Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Todd Rounkles appealed a district court's judgment affirming a North Dakota Department of Transportation hearing officer's decision suspending his driving privileges for ninety-one days for driving under the influence. On appeal, Rounkles argued the hearing officer erred in its decision to suspend his driving privileges because: (1) the breath tests were unconstitutional searches in violation of state and federal constitutions; (2) North Dakota's implied consent law violated the unconstitutional conditions doctrine; (3) without the results of the preliminary breath test, the deputy sheriff would not have had probable cause to arrest him; and (4) the Intoxilyzer breath test was not fairly administered. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Rounkles v. Levi" on Justia Law

William Roberts appealed a district court judgment affirming an order of the Department of Transportation revoking his driving privileges for two years for refusing to submit to a chemical test. Roberts argued the district court erred by affirming the hearing officer's decision revoking Roberts' license for two years based upon his refusal to submit to a chemical test because Roberts submitted to an onsite screening test prior to being arrested for driving under the influence. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Roberts v. N.D. Dep't of Transportation" on Justia Law

In 2005, Merwin Carlson was injured in a traffic accident while hauling freight as a trucker under a contract with GMR. In 2006, Carlson filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits with Workforce Safety and Insurance ("WSI"), stating GMR was his employer. In response, GMR submitted a WSI form with employer information claiming Carlson was not its employee, but was an independent contractor. WSI issued a notice of decision finding Carlson was an employee of GMR at the time of the accident and awarded him benefits. GMR, through out-of-state attorneys who were neither licensed to practice law in North Dakota nor admitted pro hac vice at the time, requested reconsideration of WSI's decision, and argued Carlson was an independent contractor. Based on the additional information submitted, WSI issued a notice of decision reversing its earlier decision and denying Carlson benefits because it concluded he was an independent contractor rather than an employee of GMR. After Carlson requested reconsideration, WSI issued an order finding Carlson was an independent contractor and requiring him to repay disability and medical benefits previously awarded. Carlson requested a rehearing before an administrative law judge ("ALJ"). The ALJ recommended finding Carlson was an independent contractor and was not entitled to benefits. WSI adopted the ALJ's recommendation and the district court affirmed WSI's decision. Carlson appealed to the Supreme Court. In the meantime, Merwin commenced a federal court action against GMR, its owners, and its out-of-state attorneys alleging numerous claims for relief, including that GMR unlawfully failed to secure WSI coverage for him, and therefore GMR was liable for his work-related injuries under N.D.C.C. 65-09-02. The federal district court granted summary judgment dismissing the action, concluding Carlson had failed to plead or prove sufficient facts to maintain a civil action under N.D.C.C. 65-09-02. Merwin and his wife Denise then appealed the state court's grant of summary judgment dismissing their personal injury and loss of consortium action against GMR Transportation, Inc. Because the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the state district court did not err in ruling as a matter of law that GMR had not lost its employer immunity under the workers' compensation laws, it affirmed. View "Carlson v. GMR Transportation, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2013, Emma Reiger entered the Good Samaritan Society's basic care facility. She executed a general durable power of attorney appointing two women "to be my attorneys-in-fact and co-agents in my name and for my benefit." Rieger signed a "Designation of Authorized Representative" authorizing the Society to "(i) initiate an application for Medicaid benefits on my behalf, (ii) participate in all reviews of my eligibility for Medicaid benefits and (iii) take such action as may be necessary to establish my eligibility for Medicaid." On the same date, Rieger signed a separate document titled, "Assignment of Medicaid Benefits," which assigned to the Society her right to obtain Medicaid benefits for services provided to her by the Society, and an "Authorization for Release of Health Information." These documents were provided to the Department of Human Services. The Department oappealed a judgment reversing the Department's dismissal of Rieger's appeal challenging its denial of her Medicaid application and remanding for a fair hearing on the application. Because the law allowed The Evangelical Good Samaritan Society, doing business as the Good Samaritan Society - Mott ("Society"), to act as Rieger's authorized representative for purposes of appealing the Department's denial of her Medicaid application, the Court affirmed the judgment. View "Evangelical Good Samaritan Society v. N.D. Dep't of Human Services" on Justia Law

Robert and Donna Irwin owned a little over eight acres property located in Ward County. In 2011, the Souris River in Ward County flooded. The City of Minot acted to combat the flood by constructing emergency earthen dikes running along municipal streets. Contractors were hired by the City to remove clay to construct the dikes from Darrell Sedevie's property, whose land bordered the Irwins' property. The City contracted with Sedevie for removal of the clay, and paid sixty-five cents per cubic yard for 20,000 cubic yards of clay. The contractors entered the Irwins' land to access the Sedevie property, removed an undetermined amount of clay and topsoil from both the Sedevie and Irwin properties, and used the materials to construct the emergency dike. Damage to the Irwins' property included destruction of a cement slab, barn, damage to a fence, and destruction of native prairie grassland. The City did not contract, obtain permission, or pay compensation to the Irwins for removal of the clay from their property. The Irwins filed a claim against the City alleging inverse condemnation under Article I, Section 16 of the North Dakota Constitution, and moved for summary judgment. They argued the City took deliberate action to remove soil and damage the property, the clay was removed for public use, the removal of the clay was the proximate cause of the damage to their property, and any defense that the City was acting under its police power or is protected from suit through sovereign immunity is inapplicable. The City moved for summary judgment to dismiss the claim. There was no dispute over the need to construct earthen dikes to protect the City from flooding. But, the record included evidence that prior to the flood, the City contracted with property owners for clay to be used in constructing the dikes. Clay was available in other sites located around Minot, and on the Sedevie property specifically. Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and a question of fact exists as to whether the imminent danger facing the City gave rise to an actual necessity to take the Irwins' property. In this case, the Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in ordering summary judgment. The judgment was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Irwin v. City of Minot" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from plaintiff-appellant Leona Kuhn's improper disposal of debris from her house in the Napoleon city dump in late June 2013, after her house had been severely damaged by fire. The City of Napoleon maintains an "inert waste landfill" for its residents, located about two miles southeast of the city. The landfill was subject to the North Dakota Department of Health's rules and regulations, which permits only certain types of garbage in the landfill sorted into separate piles, some of which is burned or buried under the regulations. Kuhn appealed a district court judgment entered after an appeal from a municipal court conviction finding her guilty of violating a City ordinance for improperly disposing of refuse, and a subsequent court order denying her request for a written restitution order. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, concluding sufficient evidence supported Kuhn's conviction, but reversed Kuhn's sentence and remanded for clarification. View "City of Napoleon v. Kuhn" on Justia Law

Steve Beylund appealed a district court judgment affirming a Department of Transportation decision to suspend his driving privileges for two years. After review, the Supreme Court concluded Beylund voluntarily consented to the chemical blood test administered by the police officer, and the criminal refusal statute did not violate Beylund's state or federal constitutional rights. The Court declined to address Beylund's argument regarding the legality of the stop because the issue was not sufficiently articulated in Beylund's appeal. View "Beylund v. Levi" on Justia Law

In November 2014, Dr. Gabriela Balf-Soran filed an involuntary commitment petition claiming L.B. was mentally ill and chemically dependent. On November 13, 2014, Carmen Johnson and Dr. Lacey Armstrong filed a Report of Examination and a Report Assessing the Availability and Appropriateness of Alternate Treatment stating L.B. did not meet the mental illness commitment criteria, but she did meet "criteria for the chemical dependency commitment." At the treatment hearing, Johnson's refusal to appear without a subpoena and an order requiring her to testify was discussed. Dr. Balf-Soran was the only witness who testified, and the district court stated it would consider her testimony "[a]s the only evidence before the Court." The court issued an order finding L.B. was chemically dependent, and there was a substantial likelihood of substantial deterioration in her physical health if she did not undergo treatment and ordered her to undergo outpatient treatment with a residential component for a period not to exceed 90 days. L.B. appealed the district court's order requiring her to undergo treatment for chemical dependency, arguing the expert examiner failed to testify, there was no clear and convincing evidence to support the district court's findings, and the district court erred by not ordering the least-restrictive alternative treatment. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Interest of L.B." on Justia Law

A Beulah police officer observed Jesse Keller driving with an obstructed license plate. Keller turned his vehicle into a parking lot and stopped. The officer parked next to Keller's vehicle and, when Keller exited the vehicle, the officer made contact with him. The officer smelled an odor of alcohol coming from Keller and noticed Keller's speech was slurred. Keller agreed to take field sobriety tests and failed the horizontal gaze nystagmus test. Keller refused further field sobriety testing. Although Keller agreed to take an onsite screening test, he failed to provide an adequate breath sample. The officer arrested Keller for driving under the influence and transported him to the hospital. The alcohol analytical report of Keller's blood sample indicated a 0.210 alcohol concentration. The officer sent the alcohol analytical report to the director of the Department of Transportation, along with other required documents. However, the officer testified he could not remember whether he had received the drug analytical report of the blood sample at the time he submitted the other documents to the director. The officer was not aware if anyone else had forwarded the drug analytical report to the director. Keller appealed a district court judgment affirming a Department of Transportation hearing officer's decision suspending his driving privileges for 180 days for driving under the influence. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the Department did not lose authority to suspend Keller's privileges when the police officer did not forward the results of the drug analytical report of Keller's blood sample to the Department. View "Keller v. N.D. Dep't of Transportation" on Justia Law

After he was found lying in the backseat of a vehicle parked at a rest area outside of Bismarck, Nathaniel Deeth was arrested for being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. Deeth requested an administrative hearing on the revocation of his driving privileges for refusing to submit to testing to determine his alcohol concentration after arrest. Because Deeth was unable to appear at the initial hearing in person, by telephone, or through counsel, the Department granted his request for rehearing. Concluding that reasonable grounds existed to believe Deeth was in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor and finding that after Deeth was placed under arrest he refused to submit to testing to determine his alcohol concentration, the hearing officer ordered Deeth's license to be revoked for 180 days. On appeal, the district court reversed the hearing officer's decision and reinstated Deeth's driving privileges, concluding the hearing officer's findings of fact were not supported by a preponderance of the evidence. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court erred in holding the hearing officer's findings of fact were not supported by a preponderance of the evidence. Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court's judgment and reinstated the hearing officer's decision revoking Deeth's driving privileges for a period of 180 days. View "Deeth v. N.D. Dep't of Transportation" on Justia Law