Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Juvenile Law
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B.T., the father of L.T., appealed the juvenile court's order that adopted a judicial referee's findings of fact and order committing L.T. to the care of the Division of Juvenile Services following his admissions to gross sexual imposition and ingestion of a controlled substance. During his initial appearance and his pretrial conference, L.T. appeared with court-appointed counsel, but his parents were not separately represented. L.T. admitted to the charges in the State's petition following an amendment. The amendment reduced the felony level of the gross sexual imposition charge against L.T. which allowed him to avoid being tried as an adult. At the dispositional hearing, L.T. and his parents B.T. and H.T. were all represented by separate court-appointed counsel. There was much debate over mandatory registration of L.T. as a sexual offender, but the judicial referee concluded L.T. would be required to register. Neither L.T. nor his mother H.T. appealed the judicial referee's order committing L.T. to Juvenile Services and mandating his registration as a sexual offender. However B.T. appealed, requesting the juvenile court to review the judicial referee's order. B.T. argued the referee erred by not adequately advising B.T. that L.T. would be required to register as a sexual offender after admitting to the State's charges. Furthermore, B.T. contended it was unconstitutional for an indigent parent to be denied court-appointed counsel during the adjudicative phase of a juvenile delinquency proceeding. The juvenile court rejected B.T.'s arguments and adopted the judicial referee's findings and order. On appeal, B.T. argued the State Uniform Juvenile Court Act was unconstitutional, and his constitutional right to counsel was violated in the first of L.T.'s adjudicative hearings. Upon careful consideration of the trial record, the Supreme Court concluded that the right-to-counsel statute in North Dakota's Uniform Juvenile Court Act protects the constitutional rights of parents and juveniles. The Court affirmed the juvenile court's disposition of L.T.'s case.

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G.K.T. appealed the district court's judgment granting T.L.T.'s motion for summary judgment and dismissing his complaint against T.L.T. and T.K. for intentional infliction of emotional distress. T.M.T. was born in 1997 to T.L.T. and T.K., the child's biological mother and father. T.L.T. and T.K. did not have a continuing relationship. G.K.T. moved to a house near T.L.T. and they became friends. In 1998, they began to live together with the child, and they married in 2000. G.K.T. adopted the child with T.K.'s consent in 2001. In 2007, G.K.T. and T.L.T. divorced; the court awarded T.L.T. primary residential responsibility and G.K.T. received parenting time. According to G.K.T., the divorce occurred because T.L.T. tried to re-establish T.K.'s relationship with the child. In 2008, T.L.T. began a new relationship with T.K., who began to spend time with the child. G.K.T. believed his relationship with his adopted child deteriorated because of the new relationship between T.L.T. and T.K, whom he sued for intentional infliction of emotional distress. He claimed T.L.T. and T.K. tried to "spoil and ruin [his] father-daughter relationship." G.K.T. asserted, as a result, that he "lost the love and affection of his daughter who is now acting in a hateful manner towards [him by] stating [he] is not her father." G.K.T. asserted that T.L.T. and T.K. acted outrageously, causing him to experience severe emotional distress. G.K.T. claimed to have lost sleep, experienced heartache and stress, and lost his job as a result of his emotional distress. On appeal to the Supreme Court, G.K.T. argued the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of T.L.T. and T.K. because it did not consider the differences between the elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress and the elements of alienation of affections in a parent-child relationship. He also argued the district court erred as a matter of law by failing to recognize intentional infliction of emotional distress as an actionable tort in North Dakota. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that G.K.T.'s his claims against T.L.T. and T.K. did not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct. The Court affirmed the lower court's decision dismissing the case.