Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Across Big Sky Flow Testing, LLC appealed a district court judgment affirming an administrative law judge's award of benefits in the death of Dustin Bergsing. Dustin Bergsing, an employee of Big Sky, was stationed at an oil tank site. Bergsing's duties included gauging the oil in tanks two times per hour, switching tanks when necessary and requesting a truck to pick up oil when the tanks were full. Shortly after midnight on January 7, another employee was sent to the site when a high tank level warning occurred. The employee found Bergsing's body lying next to an unlatched tank cover, a log book showing he last logged a tank at 10:00 p.m. and his gauging tape which was cleaned, coiled and sitting on the tank. A toxicology report showed multiple hydrocarbon compounds and components of petroleum in Bergsing's blood and lungs. An autopsy showed pulmonary edema and heart failure. Big Sky argued the greater weight of the evidence and the applicable law did not support the determination Bergsing suffered a work-related death. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding a reasoning mind reasonably could have determined the findings were supported by the weight of the evidence. View "Across Big Sky Flow Testing, LLC v. WSI" on Justia Law

Paul Sorum appealed a district court order denying his January 2014, petition for a writ of mandamus. The petition requested an order to compel Governor Jack Dalrymple and Secretary of State Al Jaeger to execute and enforce North Dakota's election laws by removing the Democratic-NPL and Republican party candidates for governor and lieutenant governor from the 2012 November general election ballot because of improper certification of endorsement by the Secretary of State's office. The writ also sought to invalidate the election results for those offices and certify the election results after disqualifying all ballots made in support of the removed candidates. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court. View "Sorum v. Dalrymple" on Justia Law

M.U. is the mother of D.H., born in 1998, and J.A.H., born in 2001. On September 6, 2013, M.U. sought assistance from Burleigh County Social Services due to concerns she was being stalked. Later the same day, a juvenile court officer issued a temporary custody order granting Morton County Social Services temporary custody of the children. At a shelter care hearing, a judicial referee found continued shelter care was necessary, as there was probable cause for deprivation. The State petitioned to obtain custody of the children, alleging the children were deprived. M.U., the mother, appealed the juvenile court order removing her children and placing them in the custody of Morton County Social Services. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court remanded this case with instructions that, within sixty days from the filing of this opinion, the juvenile court make expedited findings of fact to determine whether D.H. and J.A.H. were deprived. View "Interest of J.A.H." on Justia Law

In 2007, G.L.D. was committed to the custody of the Department of Human Services for treatment as a sexually dangerous individual and, in 2011, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed an order denying his petition for discharge. In February 2013, G.L.D. petitioned for discharge from commitment as a sexually dangerous individual. In April 2013, Dr. Lynne Sullivan submitted an evaluation to the district court on behalf of the State, concluding G.L.D. remained a sexually dangerous individual. G.L.D. appealed the district court orders denying his motion to compel discovery and his petition for discharge from treatment. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded the court abused its discretion in denying G.L.D.'s motion to compel discovery. The Court reversed the order denying the motion to compel discovery, and vacated the order denying the petition for discharge. The case was remanded for further proceedings on that petition. View "Interest of G.L.D." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Faith Krueger appealed and Grand Forks County cross-appealed a judgment in favor of the County in Krueger's action for breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, trespass to chattel, conversion, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent supervision of a public administrator. In July 2012, Krueger sued the County alleging she lost over $300,000 in property and assets after Barbara Zavala, the Grand Forks County Public Administrator, was appointed her guardian and conservator. Krueger claimed the County was liable for Zavala's actions under N.D.C.C. 32-12.1-03 because Zavala was a county employee. Krueger argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the district court erred in denying her motion to compel discovery, denying her motion for a continuance, denying her claim for damages for mental anguish, erred in its evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, and by allowing certain statements by the County's attorney during closing arguments. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. View "Krueger v. Grand Forks County" on Justia Law

S.W.S. appealed a juvenile court order terminating his parental rights to T.R.C. S.W.S. is the father and C.M.C. is the mother of T.R.C., who was born in 2011. The child was taken into custody of Traill County Social Services in late 2012, based on abandonment by C.M.C. A reunification plan was developed for each parent for reunification with the child. Close to a year later, the State petitioned to terminate the parental rights of S.W.S. and C.M.C. C.M.C. appeared at an initial hearing and advised the court that she wished to voluntarily terminate her parental rights to the child. A termination hearing was held and various witnesses testified, including the father, the father's wife, and the child's social worker. There was evidence presented about conditions in the father's home, the father's employment, and the father's chemical dependency. After the hearing, the juvenile court ordered termination of both parents' parental rights. The court found the child was deprived and the deprivation was likely to continue. The court also found it was contrary to T.R.C.'s welfare to continue to live with his parents, reasonable efforts were made to prevent the need for removing the child and to make reunification possible, and termination was in T.R.C.'s best interests. After review of S.W.S's argument on appeal, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded, concluding the trial court's findings did not adequately explain the basis for its decision. View "Interest of T.R.C." on Justia Law

Kathy Inwards was injured while employed as an assembler by Bobcat. WSI accepted liability for her claim and awarded Inwards vocational rehabilitation benefits to assist her in returning to work. In early June 2011, WSI issued a notice of intention to discontinue benefits ("NOID") stating her disability benefits would end then convert to retraining benefits. She had 30 days to request reconsideration of the decision. WSI issued a formal order requiring Inwards to "enter into training at Hutchinson Community College, Hutchinson, Kansas, in the Business Management & Entrepreneurship AAS program." Inwards requested reconsideration of the vocational rehabilitation plan, but attended two college courses during the summer of 2011 in accordance with the plan. Inwards complained to her physician that she was having increased pain as a result of her course work. Although Inwards registered for fall courses at the college, she withdrew from them. In October 2011, WSI issued a NOID to Inwards stating "[t]here is no medical evidence that supports your professed inability to attend the classes as outlined in the administrative order dated June 27, 2011. You are now considered to be in non-compliance with vocational rehab." Inwards timely requested reconsideration of this NOID, and on January 13, 2012, WSI issued a formal order suspending Inwards' rehabilitation benefits based on her noncompliance with the rehabilitation plan. Inwards timely requested a hearing to challenge WSI's finding of noncompliance and suspension of benefits. The ALJ reversed WSI's January 13, 2012 order suspending benefits for noncompliance with the vocational rehabilitation plan. WSI appealed to district court and Inwards moved to dismiss the appeal, claiming the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because WSI failed to serve the notice of appeal and specification of errors on Inwards and her employer. The court denied the motion to dismiss, concluding Inwards had no standing to object to defective service on her employer and there was good cause to excuse WSI's mistake about recently mandated court electronic filing requirements. The court reversed the ALJ's decision, concluding the finding of good cause was "not supported by law," and reinstated WSI's January 13, 2012 order of noncompliance. The Supreme Court concluded the ALJ erred as a matter of law in ruling Inwards had good cause for failing to comply with a retraining program because WSI's previous order requiring Inwards to participate in the retraining program had been appealed and had not been finally resolved at the time she withdrew from the retraining program. The Court affirmed the district court judgment reversing the ALJ's decision and reinstating WSI's order of noncompliance. View "Inwards v. WSI" on Justia Law

In July 2013, a Bismarck Police Officer arrested Appellant Ducote Haynes for being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The police transported Haynes to jail, but the arresting officer did not have a copy of the correct Report and Notice form for Haynes. The officer went to the police station to obtain and fill out the proper Report and Notice. The arresting officer's shift ended shortly after he filled out the Report and Notice and he requested another officer issue the Report and Notice and deliver it to Haynes at the jail. The second officer testified he delivered the Report and Notice to the jail and placed it in an elevator for jail staff to retrieve. Haynes requested an administrative hearing regarding the revocation of his driving privileges. At the hearing, Haynes argued the Department did not have authority to revoke his license because he was not immediately issued the Report and Notice. The hearing officer found Haynes received the Report and Notice and revoked Haynes' driving privileges for 180 days. Haynes appealed the decision to the district court, arguing the hearing officer erred in finding the Department had authority to revoke his license because the Report and Notice was not immediately issued and was not personally served on him. The district court affirmed the hearing officer's decision. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court. View "Haynes v. Dep't of Transportation" on Justia Law

Seventy-year-old James Higginbotham was employed by Industrial Contractors, Inc. ("ICI") as a welder and pipefitter in May 2010 when he sustained an injury to his left rotator cuff. The medical records demonstrated that Higginbotham's injury arose out of and in the course of his work for ICI. Prior to his injury, Higginbotham made $34.61 per hour, but only worked part time. He often traveled to work sites some distance from his home near Hazen, including a site north of Mandan. Since his injury, Higginbotham was no longer able to make the trip from Hazen to Bismarck without stopping, and he could no longer perform welding or pipefitting work. Higginbotham lived in a mobile home near Hazen, approximately 70 miles from Bismarck and 80 miles from Minot. He indicated he was having difficulty paying bills, which he did not have before the injury, and he wanted to maintain the lifestyle he had prior to his injury. Following left rotator cuff surgery, WSI referred Higginbotham to vocational rehabilitation with Kim Hornberger, a vocational rehabilitation consultant, who identified the first appropriate rehabilitation option for Higginbotham and developed a vocational consultant's report ("VCR"). The VCR concluded that it was appropriate for Higginbotham to return to an occupation in the statewide job pool suited to his education, experience, and marketable skills: cashier, telephone sales representative, gaming dealer, and greeter, and the expected income of $332 per week exceeded 90% of Higginbotham's pre-injury income of $227 per week. WSI approved the vocational plan and notified Higginbotham that it intended to discontinue his benefits. Higginbotham asked for reconsideration, and WSI issued an order affirming the rehabilitation plan and denying further disability benefits. Higginbotham appealed, and an ALJ affirmed the WSI order. Higginbotham appealed the ALJ's decision, and the district court affirmed. Higginbotham now appeals the district court judgment. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Higginbotham v. WSI" on Justia Law

Before the 2013-2014 school year, the Dickinson Education Association and the Dickinson Public School District conducted negotiations and developed and agreed upon a series of negotiated master agreements that contained the terms and conditions of employment between the certified staff and the District. Between December 2012 and May 2013, the Association and the Dickinson Board of Education held collaborative bargaining team meetings for purposes of formulating a negotiated agreement. The Association and the District's negotiations covered various provisions for both the 2013-2014 and 2014-2015 school years, but the parties were ultimately unable to come to a resolution on all issues. In May 2013, after declaring an impasse, the parties sought the involvement of an education fact-finding commission. The Commission's report recommended: (1) a two-year contract; (2) that all items previously agreed to remain in the agreement; (3) the Board's final offer on salary in year one and year two of the two-year contract; and (4) the addition of one professional development day in year two of the contract. In late-July 2013, with the parties still unable to reach an agreement, the District unilaterally issued contracts based on the Commission's recommendations, containing provisions for the 2013-2014 and 2014-2015 school years. In August 2013, the Association petitioned the district court for a writ of mandamus and also filed an application for temporary restraining order and other supporting documents. The district court granted an alternate writ of mandamus, suspending the continuing contract offers made by the Board for the 2013-2014 school year, prohibiting the District from requiring the contract offers be returned until further court order, and ordering the District to execute a negotiated agreement for only the 2013-2014 school year. Later, district court issued an order quashing the alternate writ of mandamus and ordering that individual teaching contracts for the 2013-2014 school year based on the Board's final offer were due September 13, 2013. The Association's petition for writ of mandamus remained pending, and the parties agreed the issue before the court was whether the District could unilaterally issue contracts for the 2014-2015 school year based on the negotiation process. In October 2013, the district court granted the petition, concluding the unilateral offer of a two-year negotiated agreement was not lawful in North Dakota and the Association was entitled to an order of mandamus requiring the District to offer the Association a one-year negotiated agreement for the 2013-2014 school year. The District appealed. Finding no abuse of discretion or reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Dickinson Education Association v. Dickinson Public School District" on Justia Law