Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Mother S.L.-C., and father N.P., separately appealed a juvenile court order terminating their parental rights to their three children. Upon careful consideration of the facts of this case, the Supreme Court concluded the juvenile court's findings that the children were deprived and had been in foster care more than 450 out of the previous 660 nights were supported by the evidence and were not clearly erroneous. As such, the Court affirmed the termination of both parties' parental rights. View "Interest of R.L.-P." on Justia Law

Richard L. Hagar, judge of the district court for the North Central Judicial District, filed exceptions to the Judicial Conduct Commission's recommended findings that he violated provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct by failing to diligently and promptly decide judicial matters assigned to him. He also objected to the Commission's recommended sanctions. The Supreme Court adopted the Commission's findings of fact and ordered that Judge Hagar be suspended from his position as district judge for one month without pay commencing April 1, 2014. Moreover, the Court assessed $3,710.49 for the costs and attorney fees necessary for the prosecution of these proceedings. View "Judicial Conduct Commission v. Hagar" on Justia Law

Sandy Mangelsen appealed a district court order finding he was a sexually dangerous individual and committed him to the care, custody, and control of the Executive Director of the Department of Human Services. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court's findings that Mangelsen had exhibited serious difficulty in controlling his behavior and that he was a sexually dangerous individual were not clearly erroneous. View "Matter of Mangelsen" on Justia Law

Cory Reis appealed criminal judgments entered after he conditionally pled guilty to controlled substance, burglary and theft of property charges. The Supreme Court concluded the district court did not err in denying Reis' motion to suppress because the police officers had probable cause to believe his vehicle contained contraband justifying a warrantless search of the vehicle. View "North Dakota v. Reis" on Justia Law

The North Dakota Department of Transportation appealed the reversal of an administrative hearing officer's decision suspending Tammy Wampler's driving privileges. A Jamestown city police officer received a call regarding an intoxicated driver. The officer arrived on the scene, located the vehicle, and observed it weaving between lanes. The officer initiated his overhead lights, but the vehicle continued to drive for almost half a mile before it came to a stop, and it did so only after the officer turned on his siren. The officer administered three field sobriety tests, and Wampler failed two of them and could not complete the other. Wampler submitted to an on-site chemical screening test, which indicated an alcohol concentration level of at least .08. Wampler was then placed under arrest for Driving Under the Influence. Within two hours of driving, Wampler submitted to an intoxilyzer breath test. The test results showed Wampler's alcohol concentration was 0.159. When the officer completed his certified written report to the director, he wrote "0.159" in the "Test Results" blank. Wampler made a timely request for an administrative hearing with the Department. At that hearing, Wampler raised three arguments, one of which was that the Department lacked the authority to revoke her driving privileges because the law enforcement officer failed to write "by weight" next to the notation "0.159" in the "Test Results" blank of his Report and Notice. The administrative hearing officer rejected Wampler's argument, holding "the failure to write 'by weight' is not jurisdictional." The administrative hearing officer suspended Wampler's driving privileges for 91 days, and Wampler appealed to the district court, raising all three issues. The district court determined North Dakota law required the law enforcement officer to complete a certified written report which indicated that test results showed Wampler had a blood alcohol concentration of .08 or greater by weight, that this was a basic and mandatory provision of the statute under prevailing case law, and that, while the law enforcement officer's Report and Notice included the notation "0.159" in the "Test Results" blank, the omission of the phrase "by weight" stripped the Department of authority to suspend Wampler's driving privileges. The district court determined this was the dispositive issue on appeal and did not address Wampler's other arguments. The district court reversed the decision of the administrative hearing officer and ordered that Wampler's driving privileges be restored. The Supreme Court held that the inclusion of the phrase "by weight" in the "Test Results" portion of a law enforcement officer's certified written report was not necessary to satisfy N.D.C.C. 39-20-03.1. Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court and reinstated the administrative hearing officer's decision. View "Wampler v. N.D. Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

Joshua Cook appealed a criminal judgment entered after he conditionally pled guilty to four drug-related charges and after a jury found him guilty of reckless endangerment. Because he failed to comply with the North Dakota Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. View "North Dakota v. Cook" on Justia Law

In March 2011, the State charged defendant Mitchell Holbach with terrorizing, alleging he had sent letters or filed documents with the court threatening various public officials, law enforcement officers, and court-appointed attorneys involved in his prior convictions. He appealed the trial court order: (1) finding he was not competent to understand the proceedings against him and assist in his defense in a criminal prosecution for terrorizing; (2) suspending the prosecution against him; (3) ordering him committed to the care and custody of the State Hospital with directions for annual evaluations to determine whether he has attained competency to understand the proceedings against him and assist in his defense; and (4) ordering dismissal of the charges if he has not attained competency by March 2016. Defendant argued the district court erred in finding he was not competent to assist in his defense. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the court did not clearly err in finding defendant was not competent to assist in his defense. Furthermore, the Court also concluded that defendant's pretrial commitment to the State Hospital under N.D.C.C. 12.1-04-08 must comply with the statutory procedures and safeguards of N.D.C.C. ch. 25-03.1. The Court modified the trial court's order, and as modified, affirmed. View "North Dakota v. Holbach" on Justia Law

Branden Schwalk appealed a district court order denying his motion to modify his child support obligation. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the court did not err in holding Schwalk's motion was not supported by the law and the evidence. View "Schwalk v. Schwalk" on Justia Law

From 1998 through 2009, Keith Jensen owned a cattle feedlot in South Dakota. Jensen did not personally operate the feedlot but used it for his cattle-brokering business. Jensen leased the feedlot to Arden Sieh under a five-year written lease agreement. The written lease expired in 2003, but Sieh continued to operate the feedlot under an oral lease agreement with Jensen. While operating the feedlot, Sieh purchased cattle feed from Forbes Equity Exchange, Inc. ("FEE"), a North Dakota cooperative grain elevator. In 2010, FEE filed a complaint against Sieh and Jensen for $166,015.18 worth of corn purchased by Sieh on an open account that was allegedly never paid. FEE alleged Jensen's cattle consumed the feed. In March 2011, FEE withdrew its claim against Sieh for the unpaid feed. In exchange, Sieh assigned to FEE all potential claims he had against Jensen for cattle feed and care services that exceeded Sieh's rent payments. FEE amended its complaint, and raised Sieh's claims for cattle-care costs in addition to its original suit against Jensen for unpaid cattle feed. Jensen filed a third-party complaint against Sieh for the collection of past debts, including bounced checks, missed rent payments, unpaid loans and interest, missing cattle, damaged feedlot property, and other financial obligations arising from Sieh's operation of Jensen's feedlot. Jensen ultimately lost on his contract claims, and he appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the district court did not err in denying Jensen's claim for an offset or in admitting evidence. The Court also concluded that the court did not err in finding in favor of Forbes Equity Exchange on its assigned claim against Jensen. View "Forbes Equity Exchange, Inc. v. Jensen" on Justia Law

Laura Jean Entzel appealed a district court opinion that awarded her a partial refund of her prepaid rental fee, and an order denying her request for attorney fees. Entzel entered into a Boat Space Rental Agreement with Moritz Sport & Marine. Entzel pre-paid Moritz for use of a marina boat slip from May 2011 until October 2011. Entzel chose not to use the slip at the start of the agreement period. Due to the threat of an impending flood along the Missouri River shoreline, the city of Mandan contacted Moritz at the end of May, and informed Moritz that the City wanted Moritz to take precautionary action. Moritz notified Entzel that, because of potential flooding, all boats needed to be removed from the marina. Moritz never informed Entzel that her boat could be returned to the marina once the threat was gone, and as a result, Entzel did not use the slip during the contract period. However, other customers of Moritz began to use their slips in the marina beginning mid-June 2011 until freeze in. Entzel sued Moritz in small claims court alleging breach of contract and seeking to recover the slip rental fee. Moritz removed the action to district court, arguing a force majeure clause in the contract relieved Moritz from liability, and Entzel moved for attorney fees. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the district court judgment's award of a refund to Entzel, because it held the force majeure clause of the parties' contract relieved Moritz of liability for nonperformance and allocated the risk of loss to Entzel. The Court affirmed the district court judgment's denial of Entzel's request for attorney fees. View "Entzel v. Moritz Sport & Marine" on Justia Law