Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Ransom County appealed a grant of summary judgment that awarded Plaintiffs-Appellees Tracy and Lisa Jund the $250,000 coverage limit of Ransom County's underinsured motorist coverage. The issue in this appeal involved the meaning of language in N.D.C.C. § 26.1-40-15.4(1) that "[a]ny damages payable to or for any insured for . . . underinsured motorist coverage must be reduced by" the amounts payable under any Workforce Safety and Insurance ("WSI") law. The Junds sued Johnnie B's Bar & Grill and Ransom County, alleging Tracy Jund was injured during the course of his employment as a Ransom County Deputy Sheriff when his patrol car was involved in an accident with an underinsured motor vehicle driven by Shane Reinhardt, an individual the Junds alleged had unlawfully consumed alcoholic beverages at Johnnie B's. The Junds alleged Ransom County, as a pool member of the North Dakota Insurance Reserve Fund, provided underinsured motorist coverage for the patrol car and was liable to the Junds for $250,000 in underinsured benefits under the limits of its underinsured motorist coverage. The district court construed that language to authorize a reduction for WSI benefits payable to Tracy Jund from the Junds' total compensatory damages, not from Ransom County's underinsured motorist coverage limit. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court for substantially the same reasons outlined in its decision. View "Jund v. Johnnie B's Bar & Grill, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Leah Richard appealed the dismissal of her claims for negligent hiring, supervision and retention, and assault and battery against Washburn Public Schools (the District). Petitioner, a sixteen-year-old student at Washburn High School, began working as a part-time custodian for the District. Gary Fuchs was the head custodian and her supervisor. Plaintiff alleged that during her employment with the District, which ended in 2003, Fuchs subjected her to "inappropriate conduct . . . including sexual comments and touching." In April 2006, Plaintiff sued the District seeking damages based on claims of negligent hiring, supervision and retention of Fuchs, and assault and battery. The court dismissed the negligent hiring claim, concluding Fuch's conduct was not foreseeable as a matter of law because Plaintiff produced no evidence showing the District knew or should have known Fuchs would harass or physically touch co-workers. The court dismissed the assault and battery claim, concluding it was barred by a two-year statute of limitations. Although the court determined genuine issues of material fact existed regarding Plaintiff's claims for negligent supervision and retention, the court dismissed those claims on the ground they were precluded by the exclusive remedy provisions of the Workforce Safety and Insurance Act. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Plaintiff's claims for negligent hiring and assault and battery, which she did not challenge on appeal. The Court reversed the dismissal of Plaintiff's claims for negligent supervision and retention because the trial court erred in concluding those claims were barred by the exclusive remedy provisions of the Workforce Safety and Insurance Act. View "Richard v. Washburn Public Schools" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Chase Wisness appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Nodak Mutual Insurance Company (Nodak), finding its Farm and Ranch Excess Liability Policy did not provide coverage for his claim. Plaintiff argued on appeal that the district court erred by finding the insurance policy did not provide underinsured motorist coverage. In 2007, Plaintiff was a passenger in a vehicle driven by an unrelated third party. An accident occurred, and Plaintiff was injured and is now a paraplegic. At the time of the accident, Milo Wisness, Plaintiff's father, owned a Nodak Mutual automobile insurance policy with underinsured motorist limits of $500,000. Milo Wisness also owned a Farm and Ranch Excess Liability Policy issued by Nodak. Plaintiff settled with Nodak for underinsured limits on the automobile policy and reserved the right to pursue a claim under the excess liability policy. Plaintiff then sued alleging that Nodak wrongfully denied his claim under his excess liability policy because the policy provided underinsured motorist coverage, that Nodak used bad faith when denying the claim and that his father's insurance agent negligently counseled Milo Wisness about what insurance policy to buy. Nodak and the agent denied the allegations. Plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment, asking the court to declare coverage existed for his claim. Judgment was entered awarding Nodak its costs and dismissing Wisness's claim with prejudice. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the district court's conclusion that the excess liability policy did not cover Plaintiff's claim, and affirmed the court's decision. View "Wisness v. Nodak Mutual Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The United States District Court for the District of North Dakota certified a question to the Supreme Court on whether North Dakota applies the "apparent manufacturer" doctrine to N.D.C.C. ch. 28-01.3. Plaintiffs Ruth and Nathan Bornsen brought a products liability action in state district court against Pragotrade, LLC, Pragotrade, Inc., and Cabela's Retail, Inc., for negligence, strict liability, and breach of warranty, alleging Ruth Bornsen injured her hand on while using a meat grinder manufactured by Pragotrade and purchased from Cabela's. At a hearing on the motion to dismiss, the Bornsens cited "Reiss v. Komatsu Am. Corp.," and argued Cabela's was an "apparent manufacturer" of the meat grinder under the Restatement of Torts and was not entitled to dismissal under N.D.C.C. 28-01.3-04. After supplemental briefing by the parties, the United States District Court for the District of North Dakota certified: "[w]hether the North Dakota Supreme Court intends to adopt the 'apparent manufacturer' doctrine set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts Sec. 400 or more recently, the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Product Liability Sec.14." Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that: "[t]o the extent that a statute specifies responsibilities, the statutory terms control. But to the extent that a statute does not, the rule in this Section states the common-law rule." Here, the North Dakota Products Liability Act treats nonmanufacturing sellers "more leniently" than did the common law rule. "That is a legislative determination which we are bound to follow." On the record certified in this case, the Supreme Court answer the certified question "No." View "Bornsen v. Pragotrade, LLC" on Justia Law

Patricia Saltsman appealed a district court summary judgment and dismissal of her case against Ed Hasche. Saltsman argued the district court erroneously decided Hasche did not owe a duty toward Saltsman as a lawful entrant on Hasche's land. Saltsman also argued the district court made improper findings of fact to support the summary judgment in favor of Hasche. Saltsman rode her bicycle on a sidewalk next to an apartment building and parking lot owned by Hasche. Hasche had constructed a chain-link fence with vertical "privacy slats" parallel to the sidewalk in order to provide more privacy for the tenants who parked their vehicles in the parking lot next to the apartment building. Lisa Sharp, traveling in a vehicle, exited the building's parking lot. Saltsman collided with Sharp's vehicle and sustained injuries. Saltsman sued Sharp and Hasche to recover for her personal injuries. Saltsman and Sharp settled, and the case against Sharp was dismissed. On the issue of whether he owed a duty toward Saltsman, Hasche argued Saltsman was not on his property when she was injured, she was not directly injured by his property, his fence was lawful, and no special relationship existed between Hasche and Saltsman that would create a duty. The district court granted the motion for summary judgment and dismissed Saltsman's claims, stating a landowner does not owe a duty to protect a passerby on a sidewalk adjacent to the landowner's property from the acts of an independent negligent driver. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the summary judgment in favor of Hasche, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Saltsman v. Sharp" on Justia Law

K & L Homes appealed a district court judgment based upon a jury verdict in favor of Neal Leno and Susan Leno ("the Lenos"). On appeal, K & L Homes argued: (1) the district court erred by deciding K & L Homes had not sufficiently raised the defense of fault by the Lenos in its answer; (2) the court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on comparative fault, the court erred by denying K & L Homes' request for inspection and not allowing a defendant to testify on his observations during a jury viewing; and (3) the court erred by ruling K & L Homes had not disclaimed any implied warranties as a matter of law. The Lenos purchased a newly-constructed house from K & L Homes. The Lenos alleged they noticed cracks, unevenness, and shifting due to improper construction not long after purchasing the house from K & L Homes. Initially, the Lenos claimed K & L Homes was negligent, breached the parties' contract, and breached implied warranties. The Lenos claimed the parties' contract implied warranties that the house would be built according to the applicable codes, that it would fit its purpose as a residence, and that it would be constructed according to engineering standards and in a workmanlike condition. K & L Homes requested the jury be instructed on comparative fault, but the district court denied the proposed comparative fault instruction. The district court decided K & L Homes had not adequately pled fault, and comparative fault did not apply to Lenos' cause of action. The district court also found, as a matter of law, that K & L Homes had not disclaimed any implied warranties in a Homeowners' Guide given to the Lenos at the closing on the house. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the findings made by the district court and affirmed its decisions as to all issues raised on appeal. View "Leno v. K & L Homes" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Randy Holkesvig appealed a judgment that dismissed his malicious prosecution action against Defendants Peter Welte, Meredith Larson, and Chris Smith, and awarded the defendants costs, disbursements, and attorney fees. Because Plaintiff pled guilty to one of the charges that formed the basis of his malicious prosecution action, the Supreme Court concluded the district court did not err in ruling Plaintiff could not prevail in this action as a matter of law. Furthermore, the Court concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the defendants costs, disbursements, and attorney fees. View "Holkesvig v. Welte" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Calvin and Laurie Wahl ("the Wahls") appealed the district court's amended judgment entered after a jury found Defendants Northern Improvement Company and United Rentals Highway Technologies, Incorporated were not liable for injuries the Wahls sustained in a motorcycle accident. The Wahls argued the district court abused its discretion by scheduling the trial for four days, by allowing the jury to separate for twelve days before hearing closing arguments and deliberating and by awarding Northern Improvement's expert witness fees. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the portion of the district court's amended judgment that was entered after the jury's verdict that found Northern Improvement and United Rentals were not liable for the Wahl's injuries. The Court remanded the case for the lower court's determination of whether Northern Improvement's expert fees were reasonable.

G.K.T. appealed the district court's judgment granting T.L.T.'s motion for summary judgment and dismissing his complaint against T.L.T. and T.K. for intentional infliction of emotional distress. T.M.T. was born in 1997 to T.L.T. and T.K., the child's biological mother and father. T.L.T. and T.K. did not have a continuing relationship. G.K.T. moved to a house near T.L.T. and they became friends. In 1998, they began to live together with the child, and they married in 2000. G.K.T. adopted the child with T.K.'s consent in 2001. In 2007, G.K.T. and T.L.T. divorced; the court awarded T.L.T. primary residential responsibility and G.K.T. received parenting time. According to G.K.T., the divorce occurred because T.L.T. tried to re-establish T.K.'s relationship with the child. In 2008, T.L.T. began a new relationship with T.K., who began to spend time with the child. G.K.T. believed his relationship with his adopted child deteriorated because of the new relationship between T.L.T. and T.K, whom he sued for intentional infliction of emotional distress. He claimed T.L.T. and T.K. tried to "spoil and ruin [his] father-daughter relationship." G.K.T. asserted, as a result, that he "lost the love and affection of his daughter who is now acting in a hateful manner towards [him by] stating [he] is not her father." G.K.T. asserted that T.L.T. and T.K. acted outrageously, causing him to experience severe emotional distress. G.K.T. claimed to have lost sleep, experienced heartache and stress, and lost his job as a result of his emotional distress. On appeal to the Supreme Court, G.K.T. argued the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of T.L.T. and T.K. because it did not consider the differences between the elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress and the elements of alienation of affections in a parent-child relationship. He also argued the district court erred as a matter of law by failing to recognize intentional infliction of emotional distress as an actionable tort in North Dakota. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that G.K.T.'s his claims against T.L.T. and T.K. did not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct. The Court affirmed the lower court's decision dismissing the case.

Appellant Richard Landrum appealed a district court judgment affirming an order of Appellee Workforce Safety and Insurance (WSI) which denied him benefits. Appellant received pain management care sporadically for a series of work related injuries stemming from 1990 until 2001. In 2001, Appellant began to see Dr. John Daugherty for pain from headaches, low back and leg problems and vision problems. In 2002, Dr. Daugherty prescribed Viagra to treat Defendant's sexual dysfunction. WSI questioned the Viagra prescription's connection to the 1990 work injury, and Dr. Daugherty sent WSI a letter indicating a causal connection between the work injury and Appellant's sexual dysfunction. WSI denied payment for the Viagra, ultimately issuing an order denying benefits for the Viagra. Appellant sought reconsideration of the order and requested a formal hearing, after which an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") determined WSI was not liable for the Viagra because another Workers' Compensation Commission already awarded benefits for the Viagra. In April of 2009, WSI determined Appellant's vision problems were not causally connected to the 1990 work injury. Accordingly, WSI refused to pay for treatment regarding Appellant's vision problems. Appellant asked WSI to reconsider this denial of benefits. In the meantime, after a review of Landrum's medical records by WSI's independent medical consultant, WSI also denied benefits concerning Landrum's headaches. An ALJ held a formal hearing where Dr. Peterson testified why Landrum's 1990 work injury was not the cause of his headaches and vision problems. Ultimately, the ALJ upheld WSI's decision denying payment for Appellant's treatment for his headaches and vision problems. Appellant appealed to the district court, which affirmed the ALJ's order. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Appellant argued WSI's 2009 denial of benefits for his headaches and vision problems is barred by administrative res judicata because WSI considered, or should have considered, these benefits during the proceeding in 2004 when WSI refused to pay for Viagra. The Supreme Court concluded that administrative res judicata did not bar WSI from denying further benefits and that a reasonable fact-finder could have concluded that Appellant failed to prove his work injury was a substantial, contributing factor to his headaches and vision problems.