Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Jason Bachmeier and Natasha Bachmeier (now Natasha Stevens), were divorced with a judgment entered by stipulation in 2010. They have three children together from the marriage. Stevens' attorney for the divorce prepared a parenting plan to be included in the divorce judgment. The plan was signed by both parties, and was filed with the court. The plan stated that the "legal residence of the children for school attendance shall be with [Natasha Stevens]." It also stated "Education Decisions will be made by: Mother." At the time of the divorce, the parties lived together in the marital home in Granville. All three children attended Granville school. After the divorce, Stevens moved to Glenburn, where she was employed as a teacher. Bachmeier asked the district court to enter an ex parte order preventing Stevens from enrolling the children in Glenburn schools. The district court refused to do so. After the move to Glenburn, problems arose with transportation to and from school. The parents began different living arrangements, with two children attending Glenburn schools and one attending Granville schools. Stevens filed a motion to amend the judgment and award her primary residential responsibility. She claimed the school arrangements were not working out and Bachmeier was trying to turn the children against her. Bachmeier responded with a motion to hold Stevens in contempt for changing the school the children attended and for frustrating his parenting time. The district court denied Stevens' motion, but did not rule on Bachmeier's contempt motion. He renewed his motion, and a hearing was held. The district court denied the motion for contempt, ruling that the parenting plan applied, that Stevens had the authority to change the school the children attended, and that Stevens had not willfully disobeyed a court order when they had to make transportation and parenting time adjustments because of the change of schools. Bachmeier appealed the district court's order denying his motion to find Stevens in contempt. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that under the wording of the parenting plan, the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to hold Stevens in contempt. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to hold Stevens in contempt for disrupting Bachmeier's parenting time. View "Bachmeier v. Bachmeier" on Justia Law

Edward Waslaski, Jr. appealed a district court order denying his motion for reconsideration of his post-conviction relief application. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Waslaski's motion. View "Waslaski v. North Dakota" on Justia Law

Miguel Humberto Medina Romero was convicted by jury of murder, unlawful possession/manufacture of a controlled substance (marijuana), and unlawful possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) with intent to deliver. Upon review of Romero’s arguments on appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court did not err in denying Romero's motion to allow the jury to view the crime scene, in instructing the jury on self-defense, and in denying Romero's motion under N.D.R.Crim.P. 29 for a judgment of acquittal on the charge of unlawful possession of cocaine with intent to deliver. Furthermore, the Court held that Romero failed to establish reversible error regarding inaudible words in the transcript of the jury selection. View "North Dakota v. Romero" on Justia Law

After a shooting incident in a Fargo movie theater parking lot, the State charged Felipe Estrada with attempted murder for shooting Juan Garza in an attempt to cause his death. Estrada was also charged with aggravated assault for striking Charles Roskom on the head with a handgun and fracturing his skull and with two counts of reckless endangerment for shooting in the direction of DeShawn Stodola as she ran away and for shooting toward members of the public inside the movie theater. Estrada appealed his convictions on two counts of aggravated assault and two counts of reckless endangerment. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the Supreme Court concluded the evidence was sufficient to support the guilty verdicts, and affirmed them. View "North Dakota v. Estrada" on Justia Law

Northern Oil & Gas, Inc. appealed a judgment ordering reformation of an oil and gas lease and quieting title to the oil and gas leasehold estate in Murex Petroleum Corporation, John H. Holt, LBK Sales & Service, Inc., Racer Oil & Gas, LC, and Double L, LLC. In 2007, a landman working for Morris Creighton signed an oil and gas lease with the original mineral holder. The lease was recorded, but a month later, a typographical error was discovered in the lease’s property description. Six months later, Creighton assigned his interest in the lease, with an exception of an overriding royalty interest, to Antares Exploration Fund, L.P. Antares then assigned its interest in the Creighton lease to Northern. Northern brought an action to quiet title against Creighton and Murex to determine rights of the parties to the oil and gas leasehold estate. Murex filed a third-party complaint against the original mineral rights holders, a cross-claim against Creighton, and a counterclaim against Northern. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court erred in concluding, as a matter of law, that Creighton was not a good faith purchaser and the Court held that there was a question of fact whether Creighton had constructive notice when he acquired rights under the lease. The Court reversed the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Northern Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Creighton" on Justia Law

Francis and Deborah Maddock appealed a district court judgment denying their request for permanent injunctive relief. Larry and Jane Andersen operated a farm approximately three miles from the Maddocks' property. In the 1960s, a drainage ditch was built by Larry Andersen's father to allow water to drain into a slough located on the Andersens' property. The Maddocks alleged the Andersens' ditch now caused water to unnaturally drain onto their property, and they sought a permanent injunction stopping the flow of water from the ditch onto their land. At trial, both the Maddocks and the Andersens presented their own expert witness, each of whom testified to the flow of water from the slough and various other areas and to the environmental makeup of pooling water. The district court concluded the Maddocks failed to show the water on their property came primarily from the Andersens' drain and the Maddocks failed to identify or investigate three other possible locations from which water might flow onto their land. The district court also concluded it is necessary for the drainage ditch to remain open to protect the Andersens' home and the Andersens took reasonable care to avoid unnecessary damage to the Maddocks' land. The Maddocks argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the district court should have found the Andersens were unreasonably draining their land. Because the district court's finding the Andersens complied with the reasonable use rule was not clearly erroneous, the Supreme Court concluded the lower court did not abuse its discretion in denying the injunction sought by the Maddocks. View "Maddock v. Andersen" on Justia Law

Michael Jassek appealed a district court judgment that affirmed the binding dispute resolution decision of Workforce Safety and Insurance ("WSI") that denied payment for a myoelectric prosthesis. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction, and therefore vacated the judgment. Jassek contended that because WSI failed to explain its reasons for disregarding the medical evidence favorable to Jassek, its binding dispute resolution decision was arbitrary, and that WSI's binding dispute resolution procedure violated his right to due process because it failed to provide a formal hearing. The language of N.D.C.C. 65-02-20 unambiguously provides that "[a] dispute resolution decision under this section requested by a medical provider concerning . . . a request for . . . treatment is not reviewable by any court." The statute based appealability on the identity of the party who requests binding dispute resolution, not on who appeals the binding dispute resolution decision. Jassek’s orthotist was a "medical provider," and this dispute concernd "a request for diagnostic tests or treatment," specifically the determination of an appropriate prosthetic device. Accordingly, WSI's decision on the medical provider’s request for binding dispute resolution was not reviewable by the district court, the district court was without subject matter jurisdiction, and the judgment affirming WSI's decision was void. View "Jassek v. Workforce Safety and Insurance" on Justia Law

S.R.B. appealed the trial court's order for hospitalization and treatment at the North Dakota State Hospital for ninety days and its order requiring use of prescribed medication. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded insufficient findings appeared in the record to support the trial court's orders. The case was remanded with instructions for expedited entry of findings for the order for hospitalization and treatment, and the Court reversed the order requiring use of prescribed medication. View "Interest of S.R.B." on Justia Law

Robert R. Hoff appealed an order denying his petition for discharge from civil commitment as a sexually dangerous individual. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the district court abused its discretion by not independently making an individualized determination on the record whether it was necessary to restrain Hoff during the hearing, and its failure to do so was not harmless error. View "Interest of Hoff" on Justia Law

Slawson and Gadeco were owners of oil and gas leasehold interests in a section of real property located in Mountrail County which comprised the spacing unit for the Coyote 1-32H well. In 2009, Slawson sent Gadeco and to other working interest owners in the spacing unit invitations to participate in the cost of drilling and completing the well. The Supreme Court reversed an Industrial Commission order authorizing Slawson Exploration Company to assess a 200 percent risk penalty against Gadeco, LLC, for failing to accept Slawson's invitation to participate in the well within 30 days, and remanded to the Commission to explain its decision. On remand, the Commission determined Slawson's invitation to Gadeco to participate in the well complied with regulatory requirements and authorized Slawson to assess a 200 percent risk penalty against Gadeco. Gadeco appealed the district court judgment affirming the Industrial Commission's order on remand. The district court reversed the Commission's decision holding that, after sending the July 8, 2009 invitation to participate, Slawson changed three of the five requirements for an invitation, The court determined the changed facts required that Slawson provide Gadeco with a new invitation to participate. The Commission again authorized Slawson to assess a 200 percent risk penalty against Gadeco, ruling Slawson's invitation to participate complied with the regulatory requirements for a valid invitation to participate and Gadeco failed to accept the invitation within 30 days of receipt. The district court affirmed the Commission's order, concluding its "findings and conclusions are sustained by the law and by substantial and credible evidence." The Supreme Court nevertheless concluded that the Commission has discretion and administrative expertise to evaluate compliance with the requirements for an invitation to participate. The Commission therefore did not err in construing the language in the regulation to require Gadeco's election to participate to be received by Slawson within 30 days of Gadeco's receipt of the invitation and in authorizing Slawson to assess the risk penalty against Gadeco. View "Gadeco v. Industrial Commission" on Justia Law