Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In November 2002, J.G. was initially committed as a sexually dangerous individual based on the crime of indecent exposure which occurred when he was 12 years old. J.G. has unsuccessfully petitioned for discharge numerous times since his initial commitment. J.G. appealed an order finding he continued to be a sexually dangerous individual and civilly committed him to the care, custody, and control of the executive director of the Department of Human Services for placement in the least restrictive facility or program. Because the district court's findings of fact were supported by clear and convincing evidence, the Supreme Court affirmed the commitment decision. View "Matter of J.G." on Justia Law

Darl Hehn appealed an order denying his petition for discharge from civil commitment as a sexually dangerous individual. In 1997, Hehn pleaded guilty to two counts of gross sexual imposition and one count of terrorizing. In 2003, Hehn was released from prison on supervised probation but his probation was subsequently revoked, and he was returned to prison in 2004. In 2006, Hehn was committed to the North Dakota State Hospital as a sexually dangerous individual, and the Supreme Court affirmed the commitment. In 2011, Hehn filed a second petition for discharge. While his second petition was pending, Hehn also filed a letter with the district court requesting an annual review, which the court treated as a third petition. The district court denied his second petition, which was affirmed on appeal. In December 2013, Hehn filed another petition requesting a discharge hearing. On August 14 and 15, 2014, the district court held an evidentiary hearing on Hehn's petition for discharge. In November 2014, the court denied his petition, finding he continues to be a sexually dangerous individual. The court found clear and convincing evidence that Hehn had engaged in sexually predatory conduct; had a congenital or acquired condition that was manifested by a sexual disorder, a personality disorder, or other mental disorder or dysfunction; was likely to engage in future sexually predatory acts; and had serious difficulty controlling his behavior. The court specifically found a nexus between Hehn's disorder and the likelihood of re-offense and found Hehn would have serious difficulty controlling his behavior in a less restrictive environment. Finding no reversible error in the district court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Matter of Hehn" on Justia Law

Nelson Whitetail, Sr. was committed as a sexually dangerous individual by court order on December 21, 2012. Whitetail appealed the commitment order, which the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. In 2014, Whitetail filed a petition for discharge under N.D.C.C. 25-03.3-18. An evaluation was completed and submitted by Dr. Robert Lisota, a psychologist at the North Dakota State Hospital, concluding Whitetail was likely to engage in further acts of sexually predatory conduct. An independent evaluation was completed and submitted by another psychologist, Dr. Robert Riedel. Dr. Riedel came to an opposite conclusion. At the September 15, 2014 hearing, the court heard testimony from Dr. Lisota, Dr. Riedel and Whitetail. The district court found Whitetail continued to be a sexually dangerous individual under N.D.C.C. ch. 25-03.3, and denied Whitetail's petition for discharge and ordered continued commitment. Whitetail appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision. View "Interest of Whitetail" on Justia Law

Robert Hale, doing business as Bullwinkle Builders, Inc., ("Hale") appealed a district court order affirming a City of Minot Board of Appeals decision to affirm the denial of Hale's application for a building permit. In December 2013, after a series of conversations and exchanges of information between the City's building official and Hale and his representatives, the building official denied the permit application for failure to submit certain required documentation. At issue was the building official's determination under the 2009 International Building Code ("IBC"), as adopted by the City, that Hale's facility was an "assisted living facility" classified as Institutional Group I-1, rather than an apartment building classified as Residential Group R-2. An applicant for a Institutional Group I-1 building permit was required to submit additional documentation prepared by a registered design professional and had to install more expensive wiring. The Supreme Court concluded after its review, that the Board did not act arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably in affirming a City building official's decision to deny the application and that substantial evidence supports the Board's decision. The Court therefore affirmed the district court order. View "Hale v. City of Minot" on Justia Law

Calvin Anderson appealed a judgment affirming a Workforce Safety and Insurance ("WSI") decision approving a vocational rehabilitation plan. In January 2005, after slipping on an icy driveway and injuring his right shoulder and left hip while working as an inspector-tester for Finley Engineering, Anderson reported the injury to WSI. On January 28, 2005, WSI accepted liability for the right shoulder and left hip injury and paid benefits to Anderson. During the following three years, Anderson worked in similar positions with different companies. After his injury, and throughout 2010, Anderson sought medical and chiropractic care from numerous providers to address complications with his right shoulder, neck, and left hip. In April 2010, WSI issued a notice of its decision to deny further liability for Anderson's left hip injury on the grounds that the arthritis of which he complained had been present before he sustained the work injury in 2005. After finding no objective medical evidence indicating Anderson's hip condition was caused by his work injury, WSI issued its order denying liability for his hip condition. Anderson argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that WSI's selection of a vocational rehabilitation plan under N.D.C.C. ch. 65-05.1 was not physically appropriate because no reasoning mind, after a review of his medical conditions, could conclude he was capable of completing the work required in his vocational rehabilitation plan. Anderson argued WSI failed to properly consider his difficulties with driving when it formed his vocational rehabilitation plan. "A vocational rehabilitation plan is appropriate if it meets the statutory requirements and gives the injured worker a reasonable opportunity to obtain substantial gainful employment." After review of the record, the Supreme Court concluded a reasoning mind reasonably could have determined the vocational rehabilitation plan would return Anderson to substantial gainful employment that was reasonably attainable in light of his injury.The Court therefore affirmed the district court judgment. View "Anderson v. WSI" on Justia Law

Bridge Company appeals a district court judgment ordering it to donate a toll bridge to the cities of Fargo, North Dakota, and Moorhead, Minnesota, free and clear of all liens. In May 1986, the cities and the Company entered into an agreement for the purpose of construction and operation of a private toll bridge over the Red River connecting the cities. The bridge was completed and started operations on June 1, 1988. The bridge was originally financed with publicly-sponsored bonds issued by Moorhead and capital from an investment firm. In 2004, the cities agreed to allow the Company to refinance the indebtedness, but the refinancing was required to be completely amortized by June 1, 2013, which was 25 years from the commencement of the operation of the bridge. The bank refinancing the debt required personal guarantees from the Company's two shareholders. As of June 1, 2013, the Company owed approximately $75,000 on the refinanced loan. In early September 2013, the Company's two shareholders satisfied their personal guarantees for the debt, and as of September 6, 2013, none of the original indebtedness for construction of the bridge remained outstanding. During the 25-year time span, the Company's records reflected $108,761 was paid for maintenance and repair of the bridge. All of these bills were paid by the Company before February 6, 2014. However, taxes remained owing to Cass County, North Dakota, and Clay County, Minnesota, and the unpaid taxes constituted a lien on the bridge. The district court found that during the 25-year period between June 1, 1988, and June 1, 2013, the bridge was closed 249 days because of flooding on the Red River. Applying an Acts of God clause in the original agreement, the court ruled the 25-year period was extended 249 days to February 5, 2014, and because there was no qualifying debt in existence as of that date, the Company was required to donate the bridge to the cities free and clear of any liens. Because the district court did not err in interpreting the parties' agreement and the court's findings of fact were not clearly erroneous, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "City of Moorhead v. Bridge Co." on Justia Law

Thane and Nicole Dockter appealed a judgment affirming a Burleigh County Board of County Commissioners' decision to rezone a 311 acre tract of land in Menoken Township from agricultural to industrial use. In affirming the Commissioners' decision, the Supreme Court concluded the County Commissioners' decision did not constitute impermissible spot zoning, and the decision was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable and was supported by substantial evidence. View "Dockter v. Burleigh Cty. Bd. of Cty. Commn'rs" on Justia Law

A deputy sheriff pulled over Rebecca Havemeier's vehicle after observing her driving erratically in Dunn County. After failing field sobriety tests and registering a .286 alcohol concentration on an onsite screening test, Havemeier was placed under arrest for driving under the influence. During an hour-long transport to jail in Dickinson, Havemeier consented to take a chemical test with an Intoxilyzer. Havemeier argued the Department erred in revoking her driving privileges because she did not refuse to submit to the Intoxilyzer test and, even if she did refuse, she cured the refusal. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding that the Intoxilyzer test report was not "prima facie" evidence of a refusal, because the test was not performed in accordance with the approved method when the deputy did not give Havemeier three minutes to provide a sample and no expert testimony was introduced to explain the effect of the deviation. Furthermore, the deputy's testimony at the hearing did not establish an affirmative refusal by Havemeier to chemical testing. View "Havemeier v. N.D. Dep't of Transportation" on Justia Law

Teresa Schlittenhart appealed and the Department of Transportation cross-appealed a district court judgment that reversed a hearing officer's order suspending her driving privileges and remanding to the Department for a new hearing. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the hearing officer did not abuse her discretion in scheduling a hearing for a date on which both the arresting officer and Schlittenhart could be personally present or in allowing Schlittenhart's attorney to appear telephonically at the hearing. Furthermore, the Court concluded the hearing officer did not deny Schlittenhart due process by continuing with the hearing after Schlittenhart's attorney had disconnected from the telephone call during the hearing. The Court reversed the judgment and reinstated the Department's order suspending Schlittenhart's driving privileges for 91 days. View "Schlittenhart v. N.D. Dep't of Transportation" on Justia Law

Todd Rounkles appealed a district court's judgment affirming a North Dakota Department of Transportation hearing officer's decision suspending his driving privileges for ninety-one days for driving under the influence. On appeal, Rounkles argued the hearing officer erred in its decision to suspend his driving privileges because: (1) the breath tests were unconstitutional searches in violation of state and federal constitutions; (2) North Dakota's implied consent law violated the unconstitutional conditions doctrine; (3) without the results of the preliminary breath test, the deputy sheriff would not have had probable cause to arrest him; and (4) the Intoxilyzer breath test was not fairly administered. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Rounkles v. Levi" on Justia Law