Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Workforce Safety & Insurance (WSI) appealed a district court's judgment reversing its denial of worker's compensation benefits to claimant Brenda Albright. Albright submitted her claim to WSI for a work-related back injury. Albright had a history of back problems; an independent medical records review of Albright's case showed she had "well-documented multilevel degenerative disk pathology" which contributed to the claim at issue here. The ALJ hearing Albright's case concluded her injury was not the result of a single incident, and denied her application for benefits. Finding that the evidence in the record supported the ALJ's decision to deny Albright's application for benefits, the Supreme Court reversed the district court, affirmed the ALJ and reinstated WSI's order denying benefits. View "Albright v. ND Workforce Safety & Ins" on Justia Law

In the early morning hours of April 11, 2008, Jeremy Rustad and Heidi Hanna were killed in a plane crash in McLean County. Rustad was piloting his Cessna aircraft and Hanna was a passenger when the plane crashed. The National Transportation Safety Board determined the probable causes of the accident were due to pilot error and pilot impairment due to alcohol. The estate published a notice to creditors of Rustad for three successive weeks beginning May 22, 2008, informing them they had three months to file claims. On September 24, 2008, Olson, as "co-personal representative of the estate of Heidi Hanna, deceased, caretaker of [B.H.], a minor, and temporary guardian of [B.H.], a minor," filed a claim against the estate asserting the estate was indebted to Hanna's estate and to Hanna's children. The estate "disallowed" Olson's claim. In early 2009, Olson filed this wrongful death and survival action against the estate. The estate moved for summary judgment dismissing the action. The estate argued Olson's claims were barred because she did not serve the personal representative in that capacity and the failure to present her claims in the probate action made them res judicata. The estate also argued Olson could not show Hanna was injured before Rustad died, and therefore, both the wrongful death and survivor claims were barred under the nonclaim provisions of the Probate Code. The district court rejected the estate's arguments that service of process was insufficient and that the action was barred by res judicata. The court concluded Olson presented no evidence to show Hanna died before Rustad, and dismissed the wrongful death and survival actions because they were barred by the nonclaim provisions of the Probate Code. The district court further noted Rustad had an aircraft insurance policy and the nonclaim provisions did not prevent Olson from recovering to the extent of insurance coverage available for the accident. The court ruled the language in the insurance policy unambiguously limited coverage under the circumstances to $103,000, and a judgment was entered in favor of Olson for $103,000. The Estate appealed; the Supreme Court, after review of the trial court record, affirmed. View "Olson v. Estate of Rustad" on Justia Law

Carol Johnson appealed the denial of her motions for summary judgment, to amend her complaint, and the grant of the defendants' summary judgment motions for various claims related to her involuntary hospitalization. Johnson also appealed an order denying her motion for reconsideration and an order denying her objections to the district court's award of costs and disbursements to the defendants. In 2009, Johnson, a formerly licensed attorney in California appearing pro se, sued Dr. Natalya Bronson, Registered Nurse B.R. Clark, Prairie St. John's Hospital, John Does 1-100, Jane Does 1-100 (collectively "Medical Defendants"), and Attorney Steven Mottinger after being involuntarily hospitalized. Her claims against the Medical Defendants essentially asserted that because "[a]t all material times, [she] was without mental defect or disease of any kind whatsoever," the Medical Defendants had no authority to involuntarily commit her. Johnson's claims against Mottinger asserted that he committed legal malpractice in his representation of Johnson and was also liable for false imprisonment and negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Johnson alleged that, as a result of Mottinger and the Medical Defendants' conduct, she was subjected to numerous electronic hazards and suffered "severe and serious injuries and monetary damages." Johnson sought compensatory damages for costs related to medical care and treatment, pain and suffering, and the "loss of the enjoyment of life." Johnson sought damages in excess of $10,000,000 for lost wages and reduced earning capacity, asserting her ability to reenter the legal profession had been destroyed due to the stigma of being civilly committed. Finding no reason to overturn the trial court's decisions to deny Johnson's motions, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. View "Johnson v. Bronson" on Justia Law

Michael Jassek appealed a district court judgment that affirmed the binding dispute resolution decision of Workforce Safety and Insurance ("WSI") that denied payment for a myoelectric prosthesis. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction, and therefore vacated the judgment. Jassek contended that because WSI failed to explain its reasons for disregarding the medical evidence favorable to Jassek, its binding dispute resolution decision was arbitrary, and that WSI's binding dispute resolution procedure violated his right to due process because it failed to provide a formal hearing. The language of N.D.C.C. 65-02-20 unambiguously provides that "[a] dispute resolution decision under this section requested by a medical provider concerning . . . a request for . . . treatment is not reviewable by any court." The statute based appealability on the identity of the party who requests binding dispute resolution, not on who appeals the binding dispute resolution decision. Jassek’s orthotist was a "medical provider," and this dispute concernd "a request for diagnostic tests or treatment," specifically the determination of an appropriate prosthetic device. Accordingly, WSI's decision on the medical provider’s request for binding dispute resolution was not reviewable by the district court, the district court was without subject matter jurisdiction, and the judgment affirming WSI's decision was void. View "Jassek v. Workforce Safety and Insurance" on Justia Law

In an action stemming from a failed sale of land from Greg and Shelly Schwab to Raymond Zajac, Zajac appealed the judgment entered after a jury awarded the Schwabs $4,000 on their slander of title claim against Zajac, after the district court ordered disbursement of Zajac's payment of $10,000 in earnest money to the Schwabs and after the court ordered Zajac to execute a document disclaiming any interest in the Schwabs' land. Zajac argued the district court erred in not admitting evidence at trial involving the Schwabs' attempt to cure a waterfowl easement on the land as an accommodation to complete the transaction, the court erred in not admitting evidence at trial of the present value of the Schwabs' land and denying him due process and a fair trial by taking over Zajac's self-represented case. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment and remanded the case to the district court to determine the Schwabs' attorney fees on appeal for their slander of title claim. View "Schwab v. Zajac" on Justia Law

Richard Herring appealed a district court summary judgment dismissing his action against Lisbon Partners Credit Fund, Ltd. Partnership ("Lisbon Partners") and Five Star Services ("Five Star") for nuisance, negligence, and civil trespass. Herring owned a commercial building in Lisbon. The adjoining property, including an apartment building, was owned by Lisbon Partners and managed by Five Star. Branches from a large tree located on Lisbon Partners' property overhang onto Herring's property and brush against his building. For many years Herring trimmed back the branches and cleaned out the leaves, twigs, and debris that would fall from the encroaching branches and clog his downspouts and gutters. Herring claimed that the encroaching branches caused water and ice dams to build up on his roof, and eventually caused water damage to the roof, walls, and fascia of his building. Herring contended that, after he had the damages repaired, he requested compensation from Lisbon Partners and Five Star but they denied responsibility for the damages. Herring sued Lisbon Partners and Five Star for the cost of the repairs to his building, alleging Lisbon Partners and Five Star had committed civil trespass and negligence and had maintained a nuisance by breaching their duty to maintain and trim the tree so that it did not cause damage to his property. The district court granted Lisbon Partners and Five Star's motion for summary judgment dismissing Herring's claims, concluding Lisbon Partners and Five Star had no duty to trim or maintain the tree and Herring's remedy was limited to self-help. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded: "[a]lthough … we provide a framework for resolution of disputes arising from encroaching trees which authorizes judicial and self-help remedies, we stress that it is preferable for the parties to cooperate and agree on an amicable resolution to such disputes. Under the rule we adopt today, Lisbon Partners and Five Star, as the owners of the encroaching tree, are not liable for any damages caused merely by the tree dropping leaves, flowers, or fruit. Herring alleged damages caused by branches from the offending tree physically scraping against the building. If Herring [could] present evidence establishing damages caused by the intruding branches physically contacting the building, Lisbon Partners and Five Star would be liable for such damages under the 'Hawaii' rule." The case was remanded for a determination of whether there was a genuine issue of material fact to preclude summary judgment. View "Herring v. Lisbon Partners" on Justia Law

Karl Moseng and his wife Vicki Moseng were employed by Hartland Mutual Insurance Company. Lynn Frey was Vicki Moseng's supervisor from 1985 to 2008. Karl Moseng alleged Frey used his position as a supervisor with Hartland to arrange sexual liaisons with Vicki Moseng from 1988 through 1991. Specifically, Karl Moseng alleged Frey sent Karl Moseng on geographically distant employment assignments to more easily allow the liaisons between Frey and Vicki Moseng. Karl Moseng brought claims of negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress against Frey and Hartland. Frey and Hartland moved to dismiss under N.D.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). The trial court granted the dismissal with prejudice. Karl Moseng thereafter appealed, arguing his claims were legally sufficient to survive dismissal with prejudice. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded Karl Moseng's claims were legally insufficient, and affirmed. View "Moseng v. Frey" on Justia Law

Merwin Carlson appealed a judgment affirming a Workforce Safety and Insurance ("WSI") decision that denied his claim for workers' compensation benefits after remand. Under the law of the underlying case, the Supreme Court held that the administrative law judge ("ALJ") erred in concluding WSI properly exercised its continuing jurisdiction under N.D.C.C.65-05-04 to deny Carlson benefits on remand. The Court reversed and remanded for WSI to award Carlson benefits based on the ALJ's calculation that Carlson's average weekly wage was $722. View "Carlson v. Workforce Safety & Ins." on Justia Law

Carol Forsman appealed a judgment which dismissed as a matter of law under N.D.R.Civ.P. 50(a) her dram shop and negligence action against Blues, Brews and Bar-B-Ques, Inc., doing business as Muddy Rivers, and Amanda Espinoza. Forsman argued the district court erred in granting Muddy Rivers' motion for judgment as a matter of law, claiming she introduced sufficient evidence to establish Muddy Rivers knowingly provided alcoholic beverages to an obviously intoxicated person, Espinoza, and Espinoza caused Forsman's injuries. Forsman also claimed the court erred in sustaining Muddy Rivers' hearsay objections to several police reports and she was denied the opportunity to call a rebuttal witness to challenge inconsistent statements by witnesses associated with Muddy Rivers. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the court erred in granting judgment as a matter of law on Forsman's dram shop claim, and reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Forsman v. Blues, Brews and Bar-B-Ques, Inc." on Justia Law

Sheryl Fines appealed a judgment that dismissed her action against Ressler Enterprises, Inc. (doing business as Ressler Siding and Windows (Ressler)). Fines argued the district court abused its discretion in dismissing her action against Ressler as a sanction for spoliation of evidence. She contended dismissal was not appropriate because the court erred in determining Ressler was prejudiced by the destruction of the evidence and the court failed to consider the availability of less severe sanctions. Under the facts of this case, the Supreme Court concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the sanction of dismissal and accordingly affirmed. View "Fines v. Ressler Enterprises, Inc." on Justia Law