Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

R.G., father of A.L., appealed a juvenile court order confirming a judicial referee's decision to terminate his parental rights to four minor children. In 2003, R.G. was placed on criminal probation, and in March 2009, his probation was revoked and he was sentenced to a three-year prison term. In September 2009, R.G.'s four children involved in this action were all less than four years old and were residing with their mother when the children were taken into protective custody by Benson County Social Services and placed in foster care after the mother left the children with relatives and did not return. In May 2010, the State petitioned to terminate the parental rights of R.G. and the mother. In August 2010, the juvenile court terminated the mother's parental rights and also found the children were deprived as to R.G., but the evidence was not sufficient to terminate his parental rights. The juvenile court stated R.G. was anticipating being paroled in January 2011 with release to a halfway house for three to four months. The court also stated R.G.'s early release was contingent upon his completion of a drug and alcohol treatment program. After a hearing, a judicial referee terminated R.G.'s parental rights to the four children, finding R.G. was not granted his early parole as anticipated because he had not yet completed his drug and alcohol treatment program due to his conduct in the prison facility. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the court did not clearly err in finding the children were deprived, and did not abuse its discretion in terminating R.G.'s parental rights. View "Interest of A.L." on Justia Law

Defendant Ben Simons appealed a district court judgment that affirmed an order of the Department of Human Services which found that he had abused his two-year-old child and that services were required. Defendant and his wife Traci required their children to always respond to a parent in a respectful manner and to use the phrases "yes, sir" or "yes, ma'am." In 2009, while the Simons family was attending church, their two-year-old child refused to use the phrases "yes, sir" and "yes, ma'am" when responding to his parents. Defendant took the child outside and swatted him twice on his bottom. When they went back inside, Traci Simons was able to get the child to say "yes, sir" and "yes, ma'am." Later that evening, after returning home, the child again refused to respond to Defendant with "yes, sir." Defendant took the child to an upstairs bedroom and explained to him that he would be spanked if he did not say "yes, sir." When the child continued his refusal, Defendant placed him over his knee and struck him on his buttocks three times with a wooden backscratcher. The child was wearing pants and a diaper. Defendant then hugged and consoled the child for approximately fifteen minutes, explained the consequences if he refused to say "yes, sir," and emphasized to the child that he needed to show respect to his parents. He then gave the child the opportunity to say "yes, sir," and the child again refused. Defendant repeated the three swats with the wooden backscratcher, and again consoled and spoke with the child for approximately fifteen minutes. Two days later, Stark County Social Services received a report of suspected child abuse regarding the child. A social worker investigated the report and observed the bruises on the child's buttocks. Upon completion of the investigation, Stark County Social Services found the child was an abused child and issued a "services required" finding. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the Department's findings that Defendant had inflicted bodily injury upon the child and used unreasonable force were supported by a preponderance of the evidence and the relevant statutory provisions governing child abuse were not unconstitutionally overbroad or vague. View "Simons v. North Dakota" on Justia Law

Steve Wolt appealed from an order denying his motion to amend a divorce judgment. In January 2010, the juvenile court found the two oldest Wolt children deprived because of Steve Wolt's "intentional and systematic efforts to alienate the children from [their mother] Kathy and to undermine Kathy's custody, authority and control of the children." The court found "these actions motivated [the two older children] to engage in unruly conduct, which in turn, caused them to be adjudicated as unruly children and placed in foster care." The juvenile court also found that "[w]ith regard to Kathy, the children are deprived because the alienation and disrespect that Steve has instilled in [the oldest children] towards Kathy, have caused such a serious disruption in their relations that Kathy can no longer provide proper parental care and control for [them], even though she obviously wishe[d] to do so." Steve Wolt argued the district court erred in denying him an evidentiary hearing on his motion to amend the judgment to change primary residential responsibility with regard to his third child who remained in his ex-wife's custody. He argued he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing because he established a prima facie case under state law. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court did not err in denying an evidentiary hearing on his motion to award him primary residential responsibility of his children and did not err in awarding Kathy Wolt attorney's fees. The Court also concluded, however, the district court erred in denying Steve Wolt a hearing on his motion to amend his parenting time. Accordingly, the Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Wolt v. Wolt" on Justia Law

The State appealed a juvenile court order that adopted a judicial referee's decision that minor child D.J. was not required to register as a sexual offender. In March 2009, the State filed a petition in juvenile court, alleging D.J., a sixteen year old, committed an act of gross sexual imposition by engaging in a sexual act with a six-year-old victim. A judicial referee accepted D.J.'s admission that he committed the act, ordered him to complete a sexual offender evaluation and follow all recommendations, and reserved the issue of whether he was required to register as a sexual offender under state law. The referee thereafter issued a written order, concluding the State had the burden of proving D.J. was required to register as a sexual offender and that the State had failed to satisfy its burden of proof. The State requested judicial review of the referee's decision, and the juvenile court adopted the referee's order. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that a juvenile court may order the preparation of a report or evaluation to address requirements for registration as a sexual offender and may require production of the report or evaluation to make findings on the requirements for registration. But because a court-ordered evaluation was not provided to the juvenile court in this case and the court did not make required findings on registration, the Court reversed and remanded this case for further proceedings.

F.T. (the Father) appealed a district court judgment that granted the State's petition to involuntarily terminate F.T.'s parental rights. In September 2009, the State filed a petition to terminate F.T.'s parental rights, alleging that T.T., a child, was deprived, neglected and abandoned. A hearing was held in December. F.T. moved to sequester the State's witnesses. The district court granted the motion, stating that the State's witnesses should remain in the hallway until called to testify and that Irene Dybwad, the representative from Grand Forks County Social Services, could stay in the courtroom. During a recess F.T.'s attorney observed Dybwad speaking with the State's witnesses. F.T. raised the issue to the court. The court gave F.T. the opportunity to question the witnesses that were seen talking in the hallway. The witnesses testified that no specific testimony was discussed, that they were told the State had a hard time qualifying a witness as an expert and that they were told to stick to their reports. F.T. moved for a mistrial. The district court granted the motion, explaining: "I guess I should have explained that sequestering means do not go--leave the courtroom and talk to any of the witnesses." Before the second hearing, F.T. moved to prevent the State's three witnesses involved in the mistrial from testifying at the second hearing, arguing that allowing the witnesses to testify would be unfair because the witnesses knew the questions F.T.'s attorney would ask. The district court denied F.T.'s motion, stating that the mistrial was granted based on Dybwad's misconduct and that F.T. would be able to cross-examine the three witnesses about the sequestration violation. Trial proceeded, and the district court eventually entered its judgment terminating F.T.'s parental rights. On appeal to the Supreme Court, F.T. argued that the district court abused its discretion by allowing the State's three witnesses involved in the sequestration violation to testify. Upon careful consideration of the record, the Supreme Court found that the district court's findings were supported by the record and were not clearly erroneous. The Court affirmed the termination of F.T.'s parental rights.

C.S. appealed from a juvenile court's order that found his child T.S., a delinquent and unruly child for committing disorderly conduct. At the hearing, the State presented evidence about the two alleged acts of disorderly conduct. The State asserted the first act of disorderly conduct involved a classroom incident. T.S.'s second-grade teacher testified that while attending class, T.S. started screaming words that were not making sense. T.S. later kicked the aide after a short "time out." The second act of disorderly conduct took place on a school bus. The bus driver testified that while driving the special needs bus, she heard T.S. scream the "N" word. She asked T.S. to go to the front of the bus but he refused and called her "a**hole" and "fat a**." The bus driver used physical force to restrain T.S. The juvenile court found T.S. a delinquent child and an unruly child in need of treatment and rehabilitation. The court concluded it was in the best interest of T.S. to be removed from the care of his father and be placed in the care, custody, and control of Stutsman County Social Services for one year. On appeal, C.S. argued that insufficient evidence was presented to support the juvenile court's findings of fact. Furthermore, C.S. asserted the juvenile court violated T.S.'s constitutional rights by failing to sua sponte conduct a competency hearing. Upon careful consideration of the juvenile court's record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court concluded that the evidence presented was sufficient to support the court's finding. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the juvenile court did not violate T.S.'s due process rights by failing to sua sponte order a competency hearing. The Court affirmed the juvenile court's order.

R.A. appealed a juvenile court order that transferred its jurisdiction to the district court and the district court's order affirming the transfer. In March 2010, a delinquency petition and notice of intent to transfer to district court was filed, alleging R.A. committed the offenses of gross sexual imposition and terrorizing. The State alleged R.A. engaged in a sexual act with another juvenile, A.H., by compelling A.H. to submit by threat of imminent death or serious bodily injury. The State alleged R.A. sent A.H. text messages and other messages through the Internet that contained threats. After a hearing on the transfer request, the judicial referee found there was probable cause to believe R.A. committed the offenses and ordered the case be transferred to district court. R.A. requested a district court judge review the judicial referee's findings and order, arguing the evidence did not support a finding of probable cause, the judicial referee misinterpreted or misapplied the transfer statute because the statute requires the threats be to the victim and not another person, and his confrontation rights were violated. The district court affirmed and adopted the judicial referee's findings and order. On appeal to the Supreme Court, R.A. argued there was not sufficient evidence to support a finding of probable cause because the threats of physical harm were threats of future conduct and were not imminent. The Supreme Court concluded the juvenile court did not err in finding there was probable cause R.A. committed the offenses. The Court affirmed the lower courts' orders.

B.T., the father of L.T., appealed the juvenile court's order that adopted a judicial referee's findings of fact and order committing L.T. to the care of the Division of Juvenile Services following his admissions to gross sexual imposition and ingestion of a controlled substance. During his initial appearance and his pretrial conference, L.T. appeared with court-appointed counsel, but his parents were not separately represented. L.T. admitted to the charges in the State's petition following an amendment. The amendment reduced the felony level of the gross sexual imposition charge against L.T. which allowed him to avoid being tried as an adult. At the dispositional hearing, L.T. and his parents B.T. and H.T. were all represented by separate court-appointed counsel. There was much debate over mandatory registration of L.T. as a sexual offender, but the judicial referee concluded L.T. would be required to register. Neither L.T. nor his mother H.T. appealed the judicial referee's order committing L.T. to Juvenile Services and mandating his registration as a sexual offender. However B.T. appealed, requesting the juvenile court to review the judicial referee's order. B.T. argued the referee erred by not adequately advising B.T. that L.T. would be required to register as a sexual offender after admitting to the State's charges. Furthermore, B.T. contended it was unconstitutional for an indigent parent to be denied court-appointed counsel during the adjudicative phase of a juvenile delinquency proceeding. The juvenile court rejected B.T.'s arguments and adopted the judicial referee's findings and order. On appeal, B.T. argued the State Uniform Juvenile Court Act was unconstitutional, and his constitutional right to counsel was violated in the first of L.T.'s adjudicative hearings. Upon careful consideration of the trial record, the Supreme Court concluded that the right-to-counsel statute in North Dakota's Uniform Juvenile Court Act protects the constitutional rights of parents and juveniles. The Court affirmed the juvenile court's disposition of L.T.'s case.

G.K.T. appealed the district court's judgment granting T.L.T.'s motion for summary judgment and dismissing his complaint against T.L.T. and T.K. for intentional infliction of emotional distress. T.M.T. was born in 1997 to T.L.T. and T.K., the child's biological mother and father. T.L.T. and T.K. did not have a continuing relationship. G.K.T. moved to a house near T.L.T. and they became friends. In 1998, they began to live together with the child, and they married in 2000. G.K.T. adopted the child with T.K.'s consent in 2001. In 2007, G.K.T. and T.L.T. divorced; the court awarded T.L.T. primary residential responsibility and G.K.T. received parenting time. According to G.K.T., the divorce occurred because T.L.T. tried to re-establish T.K.'s relationship with the child. In 2008, T.L.T. began a new relationship with T.K., who began to spend time with the child. G.K.T. believed his relationship with his adopted child deteriorated because of the new relationship between T.L.T. and T.K, whom he sued for intentional infliction of emotional distress. He claimed T.L.T. and T.K. tried to "spoil and ruin [his] father-daughter relationship." G.K.T. asserted, as a result, that he "lost the love and affection of his daughter who is now acting in a hateful manner towards [him by] stating [he] is not her father." G.K.T. asserted that T.L.T. and T.K. acted outrageously, causing him to experience severe emotional distress. G.K.T. claimed to have lost sleep, experienced heartache and stress, and lost his job as a result of his emotional distress. On appeal to the Supreme Court, G.K.T. argued the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of T.L.T. and T.K. because it did not consider the differences between the elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress and the elements of alienation of affections in a parent-child relationship. He also argued the district court erred as a matter of law by failing to recognize intentional infliction of emotional distress as an actionable tort in North Dakota. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that G.K.T.'s his claims against T.L.T. and T.K. did not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct. The Court affirmed the lower court's decision dismissing the case.