Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Seventy-year-old James Higginbotham was employed by Industrial Contractors, Inc. ("ICI") as a welder and pipefitter in May 2010 when he sustained an injury to his left rotator cuff. The medical records demonstrated that Higginbotham's injury arose out of and in the course of his work for ICI. Prior to his injury, Higginbotham made $34.61 per hour, but only worked part time. He often traveled to work sites some distance from his home near Hazen, including a site north of Mandan. Since his injury, Higginbotham was no longer able to make the trip from Hazen to Bismarck without stopping, and he could no longer perform welding or pipefitting work. Higginbotham lived in a mobile home near Hazen, approximately 70 miles from Bismarck and 80 miles from Minot. He indicated he was having difficulty paying bills, which he did not have before the injury, and he wanted to maintain the lifestyle he had prior to his injury. Following left rotator cuff surgery, WSI referred Higginbotham to vocational rehabilitation with Kim Hornberger, a vocational rehabilitation consultant, who identified the first appropriate rehabilitation option for Higginbotham and developed a vocational consultant's report ("VCR"). The VCR concluded that it was appropriate for Higginbotham to return to an occupation in the statewide job pool suited to his education, experience, and marketable skills: cashier, telephone sales representative, gaming dealer, and greeter, and the expected income of $332 per week exceeded 90% of Higginbotham's pre-injury income of $227 per week. WSI approved the vocational plan and notified Higginbotham that it intended to discontinue his benefits. Higginbotham asked for reconsideration, and WSI issued an order affirming the rehabilitation plan and denying further disability benefits. Higginbotham appealed, and an ALJ affirmed the WSI order. Higginbotham appealed the ALJ's decision, and the district court affirmed. Higginbotham now appeals the district court judgment. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Higginbotham v. WSI" on Justia Law

Before the 2013-2014 school year, the Dickinson Education Association and the Dickinson Public School District conducted negotiations and developed and agreed upon a series of negotiated master agreements that contained the terms and conditions of employment between the certified staff and the District. Between December 2012 and May 2013, the Association and the Dickinson Board of Education held collaborative bargaining team meetings for purposes of formulating a negotiated agreement. The Association and the District's negotiations covered various provisions for both the 2013-2014 and 2014-2015 school years, but the parties were ultimately unable to come to a resolution on all issues. In May 2013, after declaring an impasse, the parties sought the involvement of an education fact-finding commission. The Commission's report recommended: (1) a two-year contract; (2) that all items previously agreed to remain in the agreement; (3) the Board's final offer on salary in year one and year two of the two-year contract; and (4) the addition of one professional development day in year two of the contract. In late-July 2013, with the parties still unable to reach an agreement, the District unilaterally issued contracts based on the Commission's recommendations, containing provisions for the 2013-2014 and 2014-2015 school years. In August 2013, the Association petitioned the district court for a writ of mandamus and also filed an application for temporary restraining order and other supporting documents. The district court granted an alternate writ of mandamus, suspending the continuing contract offers made by the Board for the 2013-2014 school year, prohibiting the District from requiring the contract offers be returned until further court order, and ordering the District to execute a negotiated agreement for only the 2013-2014 school year. Later, district court issued an order quashing the alternate writ of mandamus and ordering that individual teaching contracts for the 2013-2014 school year based on the Board's final offer were due September 13, 2013. The Association's petition for writ of mandamus remained pending, and the parties agreed the issue before the court was whether the District could unilaterally issue contracts for the 2014-2015 school year based on the negotiation process. In October 2013, the district court granted the petition, concluding the unilateral offer of a two-year negotiated agreement was not lawful in North Dakota and the Association was entitled to an order of mandamus requiring the District to offer the Association a one-year negotiated agreement for the 2013-2014 school year. The District appealed. Finding no abuse of discretion or reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Dickinson Education Association v. Dickinson Public School District" on Justia Law

Adam Frank appealed a district court judgment affirming a Department of Transportation hearing officer's decision suspending Frank's driving privileges for driving under the influence of alcohol. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that proper foundation for the Intoxilyzer test results was not laid, and the administrative hearing officer erred in admitting the Intoxilyzer test results. The Court therefore reversed the district court judgment. View "Frank v. N.D. Dep't of Transportation" on Justia Law

Ronald McCoy appealed a district court judgment affirming a Department of Transportation decision suspending his driving privileges for 180 days. The Supreme Court affirmed because McCoy consented to take a chemical breath test given by the law enforcement officer, and his constitutional rights were not violated as a matter of law by North Dakota's implied consent law. View "McCoy v. N.D. Dep't of Transportation" on Justia Law

Joseph Herrman appealed a district court judgment affirming a North Dakota Department of Transportation decision revoking his driving privileges for one year. Herrman was arrested for driving while intoxicated. The Department revoked his license for refusing to take the chemical breath test. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the suspension. View "Herrman v. N.D. Dep't of Transportation" on Justia Law

Michael Hamre appealed a district court order affirming a North Dakota Department of Transportation ("DOT") order disqualifying his commercial driver's license for one year. Hamre argued: (1) that DOT misapplied the law by considering the administrative suspension of his noncommercial license a "conviction" under N.D.C.C. 39-06.2-10(7) (2011); (2) that N.D.C.C. 39-06.2-10(7) (2011) was void for vagueness; (3) that the one-year suspension of his driving privileges commenced on May 29, 2012, rather than on January 13, 2013; and (4) that he was entitled to attorney fees and costs. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court. View "Hamre v. N.D. Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

Mother S.L.-C., and father N.P., separately appealed a juvenile court order terminating their parental rights to their three children. Upon careful consideration of the facts of this case, the Supreme Court concluded the juvenile court's findings that the children were deprived and had been in foster care more than 450 out of the previous 660 nights were supported by the evidence and were not clearly erroneous. As such, the Court affirmed the termination of both parties' parental rights. View "Interest of R.L.-P." on Justia Law

Richard L. Hagar, judge of the district court for the North Central Judicial District, filed exceptions to the Judicial Conduct Commission's recommended findings that he violated provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct by failing to diligently and promptly decide judicial matters assigned to him. He also objected to the Commission's recommended sanctions. The Supreme Court adopted the Commission's findings of fact and ordered that Judge Hagar be suspended from his position as district judge for one month without pay commencing April 1, 2014. Moreover, the Court assessed $3,710.49 for the costs and attorney fees necessary for the prosecution of these proceedings. View "Judicial Conduct Commission v. Hagar" on Justia Law

Sandy Mangelsen appealed a district court order finding he was a sexually dangerous individual and committed him to the care, custody, and control of the Executive Director of the Department of Human Services. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court's findings that Mangelsen had exhibited serious difficulty in controlling his behavior and that he was a sexually dangerous individual were not clearly erroneous. View "Matter of Mangelsen" on Justia Law

The North Dakota Department of Transportation appealed the reversal of an administrative hearing officer's decision suspending Tammy Wampler's driving privileges. A Jamestown city police officer received a call regarding an intoxicated driver. The officer arrived on the scene, located the vehicle, and observed it weaving between lanes. The officer initiated his overhead lights, but the vehicle continued to drive for almost half a mile before it came to a stop, and it did so only after the officer turned on his siren. The officer administered three field sobriety tests, and Wampler failed two of them and could not complete the other. Wampler submitted to an on-site chemical screening test, which indicated an alcohol concentration level of at least .08. Wampler was then placed under arrest for Driving Under the Influence. Within two hours of driving, Wampler submitted to an intoxilyzer breath test. The test results showed Wampler's alcohol concentration was 0.159. When the officer completed his certified written report to the director, he wrote "0.159" in the "Test Results" blank. Wampler made a timely request for an administrative hearing with the Department. At that hearing, Wampler raised three arguments, one of which was that the Department lacked the authority to revoke her driving privileges because the law enforcement officer failed to write "by weight" next to the notation "0.159" in the "Test Results" blank of his Report and Notice. The administrative hearing officer rejected Wampler's argument, holding "the failure to write 'by weight' is not jurisdictional." The administrative hearing officer suspended Wampler's driving privileges for 91 days, and Wampler appealed to the district court, raising all three issues. The district court determined North Dakota law required the law enforcement officer to complete a certified written report which indicated that test results showed Wampler had a blood alcohol concentration of .08 or greater by weight, that this was a basic and mandatory provision of the statute under prevailing case law, and that, while the law enforcement officer's Report and Notice included the notation "0.159" in the "Test Results" blank, the omission of the phrase "by weight" stripped the Department of authority to suspend Wampler's driving privileges. The district court determined this was the dispositive issue on appeal and did not address Wampler's other arguments. The district court reversed the decision of the administrative hearing officer and ordered that Wampler's driving privileges be restored. The Supreme Court held that the inclusion of the phrase "by weight" in the "Test Results" portion of a law enforcement officer's certified written report was not necessary to satisfy N.D.C.C. 39-20-03.1. Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court and reinstated the administrative hearing officer's decision. View "Wampler v. N.D. Department of Transportation" on Justia Law