Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Jesse Keidel appealed a district court judgment affirming an administrative law judge’s (ALJ) decision denying Keidel permanent partial impairment (PPI) benefits. In May 1996, Keidel suffered a work-related injury to the meniscus of his left knee. Keidel had surgery in December 1996. In October 1997, Keidel underwent a second surgery to his left knee, a high tibial osteotomy. The doctor performing an independent medical evaluation in May 1998 opined that Keidel’s left knee condition was a “combination of his significant preexisting left knee degenerative joint disease and the work-related permanent aggravation.” Following a permanent impairment evaluation, WSI denied Keidel a PPI award because Keidel’s 15% whole body impairment was below the statutory 16% threshold for an impairment award. In January 2019, Keidel had left total knee replacement surgery. In June 2020, Keidel underwent a second permanent impairment evaluation. The evaluating doctor, Dr. Redington, determined Keidel had a 24% whole person impairment for the left total knee replacement. "Giving [Keidel] the benefit of the doubt, I will apportion 50% of the impairment rating of the left knee to pre-existing conditions." In November 2020, WSI denied an impairment award for Keidel’s left knee because his overall impairment rating after apportionment after the second evaluation was 12%, which was below the 14% threshold for an impairment award under then current version of N.D.C.C. § 65-05-12.2. At a hearing, Keidel argued the apportionment of his left knee impairment due to preexisting arthritis was litigated and decided in a 2000 hearing. Keidel argued administrative res judicata prohibited WSI from litigating whether his permanent impairment could be apportioned to a preexisting condition. The ALJ and district court concluded administrative res judicata did not apply. Finding no error in that judgment, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "Keidel v. WSI, et al." on Justia Law

John and Tammy Sadek appealed orders denying their post-judgment motion and sanctioning their attorney under N.D.R.Civ.P. 11. Jason Weber was a Richland County, North Dakota sheriff’s deputy. Sadek acted as a confidential informant for Weber. Sadek was later found in the Red River with a gunshot wound to his head and a backpack full of rocks tied to his body. Sadek’s parents sued Weber and Richland County alleging Weber deceived Sadek by telling Sadek he faced a lengthy prison sentence. They also alleged Weber negligently caused Sadek’s death by failing to adequately train and protect him. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Weber and Richland County: the misrepresentation underlying the deceit claim was a prediction of a future event and therefore not actionable as deceit as a matter of law; as to the negligence claim, there was no evidence to establish Weber’s conduct was the proximate cause of Sadek’s death. In the first appeal ("Sadek I"), the Sadeks argued a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether Weber’s conduct caused Andrew Sadek’s death. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, holding that "the evidence only presents a timeline of events and a request that a jury be allowed to speculate what happened as a result of that string of events." The Court's mandate affirming the dismissal judgment was issued on October 7, 2020. In 2022, the Sadeks filed a “Motion for Summary Judgment,” citing N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b) but requested relief under N.D.R.Civ.P. 56. The Sadeks argued the district court made a mistake by relying on “bad faith” representations by Weber who “successfully hoodwinked [the district court] and obtained a Judgment of Dismissal.” Yet the Sadeks claimed they were entitled to summary judgment because “no triable issue of fact exists as to whether Defendants owed a duty of care to Andrew under the Statute.” The brief was accompanied by a list of signatures “verifying” they agreed with on Supreme Court Justice's dissent in Sadek I. The district court entered an order denying the Sadeks’ post-judgment motion, characterizing it as "baffling and bizarre." After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s orders and granted the Appellees’ motion for sanctions. View "Sadek, et al. v. Weber, et al." on Justia Law

Robert Procive appealed when a district court dismissed his appeal of an Administrative Law Judge’s order that denied his claim for Workforce Safety and Insurance (“WSI”) benefits. Procive submitted his first claim in 2020, alleging he suffered carpal tunnel syndrome due to injuries to both wrists, elbows, and shoulders resulting from repetitive digging, hammering and driving stakes, steel posts, and iron rods into the ground. He claimed his original injury occurred in western North Dakota, and he notified his employer of his injury in November 2004 and October 2016. WSI accepted liability for Procive’s right carpal tunnel injury, but denied for the left. Later WSI issued its order reversing its acceptance of liability for the right carpal tunnel, finding Procive willfully made false statements about whether he had prior injuries or received treatment. WSI ordered Procive to repay past benefits he received. After a hearing the ALJ affirmed WSI’s decisions denying coverage. Procive appealed to the district court in Stutsman County. WSI moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Procive was required to file his appeal in the county where the injury occurred or the county where he resided. To this, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, finding the district court did not have jurisdiction. View "Procive v. WSI" on Justia Law

St. Alexius Medical Center, d/b/a CHI St. Alexius Health Bismarck, requested a supervisory writ preventing enforcement of the district court’s order compelling disclosure of privileged information. Kevin McKibbage sued Daniel Dixon, Bone & Joint Center, and CHI for medical malpractice relating to a surgery Dixon performed in 2017. In response to McKibbage’s discovery requests, CHI produced some of the requested documents and asserted privileges on others. CHI provided a privilege log identifying undisclosed documents and the privileges claimed. McKibbage filed a motion to compel arguing CHI did not provide sufficient information in the privilege log. CHI responded that it identified all the information it could without violating the peer review law, but CHI agreed to produce an amended privilege log containing greater descriptions. The district court found the law permitted the disclosure of additional information and ordered the following to be disclosed: the dates the documents were created, the identity of the person who created each document and their position at the time of creation, and the identity of the person who received each document and their position for peer review. CHI argued to the North Dakota Supreme Court that the disclosures violated North Dakota’s statutory peer review privilege. The Supreme Court granted CHI's petition and directed the district court to vacate its November 8, 2021 discovery order. View "St. Alexius Medical Center v. Nesvig, et al." on Justia Law

Robyn Krile appealed a judgment dismissing her defamation claims against Julie Lawyer. In 2017, Assistant State’s Attorney Julie Lawyer received an anonymous letter concerning a Bismarck police officer’s destruction of evidence. During Lawyer’s investigation, she reviewed the file of Sergeant Robyn Krile and concluded Krile had made false statements as a Bismarck police officer. Lawyer sent a letter (“Giglio letter”) to Bismarck Police Chief Dan Donlin summarizing her investigation into Krile’s file and stating her belief that Krile had made false statements as a Bismarck police officer. Lawyer informed Chief Donlin that such information would have to be disclosed to the defense in cases in which Krile was involved pursuant to Giglio and, as a result, the Burleigh County State’s Attorney’s Office would no longer use Krile as a witness in its cases. The Bismarck Police Department terminated Krile’s employment because the Burleigh County State’s Attorney’s Office was no longer willing to use Krile as a witness. Krile filed a complaint with the Department of Labor and Human Rights claiming the Bismarck Police Department discriminated against her based on race and sex. As part of the Department of Labor’s investigation, the Bismarck Police Department submitted two affidavits of Lawyer in which she explained the circumstances and her reasoning for issuing the Giglio letter. The Department of Labor concluded the Bismarck Police Department did not unlawfully discriminate against Krile. In March 2019, Krile sued Lawyer in her official and individual capacity for defamation. The complaint alleged Lawyer defamed Krile by publishing the Giglio letter to the Bismarck Police Department, specifically Chief Donlin, and by publishing her affidavits to the Department of Labor in the course of its investigation. The complaint also alleged Lawyer defamed Krile by publishing the Giglio letter to the Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) Board and by publishing the Giglio letter and related information to Krile’s prospective employers. Appealing the district court's judgment, Krile argued the district court erred by failing to consider all of the materials the parties submitted and thereby treat the motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment. She also argued the court erred in dismissing her defamation claims. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, concluding Krile failed to plead a valid claim for defamation. View "Krile v. Lawyer" on Justia Law

Cudd Pressure Control, Inc. and WISCO, Inc. appealed a judgment entered in favor of Murex Petroleum Corporation in a personal injury case. As between WISCO and Murex, the case presented the question of whether a defense and indemnification provision in a contract applied. As between Cudd and Murex, the case presented a question of whether the district court abused its discretion when it sanctioned Cudd for spoliation of evidence. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court erred as a matter of law when it granted summary judgment for Murex determining the defense and indemnification provision applied. The Supreme Court also concluded the trial court abused its discretion when it sanctioned Cudd. Therefore, the Court reversed those portions of the judgment. Because the sanctions included an adverse inference instruction against Cudd at trial that may have affected the jury’s fault determination, the case was remanded for a new trial on the issue of fault apportionment. View "Simmons v. Cudd Pressure Control, et al." on Justia Law

Michael and Mindy Zepeda appealed a district court judgment dismissing their claims for failure to prosecute and the denial of their post-judgment request to alter or amend the judgment. On November 25, 2013, Michael and Mindy Zepeda commenced a personal injury action against Adam and Mason Cool by service of summons and complaint. The personal injury action arose from a December 2011 assault by the Cools on Michael Zepeda resulting in Michael Zepeda sustaining injuries. Over six years later, on January 7, 2020, the Zepedas filed the summons and complaint. On July 17, 2020, the Zepedas filed a motion for reconsideration arguing the district court erred in dismissing the action because they appropriately pursued their claim under the circumstances. The court denied the motion as lacking merit after determining the request for relief under N.D.R.Civ.P. 59(j) was untimely and there was no other sufficient basis to warrant reconsideration. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, concluding the court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the Zepedas’ claims for failure to prosecute. View "Zepeda, et al. v. Cool, et al." on Justia Law

Lorne Jay appealed a district court judgment ordering Jay pay Lawrence Lavallie $946,421.76. Lavallie commenced this personal injury action after he was involved in a motor vehicle accident with Jay and Michael Charette. In Lavallie v. Jay, 945 N.W.2d 288, the North Dakota Surpeme Court retained its jurisdiction while remanding the case back to the district court for further determination on subject matter jurisdiction. Relying on the findings of the district court, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded with directions to vacate the judgment and to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Lavallie v. Jay, et al." on Justia Law

In June 2008, Scot Decker sustained work related injuries while he was working for Cyclone Drilling, Inc. in Mountrail County, North Dakota. WSI accepted liability and Decker received more than $1,250,000 in benefits from WSI. In June 2014, Decker signed a third party notice of legal representation advising WSI that he retained an attorney and planned to bring an action against a third party for the work related injuries. The notice stated Decker would act as a trustee for WSI’s subrogated interest. The notice also included a lien notice, advising that WSI had a lien in the full amount it paid in all benefits for Decker’s claim and that WSI could sue if Decker received any money related to the claim from a third party and WSI did not receive payment of its lien within 30 days of the third party’s payment to Decker. Decker brought an action against I.E. Miller Services, Inc., received a favorable verdict, and was awarded $2,045,972.60 in damages. In December 2018, WSI issued a subrogation order, finding it paid Decker for his work related injury and Decker failed to pay WSI’s subrogation interest and lien within 30 days. Decker requested a hearing before an ALJ. Decker alleged WSI incorrectly applied the law, it inappropriately included in the subrogation order benefits paid related to medical negligence which is the subject of a separate third-party action, and it did not properly determine the amount of its lien. Decker also argued WSI did not have a right to recovery of its lien before attorney’s fees and litigation expenses were paid. The ALJ ruled in favor of WSI, and Decker appealed. Decker argued the district court erred in concluding it does not have jurisdiction and dismissing his appeal. The North Dakota Supreme Court found Decker brought his appeal in Burleigh County District Court, and it was undisputed that Decker did not reside in Burleigh County and that his injuries did not occur in Burleigh County. Because N.D.C.C. 65-10-01 applied and required Decker to bring the appeal in the county where he resided or the county where the injury was inflicted, the Burleigh County district court did not have jurisdiction over the appeal. Dismissal was affirmed. View "Decker v. WSI" on Justia Law

WSI appealed a judgment ordering payment of death benefits to Gloria Felan. In 2017, Fred Felan was injured when driving a loaded truck that tipped on its side. Julie Schulz of KBO Farms, Fred’s employer, arrived at the scene a short time later. Fred declined an ambulance but agreed to allow Schulz to drive him to the hospital. At the hospital Fred complained of left chest and rib pain. X-rays taken at the hospital did not reveal any fractures. The next morning, Schulz picked Fred up from the hotel. She noted Fred was falling asleep during the meal and expressed concern he should return to the hospital to get checked again. Fred declined. Fred was discovered dead in his hotel room two days after the accident. WSI accepted Fred’s claim for injuries relating to his truck accident for contusion of thorax. WSI also did not believe Fred died from his work-related injury because Fred had multiple health problems including some related to his heart and diabetes. An autopsy confirmed Fred died of congestive cardiomyopathy and arteriosclerotic heart disease. Gloria thereafter filed a claim for death benefits. WSI would deny this claim, but an ALJ reversed the agency’s denial. WSI argued the ALJ and the district court misapplied the law by failing to properly apply N.D.C.C. 65-01-02(11)(a)(3). The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the ALJ and district court, finding the ALJ was not provided objective evidence of the claimed injury: Fred died of a cardiac arrhythmia caused by blunt force trauma to his chest cavity. However, a medical expert admitted there was no objective medical evidence that an arrhythmia occurred. Rather, the conclusion the expert reached was a result of deductive reasoning. “As our precedent indicates, objective medical evidence may be established by a physician’s medical opinion based on an examination, a patient’s medical history, and the physician’s education and experience. However, objective medical evidence may not be established solely by deductive reasoning. On this record, the ALJ erred in concluding there was objective medical evidence of a cardiac arrhythmia.” View "WSI v. Felan, et al." on Justia Law