Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Nelson Whitetail, Sr. was committed as a sexually dangerous individual by court order on December 21, 2012. Whitetail appealed the commitment order, which the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. In 2014, Whitetail filed a petition for discharge under N.D.C.C. 25-03.3-18. An evaluation was completed and submitted by Dr. Robert Lisota, a psychologist at the North Dakota State Hospital, concluding Whitetail was likely to engage in further acts of sexually predatory conduct. An independent evaluation was completed and submitted by another psychologist, Dr. Robert Riedel. Dr. Riedel came to an opposite conclusion. At the September 15, 2014 hearing, the court heard testimony from Dr. Lisota, Dr. Riedel and Whitetail. The district court found Whitetail continued to be a sexually dangerous individual under N.D.C.C. ch. 25-03.3, and denied Whitetail's petition for discharge and ordered continued commitment. Whitetail appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision. View "Interest of Whitetail" on Justia Law

Robert Hale, doing business as Bullwinkle Builders, Inc., ("Hale") appealed a district court order affirming a City of Minot Board of Appeals decision to affirm the denial of Hale's application for a building permit. In December 2013, after a series of conversations and exchanges of information between the City's building official and Hale and his representatives, the building official denied the permit application for failure to submit certain required documentation. At issue was the building official's determination under the 2009 International Building Code ("IBC"), as adopted by the City, that Hale's facility was an "assisted living facility" classified as Institutional Group I-1, rather than an apartment building classified as Residential Group R-2. An applicant for a Institutional Group I-1 building permit was required to submit additional documentation prepared by a registered design professional and had to install more expensive wiring. The Supreme Court concluded after its review, that the Board did not act arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably in affirming a City building official's decision to deny the application and that substantial evidence supports the Board's decision. The Court therefore affirmed the district court order. View "Hale v. City of Minot" on Justia Law

Calvin Anderson appealed a judgment affirming a Workforce Safety and Insurance ("WSI") decision approving a vocational rehabilitation plan. In January 2005, after slipping on an icy driveway and injuring his right shoulder and left hip while working as an inspector-tester for Finley Engineering, Anderson reported the injury to WSI. On January 28, 2005, WSI accepted liability for the right shoulder and left hip injury and paid benefits to Anderson. During the following three years, Anderson worked in similar positions with different companies. After his injury, and throughout 2010, Anderson sought medical and chiropractic care from numerous providers to address complications with his right shoulder, neck, and left hip. In April 2010, WSI issued a notice of its decision to deny further liability for Anderson's left hip injury on the grounds that the arthritis of which he complained had been present before he sustained the work injury in 2005. After finding no objective medical evidence indicating Anderson's hip condition was caused by his work injury, WSI issued its order denying liability for his hip condition. Anderson argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that WSI's selection of a vocational rehabilitation plan under N.D.C.C. ch. 65-05.1 was not physically appropriate because no reasoning mind, after a review of his medical conditions, could conclude he was capable of completing the work required in his vocational rehabilitation plan. Anderson argued WSI failed to properly consider his difficulties with driving when it formed his vocational rehabilitation plan. "A vocational rehabilitation plan is appropriate if it meets the statutory requirements and gives the injured worker a reasonable opportunity to obtain substantial gainful employment." After review of the record, the Supreme Court concluded a reasoning mind reasonably could have determined the vocational rehabilitation plan would return Anderson to substantial gainful employment that was reasonably attainable in light of his injury.The Court therefore affirmed the district court judgment. View "Anderson v. WSI" on Justia Law

Bridge Company appeals a district court judgment ordering it to donate a toll bridge to the cities of Fargo, North Dakota, and Moorhead, Minnesota, free and clear of all liens. In May 1986, the cities and the Company entered into an agreement for the purpose of construction and operation of a private toll bridge over the Red River connecting the cities. The bridge was completed and started operations on June 1, 1988. The bridge was originally financed with publicly-sponsored bonds issued by Moorhead and capital from an investment firm. In 2004, the cities agreed to allow the Company to refinance the indebtedness, but the refinancing was required to be completely amortized by June 1, 2013, which was 25 years from the commencement of the operation of the bridge. The bank refinancing the debt required personal guarantees from the Company's two shareholders. As of June 1, 2013, the Company owed approximately $75,000 on the refinanced loan. In early September 2013, the Company's two shareholders satisfied their personal guarantees for the debt, and as of September 6, 2013, none of the original indebtedness for construction of the bridge remained outstanding. During the 25-year time span, the Company's records reflected $108,761 was paid for maintenance and repair of the bridge. All of these bills were paid by the Company before February 6, 2014. However, taxes remained owing to Cass County, North Dakota, and Clay County, Minnesota, and the unpaid taxes constituted a lien on the bridge. The district court found that during the 25-year period between June 1, 1988, and June 1, 2013, the bridge was closed 249 days because of flooding on the Red River. Applying an Acts of God clause in the original agreement, the court ruled the 25-year period was extended 249 days to February 5, 2014, and because there was no qualifying debt in existence as of that date, the Company was required to donate the bridge to the cities free and clear of any liens. Because the district court did not err in interpreting the parties' agreement and the court's findings of fact were not clearly erroneous, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "City of Moorhead v. Bridge Co." on Justia Law

Thane and Nicole Dockter appealed a judgment affirming a Burleigh County Board of County Commissioners' decision to rezone a 311 acre tract of land in Menoken Township from agricultural to industrial use. In affirming the Commissioners' decision, the Supreme Court concluded the County Commissioners' decision did not constitute impermissible spot zoning, and the decision was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable and was supported by substantial evidence. View "Dockter v. Burleigh Cty. Bd. of Cty. Commn'rs" on Justia Law

A deputy sheriff pulled over Rebecca Havemeier's vehicle after observing her driving erratically in Dunn County. After failing field sobriety tests and registering a .286 alcohol concentration on an onsite screening test, Havemeier was placed under arrest for driving under the influence. During an hour-long transport to jail in Dickinson, Havemeier consented to take a chemical test with an Intoxilyzer. Havemeier argued the Department erred in revoking her driving privileges because she did not refuse to submit to the Intoxilyzer test and, even if she did refuse, she cured the refusal. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding that the Intoxilyzer test report was not "prima facie" evidence of a refusal, because the test was not performed in accordance with the approved method when the deputy did not give Havemeier three minutes to provide a sample and no expert testimony was introduced to explain the effect of the deviation. Furthermore, the deputy's testimony at the hearing did not establish an affirmative refusal by Havemeier to chemical testing. View "Havemeier v. N.D. Dep't of Transportation" on Justia Law

Teresa Schlittenhart appealed and the Department of Transportation cross-appealed a district court judgment that reversed a hearing officer's order suspending her driving privileges and remanding to the Department for a new hearing. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the hearing officer did not abuse her discretion in scheduling a hearing for a date on which both the arresting officer and Schlittenhart could be personally present or in allowing Schlittenhart's attorney to appear telephonically at the hearing. Furthermore, the Court concluded the hearing officer did not deny Schlittenhart due process by continuing with the hearing after Schlittenhart's attorney had disconnected from the telephone call during the hearing. The Court reversed the judgment and reinstated the Department's order suspending Schlittenhart's driving privileges for 91 days. View "Schlittenhart v. N.D. Dep't of Transportation" on Justia Law

Todd Rounkles appealed a district court's judgment affirming a North Dakota Department of Transportation hearing officer's decision suspending his driving privileges for ninety-one days for driving under the influence. On appeal, Rounkles argued the hearing officer erred in its decision to suspend his driving privileges because: (1) the breath tests were unconstitutional searches in violation of state and federal constitutions; (2) North Dakota's implied consent law violated the unconstitutional conditions doctrine; (3) without the results of the preliminary breath test, the deputy sheriff would not have had probable cause to arrest him; and (4) the Intoxilyzer breath test was not fairly administered. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Rounkles v. Levi" on Justia Law

William Roberts appealed a district court judgment affirming an order of the Department of Transportation revoking his driving privileges for two years for refusing to submit to a chemical test. Roberts argued the district court erred by affirming the hearing officer's decision revoking Roberts' license for two years based upon his refusal to submit to a chemical test because Roberts submitted to an onsite screening test prior to being arrested for driving under the influence. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Roberts v. N.D. Dep't of Transportation" on Justia Law

In 2005, Merwin Carlson was injured in a traffic accident while hauling freight as a trucker under a contract with GMR. In 2006, Carlson filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits with Workforce Safety and Insurance ("WSI"), stating GMR was his employer. In response, GMR submitted a WSI form with employer information claiming Carlson was not its employee, but was an independent contractor. WSI issued a notice of decision finding Carlson was an employee of GMR at the time of the accident and awarded him benefits. GMR, through out-of-state attorneys who were neither licensed to practice law in North Dakota nor admitted pro hac vice at the time, requested reconsideration of WSI's decision, and argued Carlson was an independent contractor. Based on the additional information submitted, WSI issued a notice of decision reversing its earlier decision and denying Carlson benefits because it concluded he was an independent contractor rather than an employee of GMR. After Carlson requested reconsideration, WSI issued an order finding Carlson was an independent contractor and requiring him to repay disability and medical benefits previously awarded. Carlson requested a rehearing before an administrative law judge ("ALJ"). The ALJ recommended finding Carlson was an independent contractor and was not entitled to benefits. WSI adopted the ALJ's recommendation and the district court affirmed WSI's decision. Carlson appealed to the Supreme Court. In the meantime, Merwin commenced a federal court action against GMR, its owners, and its out-of-state attorneys alleging numerous claims for relief, including that GMR unlawfully failed to secure WSI coverage for him, and therefore GMR was liable for his work-related injuries under N.D.C.C. 65-09-02. The federal district court granted summary judgment dismissing the action, concluding Carlson had failed to plead or prove sufficient facts to maintain a civil action under N.D.C.C. 65-09-02. Merwin and his wife Denise then appealed the state court's grant of summary judgment dismissing their personal injury and loss of consortium action against GMR Transportation, Inc. Because the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the state district court did not err in ruling as a matter of law that GMR had not lost its employer immunity under the workers' compensation laws, it affirmed. View "Carlson v. GMR Transportation, Inc." on Justia Law