Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Dakota Resource Council (DRC) appealed a district court judgment that affirmed a North Dakota Public Service Commission (PSC) order. DRC argued: (1) the PSC's decision was not in accordance with the law; and, (2) the PSC's conclusions of law and order were not supported by its findings of fact. In 2008, Falkirk Mining Company filed an application with the PSC requesting revision of a surface mining permit. Falkirk proposed changing the postmining use of 428 acres of land from agricultural and industrial use to recreational use. The purpose of the revision was to facilitate the transfer of approximately 730 acres of land from Falkirk to the North Dakota Department of Transportation (NDDOT). NDDOT planned to use the land as mitigation acres to eliminate "no mow" areas within the rights-of-way of the state highway system in McLean County. PSC granted the revision subject to the right of adversely affected parties to request a formal hearing. DRC asserted 86 acres located in noncontiguous parcels throughout the proposed wildlife management area should remain designated for agricultural use. Game and Fish planned to allow local farmers to grow crops on the 86 acres, harvesting 70 percent and leaving the remaining 30 percent standing as food for wildlife. McLean County, NDDOT and Game and Fish petitioned to intervene. The PSC then held a public hearing. The PSC affirmed its conditional approval of the revision to Falkirk's permit. DRC appealed to the district court. The district court affirmed the PSC's decision. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed: “[w]hen considered together, the PSC's findings of fact do not indicate its decision to grant the revision was based on the desire to facilitate the land transfer agreement rather than on consideration of the higher and better use of the land. ... The PSC's conclusions and order affirming its decision granting the revision to recreational use were supported by its findings of fact.” View "Dakota Resource Council v. N.D. Public Service Comm'n" on Justia Law

Appellant Beverly Fetzer appealed a district court judgment that affirmed a Workforce Safety and Insurance (WSI) order denying her request for benefits. While walking down a hallway on her employer's premises and during work hours, Appellant thought she heard someone call her name. Turning in response, she caught her foot and fell, fracturing her left hip and wrist. No cause of the fall was apparent. Appellant filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits with WSI, and WSI denied her claim. Appellant submitted a request for reconsideration; WSI issued an order consistent with its prior decision, determining Appellant’s injury "occurred in the course of, but did not arise out of" her employment. WSI added, "Mere walking, without more, is not an activity that is sufficiently linked to Claimant's employment so that the injury can be deemed to have arisen from employment." Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed: “If merely being at work was sufficient to show causation, the legislature need not have required the 'arising out of' test." Appellant was unable to prove a causal connection between her employment and injury. View "Fetzer v. Workforce Safety & Insurance" on Justia Law

Lance Morris appealed a district court judgment awarding Ceisha Moller primary residential responsibility of the parties' two children. Morris and Moller were not married but lived together from the latter part of 2004 through February 2009. They had two children--C.M., a son, and J.M., a daughter--before separating. Moller also had a daughter, A.G., from a previous relationship; A.G. resided with the parties and their children. After the parties separated, Morris filed suit for primary residential responsibility of the children. Moller answered, seeking primary residential responsibility herself, and she moved for an interim order awarding her temporary primary residential responsibility. A trial was held to determine parental rights and responsibilities. Both parties alleged the other had abused drugs during their relationship. Morris asserted Moller used methamphetamine during her pregnancies with C.M., who was born in 2005, and J.M., who was born in 2007, which Moller denied. Among the witnesses called at trial were the children's pediatrician and a parenting investigator, the latter of whom Morris claimed was biased toward Moller. After analyzing the best interests and welfare of the children under the factors set forth in N.D.C.C. sec. 14-09-06.2(1), the district court found it was in the children's best interests for Moller to have primary residential responsibility and for Morris to have reasonable parenting time. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the court's judgment was not clearly erroneous, and affirmed. View "Morris v. Moller" on Justia Law

Petitioner Fred M. Hector, Jr. appealed a district court judgment that affirmed the Fargo Board of City Commissioners' decision to approve special assessments against his property. In his appeal to the district court, Petitioner alleged at least 34 errors existed in the proceedings for the special assessments. In his appeal to the Supreme Court, Petitioner argued the total amount assessed for an improvement project was improperly calculated and should have been based on the City's true costs for the project, the method used to determine the amount assessed against his property was improper, the Assessment Commission failed to comply with certain statutory requirements and the City Commission failed to properly review the Assessment Commission's decision. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Petitioner was given an opportunity to appear and speak at an October, 2009 City Commission hearing. He also submitted written objections to the City Commission. The City Commission heard Petitioner’s objections and they questioned the City's attorney, the Special Assessment Coordinator, and the City Auditor. The Court concluded the City Commission complied with the statutory requirements for review of the assessments by the Special Assessment Commission. Furthermore, the Court considered all the other arguments Petitioner raised, and concluded they were without merit. View "Hector v. City of Fargo" on Justia Law

Defendant Richard Morin appealed a criminal judgment that was based upon his conditional plea of guilty to simple assault on a peace officer. Defendant pled guilty after the district court denied his motion to suppress evidence. In 2010, Bismarck police officers responded to a domestic-disturbance call at the residence of Defendant and Christine Chase, Defendant’s girlfriend. At the suppression hearing, Chase and Officer Dustin Miller, one of the officers who responded, testified. Defendant moved to suppress evidence, alleging "[l]aw enforcement officers in this matter unlawfully entered the residence of Mr. Morin in violation of his right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure." Defendant moved to suppress all "illegally obtained evidence seized" as a result of the entry and any statements he made after the entry. The State resisted Defendant’s motion. The district court held a hearing and denied Defendant’s motion, determining Chase consented to Officer Miller's entry of the home and exigent circumstances existed to allow Officer Miller to enter the home without a warrant. Based on the issues presented from the parties and the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded there was sufficient competent evidence to support the district court's findings. View "North Dakota v. Morin" on Justia Law

Defendant Christian Antonio Alaniz, Jr., appealed an order deferring imposition of sentence entered after he conditionally pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. Defendant argued the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence because there was not probable cause to justify the search of his person and the exception to the probable cause requirement for warrantless searches by school officials did not apply. Troy Vanyo was a police officer with the Grand Forks Police Department and was assigned to work as a school resource officer at a high school in Grand Forks. Vanyo had received information about possible drug use involving students in an area approximately a block and a half from the high school. One of the students was later identified as Defendant. The students walked to a town square area and Vanyo followed in his patrol car. Vanyo testified the students were seated when they saw him, stood up, and quickly walked toward a stage area in the town square. Later, Vanyo observed Defendant waiting to talk to the attendance secretary and he informed the school principal that Defendant was the other individual he observed in the town square and suspected was involved in drug activity. The principal took Defendant into a detention room and Vanyo followed them. Vanyo testified the principal questioned Defendant, Vanyo testified he told Defendant something like "if you have anything on you, you need to lay it on the table now." Defendant emptied his pockets, which contained a glass pipe and synthetic marijuana. In moving to suppress the evidence, Defendant argued the police failed to advise him of his rights under "Miranda v. Arizona," (384 U.S. 436 (1966)), there was not probable cause justifying the search of his person, and the exception to the probable cause requirement for searches by school officials did not apply. The district court denied the motion, ruling the reasonableness standard for searches by school officials applied and the search was reasonable. Defendant then entered a conditional guilty plea and reserved his right to appeal the court's denial of his suppression motion. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the search was not excessively intrusive in light of Defendant's age, gender, and nature of the suspicion. View "North Dakota v. Alaniz" on Justia Law

Petitioner Paul Schock appealed a district court judgment that affirmed an administrative order suspending his driver's license for 180 days for driving a vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, concluding "a reasoning mind reasonably could have concluded Schock provided a breath sample within two hours of driving a motor vehicle." The Court declined to grant his request for attorney's fees and costs. View "Schock v. N.D. Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

Sisters of Mary of the Presentation Long Term Care, d/b/a Ave Maria Village ("Sisters of Mary"), appealed, and Northern Excavating Co., Inc. ("Northern") cross-appealed a trial court's judgment awarding Northern $81,694.23 plus interest at 1.5 percent and costs at $743.33, and awarding Sisters of Mary $3,231.00 in attorney's fees. In October of 2009, Sisters of Mary and Northern executed a contract wherein Northern agreed to repair a water main break on Sisters of Mary's property for the cost of its "[t]ime and [m]aterials[.]" The contract did not contain a specific price. Following completion of the repairs, Northern submitted a bill for $103,244.11 to Sisters of Mary. Sisters of Mary found the bill excessive and refused to pay, asserting the repairs only had a value of approximately $40,000. Northern filed a construction lien covering the repaired property and sued Sisters of Mary seeking $98,806.98 for breach of contract and foreclosure of the lien. Sisters of Mary answered and counterclaimed alleging breach of contract, unlawful sales practices, and invalid construction lien/slander of title. Sisters of Mary also sought a jury trial. By stipulation, issues relating to the foreclosure of the construction lien were reserved and not submitted to the jury. The jury returned a verdict awarding Northern $81,694.23 plus interest at 1.5 percent for time and materials provided under the contract. After the verdict was rendered, Sisters of Mary applied for its costs and attorney's fees. In its post-trial brief, Sisters of Mary claimed it successfully challenged Northern's lien and argued the court was required to award it all of its attorney's fees and costs associated with the action. In its own post-trial brief, Northern argued it was unreasonable to require lienholders to pay costs and attorney's fees when a lienholder does not recover the precise amount claimed in a lien. The trial court ultimately awarded Sisters of Mary a portion of its attorney's fees, explaining it was a reasonable award given Sisters of Mary failed to specify "any fees that were directly related to the construction lien issue[.]" The trial court also found Northern was the prevailing party and awarded its costs. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the Legislature intended to award an owner literally all of the costs and attorney's fees arising out of a lawsuit when challenging a lien was not the only disputed cause of action: "[t]here is nothing in the statute or the legislative history to support that conclusion. We recognize that Sisters of Mary must provide the court with an itemization of its attorney's fees and costs in order for the trial court to determine those related to the successful contest of the accuracy of the lien." The Court reversed the award of attorney's fees and costs and remanded that issue to the trial court. Because the district court misconstrued the fees and costs statute, the Court reversed in part and remanded for the district court to determine the reasonable amount of attorney's fees associated with contesting the accuracy of the construction lien. View "Northern Excavating v. Sisters of Mary of the Presentation" on Justia Law

Petitioner Thomas Moore appealed a judgment that dismissed his claim for medical expenses incurred by his son, M.M., in their personal injury action against Fargo Public School District No. 1 and Eugenia Hart. In May 2004, M.M., a 15-year-old student at Discovery Middle School in Fargo, was seriously injured while practicing a bike stunt in the school auditorium in preparation for '60s Day, part of the curriculum for Hart's history class. Moore and M.M. brought a personal injury action against the District and Hart. The district court dismissed the action against the District as a matter of law, and a jury returned a verdict in favor of Hart. The Supreme Court concluded the court erred in ruling the recreational use immunity statutes barred the action against the District and erred in excluding certain evidence from the jury in the action against Hart, and we reversed and remanded for a new trial. On remand, Hart settled, and the case was tried to the jury only against the District. At the close of the evidence, the district court rejected the District's request to include a line on the special verdict form for apportioning fault to Petitioner, concluding there was no evidence from which a jury could find him was at fault. The jury returned a verdict allocating 30 percent fault to "Eugenia Hart and any other employee of the Fargo Public School District" and 70 percent fault to M.M. The jury awarded Petitioner $285,000 for past economic damages based on M.M.'s medical expenses incurred while he was a minor. Because M.M.'s fault was greater than the fault of the District, the court entered judgment dismissing the action and awarding costs in favor of the District. The court also denied Moore's request to have judgment entered in his favor for $85,500, representing 30 percent of the $285,000 awarded by the jury for M.M.'s past medical expenses. Following the majority rule, the court concluded "a child's negligence should be considered in determining the extent of a parent's recovery against a third party for medical expenses paid." Because Petitioner's claim for past economic damages derived from M.M.'s injuries, and M.M. was denied recovery under North Dakota's modified comparative fault laws, the Supreme Court concluded the district court correctly dismissed Petitioner's claim for medical expenses. View "M.M. v. Fargo Public School Dist. #1" on Justia Law

The North Dakota Attorney General, representing the State Board of Higher Education, petitioned the Supreme Court to exercise its original jurisdiction and enjoin Secretary of State from placing a referendum measure on the June 2012 primary election ballot regarding 2011 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 580 ("Senate Bill 2370"). The submission of the referendum measure to the Secretary of State reinstated N.D.C.C. 15-10-46, which requires the University of North Dakota (UND) to use the "Fighting Sioux" nickname and logo for its intercollegiate athletic teams. A majority of the Court would have exercised its discretionary original jurisdiction and consider the underlying constitutional issue about the Board's authority over UND; two members of the Court concluded this was not an appropriate case in which to exercise its discretionary original jurisdiction. As a result, there were not enough members willing to decide the constitutional issue. The Court therefore did not address the constitutional issue presented, and declined to enjoin the Secretary of State from placing the referendum measure on the ballot. View "N.D. State Board of Higher Education v. Jaeger" on Justia Law