repair in Fargo. Santoyo owned the two parcels of real property and building that are the subject of the leases and option agreement in this case. The original lease term was from June 15, 2008, to June 15, 2010, with Savre paying rent of $2,300 per month until June 15, 2009, at which time the rent would increase to $2,708.33. About the time of the rent increase, Savre and Santoyo entered into a "Lease to Purchase Option Agreement." Although the lease and option agreement required Savre to pay his monthly rent payments on the first of each month, Savre was frequently late in his payments from the beginning of the lease. Santoyo accepted the payments and did not give Savre written notice of any intent to terminate the lease based on Savre's late payment. Savre made monthly payments in varying amounts under the option agreement, and the district court found he paid at least a total of $4,000 each month. In the fall of 2012, Savre and another individual formed JDDS, LLC, intending to use the entity to finance the purchase of Santoyo's property. The district court found, however, that Savre did not attempt to assign, convey, delegate or transfer his purchase option to JDDS. In late 2012, Savre made his first attempt to exercise his option to purchase the property with a handwritten notice to Santoyo. In early 2013, Savre made a second attempt to exercise the option with another handwritten notice to Santoyo. Santoyo did not respond to Savre. By the time of the second attempt to exercise the option, Savre had paid at least $180,000 in monthly payments, satisfying an option agreement requirement. After Santoyo did not sell him the property, Savre stopped making monthly payments. Santoyo initiated eviction proceedings against Savre in the district court. The court granted the eviction and entered judgment against Savre for unpaid rent and Santoyo's costs and disbursements. Savre vacated Santoyo's property at the end of June 2013 and began leasing a different space in Fargo. Savre subsequently commenced this action, alleging that Santoyo breached the option agreement when he failed to sell the property leased to Savre after he exercised his option and that Santoyo had been unjustly enriched. Santoyo denied the allegations and counterclaimed, alleging Savre violated his contractual and statutory duties by damaging the property upon being evicted from the premises. Santoyo argued the district court erred as a matter of law when the court concluded Santoyo had a contractual duty to sell his property to a third party that did not exist at the time of the agreement and had no rights under the agreement. The Supreme Court concluded the district court did not clearly err in finding that Santoyo had breached the agreement and that Santoyo had waived strict compliance with the option agreement's terms when he accepted Savre's late lease payments. Furthermore, the Court concluded the court failed to make sufficient findings of fact to explain dismissal of Santoyo's counterclaim for damages. The Court accordingly affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Savre v. Santoyo" on Justia Law

The Pifer Group, Inc., appealed, and Judith Liebelt and Sandra and Dennis Janke cross-appealed, a judgment awarding Pifer Group $8,215.81 for breach of two land auction sale agreements. Liebelt and the Jankes entered into separate land auction sale agreements with Pifer Group to auction their Cass County farmland. On the morning of the scheduled auction, Liebelt and the Jankes sent Pifer Group an email stating: "We are withdrawing from today's 11am land auction and will refuse any and all bids pursuant to our contract agreement." No auction sale was held. Pifer Group sued Liebelt and the Jankes for breach of the auction sale agreements and sought damages based on full sales commissions that would have been owed if the sales occurred. Construing the auction sale agreements, the district court on summary judgment awarded Pifer Group only cancellation fees of $8,215.81 and rejected the arguments of Liebelt and the Jankes that the agreements were void as a matter of law. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the auction sale agreements are enforceable and the district court did not err in its interpretation of them. View "Pifer Group, Inc. v. Liebelt" on Justia Law