Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The North Dakota Department of Transportation appealed the district court's judgment reversing the administrative hearing officer's decision to suspend Dante Pesanti's driving privileges for 180 days for driving under the influence of alcohol. After review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded reasonable minds could have concluded the administrative hearing officer's finding that the arresting officer had a reasonable and articulable suspicion that Pesanti had committed a violation is supported by the weight of the evidence on the entire record. Therefore, the Court reversed the district court's judgment and reinstated the administrative hearing officer's decision to suspend Pesanti's driving privileges. View "Pesanti v. N.D. Dep't of Transportation" on Justia Law

Kevin Moore appealed a district court order summarily dismissing his third postconviction application, arguing his postconviction counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to file a brief in support of his postconviction application. Because the district court's summary dismissal of Moore's postconviction application was not erroneous, and because an ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel claim could not be established from the record, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court order. View "Moore v. North Dakota" on Justia Law

C.G. appealed a juvenile court judgment terminating his parental rights and directing him to pay child support for his son, C.N. C.G. argued that the juvenile court was clearly erroneous in finding C.N. was a deprived child and that aggravated circumstances warrant termination. C.G. also argued the juvenile court erred in ordering C.G. to pay child support despite terminating his parental rights. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment terminating the parental rights of C.G. and ordering him to provide child support. View "Interest of C.N." on Justia Law

Ford Motor Credit Company appealed a district court order dismissing its action to renew a prior judgment. Ford sued Jeremy Halvorson in Minnesota on a contract matter. A judgment was entered in Minnesota against Halvorson. Halvorson moved from Minnesota to North Dakota, and the Minnesota judgment was registered in North Dakota in 2011. Halvorson did not pay the judgment. In 2013, Ford commenced this action to renew the judgment by personal service of the summons and complaint upon Halvorson. Halvorson did not respond to the summons and complaint, and Ford moved for entry of a default judgment against Halvorson. The district court, on its own motion, denied the motion for default judgment and instead dismissed Ford's complaint with prejudice, concluding that Ford's action was an improper duplicate action on the original debt and that the proper method to renew a judgment was by affidavit under the procedure provided in N.D.C.C. 28-20-21. Ford moved for reconsideration of the order dismissing its action, and the court entered an order affirming dismissal of the action. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's order dismissing Ford's action on the judgment. Because there was no reason apparent on the record to deny the default judgment, the Court remanded the case to the district court with directions to enter a default judgment in favor of Ford in its action to renew the prior judgment. View "Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Halvorson" on Justia Law

Appellants Gary Puhr, Kristen Pfahl, Brad Schubert, and Brian Shubert appealed orders in consolidated probates of the estates of Lowell, Gust, and Anne Shubert approving a land sale by the estates' personal representative, Charlene Wikholm, and denying the appellants' petition to remove Wikholm as the estates' personal representative. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that the appeal from the order approving the land sale was moot and that the order denying the petition to remove Wikholm was appealable and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition to remove Wikholm as the estates' personal representative. Therefore, the Court dismissed the appeal of the order approving the land sale and affirmed the order denying the removal of Wikholm as personal representative. View "Estates of Shubert" on Justia Law

Jason White appealed a district court order summarily affirming a municipal court judgment of conviction for disorderly conduct. White himself did not appear at a pre-trial hearing; his attorney did. Because the district court's summary affirmance was improper under N.D.R.Crim.P. 37(l), the Supreme Court reversed and remanded. On its face, the language of the summary affirmance subdivision was clear that it applied only when the defendant does not appear at a trial anew. Thus, summary affirmance is improper at hearings, such as dispositional conferences, which occur before the trial anew. View "City of Fargo v. White" on Justia Law

The biological father of a minor child appealed an order terminating his parental rights to the child and an order granting a petition for adoption of the child. The father argued he did not fail to communicate with and fail to manifest a significant parental interest in his child without justifiable cause when, while he was incarcerated, the biological mother obtained a protection order against him, returned all correspondence and packages sent by him or his family, refused all phone or electronic communications from his family, and refused any visitation between the child and him or any of his family. The Supreme Court affirmed the orders terminating the biological father's parental rights and granting the adoption. View "Adoption of I.R.R." on Justia Law

Gaylord Gene Evans appealed after a jury found him guilty of negligent homicide. Evans argued:(1) there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction; (2) that the district court permitted a lay witness to testify as an expert; (3) and that the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct. Upon careful analysis of the district court record, the Supreme Court concluded: (1) defendant failed to show that the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, permitted no reasonable inference of guilt; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing an officer to testify because he did not give expert testimony under N.D.R.Ev. 702 and his opinions were based on his personal experience, perception, and helpful to the jury's determination; (3) and, in light of the entire trial, it was clear the State's innocuous remark did not rise to the level of misconduct resulting in an unfair trial, or deprive Evans of his due process rights. View "North Dakota v. Evans" on Justia Law

James Leach, IDA Marketing Corporation, and IDA of Moorhead Corporation appealed a judgment holding them jointly and severally liable to Reed Danuser for claims involving Danuser's termination as president and chief executive officer of the corporations and Leach's breach of a fiduciary duty to Danuser and requiring IDA Moorhead to pay Danuser for loans he made to IDA Moorhead. Upon careful analysis of the inter-company agreements and facts presented at the district court, the Supreme Court affirmed, finding: (1) James Leach was responsible for freezing out Danuser's interests in the corporations, which, as found by the court, involved more than just the wrongful termination of Danuser's employment; (2) Leach was not a party to a stock buy-sell agreement, and under the circumstances of this case as found by the district court involving the freeze out of Danuser's interests in the intertwined corporations, the court's determination of damages was not a misapplication of the law and was not arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable; (3) both James Leach and IDA Moorhead gained from James Leach's actions, which were attributable to the corporation. The district court decided James Leach had control of the corporations when he breached his fiduciary duties to Danuser. Therefore, the district court did not misapply the law in deciding James Leach and the corporations were jointly and severally liable for Danuser's damages and the court's decision was not arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable. View "Danuser v. IDA Marketing Corp." on Justia Law

Darl Hehn appealed an order denying his petition for discharge from civil commitment as a sexually dangerous individual and from an order delaying a hearing on a subsequent petition for discharge until twelve months had passed since the last discharge hearing. Upon review of the record of this case, the Supreme Court affirmed, concluding: (1) the district court did not err in finding that Hehn remained a sexually dangerous individual; and (2) the district court did not err in concluding Hehn was not entitled to another discharge hearing until twelve months had passed since the last discharge hearing. View "Matter of Hehn" on Justia Law