Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 1989, Southeastern recovered a judgment against David Herzig in a North Carolina court. In August 1998, the North Carolina judgment was transcribed and filed in North Dakota under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, and renewed in North Carolina in 2000, and was again transcribed and filed in North Dakota for enforcement purposes. In 2004, Alphild Herzig, David Herzig's mother, was joined as a party. In 2005, Southeastern moved for an order compelling Alphild Herzig to comply with Southeastern's discovery requests and requested sanctions. In June 2006, Southeastern moved to compel discovery and requested sanctions. The court granted Southeastern's motion for sanctions against Alphild Herzig contingent on submission of a checklist of items to be produced so the court could set a daily sanction for each item not provided. The court also found Alphild Herzig was in contempt and awarded attorney fees. In August 2006, Alphild Herzig moved for release from the sanctions. The court denied her motion. In 2008, Alphild Herzig moved for an order to dismiss her as a party in the original action and vacating the 2004 order joining her as a party and all subsequent orders issued against her, including the 2006 contempt orders. Southeastern opposed Alphild Herzig's motion to dismiss. However, Alphild Herzig died before the court ruled on the motion. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the daily sanctions imposed on Alphild Herzig under 2006 contempt orders abated at her death. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the district court had not followed its instructions on whether a portion of the daily sanctions were intended to be money damages to compensate Southeastern or whether the sanctions were a forfeiture. As such, the Court reversed and remanded the district court to make that determination. View "Investors Title Ins. Co. v. Herzig" on Justia Law

Brendan Muldoon appealed a district court judgment that affirmed an order from an administrative law judge ("ALJ") which: affirmed an order of Workforce Safety and Insurance ("WSI") finding Muldoon was an employer under N.D.C.C. 65-01-02(17); that Muldoon wilfully failed to secure workers' compensation coverage for his employees; and that Muldoon was personally liable for past premiums and penalties owed to WSI. Upon review of the ALJ's record, the Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the ALJ's findings were supported by a preponderance of the evidence. View "Muldoon v. WSI" on Justia Law

The State of North Dakota, by and through the Department of Human Services and its Child Support Enforcement Division ("the Department"), appealed a district court order denying its application for an order to enforce an administrative subpoena. In July 2010, the Department issued an administrative subpoena to the North Dakota Insurance Reserve Fund ("NDIRF") directing it to provide information on all claims submitted to the Fund. NDIRF objected to the subpoena, contending that the Department was not statutorily authorized to issue an administrative subpoena to NDIRF and that the subpoena was vague, ambiguous, and unduly burdensome. The Department filed an application for an order enforcing the administrative subpoena in district court. The district court determined that the Department was not statutorily authorized to issue an administrative subpoena to NDIRF and denied the application. The district court did not address NDIRF's arguments that the subpoena was vague, ambiguous, and unduly burdensome. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court erred in holding the Department was not statutorily authorized to issue an administrative subpoena to NDIRF. Accordingly, the Court reversed the order denying the Department's application for an order enforcing the administrative subpoena. Because the district court did not address NDIRF's contentions that the subpoena was vague, ambiguous, and unduly burdensome, the case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings to properly consider these issues under the limited four-factor review of enforcement of an administrative subpoena. View "North Dakota v. No. Dakota Ins. Reserve Fund" on Justia Law

Merwin Carlson appealed a judgment affirming a Workforce Safety and Insurance ("WSI") decision that denied his claim for workers' compensation benefits after remand. Under the law of the underlying case, the Supreme Court held that the administrative law judge ("ALJ") erred in concluding WSI properly exercised its continuing jurisdiction under N.D.C.C.65-05-04 to deny Carlson benefits on remand. The Court reversed and remanded for WSI to award Carlson benefits based on the ALJ's calculation that Carlson's average weekly wage was $722. View "Carlson v. Workforce Safety & Ins." on Justia Law

Strata Corporation and Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company appealed a partial summary judgment dismissing Liberty Mutual's subrogation claim against United Crane & Excavation, Inc., after the district court certified the partial summary judgment as final under N.D.R.Civ.P. 54(b). Because this case did not represent the "infrequent harsh case for immediate appeal and subsequent proceedings in the district court may moot the issue raised on appeal," the district court improvidently certified the partial summary judgment as final and the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. View "City of Mandan v. Strata Corp." on Justia Law

James Mickelson appealed a judgment affirming a Workforce Safety and Insurance ("WSI") decision denying his claim for workers' compensation benefits. He argued WSI erred in deciding he did not suffer a compensable injury. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded WSI misapplied the definition of a compensable injury, and the Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Mickelson v. Workforce Safety & Ins." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-Appellants Mark Tibert, Melvin Tibert, Sue Tibert, and William Tibert appealed a district court judgment that dismissed their declaratory judgment action against Nodak Mutual Insurance Company. Mark, Melvin, and William Tibert are brothers, and Sue Tibert is Mark's wife. The Tiberts were involved in a lengthy dispute with Minto Grain, LLC, and its owners William and Katherine Slominski. Mark and Sue Tibert and Melvin Tibert owned homes on property adjacent to a grain elevator owned and operated by Minto Grain. Minto Grain intended to expand its facility, and acquired a portion of BNSF Railway's right-of-way on a roadway abutting and providing access to the Tiberts' properties. The Tiberts had various homeowner's policies and umbrella policies, which included personal injury liability endorsements, with Nodak. In 2004, Minto Grain brought an action against the Tiberts, alleging civil conspiracy, wrongful interference with business, tortious interference with contract, nuisance, trespass, and abuse of process. The Tiberts delivered the complaint to Nodak. Nodak denied it had a duty to indemnify or defend the Tiberts under the policies. The Tiberts brought this declaratory judgment action against Nodak, seeking indemnification and recovery of their costs of defending the underlying action. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court did not err in concluding Nodak did not have a duty to indemnify the Tiberts for the damages paid to Minto Grain, but did err in concluding Nodak did not have a duty to defend the Tiberts in the underlying action. The Court considered the remaining issues and arguments raised by the parties and found them to be either unnecessary to its decision or without merit. View "Tibert v. Nodak Mutual" on Justia Law

Appellant Beverly Fetzer appealed a district court judgment that affirmed a Workforce Safety and Insurance (WSI) order denying her request for benefits. While walking down a hallway on her employer's premises and during work hours, Appellant thought she heard someone call her name. Turning in response, she caught her foot and fell, fracturing her left hip and wrist. No cause of the fall was apparent. Appellant filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits with WSI, and WSI denied her claim. Appellant submitted a request for reconsideration; WSI issued an order consistent with its prior decision, determining Appellant’s injury "occurred in the course of, but did not arise out of" her employment. WSI added, "Mere walking, without more, is not an activity that is sufficiently linked to Claimant's employment so that the injury can be deemed to have arisen from employment." Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed: “If merely being at work was sufficient to show causation, the legislature need not have required the 'arising out of' test." Appellant was unable to prove a causal connection between her employment and injury. View "Fetzer v. Workforce Safety & Insurance" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Allen Perius appealed a district court judgment following a jury verdict in favor of Appellee Nodak Mutual Insurance Company. In 2004, Plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle accident with an uninsured driver, Jacob Kessler. Plaintiff insured his vehicle with Nodak for basic no-fault benefits and uninsured motorist benefits. Nodak paid Plaintiff no-fault benefits as a result of the accident. Plaintiff did not seek further medical treatment until March 2005, when he saw a chiropractor. Plaintiff submitted the bills to Nodak for payment as no-fault benefits. After Plaintiff submitted to an independent medical examination, Nodak denied him payment for any medical treatment after December 31, 2004, concluding such treatment was unrelated to the accident. In 2007, Plaintiff brought suit against Kessler, alleging he negligently operated his motor vehicle and caused Plaintiff's injuries. Plaintiff also sued Nodak, alleging the company breached its insurance contract with him. Nodak denied liability, and asserted a cross-claim against Kessler regarding Plaintiff's uninsured motorist claim. Kessler did not answer the claims against him. In 2009, Nodak moved for summary judgment, arguing no competent, admissible evidence established his claimed injuries were caused by the accident. Plaintiff resisted the motion, and submitted the affidavits of two of his treatment providers who stated their belief that Plaintiff's injuries and treatment were due to the accident. The district court granted Nodak's motion for summary judgment, and this Court reversed and remanded, finding disputed issues of material fact existed. A trial was set on remand. Shortly after, Plaintiff sent Nodak amended responses to Nodak's interrogatories. Prior to trial, Nodak was informed of Plaintiff's intent to call a chiropractor, as an expert witness. Nodak filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude the expert witness, alleging the expert was not properly disclosed.The district court granted Nodak's motion, but ordered the doctor would still be allowed to testify as a fact witness. The jury returned a verdict in Nodak's favor. The Supreme Court concluded that Plaintiff did not properly disclose his witness and that the district court did not abuse its discretion excluding the expert's testimony as a discovery sanction. View "Perius v. Nodak Mutual Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Appellant Valerie Joy Tronnes appealed a judgment that affirmed the Job Service of North Dakota's decision to deny her claim for unemployment benefits. In 2002, Appellant began working part-time at the Wal-Mart Vision Center. In 2010, Appellant received her paycheck (via a debit-card style card), and purchased a few items at Wal-Mart's customer service center. The amount of the purchase was mistakenly credited to Appellant's account by a different employee rather than deducted, which resulted in a substantial benefit to Appellant. Appellant met with the vision center manager about the extra money on her card, but later testified she believed the amount to be correct. The store gave Appellant the option of resigning as a result of her spending the extra money, but believed the paid time off she was given ( a "D-day"-- so named to give Appellant a day to decide whether to remain employed at Wal-Mart) meant she would be fired soon. Store management negotiated a payment plan for Appellant to repay the amount she was credited and allowed her to return to work. Ultimately the "repayment plan" took the form of the store withholding Appellant's subsequent paychecks to cover the indebtedness. Appellant did not report to work after that payday, and subsequently filed for unemployment benefits. The Job Service determined Appellant was ineligible for benefits because she voluntarily quit her job. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the evidence in the record supported the Job Service's denial of benefits to Appellant. View "Tronnes v. Job Service" on Justia Law