Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Toni Weeks appealed a district court judgment that affirmed a decision by Workforce Safety and Insurance (WSI) that reduced her disability benefits. Petitioner was injured at work after being exposed to anhydrous ammonia while employed by Dakota Gasification Company, in Beulah, North Dakota. In 2009, WSI received confirmation that on November 1, 2009, Weeks' social security disability benefits would convert to social security retirement benefits. WSI issued a notice of intention to discontinue or reduce benefits, in which Petitioner was informed that her permanent total disability benefits would end on October 31, 2009, and she would receive an "additional benefit payable" beginning November 1, 2009. Petitioner requested reconsideration. In November 2009, WSI issued an order denying Petitioner further disability benefits after October 31, 2009. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that because Petitioner failed to adequately brief her argument that WSI's reduction of her wage loss benefits violated equal protection under the federal and state constitutions, the Supreme Court declined to address her argument and otherwise affirmed the judgment. View "Weeks v. Workforce Safety & Insurance" on Justia Law

Petitioner Maria Willits appealed the decision of the Job Service North Dakota ("Job Service") that denied her application for unemployment benefits after Job Service found she voluntarily left her employment without showing good cause attributable to her employer. In October 2003, Petitioner began working full time as a licensed practical nurse (LPN) for Circle of Nations School, a boarding school for Native American children located on federal property in Wahpeton. According to Petitioner, she became concerned that one staff member she had trained was not proficient in English. After a different staff member committed a medications error in late October 2009, Petitioner met with the dean of students of the school and expressed concerns about training the two staff members to administer medications because she did not believe they were qualified and would pose a risk to the student population. Petitioner told the dean that she would not re-certify the two staff members but would train others. Petitioner subsequently contacted the State Board of Nursing and inquired whether she could conduct medication administration training as an LPN. She was informed that she was not authorized to train staff to administer medications and that she needed to be supervised by a registered nurse or licensed practitioner. According to Petitioner, she concluded her work at the school was outside the scope of her nursing license. Petitioner's concerns were discussed with the school's administrators. In November 2009, Petitioner informed the school through a phone message that she quit her employment. By then, the school had obtained the services of a doctor to oversee nursing activities. The Supreme Court affirmed Job Service's decision, concluding "a reasoning mind reasonably could have determined that [Petitioner] did not make a reasonable effort to preserve her employment relationship and, consequently, that she left her employment without good cause attributable to her employer."

Plaintiff-Appellant Kathleen Godon appealed the district court's judgment dismissing her complaint for breach of contract against the Defendant-Appellee Kindred Public School District. Plaintiff entered into a teaching contract with the School District for the 2008-2009 school year. In addition to the teaching contract, Plaintiff’s employment was subject to a professional negotiation agreement between the Kindred School Board and the Kindred Education Association. This more extensive agreement provides other terms of employment, including the base salary for a teacher in the District and the types and amounts of leave a teacher receives. The agreement did not provide for unpaid leave, but before the start of the school year, Plaintiff asked the District administration to allow her to take a week off work for travel. The District approved her request but required that she take unpaid leave for the days she could not apply personal leave. Plaintiff agreed to these terms. When school was not scheduled to be in session because of spring break, the District held school to make up for a storm day cancellation. Plaintiff did not work that day. While Plaintiff was away, the District cancelled school to allow employees and students to respond to imminent flooding in the Red River and Sheyenne River valleys. The District paid all teachers who did not request leave for this period as if school had been in session. Of four teachers who had previously requested and were granted leave during the flood cancellation period, only Plaintiff challenged the District's decision and filed a grievance. She claimed she should have been paid like all other teachers in the District who did not teach during the flood period. The District denied her grievance. Plaintiff brought suit in district court, alleging the District breached her teaching contract and violated her equal protection rights under the North Dakota Constitution. The district court ruled in favor of the District, finding that Plaintiff’s teaching contract was amended when the District granted her request for leave to travel. Upon review, the Supreme Court held Plaintiff's arguments as without merit. The Court affirmed the District and the district court's decisions.

Appellant Richard Landrum appealed a district court judgment affirming an order of Appellee Workforce Safety and Insurance (WSI) which denied him benefits. Appellant received pain management care sporadically for a series of work related injuries stemming from 1990 until 2001. In 2001, Appellant began to see Dr. John Daugherty for pain from headaches, low back and leg problems and vision problems. In 2002, Dr. Daugherty prescribed Viagra to treat Defendant's sexual dysfunction. WSI questioned the Viagra prescription's connection to the 1990 work injury, and Dr. Daugherty sent WSI a letter indicating a causal connection between the work injury and Appellant's sexual dysfunction. WSI denied payment for the Viagra, ultimately issuing an order denying benefits for the Viagra. Appellant sought reconsideration of the order and requested a formal hearing, after which an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") determined WSI was not liable for the Viagra because another Workers' Compensation Commission already awarded benefits for the Viagra. In April of 2009, WSI determined Appellant's vision problems were not causally connected to the 1990 work injury. Accordingly, WSI refused to pay for treatment regarding Appellant's vision problems. Appellant asked WSI to reconsider this denial of benefits. In the meantime, after a review of Landrum's medical records by WSI's independent medical consultant, WSI also denied benefits concerning Landrum's headaches. An ALJ held a formal hearing where Dr. Peterson testified why Landrum's 1990 work injury was not the cause of his headaches and vision problems. Ultimately, the ALJ upheld WSI's decision denying payment for Appellant's treatment for his headaches and vision problems. Appellant appealed to the district court, which affirmed the ALJ's order. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Appellant argued WSI's 2009 denial of benefits for his headaches and vision problems is barred by administrative res judicata because WSI considered, or should have considered, these benefits during the proceeding in 2004 when WSI refused to pay for Viagra. The Supreme Court concluded that administrative res judicata did not bar WSI from denying further benefits and that a reasonable fact-finder could have concluded that Appellant failed to prove his work injury was a substantial, contributing factor to his headaches and vision problems.

Plaintiff Richard Spratt appealed a district court summary judgment that dismissed his age discrimination claim against MDU Resources Group, Inc. ("MDU"). In 2001, Plaintiff was hired as the vice president of human resources for Montana-Dakota Utilities Co., a division of MDU. Plaintiff claimed that in 2007 the president and chief executive officer of MDU told him two high-ranking executives at MDU were "out to get" Plaintiff, and he needed to "watch [his] step.â Plaintiff further claimed that when he asked the president why they were out to get him, the president responded he thought it was because of "these fights that you're fighting . . . with corporate" and because "[y]ou're too old and you make too much money." Plaintiff further contended that the president reassured him he did not need to worry about losing his job because "[y]ou're all right as long as I'm here." In March 2008, the company got a new president. In April, Plaintiff was advised that his position was being eliminated as a result of a reorganization of the human resources function at MDU. Plaintiff was offered the option of resigning and receiving a severance package. He refused and was terminated effective April 3, 2008, at age fifty-nine. MDU contended elimination of Plaintiffâs position was part of a comprehensive reorganization of the human resources function at MDU. Furthermore, MDU argued that although Plaintiffâs was the first position eliminated, two human resources positions at another MDU division were eliminated within one month of Plaintiffâs termination. Plaintiff sued MDU, alleging he was wrongfully terminated based upon his age in violation of the North Dakota Human Rights Act. MDU moved for summary judgment, alleging Plaintiff could not meet his burden of establishing a case of age discrimination. The district court granted summary judgment dismissing Plaintiffâs claim. The Supreme Court concluded the district court did not err in determining that Plaintiff failed meet his burden of proof, and it upheld the lower courtâs grant of summary judgment.