Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

K & L Homes, Inc. ("K & L") appealed the trial court's summary judgment declaring no coverage existed under K & L's commercial general liability ("CGL") policy with American Family Mutual Insurance Company ("American Family") for damages awarded against K & L in an underlying action. Upon review of the applicable case law pertinent to this matter, the Supreme Court concluded there could be an "occurrence" under the CGL policy at issue in this case. Therefore, the Court reversed the summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "K & L Homes, Inc. v. American Family Mutual Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Pro se Defendant-Appellant Michael Farrell appealed a district court civil judgment of $400 in unpaid fines and fees. In 1993, Farrell pled guilty to criminal trespass and criminal mischief and was ordered to pay fines, restitution, and fees. In 1994, the district court issued a bench warrant for failure to pay $1,351.88 in fines and costs. In 2012, Farrell requested from the district court under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act a final disposition on any and all charges. In response to Farrell's letter, the State moved to dismiss a separate pending simple assault charge because Farrell was incarcerated in Utah and the case was too old to warrant prosecution. The district court granted the State's motion to dismiss the simple assault charge. On the same day, the district court ordered a civil judgment totaling $400 be docketed against Farrell for unpaid fines and costs. The civil judgment was mailed, and Farrell appealed to the Supreme Court. Subsequently, the State moved to "satisfy the judgment," acknowledging that under N.D.C.C. 29-26-22.1, a criminal judgment that imposes fines and fees may be docketed as a civil judgment only within 10 years of the criminal judgment. The district court granted the State's motion and ordered the civil judgment satisfied on January 3, 2013. Generally, a satisfaction on the record extinguishes a claim, and the controversy is deemed ended, leaving an appellate court with nothing to review. Although the State's motion to the district court was labeled as a "motion to satisfy judgment" and the court ordered the "judgment be satisfied," there was not a satisfaction of judgment under North Dakota law. "The intent may have been to vacate the judgment, but because of the appeal, the district court lacked jurisdiction to enter the January 3, 2013, order." Accordingly the Supreme Court reversed the district court's civil judgment for costs and fees. View "North Dakota v. Farrell" on Justia Law

The North Dakota Department of Human Services appealed a district court order reversing and remanding the Department's order decreasing Plaintiff-Appellee Penne Nienow's monthly Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program ("SNAP") benefits. The County determined Nienow received income from a prior mineral rights lease and, therefore, the 2011 payment was a recurring lump-sum payment. The County reduced Nienow's SNAP benefits to $16 per month. Nienow filed a request for hearing to the Department, and an evidentiary hearing was held. The County's representative testified Nienow stated that she leased the mineral rights and received income from the lease every five years and that she had leased the rights at least once before. After the hearing, the administrative law judge ("ALJ") concluded the County correctly determined Nienow's income and properly reduced her SNAP benefits. The Department adopted the ALJ's findings and conclusions. Nienow appealed the Department's order to the district court. The district court reversed and remanded, concluding Nienow's payment was a mineral leasing bonus, a nonrecurring lump-sum payment, and should not have been considered as income in determining Nienow's eligibility. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court reversed the district court order and reinstated the Department's final order reducing Nienow's SNAP benefits. View "Nienow v. Anderson" on Justia Law

Derrick Deaver appealed a district court order that granted a motion by Julie Jensen to restrict his parenting time with the parties' two minor children by requiring him to exercise supervised parenting time outside the presence of his fiancee and her daughter. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded the court's decision was not clearly erroneous, and affirmed the order. View "Jensen v. Deaver" on Justia Law

Joan Eldridge appealed a district court judgment finding Lloyd Lester, Rex Niles, and Kyle Dragseth each owned a 1/4 interest in a well on Eldridge's property and an easement over the land affected by pipelines from the well to each of their houses. Finding no error in the district court's discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Niles v. Eldridge" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Thomas Doppler appealed a district court judgment of conviction for possession of methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia following a jury trial. Doppler argued on appeal that the district court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of Doppler's prior felony convictions. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, concluding Doppler's substantial rights were affected by the improper admission of Doppler's prior convictions. View "North Dakota v. Doppler" on Justia Law

The State appealed trial court orders dismissing three separate criminal complaints of endangerment of a child against Defendants Alexis Stegall, Chelsea Hettich, and Kimberlie Lamon. In each case, defendants gave birth to children who tested positive for methamphetamine in their systems. The dispositive issue before the Supreme Court was whether the offense of endangerment of a child applied when a pregnant woman ingests a controlled substance that continues to affect the child postpartum (specifically, the child tests positive for a controlled substance following birth). Under the Court's statutory interpretation of N.D.C.C. 19-03.1-22.2 and its holding in "Geiser," the Court held that a pregnant woman is not criminally liable for endangerment of a child for prenatal conduct that ultimately harms a child born alive. "If we limited the scope of Geiser to only unborn children who died in utero, but held a pregnant woman liable if the child ultimately lives and tests positive for a controlled substance postpartum, we would be criminalizing a nonfatal injury while not criminalizing conduct resulting in a fatal injury. Such an interpretation would create an absurd result. It would criminalize conduct that is not a crime at the time the conduct occurs, is not a crime if the unborn child dies in utero, but is a crime only by virtue of its effect on the child born alive." Accordingly the Court affirmed the trial courts' orders dismissing the criminal complaints. View "North Dakota v. Stegall" on Justia Law

Petitioner-Appellant Edward Waslaski appealed a district court order denying his petition for post-conviction relief on charges he pled guilty to 24 years ago. Petitioner pled guilty to 39 counts of burglary under a plea agreement. On appeal, he argued he was prejudiced because his counsel was unable to review a transcript or file and he should be able to use his recitation of fact in the absence of a transcript. He also argued his original guilty plea was not entered knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily and he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Waslaski v. North Dakota" on Justia Law

Petitioners Randall Dionne, Cynthia Larson, and James Goodness appealed a district court judgment dismissing their petition for formal probate of Ardis Dionne's will, and denying a N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b) motion to vacate the dismissal of James Goodness's petition to void the deed of property to Respondent-Appellee (and personal representative of the estate) Norman Dionne. At the time of her death, Ardis Dionne owned a 1/4 interest in some land in Mountrail County. Norman Dionne was appointed the personal representative, and instituted an intestate probate proceeding. The will left all of Ardis Dionne's property, including the real estate, to her husband James Goodness. Norman Dionne and Cynthia Larson met with Goodness in to persuade him to transfer or sell the real estate to them. Goodness told them he did not want the real estate, and signed a deed that purported to transfer the estate's interest in the property to Norman Dionne for one dollar, and that "[a]fter paying administration expenses and creditor's claims, if any, all of the remaining assets of the estate (including the proceeds from the sale of the land) shall be distributed to James Goodness." But "James Goodness" was crossed but and "Norman for maintenance, 4/25/02" was handwritten in. Goodness and all of Ardis Dionne's children signed the deed. Subsequently, Norman Dionne, as personal representative of the estate, issued a deed to himself in his individual capacity. In 2008, Randall Dionne and Cynthia Larson filed a petition to void the deed Norman Dionne had issued to himself and to transfer the land back into the estate for distribution. Randall Dionne and Cynthia Larson claimed the parties did not intend all of the land to go to Norman Dionne when James Goodness signed the deed giving up his interest in the land. They claimed the land was supposed to be kept by the estate until Ardis Dionne's mother died, and then be distributed to all six children equally. The district court dismissed the petition on summary judgment, ruling the deed unambiguously transferred the property to Norman Dionne. Randall Dionne and Cynthia Larson appealed, and the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a trial, ruling the deed was ambiguous and summary judgment was inappropriate. A bench trial was later held to determine the intent of the parties that signed the deed. The district court found the intent of the parties was that the entire property would go to Norman Dionne. A new petition was then filed seeking formal probate of Ardis Dionne's will. Finding the issue res judicata, the Supreme Court held that "[a]dmitting the will to probate [would have been] an exercise in futility. . . Here, if the will [was] valid, James Goodness [was] the sole beneficiary, and signed a valid distribution agreement transferring his whole interest in the property to Norman Dionne. If the [was] not valid, the property [would pass] by intestacy equally to all of Ardis Dionne's children, who also signed a valid distribution agreement transferring their whole interest in the property to Norman Dionne. There is no reason to admit the will to probate. The district court properly granted Norman Dionne's Rule 12(b)(vi) motion and dismissed the petition." View "Estate of Dionne" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Lindsey Hysjulien appealed a grant of summary judgment which dismissed her claims for employment discrimination and negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress against Hill Top Home of Comfort, Inc. and Greg Armitage. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on Plaintiff's claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. However, because genuine issues of material fact existed regarding the running of the statutes of limitations for her state and federal employment discrimination claims and regarding her intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, the court erred in granting summary judgment on these claims. Accordingly, the Court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Hysjulien v. Hill Top Home of Comfort" on Justia Law