Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Arrow Midstream Holdings, LLC and Arrow Pipeline, LLC (collectively "Arrow") appealed, and Tesla Enterprises, LLC ("Tesla") cross-appealed, a judgment dismissing without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction its action against 3 Bears Construction, LLC and Tesla for breach of contract and a declaration that Tesla's pipeline construction lien was invalid. In 2013, Arrow hired 3 Bears to be the general contractor for the construction of a pipeline located on a right-of-way easement acquired by Arrow from the Bureau of Indian Affairs over Indian trust land on the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation. 3 Bears entered into a subcontract with Tesla to supply materials and labor for the construction. 3 Bears was owned by two members of the Three Affiliated Tribes ("Tribe") and was certified under the Tribal Employment Rights Ordinance ("TERO"). 3 Bears claimed Arrow was a covered employer who was required to comply with TERO rules. After the pipeline was completed, a dispute arose between 3 Bears and Tesla concerning amounts Tesla claimed it was owed by 3 Bears for work Tesla performed. In mid-2014, Tesla sent Arrow a notice of right to file a pipeline lien under N.D.C.C. ch. 35-24. Tesla recorded the pipeline lien against Arrow in the Dunn County recorder's office in June 2014. In July 2014, Arrow commenced this action in state district court challenging the validity of the pipeline lien, seeking indemnification, and claiming 3 Bears breached the parties' contract. In August 2014, 3 Bears moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In November 2014, 3 Bears filed a complaint against Tesla and Arrow in Fort Berthold Tribal Court. 3 Bears sought a declaration that the pipeline lien was invalid, alleged Arrow had breached the master service contract, and requested an award of damages. In December 2014, the state district court agreed with 3 Bears' argument that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the lawsuit. The court concluded "exercising jurisdiction over this action under the circumstances presented here would infringe upon Tribal sovereignty." The court further concluded, "at the very least, Arrow and Tesla, as a matter of comity, should be required to exhaust their tribal court remedies before this Court exercises jurisdiction." The court dismissed the action "without prejudice to allow any of the parties to re-open the case without payment of another filing fee should it become necessary for purposes of enforcing the Tribal Court action or for any other reason." After review of the matter, the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed and remanded, concluding the district court had jurisdiction over this lawsuit. View "Arrow Midstream Holdings, LLC v. 3 Bears Construction, LLC" on Justia Law

Nathaniel Fleck and Alma Bergmann as trustees of the George J. Fleck Trust ("Fleck") appealed the grant of summary judgment quieting title to an oil and gas lease in favor of Missouri River Royalty Corp., Exxon Mobil Corp. and Mountain Pacific General, Inc. (collectively "defendants"). Fleck owns mineral interests in McKenzie County described as the south half of section 10 in range 100 west of township 150 north. In 1972, Fleck's predecessors in interest executed an oil and gas lease in favor of the defendants' predecessor in interest. The lease term was ten years and as long thereafter as oil or gas was produced. The lease also provided it would not expire if production ceased after expiration of the primary term if the lessee resumed operations to drill a well or to restore production within ninety days. In 1982, the Fleck 1 well was completed and the lease extended. In 2012, Fleck served the defendants with a notice of forfeiture and a demand for release of the lease. Fleck sued the defendants to quiet title, alleging the oil and gas lease expired due to a failure to produce oil or gas in paying quantities. The defendants answered, counterclaimed and requested the court declare the lease remained valid and in effect by the continued production of oil and gas from the Fleck 1 well and by the commencement of operations to restore production. Fleck moved for summary judgment, arguing they were entitled to a declaration quieting title to the mineral interests because the lease terminated when the Fleck 1 well stopped producing in paying quantities in 2010 and the defendants failed to engage in new drilling or reworking operations within ninety days. Pacific Mountain General and Missouri River Royalty separately moved for summary judgment, arguing the lease extended into its secondary term and remains valid and in effect based on the continued production of oil and gas by the Fleck 1 well. Exxon Mobil joined Missouri River Royalty's motion. The district court interpreted the lease and found production in paying quantities was not required to extend the lease, the well consistently produced an average of a few barrels per day, production was continuous at all relevant times and any cessation of production was temporary. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the district court misapplied the law in interpreting the lease and that summary judgment was not appropriate. View "Fleck v. Missouri River Royalty Corp." on Justia Law

Jon Norberg appealed a district court judgment allowing his former parents-in-law, Robert and Cheri Knorr, to buy back certain real property under an alleged oral lease. He argued the district court erred in concluding the Knorrs established promissory estoppel and constructive trust. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, concluding the district court's findings of promissory estoppel were not clearly erroneous. View "Knorr v. Norberg" on Justia Law

In November 2012, the Sargent County Water Resource District filed a declaratory action regarding the ownership and control of property in Sargent County, including all property located south of the north boundary of Drain 11. The District claimed ownership as the successor in interest to the Sargent County Board of Drain Commissioners, which had obtained its interest in the property by right-of-way deeds signed in 1917 and 1918 and recorded in the Sargent County register of deeds office. The District sought declaratory relief because Paul Mathews sought to exert control over the property, claiming a property interest through his rental agreement with Phyllis Delahoyde and Nancy Mathews, the purported owners of the property. Nancy Mathews and Paul Mathews answered the complaint and raised a number of defenses and a counterclaim against the District (Delahoyde did not claim an interest in the disputed property, nor did she join the codefendants in the appeal). Nancy Mathews and Paul Mathews appealed the judgment determining language of the 1917 and 1918 deeds granted fee title in the disputed property to the District's predecessor. The Supreme Court reversed after review, concluding the plain language of the 1917 and 1918 right-of-way deeds at issue conveyed easements. View "Sargent County Water Resource District v. Mathews" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Timothy Huether contracted with Nodak Mutual to provide insurance coverage for his house, buildings and structures on his farm. The coverage was under Nodak Mutual's Farm and Ranch Policy. The Farm and Ranch Policy did not provide insurance coverage for grain dryers. Huether added an equipment endorsement insuring his agricultural equipment, which included a grain handler dryer. A fire destroyed the grain handler dryer, fans and parts. Nodak Mutual's agricultural endorsement provided coverage for "direct physical loss or damage caused by perils 1 through 10." Huether's Farm and Ranch Policy listed fire as Peril 1. Damage from fire was a "direct physical loss or damage" and Nodak Mutual paid Huether $278,187.44 for damage to the grain dryer, control room and grain handling equipment. Huether did not contest the coverage or payment for those items, but claimed an additional $82,954.77 in expenses for transporting to and drying his crops at other grain drying facilities. Nodak Mutual denied Huether's claim because the agricultural equipment endorsement covered "direct physical loss or damage" and did not cover loss-of-use. Huether sued Nodak Mutual seeking damages for the denied claim. The district court found Huether's claim was not covered under the policy and granted summary judgment in favor of Nodak Mutual. Huether appealed, arguing the district court erred in granting summary judgment for Nodak Mutual because it misinterpreted the terms of the insurance policy. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Huether v. Nodak Mutual Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Rocky Norby appealed, and the Estate of Kuykendall and others cross-appealed, a judgment quieting title to certain McKenzie County property in James Kuykendall and dismissing Norby's action to eject Kuykendall from the disputed property. Because Norby could not claim title to accretions beyond the fixed boundary line set forth in his deed, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. View "Norby v. Estate of Kuykendall" on Justia Law

Greg Holverson sued Susan Lundberg to quiet title to a tract of land in Burleigh County, alleging he executed a contract for deed to purchase land from the Trust in 1978. He defaulted on payments under the contract for deed and Lundberg sent him a notice of statutory cancellation of the contract on December 13, 2012, which required him to satisfy the contract by June 17, 2013. Holverson alleged he presented a cashier's check to Lundberg for the balance due under the contract for deed on June 14, 2013, but she refused to accept the check. He sought to require Lundberg to accept the check, convey the land to him and to quiet title to the land. Lundberg answered and counterclaimed, seeking to rescind the 1978 contract for deed and a 1997 amended contract for deed and a mortgage, alleging Holverson's fraud and false representations induced her to forebear from cancelling the contract for deed before 2012, and she instead agreed to amend the contract for deed and a mortgage in 1997 to extend his time to pay and to reduce the amount owed the Trust. She alternatively claimed that if she was not entitled to rescind the contract for deed, she was entitled to damages for Holverson's fraud and misrepresentation. The district court granted Holverson summary judgment, dismissing Lundberg's counterclaims, directing her to accept Holverson's cashier's check and convey the land to him, and quieting title in the land to him. Lundberg appealed the grant of summary judgment. The Supreme Court concluded it did not have jurisdiction over this case because the district court had ordered but not yet determined the amount of attorney fees due Holverson. Accordingly, the Court dismissed this appeal. View "Holverson v. Lundberg" on Justia Law

Ronald Olson and Marlys Kjellberg appealed the grant of summary judgment dismissing their action for damages against Alerus Financial Corporation, Alerus Financial, National Association ("Alerus Entities") and Jayson Menke, and an order denying leave to amend their complaint. Robert Olson, Ronald Olson and Marlys Kjellberg ("Olsons") are siblings who owned farm real estate in Grand Forks County, North Dakota. Jayson Menke was a real estate agent with Botsford & Qualey Land Company of Grand Forks. On June 9, 2011, the Olsons signed a real estate listing agreement with Botsford Qualey and Menke that provided Botsford Qualey with the exclusive right to sell 200 acres of the Olsons' farmland. The listing agreement stated, "Seller is solely responsible for determining the appropriate listing price and has elected to offer the property by Conventional Sale." Menke provided the Olsons an analysis of their farmland, estimating the fair market value at $1,500 per acre. The Olsons increased the listing price to $1,700 per acre. The listing agreement shows an initially proposed sale price of $225,000, which the Olsons increased when they crossed out that amount and inserted $340,000 as the selling price. The Olsons' long-time tenant made a written offer to buy the land at the full asking price of $1,700 per acre. he Olsons and Menke subsequently learned the tenant was attempting to resell the farmland at a higher price than he agreed to pay the Olsons. On August 30, 2011, the tenant closed on his purchase from the Olsons. That same day, the tenant closed on the sale of the same farmland to a nearby farmer for $500 more per acre than he paid the Olsons. On December 15, 2011, Alerus Financial, N.A. acquired the stock of Botsford Qualey and Botsford Qualey filed notice of intent to dissolve. the Olsons sued "Alerus Financial Corporation (former parent company of Botsford & Qualey Land Company)." Alerus Financial Corporation answered. At about the same time, Botsford Qualey and Menke served a joint answer to the complaint even though they were not listed as defendants or served with the summons. The Olsons moved to amend the complaint to add Alerus Financial, N.A., Menke and Botsford Qualey as defendants. On April 4, 2014, the district court granted the Olsons leave to add Alerus Financial, N.A. and Menke as defendants but did not allow the Olsons to add Botsford Qualey. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the district court's order denying leave to amend the complaint and remanded for further proceedings. The Court also reversed the district court's order granting summary judgment dismissing the Olsons' claims against Menke for breach of fiduciary duty. The Court affirmed the district court's order for summary judgment dismissing the Olsons' claims seeking to impose respondeat superior liability on the Alerus entities and to pierce the Alerus entities' corporate veil. View "Olson v. Alerus Financial Corp." on Justia Law

Laura Weed appeals from a judgment reforming a warranty deed and quieting title in a tract of land to Allan and Robin Freidig. In 2003, Weed hired David Hovendick, a registered land surveyor, to survey her house and a five-acre tract of land around her house on the east side of Devils Lake for her lender. According to Hovendick, Weed informed him that she did not want to include any land under Devils Lake in the survey because she did not want the submerged land encumbered by her mortgage. Hovendick's certificate of survey followed Weed's instructions and did not reference the Devils Lake shoreline nor did it extend her property's boundary line below the shoreline. In 2004, Weed hired Hovendick to survey and evenly divide another tract of land south of her five-acre parcel into two lots, each about one acre in size. According to Hovendick, he used witness corners for those two lake front lots rather than monument corners so an owner could identify the property line as the water rises or falls and he would have used monument corners if Weed had instructed him to set the property corners of those two lots at the shoreline. In 2004, Weed employed the Freidigs' real estate firm to sell one of the lots as "lake front property" with "excellent slope to water." The lot was sold to John and LaMae Henry by warranty deed describing the west boundary of the conveyed land in language tracking Hovendick's certificate of survey that the property lines shall extend or shorten to the water's edge with the rise and fall of Devils Lake dictating the west boundary of the lot. In 2005, Weed employed the Freidigs' firm to sell the other lot as "lake front property" with "excellent slope to water." The lot was sold to Marty Robertson by warranty deed describing the west boundary of the lot "along said water's edge" of Devils Lake and containing "0.97 acres more or less." The deed was prepared by the same attorney who prepared the earlier Weed-Henry deed and stated the legal description for the lot was obtained from Hovendick's certificate of survey, but the deed did not contain the language describing the west boundary of the lot as extending or shortening to the water's edge with the rise and fall of Devils Lake. In 2009, Robertson sold the lot to the Freidigs by warranty deed using the same property description as the Weed-Robertson warranty deed. In 2013, a discrepancy in the lake side boundary of the property described in the Weed-Robertson and Robertson-Freidig warranty deeds was discovered. The Freidigs sued Weed and all others claiming an interest in the lot for reformation to reflect the property line for the lot extended to the water's edge with the rise and fall of Devils Lake and to quiet title in the disputed tract of land to the Freidigs. Weed argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the district court erred in reforming that warranty deed. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court did not clearly err in determining a mutual mistake was made in describing the property conveyed in the warranty deed. View "Freidig v. Weed" on Justia Law

Dale Sundley appealed a judgment quieting title to certain real property in favor of Larry and Janice Moody, and that dismissed Sundley's adverse possession counterclaim. Sundley argued the district court erred in finding he did not acquire ownership of the disputed property by adverse possession and failing to find the boundary of his property was established by acquiescence. "All the elements for adverse possession must be satisfied for a claim of adverse possession under any of the statutory provisions, and if any element is not satisfied the possession will not confer title." Finding that Sundley failed to meet his burden of proving the elements of adverse possession, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Moody v. Sundley" on Justia Law